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ASTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model for Vietnam’s
transition economy that is capable of analysing the impact of existing and prospective reform
measures on its macroeconomic adjustment and development.

xiv

The model enables the identification of ways in which reform policies have transmitted their
effects to the domestic economy, as well as enabling an exploration of the impact of external shocks
on the Vietnamese economy and the policy implications that flow from them. The macroeconomic
adjustment policies emphasised in this thesis consist of trade liberalisation, state-owned enterprise
privatisation, and expansionary fiscal policy. The findings obtained from this study are important in
the context of contemporary Vietnam, in terms of providing the basis for evaluating alternative policy
recommendations.
The model developed contains a number of key assumptions. The domestic economy produces
output that is consumed domestically and is an imperfect substitute for the imported good equivalent.
The price of these goods is domestically determined. The deterministic framework of the model,
combined with economic agents possessing rational expectations, is equivalent to the case of perfect
foresight. Financial markets are assumed to be in continual equilibrium, while non-financial markets
are subject to sticky price and quantity adjustment. The model developed focuses on the long run
nature of the dynamic adjustment process, because the reform measures focused upon will exert
important long run effects on the Vietnamese economy. This arises from allowing for physical capital
stock accumulation and from the requirement that the current account balance must be zero in
equilibrium.
A number of specific features are incorporated in the model that make it more applicable to the
Vietnamese case: (i) explicitly distinguishing the contributions of both SOEs and the private sector to
domestic aggregate supply in examining the impact of privatisation policy; (ii) incorporating trade
restrictions on either exports and imports in analysing the impact of external liberalisation on the
economy; (iii) explicitly distinguishing the composition of government expenditure (current and
capital) in analysing the impact of expansionary public investment spending on domestic private
investment capital as well as economic development in Vietnam; and (iv) distinguishing
macroeconomic outcomes from a fixed exchange rate with imperfect capital mobility system to that
from a flexible exchange rate with perfect capital mobility system.
Three types of policy reforms are simulated: (1) in carrying out privatisation it is assumed that 5
per cent of the capital stock of SOEs is given to the private sector; (2) the nominal exchange rate is
assumed to be devalued by 5 per cent; (3) and the tariff rate is assumed to be reduced by 5 per cent.
For each shock, with the assumption that the economy is operating in a fixed exchange rate system,
the simulation was carried out at different speeds, gradually and immediately. Two extreme reform
packages, in which privatisation, tariff reform, and devaluation are undertaken at the same time,

xv

designed to illustrate the more complex cases of gradualism and shock therapy approaches, are also
considered. In addition, these shocks are considered in an alternative model, in which a flexible
exchange rate with perfect capital mobility is assumed. The impact of changes in government capital
expenditure, combined with these reform policies, on the Vietnamese economy, are then explicitly
analysed.
The simulation results suggest that different reform policies can have different effects upon the
Vietnamese economy. The main findings from the simulation results for the single policy (exchange
rate devaluation, tariff reduction, and privatisation) indicate that, under the fixed exchange rate and
imperfect capital mobility system, for the short run period, the government should adopt the “Big
Bang” approach because this has positive impacts upon Vietnamese economic development. For the
medium and long run periods this approach would still be advisable for the case of an exchange rate
devaluation, because by adopting this approach the deterioration of the private capital stock,
aggregate supply, and international competitiveness could be minimised. However, there is no
difference in the impact upon Vietnamese economic development irrespective of whether the
application of the tariff reduction and SOE privatisation is up-front or partial. When these three
policies are conducted at the same time, the “Big Bang” approach is still the “best” approach for the
macroeconomic variables except for foreign asset stocks, which can have a benefit only from the
reform package if it is done gradually over a specific period of time.
For the complete reform policy package, when comparing the alternative versions of the model,
under a floating exchange rate and liberalised capital controls, the gradual approach is somewhat
better than the “Big Bang” approach in regard to the increase of domestic production, private
investment and international competitiveness over the short and medium run periods. The major
conclusion obtained from the comparison between the two versions of the model is that the reform
package, when introduced gradually in the flexible exchange rate system with deregulated financial
markets, can produce better macroeconomic outcomes for Vietnam. This conclusion is also supported
from a simulation involving a temporary increase in public capital spending combined with a reform
package.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview and issues to be addressed
In the late 1980s and early 1990s one of the most important features of the global
economy was the economic transformation in former centrally planned economies in
Europe and Asia to a market economy. Altogether over 30 countries with a population
about one-third of all mankind, were involved in these dramatic changes. The implications
were vital not only for these nations, but also for the entire world.
An indispensable part of the transition to a market system was the opening up of
former socialist countries and their integration into the global economy. Transition is a
process involving a fundamental shift leading from the centrally planned economy based on
the dominance of state ownership toward a free market, with the private sector in the key
role. Thus, the transition entails the introduction of entirely new institutional arrangements.
A market economy requires not only liberal regulation and private ownership, but also
adequate institutions. This is a process of replacing an old system with a new one. It is not
simply another attempt to refurbish the old system by tinkering with the way it performs.
For this reason transition is a lengthy process comprised of various spheres of economic
activities.
In a broad sense, transition implies: (i) liberalising economic activity, prices, and
market operations, along with reallocating resources to their most efficient use; (ii)
developing indirect, market-oriented instruments for macroeconomic stabilisation;
achieving effective enterprise management and economic efficiency, usually through
privatisation; (iii) imposing hard budget constraints, which provides incentives to improve
efficiency; and (iv) establishing an institutional and legal framework to secure property
rights, the rule of law, and transparent market-entry regulations (Havrylyshyn and Wolf,
1999). While there was never much doubt about what had to be done, one of the big
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disputes about the transition to a market economy concerned how fast it could, or should,
be undertaken, and in what order various reform measures should be carried out. Although
the discussion has been wide-ranging the consensus focuses on two approaches, namely the
“Big Bang” or “shock therapy” and “Gradualism” approaches.
The case for “Big Bang” is made on the basis of four main arguments. First, a rapid
reform process increases the incentives to relocate resources, resulting in a more rapid
relocation of resources and, therefore, lower adjustment costs than if the relocation was
prolonged. Second, a fast reform process affords better coordination in the implementation
of the reform. Third, speed helps establish credibility in the reform process leading the
foreign investors to increase investment and the private sector to relocate resources rapidly
and also increase investment. Fourth, a rapid introduction of reforms can overcome the
political resistance to prolonged reforms, leading to an effective implementation of the
reform package (Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2001).
The case of gradualism is also made on the grounds of four arguments. First, a fixed
cost of adjustment is spread over a longer period of time, thereby reducing its short-run cost
(Nuti and Portes, 1993). Thus, there is likely to be more political support for a phased
approach. Second, it takes time to build a new world since it is impossible to enact all
measures in a short period of time (Murrell, 1990). Third, to the extent that the use of
certain instruments can be incompatible with certain targets, a phased approach to reforms
is needed. Finally, it is impossible to introduce many reforms at once (Gelb and Fischer,
1991).
Although debate about the speed of reforms are currently much less acute than
before, the theoretical, as well as empirical, work on the subject have not established the
superiority of one course of reform over another. There are cases where fast (Eastern
European countries or Vietnam in the beginning of the transition period) and gradual
(China) reformers have succeeded and where they have failed (former Soviet Union
countries). In general, the discussion in the literature has been fragmented in that it has
taken a sectoral rather than a comprehensive look at the reform packages. In addition, there
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has been little analysis of the underlying analytical models which can be used to explain the
superiority of one course of each reform policy over another, or the reform packages as a
whole, particularly in terms of the experience of the East Asian transition economies. To
some extent this is due to a number of methodological limitations which are as follows.
Firstly, no single theoretical model is applicable over the entire transition process, as
the transition economies will change from one form (centrally planned economy) to another
(market economy) over the period. With no single applicable theoretical form, equation
specification is highly problematic. Thus simulation and policy analysis would then seem
to be very difficult.
Second, the data that reflect the transition period set in place to date are not of a
sufficient duration, and therefore will not yield enough observations to justify an
estimation-based model. Generating the direction for gathering the needed data in the most
efficient and useful manner is often used to overcome this limitation. Consequently,
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which are static in nature but use the least
data-intensive technique, have been widely applied.
Finally, given the complexity and dynamism of the transition process, there is an
urgent need to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model that can be used for simulation
purposes to show whether the reform policies, in individual or in package, lead to improved
macroeconomic development. Although there has not been any model in this style applied
to a transition economy, based on some existing theoretical models contributed by Mundell
and Fleming (1961), and Dornbusch (1976) among others, one can develop a model for this
purpose with the necessary amendments and with the features of a transition economy.
The aforementioned deficiencies are especially reinforced in the case of Vietnam.
The Vietnamese economy is distinguished by being an undeveloped economy when it
started the transition process, and having the objective of building a market economy with a
“socialist orientation”. The country has embarked upon transition since the mid-1980s,
when it found itself facing an economic crisis resulting from the gradual approach to
socialist transformation. In the first period of transition to a market-oriented economy
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1986-1988 the reforms can be characterised as being based on a gradual approach.
Production in agriculture and by industrial state enterprises increased, but the co-existence
of the plan system and the free market led to unmanageable problems, which were reflected
in hyper-inflationary conditions by the end of 1988.
The subsequent round of economic reforms in 1989 carried many of the
characteristics of the “Big Bang” approach. Prices were completely liberalised, the
exchange rate was liberalised and devalued, barriers to external trade were removed, the
real interest rate was sharply increased and state enterprises could no longer count on
subsidies from the government budget. The impact of these measures was a slowdown of
economic growth in the subsequent years, but it was only temporary. By 1992 the growth
rate settled at about eight per cent and remained there for another five years. However, the
Asian financial crisis of mid-1997 contributed to a slowing down of economic reforms in
Vietnam. To avoid an adverse impact of the crisis on the economy the government adopted
a more cautious economic stance, giving priority to ensuring macroeconomic stability
rather than taking risks in order to achieve higher growth. Therefore, it could be suggested
that the period after 1997 has been characterised by a slow gradual approach.
Consequently, economic growth has slowed down, the competitiveness of Vietnamese
goods was weakened due to a relative appreciation of the Vietnamese currency compared
with other currencies in the East Asian region, state enterprises and banks were performing
poorly, and public services and fiscal balances were under pressure. However, the
contribution by economists, in and outside the country, to the analysis of the impact of the
reform policies, in particular their speeds and sequencing, on macroeconomic performance
in order to provide a basis for policy recommendations for Vietnam is still limited.
In summary, the study of the modelling of macroeconomic adjustment policies in
transition economies is undoubtedly of practical and theoretical importance. However, this
subject area is characterised by a number of important knowledge gaps concerning essential
issues, including model-specification to capture the essential features of a transition
economy, and appropriate estimation methodologies. This study attempts to reduce these
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gaps by developing an analytical framework to study the macroeconomic adjustment
policies, and their implications, for Vietnam’s economic transition.

1.2 Objectives and scope of the thesis
The study has the following general and specific objectives.
A. General
1.

To study the literature on transition economies with the objective of

identifying the key issues involved in the process of transition from a planned to market
economy, in terms of both the policies required and the conditions for choosing such
policies and, more controversially, the speed and sequencing of such policies.
2.

To present the recent growth profile of the Vietnamese economy, its

different phases of development, and the macroeconomic adjustment policies implemented
during the transition period since 1986. The theoretical and empirical basis upon which
Vietnam’s reforms relating to internal and external liberalisation, and privatisation and
restructuring of state-owned enterprises is based will be scrutinised.
3.

To analyse the theoretical framework of the current state of the art of

macroeconomic models in transition economies, and to discuss the nature of the empirical
work on macroeconomic modelling that has been so far in the context of Vietnam. These
works are undertaken in order to identify the gaps so as to build a dynamic macroeconomic
model that take note of the Vietnamese current economic reforms and provide a basis for
policy recommendations for the Vietnamese government.
B. Specific
1.

To identify the dynamic macroeconomic adjustment process arising from

two policies, devaluation of the exchange rate and tariff reduction. At one extreme, there is
an up-front devaluation and tariff reduction, and at the other these policies are introduced
gradually through several discrete steps.
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2.

To explore the effect of the policy of privatisation or restructuring of state-

owned enterprises, introduced gradually or immediately, on some key macroeconomic
indicators.
3.

To investigate the impact of variations of public investment spending on

private investment as well as on macroeconomic development.
4.

To conduct a comparison between the adjustment path for the economy

under two exchange rate regimes, fixed and flexible, where the reform package is
implemented immediately and that where it is implemented gradually.
Specifically, the study poses and seeks answers to the following key research
questions: (i) what are the key elements of reform required during the transition process,
how fast can, or should, these reform policies be undertaken, and what order should various
reform measures be carried out. In particular these questions are examined to distinguish
the experiences between the transition economies in Europe and Asia; (ii) what were the
main reform policies and how were they applied in each period of Vietnam’s transition
process, and how have these policies affected the development of the Vietnamese
economy; (iii) whether the models or frameworks that have been used for analysing the
macroeconomic adjustment changes in the transition economies, particularly in Vietnam,
can satisfy the study’s above-mentioned objectives. If not, what existing theoretical models
can provide the basis and how do they need to be modified, in order to suit the
characteristics of the Vietnamese economy; and (iv) what are the most appropriate policy
responses to the internal and external shocks facing Vietnam.

1.3 Study methodology
1.3.1

Data sources
The statistical data used in empirically estimating the model developed in Chapter 5

have been obtained from a number of different sources. Statistics on GDP, private and state
consumption, total investment, capital stock, total exports and imports were collected from
the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam and the annual reports of the World Bank
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and United Nations Development Programs (UNDP), various issues. Financial figures,
monetary aggregates and the general price level were obtained from various reports
produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). International figures including world
real income, proxied by real GDP in billions of US dollars, for the ten major trading
partners with Vietnam, the world price level and world nominal interest rate were taken
from International Financial Statistics (IFS). These data are limited to annual data for the
sample period 1986-2001.
In addition, in order to examine the long run dynamic macroeconomic adjustment
process in response to external and policy shocks in Vietnam, the coefficient parameter
values were derived from both the estimation of the developed model in Chapter 6 and
Harvie and Lee (HL) (1996) and Harvie and Kearney (HK) (1996) models for use in the
simulation analysis.
1.3.2

Method of study
This study will primarily be a modelling exercise. A dynamic macroeconomic model

for Vietnam, which is based on three general theoretical foundations contributed by
Mundell-Fleming (1963), Dornbush (1976) and Branson (1977, 1984), and two specific
models of Harvie-Lee (1996) and Harvie-Kearney (1996), will be developed and presented
in Chapter 5. These basic models enable an analysis of the dynamic adjustment process
from an initial equilibrium towards a new equilibrium, arising from external shocks to the
economy.
In the HL and HK models, and also in this study, a deterministic framework is
adopted. The deterministic model used here is analysed under the assumptions of rational
expectations and this is equivalent to the case of perfect foresight. It is assumed that
financial markets are in continual equilibrium while non-financial markets are subject to
sticky price and quantity adjustment. Such stickiness of adjustment of non-financial
markets can cause economic variables to overshoot or undershoot their equilibrium values,
and produce different adjustment processes. The analysis will emphasise the long run
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nature of the adjustment process, since the external shocks and policy changes will have a
long run impact on the economy, by inclusion of capital stock accumulation/decumulation
in the product market and foreign asset stock accumulation/decumulation arising from
developments in the current account.
However, a number of significant amendments are required to make this framework
more applicable to the specific features of Vietnam as a transition economy. The model
will focus on four types of policy reforms currently applied: exchange rate policy, external
sector liberalisation, state enterprise reform, and expansionary fiscal policy, which have not
been considered before for Vietnam in the context of the theoretical and empirical
frameworks adopted. First, the model explicitly distinguishes the contributions of both
SOEs and the private sector to domestic aggregate supply. This is conducted to examine the
impact of the privatisation policy. It is assumed that the private sector is more efficient than
the public sector so privatisation of SOE capital stocks means that the capital of SOEs is
simply given to the private sector, and as a result the private capital stock and private
wealth will increase. Second, trade restrictions on either exports and imports are
incorporated in the model. Relaxing trade restrictions through tariff reduction has a direct
effect upon exports and imports, which are major contributions to an increase in aggregate
demand. Third, it is extended to distinguish the role between public investment spending
and public consumption spending upon the adjustment process. Public investment may
contribute to the level of aggregate supply. An increase in public investment spending, in
particular on infrastructure projects in Vietnam, may lead to favourable developments for
the Vietnamese economy. Fourth, a fixed exchange rate and imperfect capital mobility are
assumed. This is because asset markets in Vietnam are not well developed as in most other
transition economies, and therefore domestic and foreign financial assets are not perfect
substitutes. Fifth, the analysis focuses on adjustment under both a fixed exchange rate with
imperfect capital mobility system and a flexible exchange rate with perfect capital mobility
system, which is relevant to Vietnam when it integrates into the world market. Finally, the
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importance of income, wealth and the current account for the dynamic adjustment process
is emphasised.
1.3.3

Estimation of the model
The model is estimated using three packages, TSP (versions 4.4 and 4.5), Microfit 4

and Shazam (version 9). The data utilised for the estimation are yearly data from 1986 to
2001. A simple method - Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is first utilised for the
estimation of the behavioural equations. However, using this simple approach, which often
ignores the non-stationary properties of the time series data, may cause misleading
statistical and therefore economic inferences. It is therefore necessary to ensure whether the
time series are stationary before proceeding to econometric estimation.
Two methods are applied to examine the time series properties of the variables. From
an informal examination by graphing the data it might be concluded that the variables
under consideration are well characterised as non-stationary in the levels and first
difference, but stationary in the second difference, which means that the variables are
integrated of order I (2) . The formal augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is applied to test
for the presence of unit roots. However, the conclusion of the order of the variables, I (1) or
I (2) , from this test are inconclusive because the critical values for unit root tests tabulated

by Fuller (1976) or Dickey and Fuller (1981) have a sample size of at least 50, whilst the
sample size of data used in this study has only 16 observations. The critical values for
smaller sample sizes are not presently available.
With the assumption that the variables of interest are integrated in the same order of
I (1) , two simple methods, Engle-Granger (EG) or Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test

and the cointegrating regression Durbin Watson (CRWD) test provided by Sargan
Bhargava (1983), are applied to detect for the existence of long run relationships between
the variables involved. Where evidence of a long run relationship is found, the error
correction model (Granger, (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987)) is estimated by OLS,
incorporating the short run dynamics of the system with the information from the long run
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cointegration relationship. However, these procedures are not applied when it is assumed
that the variables are integrated of order I (2) due to the limitation of small sample size.
This study also applies the bootstrap method, initiated by Efron (1979), for correcting
the problem of small sample size in estimating the behavioural equations of the developed
model. The bootstrap method in OLS regressions is conducted first to examine how good
the OLS coefficient values previously estimated are, and whether they are biased. Then it is
applied to check the accuracy of the tests of unit roots estimated previously. Although
having been affected by a serious “degrees of freedom” problem, the results obtained from
these various approaches indicate that OLS regression based on the levels of the logarithm
variables can give reliable coefficients in terms of their magnitudes. Therefore, it can be
useful in providing a range of possible parameter values to be used in the simulation
analysis conducted in Chapter 7.
1.3.4

Simulation of the model
The parameters, both estimated and imposed, are then used to conduct a simulation

analysis to examine what policy options should be used in response to external shocks. Due
to the complexity of the model developed, it is not possible to derive analytically
unambiguous results for the steady state properties of the model. Thus, an analysis of the
steady state and dynamic properties of the model is conducted by numerical simulation or
calibration. The program utilised to derive these results is called “Saddlepoint”, which is
designed for solving linear rational expectations models with constant coefficients. It is a
continuous time analogue of the first order linear difference model with rational
expectations of the type studied in Blanchard and Khan (1980).
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1.4 Organisation of the study
The chapter scheme is organised in accordance with the following order:
Chapter 2 – Literature Review of Transition Economies provides a critical overview
of recent literature concerning transition economies. The main focus is placed upon the
causes of collapse of the centrally planned economies by the end of the 1980s, identifying
the key reform policies required in the process of transition from planned to market
economies, their sequencing and speeds. This chapter also considers the achievements of
the transforming countries after a decade of economic reform, and analyses the wide
differences of economic performance among transition economies in Europe and Asia.
Chapter3 – The Economy of Vietnam presents an overview of Vietnam’s
development performance since its reunification in 1976. Particular attention is given to the
period of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy (1986-present).
This chapter highlights the analytical framework underlying the current economic changes
and provides a critical assessment of the transition process. An analysis of the performance
of macroeconomic policies has been done by looking at various macroeconomic indicators.
This chapter also identifies the major macroeconomic problems currently facing the
Vietnamese economy.
Chapter 4 – Economic Transition and Macroeconomic Adjustment: Theories and
Empirical Evidence covers a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical models
developed for transition economies and Vietnam in particular. A macroeconometric model,
computable general equilibrium and multi-sectoral models constructed for the Vietnamese
economy are examined in order to identify gaps in knowledge that can be covered by this
study.
Chapter 5 – Modelling Macroeconomic Adjustment in Vietnam’s Transition Economy
aims to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model for Vietnam based on the contributions
of three existing models, namely, Mundell-Fleming (1963), Dornbusch (1976) and Branson
(1977, 1984), and most importantly that of Harvie-Lee (1996) and Harvie-Kearney (1996).
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The focus of this chapter is also to provide a critical appraisal of the existing policy-based
theoretical models, which can provide the basic building blocks for a dynamic
macroeconomic model developed for Vietnam. A number of amendments to these
theoretical models also are discussed in order to make them more applicable to Vietnam.
Chapter 6 – Empirical Estimation of the Model presents the empirical estimations
derived from the model developed in Chapter 5. The data sources and the econometric
methods used to estimate the model are described.
Chapter 7 – Simulation Analysis and Policy Implications investigates the effects of
alternative paths for the Vietnamese economy corresponding to different assumptions
regarding policy changes and reforms. Although there are many other reforms that can be
examined, this study concerns four types of policy reforms: exchange rate policy, external
sector liberalisation, state enterprise reform, and public investment spending policy. A
comparison between the two exchange rate regimes, fixed and flexible, in which the reform
package is implemented immediately (“Big Bang” case) and gradually (“Gradualism” case)
is also conducted in this chapter, in order to provide a basis for policy recommendations for
Vietnam.
Chapter 8 – Summary and Conclusions brings together the major findings of the
study and brings out policy implications to be followed by Vietnam. A number of
limitations of the study are indicated along with suggestions regarding areas of further
research.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW OF TRANSITION ECONOMIES
2.1 Introduction
The dramatic collapse of the East European Socialist Bloc and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, at the outset of the 1990s, set in motion for all the formerly centrally
planned economies (CPEs) an economic transition towards market-oriented economies.
The new term of “transition or transformation economy” has emerged since then and is
used to describe economies where production and allocation of all resources were once
controlled by state planning, but which are moving to decentralized production decision
making and market allocation of resources underpinned by widespread private ownership
(World Development Report, 1996). Such a transition has involved 31 countries in Europe
and Asia containing one-third of the world’s population 1. As this transition has involved
many countries, and has very few precedent theories 2, there was a sharp increase in the
macroeconomic study of transition economies by many economists. A considerable amount
of theoretical literature exists, accompanied by substantial empirical investigations, on
transitional economies, subsequently focusing upon economic models of transition,
sequencing of reform, with emphasis on key ingredients for its success. This has involved a
general as well as country specific analysis.

1

Transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union
Central European Economies (CEE)
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Baltics Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Transition economies in Asia
Cambodia, China, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Vietnam.
2

The closest would have been Chile from 1973 with the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende
government.
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The main purpose of this chapter is to overview a range of issues related to the
transition economies, touching on key problems of sequencing and speed of reform
policies, which provides the theoretical base for a model developed and simulated in later
chapters of this thesis for the case of Vietnam. In fact, the issues of economic transition,
including the elements of reforms, sequencing of reforms, and speed of reforms (“Big
Bang” versus gradualism), are the leit-motif of this chapter. The structure of the chapter
reflects this perspective by including analyses of the ingredients of required
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, the development and reform of key markets as well
as the structural adjustment policies. However, before going to the main issues of economic
transition, Section 2 will review the causes of collapse of the centrally planned economies.
This may be explained as a combination of accident and necessity; of domestic and external
causes; of economic and political determinants; as influenced by the West or as due to
developments within the socialist system. Understanding the causes of their collapse may
help to discern the directions of the transition process and its difficulties.
Section 3 identifies the key issues involved in the process of transition from planned
to market economies, not only in terms of the policies required but also the conditions for
choosing such policies and, more controversially, the sequencing of such policies.
Transition will involve a fundamental change of institutions and imply profound social
implications. The success of the transition process will depend on the initial economic,
social and political situations, and how the government conducts the reform programs.
Section 4 considers the achievements of the transforming countries after a decade of
economic reform. However the experiences and successes vary from one country to
another, and depend on many factors such as their initial economic conditions, exogenous
economic shocks, reform policies, and speed of reforms. This section also briefly analyses
the wide differences of economic performance among transition economies in Europe and
Asia. It is argued that, in Europe, the best performers are countries that were the most
committed to reform at the start and that have carried out reforms rapidly and consistently.
However, the story is different in the Asian transition economies where the application of
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reform in a partial and phased manner resulted in rapid growth, although this has been
volatile in both China and Vietnam.
Finally section 5 presents a summary of the major conclusions derived from this
chapter.

2.2 Collapse of Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs)
The period from 1917 to the early 1950s witnessed a number of countries, containing
one-third of the world’s population, reject the market as a mechanism for allocation of
resources and determination of production, and instead embrace the so-called Soviet model
of central planning. The main features of this model were: material balance planning for
allocating resources; collectivised agriculture; price, wage, interest rate and exchange rate
control; emphasis on heavy industry dominated by large state owned enterprises (SOEs)
with little priority given to the production of consumer goods; foreign trade control through
state trading monopolies; emphasis on economic autarky; and discrimination against the
private sector (Harvie, 1998b). While the achievements of the Soviet model were
considerable, including: increased output, the attainment of industrialisation, the provision
of basic education, housing, jobs for the entire working population, an ability to avoid
severe cyclical downturns, a relatively equal income distribution, and welfare system which
ensured access to basic goods and services, it was subject to economic and social instability
and intrinsic inefficiency, which were a commonly held belief of the collapse of the CPEs.
However, understanding and analysing clearly the causes of the collapse may help to
discern the directions of the transition process and its difficulties, and also to explain why
non-European countries show a different pattern.
As Brus and Laski (1989), Kornai (1992), Lavigne (1995), among others, pointed out
the idea of economic rationality that underpinned communism, or socialism, failed over
time rather than all at once. A number of following problems were apparent, however, and
usually mentioned:
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•

Economic growth was declining most noticeably during the 1980s, and
particularly the second half of the 1980s (see Table 2.1), and always
characterised by the prevalence of shortage.

•

The productivity of labour and capital was low (see Table 2.2); output per
worker was decelerating over time, and output per unit of fixed assets
dramatically declined, especially after the mid-1970s.

•

Contrary to initial expectations, the socialist system was never conducive to
technical development and innovations, except the sectors which were given a
high priority such as military and space activity, especially in the former
Soviet Union.

•

Poor incentives resulted in not only unsatisfactory efficiency but also low and
deteriorating quality.

•

Environmental devastation was extraordinary over time.

Table 2-1: Growth Rates in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1950-1990
(annual change of National Material Products, in per cent)
Bulgaria

CzechoGDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
slovakia
1951-55
12.2
8.1
13.2
5.7
8.6
14.2
11.3
1956-60
9.6
7.0
7.4
6.0
6.6
6.6
9.2
1961-65
6.6
1.9
3.5
4.5
6.2
9.1
5.7
1966-70
8.7
6.9
5.0
6.7
5.9
7.7
7.1
1971-75
7.9
5.7
5.4
6.3
9.7
11.3
5.1
1976-80
6.1
3.7
4.1
2.8
1.2
7.2
3.7
1981-85
3.7
1.8
4.5
1.4
-0.8
4.4
3.2
1986-90
-0.5
1.0
-1.8
-0.5
-0.5
-3.5
1.3
Sources: Table 4.4 Lavigne (1995) - Statistical Yearbook of the CMEA, editions of 1971 and 1986; ECE/UN,
Economic Survey of Europe in 1990-91.
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Table 2-2: Extensive Growth in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (1981-1985)
(average annual percentage change)
Labour productivity
1981-85
1986-89
Bulgaria
3.5
4.0
Czechoslovakia
1.1
2.1
East Germany
4.3
3.5
Hungary
2.1
2.9a
Poland
-0.1
4.5
Rumania
4.2
4.5 a
Soviet Union
2.7
3.3
Source: Table 1.5 Rider and Knell (1992) p. 18.
a
1986-88, b 1986-87

Capital productivity
1981-85
1986-89
-2.9
-2.2
-3.6
-2.1
0.2
-1.3
-2.2
-0.8b
-3.4
1.2
-4.2
-1.2b
-3.1
-2.3

Although the command economy had facilitated industrialisation and urbanisation, it
lacked an ability to proceed with modernisation. By its very nature, the centrally managed
economy favoured large-scale heavy industry with enormous steelworks as its ideal
enterprises (Åslund, 1992). It lacked an ability to undertake the transition to small-scale,
high-technology and service enterprises. The economic structure stagnated completely after
industrialisation, and the socialist economies were unable to substitute capital for labour:
thus, while capital was growing, the labour force per unit of capital was not declining, and
hence the rate of return to new investment declined to a level of near zero by the mid-1970s
(Easterly and Fisher, 1994). In addition, defence and heavy industry tended to carry the
greatest political weight, leaving a smaller share of total resources to health, education, and
infrastructure.
In response to the situations of declining economic growth and living standard as
seen in the whole socialist system, in the 1960s some governments of Eastern European
countries attempted to move towards economic decentralisation with the aims of improving
the effectiveness of planning and trying new planning techniques. Differences between
countries appeared in methods and results. The Soviet Union and East Germany, for
example, introduced only limited reforms, which were aimed at strengthening the
functioning of centralised management. At the other extreme, Hungary, and until the late
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1960s, Czechoslovakia 3, adopted further decentralisation. Their aim was to allow some
market mechanisms to regulate enterprises within established limits – effectively allowing
profits or losses to replace compulsory quantitative targets – shifting emphasis from microlevel decision-making to macro –level targets, policy and direction. Although more radical
attempts at reform were attempted in the 1980s, as Table 2.2 shows, the economic growth
path in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union continued to follow an extensive growth path,
with little gains in labour productivity and negative growth in capital productivity.
Moreover, unfinished construction as a share of construction investment rose in the Soviet
Union from 112 per cent in 1970 to 169 per cent in 1985, indicating that chronic shortages
remained prevalent (United Nations, 1990). Similarly, investment cycles could also be
observed in Eastern Europe. From this “it becomes immediately apparent that it is the
institutional framework which lies behind the crisis in centrally planned economies”, and
“overcentralisation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was perhaps the most
important factor which led to the collapse of these countries” (Knell and Rider, 1992,
p.18).
The collapse of the Soviet centralised planning model led the governments of
socialist countries in Europe to reject central planning, and thereafter, each independently
embarked on a transition process towards decentralised market driven economies based
upon predominant private ownership. A catalyst for the post 1989 economic reforms in
these economies was their political reform toward multi-party democracy during this
period, for example Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc. (Harvie, 1998b).
In the context of the planned developing economies of East Asia, China and Vietnam,
their adoption of the Soviet economic model of central planning, collectivised agriculture
and state ownership occurred in distinct phases. China adopted this model after the
declaration of the People’s Republic in 1949. The general adoption of the Soviet economic
model happened in Vietnam after the reunification of the country in 1975. However, the
relevance of the system as a model for economic development had already been questioned.
3

This country has been divided into two countries Czech Republic and Slovakia Republic since 1993.

Chapter 2 – Literature review of transition economies

19

______________________________________________________________________

This occurred in China during the period of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and again
during the ten-year Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The first steps
away from central planning were taken by China in 1978-9, with agricultural reform and
the adoption of an open door policy. Allowing farmers to retain the benefits of increased
output had a major impact in an economy that was still overwhelmingly rural and higher
rural incomes created a large constituency in favour of reform. Liberalising foreign trade
and permitting foreign investment, which was first applied in four special economic zones
in the coastal regions, had a more gradual, but still substantial, impact on what had become
a closed economy. Similarly, in Vietnam, the implementation of central planning went into
decline from the mid 1980s during which its already heavily dependent and moribund
economy experienced further macroeconomic crisis and a deteriorating performance.
Economic reform began in Vietnam in late 1986 and started also from the agricultural
sector. Collectivised farming was replaced by a mixture of arrangements with the general
characteristic of greater household responsibility for agricultural production decisions. The
economy was opened up to foreign investment and international trade. During 1988 and
1989 the abolition of central planning was accelerated and most price controls were
removed. Macroeconomic stability measures and removal of exchange controls supported
the reform process. These reform policies will be presented and analysed in detail in the
next chapter.

2.3 Economic Transition
As aforementioned the countries referred to as “transition economies” comprise 31
countries in Europe and Asia, including all former members of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) (excluding Cuba) and a number of additional countries in
East Asia and the Balkans region comprising close to 30 per cent of the world’s population.
The most common classification partitions the transition countries into four groups as
represented in Table 2.3: the EU accession countries (which include the Baltic countries);
the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the East Asian transition
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economies; and the other countries in southeastern Europe (excluding the EU accession
countries located in the Balkan region) (World Economic Outlook, IMF 2000).
The defining characteristic of the transition countries is their decision to abandon
central planning as the principal mode of organising their economies, and to move to
market oriented economies with significant private ownership of the means of production.
In most of these countries the “transition” coincided with major political transformation,
and some, but not all, observers include the shift from a one party autocratic system to a
multiparty democracy in their definition of “transition”. In China, and Vietnam, however,
the political system has not been modified significantly during the transition process
(World Economic Outlook, IMF 2000). In addition to these political differences, transition
economies display an enormous diversity in terms of physical and population size, level of
economic development in particular, natural resource endowment, and cultural and
historical background. With the objectives of raising economic efficiency, promoting
economic growth, and improving economic wellbeing it is obvious that the common core
elements of the transition process including macrostabilisation, price and market
liberalisation (including international trade), restructuring and privatising state enterprises,
and re-defining the role of the state, are required to be applied in these transition
economies. Nevertheless, the extent of the policies implemented and their sequencing or
speed should depend not only on the country’s initial conditions, but also on its external
environment and economic strategy. With regard to all these factors, the remainder of this
section proceeds to overview the following issues: key elements of reform required during
the transition process, the sequencing and speed of reform, “Big Bang” vs. “Gradualism”.
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Table 2-3: Transition Economies: Alternative Geographic, Political, and Reform-Effort Groupings1
(bold script: radical reformers; italic script: intermediate reformers; normal script: slow reformers)
EUROPEAN TRANSITION COUNTRIES

ASIAN TRANSITION COUNTRIES

Memorandum:

Members of the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (CMEA; ceased to exist in 1991)
Associated members

Full members

Former Fed. Of Yugoslavia

Ex-Czechoslovakia

Other Southeast. Europe

EU Accession Countries

Southeastern Europe (Balkans countries)
Albania

2

Yugoslavia
Bosnia/Herz.
Croatia
Macedonia

Former Soviet Union

Slovenia

Romania
Bulgaria

1

Visegrad countries
Hungary
Poland

Czech
Republic
Slovak
Republic

Commonwealth of Independent States
Baltic countries
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania

Europe

Caucasus

Central Asia

Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

Other Asia
Mongolia
Vietnam

Cambodia
China
Lao PDR

Centrally
planned
economies not
having
embarked on
reform
Cuba3
North Korea

The reform-effort classification takes as its criterion the average level of the EBRD transition indicator in 1999, choosing the following thresholds: radical
reformers (in bold letter) with an indicator above 3; intermediate reformers (in italics) with an indicator between 2 and 3; slow reformers (normal script) with an
indicator below 2.
2
CMEA membership became inoperative in 1961.
3
Member of CMEA from 1972 to 1991.
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 2000
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2.3.1

Elements of reform
An interesting fact about reform in transition economies is the broad agreement

among economists about what needs to be done. Broadly, the elements of reform can be
grouped into four categories: macroeconomic stabilisation; price and market reform (the
latter emphasising trade reform, labour market reform and financial sector reform);
restructuring the role of the state with emphasis on market supportive measures including
legal reform, institutional reform; and building the provision of a social safety net.
Macroeconomic stabilisation is a vital ingredient in transition from a planned to a
market economy, especially for countries with large internal and external economic
imbalances. This involves the use of government fiscal and monetary policies to achieve
external and internal macroeconomic stabilisation. Following the recent experiences of
some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, as well as stabilisation in market
economies with large public sectors and problems of monetary overhang from years of
financing deficits by printing money, it is clear that tightening fiscal and credit policies can
reduce inflation and the current account not only in transition but also in market economies.
However, as Fischer and Gelb (1991) argued, there are some differences, which reflect the
different microeconomic incentive structures in the two systems. As firms in transition
economies were traditionally subsidised by the government and not subject to bankruptcy
laws, ‘stabilisation policies cannot rely on the same response as those in a market
economy’. For these countries the focus of stabilisation policies may emphasise addressing
several prevailing problems. The first problem is the very nature of the socialist economy
with its soft budget constraints 4. In the classical socialist system, state enterprise directors
are not concerned about their profits and sometimes are not even aware of them. To solve

4

Soft budget constraints, which was first identified by Janos Kornai (1982), happen in the state-owned
firms where the managers believe that if they run at a loss, or make smaller profits than they have been
instructed to, the state will meet the firm’s losses, and not sack them. This is contrasted with a hard budget
constraint, where the results of failure to break even, or to achieve required levels of profits, are expected
to be catastrophic: for example, closure of the enterprise or dismissal of the management.
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this problem the imposition of a hard budget constraint, including the elimination of
subsidies that offset the losses of firms, public sector wage controls, and credit ceilings
administered by the governments and central banks, is needed. The second problem is the
monetary overhang, which is defined as the amount of income consumers have kept on
hand because there has been nothing to buy with it. It is argued that there are several broad
options to deal with this problem such as currency reform; inflation; raising interest rates;
and the sale of state property to the public. The last problem is dealing with external
imbalance and exchange rates. Changes in exchange rates and exposure to world markets
are the suggestions for economic stabilisation in transition countries. It is argued that the
initial exchange rate in transition economies should imply a big undervaluation of the
currency (Åslund, 1992). There are two reasons for this argument. First, a sizable initial
inflation was inevitable because of the monetary overhang, repressed inflation, the soft
budget constraints of enterprises, and the necessary adjustment of relative prices. Second, it
was vital to activate exports and balance foreign trade, for which a low exchange rate is of
crucial importance.
In market economies liberalisation usually means eliminating price controls and
relaxing trade protection in some protected sectors. However, the extent of liberalisation in
transition economies is much broader, it includes: abolishing state orders and procurement,
state production and trading monopolies, and centralised allocation of foreign exchange.
Liberalisation also means freeing entry into production, services, and trade, including the
freedom to open a new business, to expand or break up an existing business, and to change
product mix, suppliers, customers, or geographical base (World Development Report,
1996).
Privatisation and enterprise restructuring in transition countries has turned into a key
issue since the outset of the 1990s. The main contents of privatisation of SOEs would be
the establishment of private property rights for the agricultural and industrial sectors, the
breaking up of state monopolies, and the closing of non-profitable firms. In reality, these
issues had emerged one decade before in the West and in the Third World, but it is
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questionable whether transition countries can learn and apply the experiences from these
countries. Nevertheless, Åslund (1992) identified two differences as to why transition
countries cannot follow the privatisation programs applied in those countries. The first is a
difference of scale. While Western privatisation involved tens of enterprises over several
years, in transition economies each country needs to privatise thousands of state enterprises.
Second, ‘the privatisations in the West – and even in developing countries – have occurred
in market economies with a multitude of markets, market prices, dominant private
ownership, a reasonable market compatible legal system, and basically a market-oriented
thinking’ (Åslund, 1992, p. 69). These differences are of vital importance.
There are several factors making privatisation more urgent in transition economies,
especially in the CEE. The first one is to create a so-called level playing field for the private
sector in order to facilitate a reasonably well-functioning market. The second one is to
address the chronic shortage in the economies resulting from a severe bottleneck problem
in SOEs. More over, the state administration was badly organized and the staff
inadequately trained for many supposed tasks. It was, therefore, vital to introduce a large
private sector consisting of both new enterprises and privatised existing SOEs, because it is
able to respond to new demands with flexible supply. The last reason is, as argued by some
analysts, that privatisation has been treated as a solution to the financial difficulties that the
state faces in making the transition. Privatisation would help to generate revenues at a time
when ordinary state revenues are falling, assuming that such enterprises can be sold to
prospective buyers, mainly to foreign investors since domestic funds may be scarce
(Kornai, 1990).
The largest dispute concerns the method of privatisation of state-own enterprises. For
the large and medium state-owned enterprises, approaches to privatisation are from
extensive efforts at sales to strategic owners including foreign investors, to insider buyouts,
to innovative voucher programs involving the creation of large and powerful new financial
intermediaries (World Development Report, 1996). However, each approach to
privatisation has tradeoffs among various goals.
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It is argued that while the best-known model of sales to outsiders had been very
successful in established market economies, they have proved costly and slow and far more
difficult to implement than anticipated in most CEE countries (World Development Report,
1996). One reason is the limited amount of domestic capital that can accompany a large
dependence on foreign capital. Another problem is that it is difficult to place a value on
firms offered for sale because of inadequate accounting. A final disadvantage of the sales
approach is its perceived unfairness because many citizens cannot participate in the sale
process.
Management – employee buyouts, in which employees and their families can use
vouchers and cash to buy major stakes in their own firms, are a widely used alternative to
sales. This method is relatively fast and easy to implement, both politically and technically.
However, the disadvantages and risks are many. One is dealing with the uneven distribution
of the benefits and another is that government typically charges low prices to insiders and
thus realises little revenue. In addition, by using management – employee buyouts outsiders
are prevented from buying shares or they may hesitate to invest in firms with significant
insider ownership.
A third form of privatisation distributes vouchers across the population and attempts to
allocate assets approximately evenly among voucher holders. The central principle of
voucher privatisation is that all citizens above a certain age receive an equal number of
vouchers, which they are entitled to exchange within a certain time for shares in thousands
of enterprises that are to be privatised. This form of privatisation has been adopted in a
number of countries, notably in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland,
Romania, Russia, and Latvia. The advantages of free distribution are that utmost equality is
achieved, massive and fast privatisation is accomplished. However, it raises no revenue for
the government, and it has unclear implications for corporate governance.
The Czech Republic was the first to implement this form of privatisation and
had been considered the most successful compared to other countries. However, an
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1998) report stated
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that the Czech voucher approach to privatisation produced ownership that impeded efficient
corporate governance and restructuring. The problem was that insufficiently regulated
privatisation investment funds ended up owning large and controlling stakes in many firms
privatised through vouchers, as citizens sought to limit their risk by transferring their
vouchers into these funds in exchange for shares in the latter. But many of the largest funds
were owned by the major domestic banks, in which the Czech state retained a controlling or
major stake (Nellis, 1999).
Privatising small firms has proved much easier than privatising large ones. Local
authorities can take charge of transferring small units, and because they are easier to value
many parties can gain access to enough information for open auctions to succeed. It is
believed that privatised small businesses can serve as schools for entrepreneurs and
investors and can absorb labour being shed from large-scale enterprises.
The last task in a list of elements of reform is creating a new role for the state. This
involves redirecting the role of the state away from direct ownership and control over
production and distribution and toward a more indirect regulatory role. This would require
the creation of new legal systems and effective means for their enforcement, which can
establish and apply the rules of the game, lower transaction costs, increase commercial
certainty, create incentives for efficiency, and control crime and corruption so that business
can focus on productivity activities. Creating a new role for the state also requires strong
financial institutions to encourage saving and channel it to its most productive uses, and
powerful government to support and complement a set of economic activities as well as
social welfare systems.
2.3.2

Sequencing of reform
While there is general consensus over the nature of the reforms to be implemented,

the sequencing of those reforms has been intensely debated. Figure 2.1 presents a summary
of the major reform areas as well as their proposed sequencing, as originally advanced by
Fischer and Gelb (1991).
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Figure 2-1: Economic Transition Phases of Reform*
Intense

Continuing

Macrostabilisation
Price and Market Reform
Demonopolise and private distribution

Goods and Services:
Price Reform

Remove Quantitative Restrictions

Adjust tariffs to moderate levels

Trade Reform
Deregulate hiring/firing

Liberalise wage bargaining

Labour Market
Preparation

Liberalise

Finance and Banking
Restructuring and Privatisation
Small Scale Privatisation and
Private Sector Development
Governance, restructure and privatise

Large Scale Governance,
Restructuring and Privatisation
Redefining Role of State

Intensive (tax, property, commercial,
foreign investment, law)

Continuing

Legal Reforms
Tax administration, budgeting, legal, regulatory institutions
Institutional Reforms
Emergency

Institutionalisation

Unemployment Insurance
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Transition time (in years)

Source: Fischer and Gelb (1991), p.102.
* The dark areas imply greater intensity of reform measures.

A clear message from this figure is that economic transition in reality will require a
gradual approach. Short-term focus should be placed on the need to attain macroeconomic
stability, including the containment of inflation and the reduction of interest rates, essential
for the development of a private oriented market economy. Other key areas for early reform
include that of: price liberalisation to enable market signals to play a crucial role in
determining resource allocation; trade reform, including that of current account
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convertibility to enable rapid integration into the global economy; small scale privatisation;
legal and institutional reform to provide the framework essential for the development of an
increasingly market oriented economy; and, finally, the establishment of a social safety net,
particularly that of unemployment insurance. These would be representative of a minimum
“Big Bang” menu of measures. Only later on in the transition process would it be possible
to implement reform of the labour market, the banking and finance sector, and the
privatisation of large scale SOEs.
In line with the particular sequencing issues, a general consensus was reached on the
point that stabilisation should precede structural transformation. It is argued that structural
reforms are highly unlikely to be successful in circumstances where there is a concurrent
crisis of macroeconomic stabilisation (Sachs, 1989). However, the problem of credibility
was seen as essential, so that even at an early stage announcements of systemic measures,
such as a quick move toward privatisation and demonopolisation, were highly
recommended by experts (Nutti, 1991 and Jeffries, 1993). In fact three issues have
dominated the sequencing debate. They were related to liberalisation (both internal and
external), to the privatisation of SOEs, and to financial sector reforms.
The first issue in the sequencing debate is over domestic and trade liberalisation. In
regard to domestic liberalisation policy, the liberalising of prices emerged in the forefront
of the debate. There was widespread concern about a surge in inflation, beyond the
expected initial jump once controls and subsidies were lifted. Because most of the
producers and retailers were large state enterprises it was feared that they would behave as
monopolies to increase prices to the maximum profit level. This would tend to increase
wages and thus fuel an inflationary spiral. In addition, a very high ‘monetary overhang’, a
natural characteristic of the socialist economies, and excess demand would occur as soon as
prices were freed. As price liberalisation may intensify inflation and shortage, there was
thus some argument over the issue of demonopolising first, before freeing prices, and
eliminating the overhang first as well. However, both debates soon faded away. It became
obvious that demonopolising could only go hand in hand with privatising and hence take
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time, as Lipton and Sachs (1990) argued that ‘the transition process is a seamless web’
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p.99). Besides, large SOEs could not be likened to market-type
monopolies and they lacked a global view of the market, especially of the consumer
market. On the other hand the monetary overhang was eliminated much more quickly than
anticipated through increased prices, which wiped out households’ savings.
Economists have also debated how fast and extensive the liberalisation of foreign
trade should be. There is a distinct difference between Lipton and Sachs, who favoured a
maximum of instant liberalisation, and McKinnon (1992), who preferred a gradual
liberalisation. The reason for choosing instant trade liberalisation is that this package
implied the opening up of the domestic market along with a strong devaluation of the
domestic currency, and current account convertibility. This also has four advantages.
Firstly, price liberalisation would be automatically coupled with competition from abroad,
which would prevent the domestic monopolies from increasing their prices sharply.
Secondly, the distorted price structure inherited from the past would be corrected by an
imported price structure reflecting relative world prices. Thirdly, as an outcome of the
devaluation, and provided a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime was selected, the
exchange rate would provide a firm nominal ‘anchor’ for the stabilisation program. Finally,
a depressed exchange rate would deter imports, so that there would be no need for high
tariffs at a time when more openness was required (Lavigne, 1995).
Despite these good reasons, the simultaneity of trade and price liberalisation was
questioned. It was argued that excessive devaluation and excessive opening up of the
economy exaggerated the initial price shock (Nuti and Portes, 1993), and that too early an
exposure to external competition could devastate the domestic economy (McKinnon, 1992).
The desirable sequencing of demonopolisation, liberalising domestic markets, and
liberalising trade depended on the initial situation of each country embarking on the
transition process, and would vary by country. For example, Kaser (1990) posed the choice
as “… whether domestic pricing and foreign trading (which in practice requires sharp
devaluation and internal convertibility) should precede or follow demonopolisation.”
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(Kaser, 1990, p. 610). His arguments are based on empirical analysis of economic reform in
Poland in which, to some extent, the government had little choice – macro stabilisation was
so important given the pre-existing state of hyperinflation that market liberalisation and
trade liberalisation in particular were likely to act far more quickly than demonopolisation,
which may take many years. In contrast, for Hungary, Hare (1990) preferred domestic
liberalisation to trade liberalisation. He pointed out that higher prices relative to wages
(achieved by shifting market power from labour to the monopoly firms) should reduce
excess demand, and higher profits will allow investment to be restructured in line with
market demand, rather than bureaucratic preference. Immediate trade liberalisation would,
according to Hare, imply a large increase in both imports and unemployment which would
generate “strong and possibly irresistible political pressures to stop the reform process and
re-impose central controls” (Hare 1990, p. 593).
The second issue in the sequencing debate is privatisation. Blanchard et.al. (1991),
Lipton and Sachs (1990) gave priority to stabilisation and privatisation over restructuring
the economy at the start of the transformation program. They also argued that marketisation
and privatisation should be simultaneous and rapid in order to create proper motivations
and incentives to support the market economy. The main arguments for immediate
privatisation, if necessary before the other components of the reform, are based on the need
to make the reform process irreversible. “Until privatisation has been accomplished, the
economic crisis is likely to persist” (Åslund, 1991, p. 30). Åslund also suggests that
privatisation will solve all the problems of transformation and lead to robust economic
growth. To support this idea, Blanchard, et al. (1991) suggested that the state-owned
enterprises should be given away rather than sold. The reason for this, it is argued, is that if
firms are to be sold off quickly, before the reform process has established a rational and
competitive set of prices which may be used to value the firm, and before property rights
legislation is clearly established, then there is great danger that insiders or incumbent
management will obtain control of many firms.

Chapter 2 – Literature review of transition economies

31

______________________________________________________________________

In contrast the main argument against rapid privatisation is that although state
enterprise debt is regarded as one of the most difficult economic problems in many
transition economies, however, privatisation is not a solution to the enterprise debt crisis.
As argued by Köves (1992), inefficient management is an inherited problem rooted in the
economic and political environment in which SOEs long had to exist. The quality of
management has tended to adapt to changes in the economic policies of the respective
regimes. As economic liberalisation has progressed, the management of SOEs has become
more business-oriented. It is unreasonable to expect that privatisation by itself will produce
capitalist-type managers. In addition, from the practical experiences in many transition
countries with weak institutions, privatisation’s promise has not been fulfilled. Some
therefore argue that the best course of action for such countries is to postpone further
privatisation until competitive forces and an enabling institutional/governmental framework
are in place (Nellis, 1999).
The third debated issue relates to banking and financial reforms. Though such
reforms belong to the phase of structural transformation, the standard instruments of
monetary and fiscal stabilisation require a two-tier banking system, which would allow the
Central Bank to influence the monetary creation by the commercial banks through an
interest rate policy. They also require a well-functioning, modern tax system. If the budget
deficit is to be reduced, not only must expenditure be cut but also tax collection must be
improved (Calvo and Frenkel, 1991). But if this is indeed a precondition to successful
stabilisation, a full banking and tax reform might take too much time in view of the urgent
needs of stabilisation (Lavigne, 1995)
2.3.3

Speed of reform - “Big Bang” vs. “Gradualism”
There was never much doubt about what had to be done: macroeconomic stabilisation

and controlling inflation, control over budget deficits, price liberalisation, adoption of a
single exchange rate, current account convertibility, opening to trade and capital
movements, building up banking and financial systems, establishing property rights, ending
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soft-budget constraints, and setting up market-based welfare systems. Nevertheless, one of
the big disputes about the transition to a market economy concerns how fast it can, or
should, be undertaken, and in what order various reform measures should be carried out.
Although the discussion has been wide-ranging the consensus focuses on two approaches,
namely “Big Bang” or “shock therapy” and “Gradualism” approaches. Woo (1994)
characterises “Big Bang” as consisting of four actions which must be implemented either
simultaneously or in quick succession. These four actions are (i) almost complete price
liberalisation, (ii) liberalisation of the trade sector by a currency devaluation (to the black
market level) and abolition of trade barriers, (iii) legalisation of private economic activities
and the announcement of plans to privatise SOEs and (iv) adoption of non-inflationary
macroeconomic policies. In general, for many economists the “Big Bang” approach means
that moving to markets from a centrally planned economic system can only be done in one
go. Of course the usual lags such as design, decision and implementation imply that the
strategy cannot be enacted literally in one day, but the proponents of “Big Bang” insisted
that fast-moving is highly desirable (Wyplosz, 1999). In contrast, the proponents of a
gradual approach have argued that not only is it impossible to do everything at once, but
that it is highly undesirable. The gradualists have proposed instead a sequencing of policy
measures, which means that changes will be spread over time to prevent economic
disruption, such as inflation and unemployment which are certain to occur when the “Big
Bang” approach is used. An example would be the gradual lifting of state price control over
basic consumer goods and services, such as food and housing. Once one reform is
consolidated and in place, another reform begins.
Arguments advanced by Lipton and Sachs (1990), Kornai (1990), Fischer and
Frenkel (1992), Blanchard et.al (1991), Balcerowicz (1994), Åslund, Boone and Johnson
(1996), and many others, favoured a swift transition, convinced that the conditions for longterm stabilisation and systemic transformation could be established only at the cost of a
serious short-term recession and decline in living standards. The decision to start along
many fronts simultaneously reflected a belief that the components of reform were
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interlinked and complementary, so that partial reforms would lead to unsatisfactory
outcomes. From their opinions, to be fully effective, most measures needed each other. For
example, restoring the price mechanism is only useful if firms face hard budget constraints,
which in turn requires clear property rights and an ability to uphold them. This in turn calls
for the phasing out of state subsidies. The emergence of potentially profitable firms requires
the establishment of a financial system. Necessarily, then, monetary policy has to be shifted
to controlling the money supply, which is impossible unless the budget is brought under
control. In short, to succeed, macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms need each
other, and each other part strengthens the whole (Wyplosz, 1999). They were also certain
that gradualism would not be successful because the commitment to change is in doubt, the
expectation is that policy will be reversed and the needed behavioural responses are
therefore not forthcoming.
Proponents of shock therapy or “Big Bang” strongly emphasise stabilisation and
liberalisation. Regarding stabilisation, they stress the necessity of a restrictive monetary and
fiscal policy in order to combat budget deficits and external disequilibria (Berg and Sachs,
1992, Lipton and Sachs 1990). The core element of a shock therapy, however, is rapid
elimination of domestic price control by the state. Price liberalisation is essential for
macroeconomic stabilisation and for microeconomic restructuring. A general increase in
the price level has to eliminate the monetary overhang, while changing relative prices will
improve allocative efficiency. Producers will economise on the utilisation of inputs, while
consumers are expected to experience welfare gains because no longer will they be forced
to substitute initially unwanted for eventually unavailable commodities (Brada, 1993). The
therapists (who support the “Big Bang” approach) also have supported the idea that
liberalisation of the domestic market must be taken through both the freeing of prices and
the liberalisation of international trade simultaneously.
Proponents of the “Big Bang” approach accept that the transition from a command
economy to a market economy will involve a great deal of pain, as, for example, the SOEs
are dismantled. Inevitably there will be large-scale unemployment as the largely
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underutilised labour force is disgorged on to the labour market. It is unlikely that private
sector activity, while it is in its embryonic stage, will grow sufficiently rapidly to enable a
smooth transition to take place. As a result there will be losers in the system, and, it was
felt, the sooner the transition is completed the shorter the period of pain (Lipton and Sachs,
1990)
The case for gradualism is usually made on the grounds that a fixed cost of
adjustment is spread over a longer period of time, thereby reducing its short-run cost.
Arguments against a quick transition tend to emphasize the dangers of massive
unemployment and that the restructuring is a process that takes time (McKinnon, 1991;
Nuti and Portes, 1993). Another argument for gradual change is that without it social costs
will become excessive, and it is impossible to undertake such massive changes very fast
because society and humans need time to adapt to a new structure and learn how to manage
it. In line with this issue, Murrell (1990) referred to Schumpeter’s evolutionary economics
and suggested that economic institutions must develop organically and cannot be
transplanted. According to this view creating effective institutions is a lengthy process
requiring much trial-and-error, implying that reform should occur in an evolutionary
manner that adapts existing institutions to new needs pragmatically and gradually as has
occurred in China.
If Woo’s (1994) four characteristics of the “Big Bang” is recalled, then gradualism
basically denies that they are essential to the transition process based on China’s
experiences. First, price reform does not have to be complete or rapid. For example, a dual
price system existed for many years. Second, gradualists do not regard privatisation of
SOEs as essential to improving their performance. Increasing competition may be
important for increasing efficiency and reducing costs, but privatisation by itself is
necessary but not sufficient. Third, gradualists argue that the problem facing the transition
economies is one of structural imbalance and the absence of proper incentives, rather than
macroeconomic imbalance that needs to be corrected by a massive reduction in aggregate
demand. Indeed, they argue that the macroeconomic stabilisation measures aimed at
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reducing aggregate demand, is likely to do more harm than good. Proponents of gradualism
also argue that suddenly subjecting the whole of the domestic economy to international
competition could put the domestic firms in a vulnerable situation (Pyle, 1997). However,
gradualism presents some problems, mainly in relation to the question of optimal
sequencing. Sequencing concerns whether microeconomic reforms should precede
macroeconomic reforms or vice verse, agricultural reforms should precede industrial
reforms, which should precede financial reforms and so on. Another issue in sequencing is
whether economic liberalisation should precede political liberalisation. In Eastern European
countries political liberalisation has taken place at the same time as economic reform, while
in China (and Vietnam also) political reform has never been on the agenda.
Debates about the speed of reforms are currently much less acute than before. Both
shock therapists and gradualists admit the need now for macroeconomic stabilisation first,
and after most prices were deregulated and macro stability ensured, the remaining reforms,
structural and institutional, by their very nature can be only gradual.

2.4 Economic Progress after a Decade of Transformation
Economic performance among the transition economies has differed widely during
the last decade (1990-2000). The clearest differences are between the East Asian countries,
China and Vietnam, and the countries of the CEE and CIS. China and Vietnam have
contained inflation and benefited from continued high growth in GDP since the beginning
of their reforms, while all CEE and CIS countries have experienced large output declines,
and most have experienced hyperinflation. But even among the CEE and CIS countries,
there are marked differences. Some countries lost over half of their GDP and growth
performance in a number of countries is still poor, while others are growing strongly. Some
are still suffering from high inflation while others have successfully reduced annual
inflation to 50 per cent or less. It is argued that the countries that have done best are those
who pursued their reform agendas most consistently, and they are also those who seemed
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from the start most committed to reform. By and large they are the countries closest to the
dynamic economic regions in Europe and Asia (Fischer and Sahay, 2000).
This subsection continues by first summarising the macroeconomic performance of
the transition economies over the last decade, and accounting for the widely differing
outcomes between them. What are the main determinants of this divergence of outcomes
across transition economies is analysed thereafter.
2.4.1

Macroeconomic performance
Macroeconomic development during the transition process, as reflected in output

levels and rates of inflation, are summarised in Figure 2.2 for five country groups 5.

5

In this, the data are adjusted for the East Asian countries whose transition began prior to 1989. The first
11 years of transition for these countries cover the following periods: China (1978-98), Lao PDR (198697), and Vietnam (1986-97).
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Figure 2-2: Output and Inflation Performance During Transition

The evolution of output and inflation during the transition has differed
considerably among countries.
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The European and CIS transition economies suffered a substantial output contraction
at the start of the transition. The decline was particularly severe in the CIS countries, where
the recovery process also started later and was less vigorous. The Baltic countries’
performance was initially similar to that of the CIS countries, but since the mid-1990s they
are well on their way towards joining other EU accession countries. The performance of
other countries in southeastern Europe and some CIS countries in central Asia has been
erratic because of civil strife and war. In contrast, output growth remained very strong in
the transition countries of East Asia following the onset of reforms; it continued to increase
throughout the transition period, and the output level is now almost double that compared
to the starting level in these countries.
In most transition countries prices increased substantially during the initial stage of
the transition, as a result of price liberalisation and the large monetary overhang inherited
from the period under central planning (Figure 2.2, low panel). The increase in inflation,
which reached four digit rates in the mid 1990s in a number of CIS countries, was
attributed to the monetisation of large budget deficits, arising from output contraction and
fiscal restructuring. However, by 1999 inflation rates were reduced to single digits in most
countries. It is argued that inflation stabilisation is one of the major successes of the
transition process (Fisher and Sahay, 2000), especially compared with countries in Latin
America.
Both EU accession and CIS countries started the transition with a much larger
industrial sector and a much smaller service sector than market economies with comparable
per capita incomes, while China and Vietnam started with a large agricultural sector.
During the transition, the excessive industrialisation that characterised all but the transition
countries of East Asia has been reduced, as is evident from the falling share of industrial
output in total GDP (see Table 2.4) in all but the East Asian transition economies. This was
partly a result of a rapid expansion – in both absolute and relative terms – of the service
sector, which had been severely neglected under central planning.
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Table 2-4: Composition of Output in the Transition Country Groups
Regions and periods

Agriculture
EU accession countries
1990-91
13.7
1997-98
13.9
CIS
1990-91
27.5
1997-98
18.7
China
1990-91
25.5
1998-99
15.9
Vietnam
1990-91
40.2
1998-99
23.8
Source: World Bank country office data.

Percentage of GDP
Industry

Services

45.1
33.0

41.2
53.1

39.7
31.2

32.8
50.1

42.1
50.9

32.4
33.2

22.6
34.3

37.2
41.9

The public sector dominance in economic activity was replaced by a remarkable pick
up in, and transfer of resources to, private sector activity: the private sector share of GDP
rose to an average of 70 per cent in the EU accession countries in 1999 and to 50 per cent in
CIS countries (see Table 2.5). This adjustment was achieved via both privatisation of old
SOEs and the emergence of new private firms and activities. The European Bank for Rural
Development (EBRD) (2000) estimates that in 1999 the private sector produced over half
of GDP in 20 of the 26 transition countries in Europe. Although privatisation generally
enhanced firms’ productivity, especially when hard budget constraints were imposed, in the
transition economies, productivity in both new domestic firms and foreign-owned firms
exceeded that in domestic privatised or public firms. This suggests that the process of
enterprise restructuring remains incomplete (Djiankov and Murrell, 2000).

Chapter 2 – Literature review of transition economies

40

______________________________________________________________________

Table 2-5: Private Sector Growth, 1990s
Countries

1990
11
12
10
18
17
10
12
5
5

Percentage of GDP
1994
50
65
55
55
40
20
40
15
50

1999
EU accession countries
68
Czech Republic
80
Estonia
75
Hungary
80
Romania
60
CIS
50
Armenia
60
Belarus
20
Russian Federation
70
Asia
China
35
42
50
Vietnam
32
27
40
Sources: EBRD for EU accession and CIS countries; Chinese Statistical Yearbook for China; UNDP
and IMF for Vietnam.

Ownership developments in the economies of East Asia show a diverging trend. In
China, ownership has been diversifying substantially toward a wide variety of forms
including that of collectives, joint ventures between state and foreign private enterprises,
foreign funded enterprises and domestic private enterprises. The growth of the so-called
non-state sector has been increasing rapidly since the initiation of economic reform, and is
now larger than the share of the formal state sector in the country’s GDP. On the other hand
Vietnam was found by the World Bank to be the only country in this sample where the state
sector’s share had risen in the period 1990-1994, but many enterprises classified as state
firms in this country are in fact joint ventures with private (mainly foreign) partners. Since
1999 the Vietnamese government has taken a series of actions, such as promulgating the
new enterprise law, aimed at improving the investment climate for a more fair business
environment to promote private sector development. Despite these recent developments,
compared to China the private sector in Vietnam, which now accounts for about 40 per cent
of GDP, still faces a number of remaining impediments. Its activity was still constrained by
an entrenched bureaucracy, a non-transparent tax and regulatory framework, and an uneven
playing field in terms of market access, foreign exchange and bank credit availability.
While in China a change in leadership attitude has led to the explicit recognition of the
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private sector as an important component of the economy, along with earlier steps in
clarifying the legal framework, that has been seen as key in fostering the rapid expansion of
the private sector, which accounted for 50 per cent of GDP in the period 1999-2000. If
private farmers are included this figure is likely to be around 66 per cent.
Exports have also been the major engine of growth in transition economies. The
European transition countries, which are more advanced in their recovery, have been more
successful in increasing their exports and reorienting them to the industrial countries.
Exports from countries with more open trade regimes, mostly in EU accession countries,
declined less with the initial disintegration of the Soviet Union and CMEA and recovered
faster, contributing more to overall output growth. By contrast, in most CIS countries,
which stuck with state trading arrangements and still imposed significant export controls,
OECD-oriented exports of manufactures have remained marginal and the contribution of
exports to growth has been negligible, but there is a definite upward trend (see Table 2.6).
Trade policies in China and Vietnam have combined substantial liberalisation with
active export promotion. State trading now covers only a few important products and
represents a shrinking share of trade in both countries. Many exports have been liberalised
completely, but imports remain subject to significant restrictions. Both countries have
exempted exporters from import duties on their inputs and created favourable conditions for
export-oriented foreign investment.
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Table 2-6: Export Growth and Destination, 1990s
Countries

Real export growth
1993-98
8.8
22.0
4.3
10.4
10.8
11.1
7.3
12.9
8.7
6.9
5.7
3.2
-8.6
14.0
-3.2
10.3
3.4
-2.4
4.8
4.7
5.8

Share of exports to industrial countries
1992-93
1998-99
35.8
67.5
62.9
94.1
55.1
59.0
29.9
69.3
25.9
71.3
67.4
81.5
22.2
65.5
71.6
75.5
44.3
71.0
15.9
59.2
33.7
70.7
28.0
29.0
9.4
34.9
4.2
20.0
15.3
11.0
2.3
25.9
43.8
29.6
24.7
44.0
6.2
31.3
59.3
49.4
18.1
23.3

EU accession
Albania
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Macedonia, FYR
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
CIS
Armenia
Azerbaijana
Belarus
Georgiaa
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Asian
Chinab
8.3
43.7
Vietnamb
21.3
41.6
Note: a. 1995-98; b. 1991-2001.
Sources: World Bank and International Monetary Fund databases

54.6
50.2

Another important factor contributing to the recovery of output in the transition
economies has been direct investment from abroad. These flows are important not only as a
source of capital and new technology to modernise industries and extract natural resources,
but also bring in improved managerial practices and as a signal of confidence in the
transition to a market economy. During 1996-99 more than US$70 billion in direct
investment came to the European transition countries, most of it to the EU accession
countries (see Table 2.7). In the CIS countries foreign direct investment was largely
confined to the energy-rich countries, with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia receiving
75 per cent of the total. In the East Asian transition countries, China has achieved
remarkable success in comparison to other developing countries, such as Vietnam, in
attracting foreign direct investment. From virtually zero in 1981 the figure was raised to
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US$45.3 billion by 1997, representing a half of all foreign direct investment to developing
countries. With the rapid growth of foreign investment in China, foreign-invested
companies have become an increasingly important source of China’s strong export
performance. In 1998, exports by foreign-invested companies amounted to US$64 billion,
or about 40 per cent of China’s total exports, up from 12 per cent in 1990. The rapid growth
of foreign investment was a result of some deliberate policies of the Chinese government
through the creation of special economic zones, the opening of coastal areas, and
preferential tax treatment and access to foreign exchange for exporters.
Table 2-7: Main Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992-99
Countries

US$ millions
21,091
4,821
647
9,399
2,540
8,272
237
2,357
3,965
427

1992-95
Percentage of GDP
0.5
2.9
3.9
5.7
0.6
1.0
4.2
2.7
0.3
3.5

US$ millions
50,558
10,104
1,050
6,979
17,096
22,001
3,222
4,971
8,412
334

1996-99
Percentage of GDP
3.3
4.6
5.2
3.8
2.9
2.5
20.9
6.4
0.7
3.0

EU accession
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
CIS
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russian Federation
Turkmenistan
Asia
China
72,300
1.2
170,000
4.1
Vietnam
6,306a
3.6
10,107
10.5
Note: Shares of GDP are period averages of medians for the group.
a. 1991-95
Sources: World Bank Report, 2002, Table 1.5, p.7 for EU accession and CIS countries; Ma (2000), Table 7.2,
p. 122 for China; UNDP and World Bank staff estimates for Vietnam.

The transition process also had a major impact on poverty and income inequality. In
all the transition countries many people have gained, and imports of high quality consumer
goods have boomed. But the combination of falling output and rising income inequality has
led to large increases in poverty. Some increase in inequality could be expected as a result
of introducing market incentives and adjustment of relative prices to reflect scarcities. In
the countries of the former Soviet Union (particularly the western CIS), the share of the
population living in poverty rose to more than 40 percent as of 1998, up from around 10 per
cent before the transition period (1987-1988) (see Figure 2.3). The recorded increase in
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poverty was sharpest in those countries, as generally argued, where the reform process
stalled, there was a deficiency in entrepreneurship and new growth opportunities, and
where privatisation favoured insiders, and poor targeting of social safety nets permitted an
uneven accumulation of wealth (World Economic Outlook, IMF 2000). Income inequality
also increased in the transition economies of Asia, but, since output increased rapidly, these
countries were still able to achieve impressive reductions in their poverty rates during the
transition process. The initial phase of rural reform (1978-1984) in China led to both
increased growth and reduced inequality, lifting 200 million people out of poverty. But
after 1985, as reform centred on the industrial sector, inequality rose markedly, mainly
because of increased urban-rural disparity, and the number of poor stopped falling. Rural
poverty is a continuing problem. In Vietnam strong growth, due to the combined effects of
land reform, stabilisation, and liberalisation, helped cut the share of the population in
poverty in half over the past decade, some 30 million people, with around 37 percent of the
population estimated to still live in poverty6.

6

This poverty incidence is measured according to internationally defined measures of poverty, as
described in “Vietnam: Attacking Poverty” (World Bank Report, 1999). There are two poverty lines
calculated on the basis of per capital expenditure – the overall poverty line and the food poverty line – that
are used to calculate the number of people in a poverty situation. The poverty line in Vietnam for the year
1998 is as follows: food poverty: US$92/per person/per year; overall poverty: US$128/per person/per
year.
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Figure 2-3: Change in Poverty and Income Distribution
(Simple country averages for each group)

Except for the East Asian transition economies, the incidence of poverty rose in all
countries during transition, and income distribution became more uneven.
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countries
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Baltic
countries
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Source: Branko Milanovic, Income, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from a Planned to Market
Economy , The World Bank Regional and Sectoral Series (Washington: World Bank, 1998).

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000.
1
2

Data exclude Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan.
Poverty is defined as having an income of less than four U.S. dollars per day in purchasing-power-parity terms.

Chapter 2 – Literature review of transition economies

46

______________________________________________________________________

2.4.2

Reasons for the variable performance in the transition economies
The divergent economic performance in the transition economies can be explained in

terms of four main factors: (i) differences in initial conditions including geography (such as
endowment of natural resources and the proximity to Western markets), years spent under
planning, and the nature of economic development under socialism (such as the extent of
overindustrialisation, military output, and repressed inflation); (ii) external economic
shocks such as regional economic crisis, war and civil strife; (iii) reform policies and
strategies; and (iv) speed of reforms.
According to Fischer and Gelb (1991), two economic differences distinguish the
countries embarking upon a process of economic reform. They are the degree of economic
centralisation and the degree of internal and external macroeconomic balance. Figure 2.4,
which is taken from the above article, presented the initial conditions faced by some East
European countries, China and Vietnam 7 at the commencement of reform. Czechoslovakia
and Hungary were close to macroeconomic equilibrium and could therefore concentrate on
the structural reforms required for the transition to a market economy. In contrast, for
countries facing severe macroeconomic imbalance such as Poland and the former Soviet
Union, macroeconomic stabilisation would appear to be the immediate task. This policy
could be needed for the case of Vietnam, which started the transition process in the mid1980s with a relatively severe macroeconomic imbalance and high inflation. However, for
China, the country started off with macroeconomic balance but experienced a high degree
of economic centralisation, with structural reform being required to maintain
macroeconomic stability.

7

China and Vietnam are added by the author based on the research of their initial conditions.
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Figure 2-4: Initial Conditions for Transitional Reform

Low

Degree of Economic Centralisation
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China1

Internal &
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Macroeconomic
Imbalance
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Czechoslovakia

*
Hungary

*
*
Vietnam1
*abc abc abc
Yugoslavia
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*
USSR
*
Bulgaria

Poland
*

Source: Fischer and Gelb (1991), p. 69.
1
Added by author.

Recently, in testing for the influence of initial conditions on the economic
performance of transition economies, de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1997) calculated a set of
12 indicators including initial income, urbanisation, natural resource endowment, location,
pre-transition reforms, initial repressed inflation, overindustrialisation, share of trade with
the CMEA, black market rate for foreign exchange rate, new versus old states, and years
under planning. The authors estimate a model where growth (in 1992-1995) is explained by
initial conditions, policy reforms (measured by the aggregate Liberalisation Index
developed in de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996a)). Their finding is that both initial
conditions and the Liberalisation Index are quite significant in the growth equation. Based
on these same indicators, the World Bank Report (2002) aggregates the initial conditions of
the transition economies into three categories: structure, distortions and institutions 8. Such
8

Structure encompasses such variables as the share of industry in GDP, the degree of urbanisation, the
share of trade with the socialist block, the richness of the natural resource endowment, and the initial
income. Distortions in the economy refer to such factors as repressed inflation, black market exchange
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unbundling of initial conditions is used in the statistical analysis which can provide a
clearer answer to the question of the importance of initial conditions versus policy reforms
in explaining the recession and recovery periods of the transition experience. Three
conclusions on the importance of these initial conditions from this Report are as follows.
First, initial conditions are more important factors in explaining the difference across
countries during the initial period of output decline (1990-94) than over the full 10 years of
transition. The three aggregate indicators of initial conditions defined earlier explain 51 per
cent of the variation in the average rate of growth across countries during 1990-94, but only
41 per cent of the variance in average growth during the decade.
Second, the different types of initial conditions were more significant in the early and
later stages of transition. Initial distortions in the economy are most closely associated with
lower performance during the first years of transition, while initial institutions are more
strongly associated with variations in subsequent performance.
Third, while initial conditions have a greater impact on the initial collapse of output
than on the subsequent recovery, the impact of policies becomes stronger as the transition
progresses. Indeed, policy variables are statistically significant in both periods, implying
that market-oriented policy reforms not only speed economic recovery and promote growth
in the medium term, but also mitigate the effects of the transition recession in the short
term.
In the case of the Asian transition economies it has been suggested that conditions at
the outset of the transition process may have been less adverse than in the European
transition economies, they were not encumbered with a large SOE sector and with
excessive resources in industries, and hence permitted an easier approach to market-based
systems. Kalra and Sløk (1999) argued that there are several favourable conditions that can
be explained for the strong output growth in the Asian transition economies during the

rates, trade shocks arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the extent of prior economic reform
within the centrally planned system, and the degree of economic stagnation prior to the transition.
Institutions encompass such variables as years under central planning, location in relation to Western
markets, and experience with nationhood.
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disinflation period, which was in sharp contrast to the European transition experience. First,
these countries have a more settled political situation, so that institution building could
focus on the economic domain without also having to weave a new political fabric.
Reforms in China and Vietnam were trigged without the collapse of the political structures.
Second, both inherited a relatively large size of the agricultural sectors, and the availability
of large rural labour surpluses has facilitated a natural acceleration of growth without a
large dismantling of the overindustrialised state-owned enterprises as in their counterparts
in Europe. In China, agriculture accounted for about 40 per cent of GDP in the late 1970s,
and employed 70 per cent of the economically active population. The share of agriculture in
output in Vietnam was even higher. Transfer of labour from agriculture to manufacturing,
particularly in China during the 1980s, led to substantial gains in productivity and income
growth. Third, these countries were less integrated with the CMEA system (however,
compared to China, Vietnam was more dependent on this system), which provided these
economies a cushion against the large external shock associated with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Finally, the Asian transition countries were under central planning only for a
short time and there was a collective memory of market-oriented system, particularly in
South Vietnam. In Vietnam, a significant non-state sector continued to exist, with about 40
per cent of industrial production and a large part of the service sector remained in private
hands. Moreover, agriculture in the south of Vietnam had never been fully collectivised.
However, not all initial conditions in the Asian transition economies were favourable. The
heavy dominance of agriculture means low per capita income levels, extreme poverty,
rudimentary infrastructure, and weak administrative capacity. There is also huge potential
for productivity gains if workers can be transferred into manufacturing.
The second factor that contributed to delayed economic recovery in the transition
period is external economic shocks. The collapse of the institutional and technological links
of the Soviet centrally planned system disrupted the supply of inputs for production and the
delivery of outputs, posing new challenges for enterprises. The loss of budget transfers
from the centre and the elimination of subsidised energy imports were severe blows,
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particularly to some of the newly independent states of the CIS. The various financial crises
of the 1990s – Mexico, Russia, and East Asia – also contributed to delaying or interrupting
the recovery of output. War and civil strife in some countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Tajikistan and others took a major toll on lives, infrastructure, and the state, undermining
the political consensus on reforms needed for successful transition.
The empirical evidence shows that the impact of initial conditions faded gradually
over time: the macroeconomic performance at the beginning of the transition process was
heavily influenced by the initial conditions, but the subsequent path of recovery was closely
associated with the strength of the reform efforts. There are some empirical analyses which
have largely focused on the third factor: effects of reform strategies and policies. A number
of papers, Balcerowicz and Gelb (1994), de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996a), and Fischer,
Sahay and Vegh (1996a,b and 1998) and Denizer (1997), have emphasised the variability in
policies and performance, and have shown that government policies were key determinants
of cross-country variation in growth and inflation. This analysis shows that economies in
CEE and CIS countries contracted strongly as major reforms were initiated, but mostly
resumed growth about two years later after achieving price stability. This analysis also
shows that delaying reforms does not prevent output declines, and success in controlling
inflation has been positively related to reforms.
Most recent studies of the impact of reforms on growth in transition economies use
average reform indices developed by the World Bank and the EBRD. Havrylyshyn and van
Roden (1999) show that economic liberalisation has a more significant impact on economic
performance than measures of the quality of the institutional environment, although the
latter’s importance is increasing over time. Fischer and Sahay (2000) show that average
growth over the first decade of transition is best explained by the EBRD’s liberalisation and
small-scale privatisation indices, whereas Stiglitz (1999) found out that growth is positively
influenced by progress in privatisation only if there has been an associated improvement in
governance.
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Other papers in the literature find that that there have been close links between
political transition and intensity of reforms. Balcerowicz and Gelb (1994), de Melo,
Denizer and Gelb (1996a), and Åslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996) show that economic
reforms have been easier in countries where rapid and fundamental political changes have
taken place.
It has been difficult, however, to accommodate the experience of some East Asian
countries within the framework of a number of transition countries in the CEE and CIS.
China and Vietnam initiated and implemented their economic reform efforts in a relatively
stable political climate, without the disruptive effects associated with civil strife or the
dissolution of state structures. Initial conditions - for instance, permitting greater private
sector activity in agriculture and relaxing entry into industry in rural areas - have often been
referred to as the primary causes of growth (Sachs and Woo, 1997). Several other studies
have realized the role of initial conditions in shaping Asia’s reform strategy. Thomas and
Wang argue, “countries with relatively stable political and macroeconomic conditions
usually feel no particular urgency to reform, so they can afford to conduct reforms in an
evolutionary fashion, rather than risk political and economic chaos” and “China and most
East Asian countries belong to this group” (Thomas and Wang, 1997, p. 223).
Another explanation provided for the phenomenon of the variable performance
experienced by transition economies during the last decade includes attempts to model the
impact of gradual, piecemeal reforms and the impact of shock therapy type measures. For
therapists, if the weakening state is not able to enforce production quotas under the system
of dual pricing, transfer of resources to the private sector with market prices creates
bottlenecks and shortages in the state sector, resulting in the fall of total output (Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). For gradualists, they believed that the institutional vacuum
resulting from the elimination of old regulations and institutions before the new ones are
created may have a devastating impact on output. In particular, they believed that the
Chinese strategy, which relied on the rapid growth of newly created private businesses, is
superior to large scale privatisation, since property rights in this case can be better

Chapter 2 – Literature review of transition economies

52

______________________________________________________________________

preserved and enforced. There were also a number of models showing that, under particular
assumptions, slow liberalisation may be preferable to the “Big Bang” approach. For
example, Friedman and Johnson (1996) argued that in the presence of complementarities
between government policies and enterprise attributes and convex adjustment costs for
enterprises (i.e. costs increasing with the speed of reforms), radical “Big Bang” reforms
might not necessarily be optimal. It has been argued (Li, 1996) that in the absence of
competitive product markets (monopolisation) at the outset of the reforms, shock therapy
can only lead to the reduction of output while incremental reforms, such as the Chinese
type dual track pricing system forcing enterprises to meet production quotas but allowing
them to sell above-the-plan output at market prices, may contribute to the expansion of
output. It was also argued that if state firms are allowed to choose between market and
centrally planned prices (for both – inputs and outputs), then not only is Pareto optimality
guaranteed at the end of the process, but also – with the appropriate state allocation of
cheap resources and production quotas – it could be ensured that at every stage of the
transition process no one is going to be worse off and at least someone is constantly made
better off (Qian, Roland and Lau, 1997). Roland and Verdier (1994) showed that
investment and output may fall as a result of immediate price deregulation due to the need
to find new partners, and that under gradual dual track price liberalisation it is possible to
avoid this effect. This argument is supported by some empirical evidence from China,
Hungary and Uzbekistan as well.

2.5 Conclusions
The collapse of planned socialism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s
was attributed to the structural weakness of central planning in improving the standards of
living of the population. The centrally planned economies, characterised by obsolete and
uncompetitive productive capacities, macroeconomic imbalances, lack of modern
infrastructure and factor markets, and weak institutions, could not last forever and required
change to another form of economy – a market economy - that could improve their current
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situation. However, there is no simple or singular path for the successful economic
transition from a planned to market economy. A number of key policy areas can be
identified, including that of macroeconomic stabilisation, price and market reform,
restructuring and privatisation and the need to redefine the role of the state. While there is
general agreement on these basic measures, major disagreement relates to the speed and
sequencing of such reforms. During the first years of the transition process, the “Big Bang”
approach was favoured by many economists and policy makers in Europe. In reality,
however, it was primarily limited to the implementation of a rapid macroeconomic
stabilisation program, with the process of restructuring the economy, including that of
privatisation, and the development of institutions required in the context of a market taking
a much longer period of time to achieve – gradual approach.
There has been considerable variation in the economic performance of the transition
economies since the beginning of economic transition. For the CEE and CIS countries the
initial part of the process has been characterised by reduced production as well as a
temporary, in most cases, dramatic increase in inflation. The extent and consistency of
macroeconomic development policies have been pointed out as the main causes for the
difference between each country’s performance, along with other factors such as their
initial conditions, geography, history and culture.
This review, however, shows that the East Asian economies of China and Vietnam
have performed remarkably differently during their process of economic reform. Neither
suffered the declines in GDP growth, nor the significant increases in inflation. Such
progress, which, arguably, has been attributed to these countries’ specific economic
structures, geographic position, and the economic stabilisation policies implemented, will
be comprehensively investigated in the next chapter for the case of Vietnam.

CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMY OF VIETNAM
3.1 Introduction
This chapter endeavours to provide an investigation of the economic reforms which
have been implemented in the Vietnamese economy since its reunification in 1976.
Particular attention is given to the period of transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market economy (1986 – present). This period has witnessed a significant
macroeconomic adjustment, which can be categorised into two groups – stabilisation
policies and structural reforms. While stabilisation policies aim at eliminating
macroeconomic imbalances through demand adjustments, structural adjustment policies
aim at raising output growth through policies that bring about major changes in the
microeconomic structure by promoting competitiveness, efficiency and dynamism among
the production units within the system.
The objective of this chapter is to distinguish how these adjustment policies are being
used in Vietnam’s macroeconomic system. The second section emphasises some of these
issues for the period 1976-1985, which is described as a period of macroeconomic crisis,
with a major deterioration of the economy, and also presents the initial economic reforms
that the government applied in response to this crisis. The focus of the third section is to
discuss the macroeconomic policies being applied since the Doi Moi (renovation) policy
began in 1986, and present the major trends of the macroeconomic indicators which have
been brought about by these policies. The fourth section discusses the major
macroeconomic problems currently facing the Vietnamese economy, focusing on the
interaction and interrelationship between the public and private sectors, savings and
investment, import-substitution and export-oriented policies, and financial and banking
reforms. The conclusion is summarised in the last section.
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3.2 Vietnam’s macroeconomic crisis 1976-1985
After national reunification in 1975 the Vietnamese leadership committed itself to
pursuing a fundamentally socialist path, which was built on the basis of a socialist centrally
planned model imported from the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries, for the
whole united country. However, inexperience, ignorance in economic management of a
modern economy, and, most importantly, deficiencies inherent in the economic model itself
were important factors that soon led the economy into a serious economic crisis in the late
1970s and early 1980s. This period can be broken down into two sub-periods categorised
by the framework of Five Year Plans (FYP). In the period of the Second FYP (19761980) 9, Vietnam pursued a policy of socialist construction and development, with the socalled Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) development model being applied to the
whole country, with the task of strengthening socialist construction in the North and
transforming the South’s capitalist economy to a socialist one. During the period of the
Third FYP (1980-1985) Vietnam went through a phase of economic crisis resulting from
subjective and over-ambitious policies, a too-rapid economic reorganisation in the socialist
direction in the South and major economic distortions in the North. The focus was placed
upon relatively modest liberalisation of the economy initiated first in the agricultural and
industrial sectors and then in the trade sector. Although some of the decentralisation
measures in economic management that were introduced contributed to the recovery of
Vietnam’s economy, the goal of complete socialist transformation of the economy was still
retained but a more gradual approach to it was adopted. At the end of this period, the
emergence of severe macroeconomic imbalances, as reflected in high and rising inflation,
prompted the government to accept more radical measures to reform the economy and
Vietnam shifted to a new period - the period of transition from a centrally planned economy
to a market-oriented one.

9

The First Five Year Plan applied when the country was at war with the US (1961-1965).
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3.2.1

The premises of the Vietnamese macroeconomic crisis
Looking back at the performance of the Vietnamese economy after reunification in

1976 to 1985, what is most obvious is poor growth performance. The performance of
Vietnam’s economy during the Second FYP (1976-1980) failed to achieve its planned
targets (Table 3.1 and 3.2). By most indicators the economy appeared to be continuously
declining, and outcomes were much lower than the projected targets. Despite the improved
performance of the economy over the period of the Third FYP (1981-1985), the economy
confronted a number of problems at mid decade resulting in rising inflation that was stoked
by food shortages and a rapid increase in the money supply.
In the Second FYP, which was presented at the Fourth Party Congress of the
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in December 1976, the development of agriculture
was to be given the first priority, due to the urgent need to deal with food shortages and
increasing unemployment created after the war. The emphasis on agricultural development
was reflected in the allocation of a large amount of finance (US$2.25 billion) to it, out of a
total outlay of US$7.5 billion earmarked for the plan (30% of the total). The priority was
further demonstrated by the fact that a large portion of the 35 per cent of the budget which
would go to industry, would be devoted to producing agriculture essentials. The
performance of the agriculture sector in this period, however, was below expectations
(Table 3.1). Food crops production declined from 13.5 million tonnes in 1976 to 12.6
million tonnes in 1977, contributing to a decline in agricultural output from 65.4 billion
dong to 61.7 billion dong in real terms (Table 3.3). The situation became even worse when
the value of agricultural output at constant 1982 prices further declined to 60.6 billion dong
in 1978. During this period, agricultural output grew only 1.9 per cent per year, well below
the population growth rate of 2.3 per cent and far behind the planned target growth rate for
agriculture of 8-10 per cent per year.
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Table 3-1: Gross Social Product (GSP) 1976-1985 (million dong)
Second Five Year Plan
Third Five Year Plan
GSP at current prices
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Others
GSP at constant 1982 prices
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Others
GSP by economic sector
State sector
Cooperatives
Private sector
Growth rate of GSP (%)

1976
Value
%

1977
Value
%

1978
Value
%

1979
Value
%

1980
Value
%

1981
Value
%

1982
Value
%

1983
Value
%

1984
Value
%

1985
Value
%

2696
931
1036
290
439
206196
80482
80741
14240
30733

100
34.5
38.4
10.8
16.3
100
39.0
39.2
6.9
14.9

2950
927
1173
337
513
215349
79609
89166
14365
32209

3424
1155
1351
317
601
224081
78780
97345
14302
33654

3731
1406
1368
301
656
220287
81014
92447
14270
32556

4281
1761
1413
293
814
218070
87040
84050
14200
32780

10102
4487
3598
476
1541
222310
89980
84910
13770
33650

23915
9916
9182
1220
3597
239150
99450
91820
12200
35680

100
41.5
38.4
5.1
15.0
100
4106
38.4
5.1
14.9

32148
12482
12090
1833
5743
262230
107770
103590
13880
36990

49728
19056
19083
2729
8860
288520
113000
117170
15710
42640

135187
50238
55750
9927
19272
310390
119420
131180
17260
42530

76128
45398
84679

36.9
22.0
41.1

33.1
27.2
39.6

87100
33.2
74360
28.4
100700
38.4
9.7

-

100
31.4
39.8
11.4
17.4
100
37.0
41.4
6.7
14.9

86512
40.2
46338
21.5
82449
38.3
4.4

95318
48048
80715
4.1

100
33.7
39.4
9.3
17.6
100
35.2
43.4
6.4
15.0
42.5
21.5
36.0

100
37.7
36.7
8.0
17.6
100
36.8
42.0
6.5
14.8

77350
35.1
54100
24.6
86620
39.3
-1.7

100
41.1
33.1
6.8
19.0
100
39.9
38.6
6.5
15.0

77350
35.5
54100
24.8
86620
39.7
-1.0

100
44.4
35.6
4.7
15.3
100
40.5
38.2
6.2
15.1

78320
35.2
56050
25.2
87940
39.6
1.9

79250
65110
94790
7.6

Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Data: Economics and Finance 1955-1986, Hanoi, 1988.

Table 3-2: Vietnam’s Economic Performance: Projected and Actual GSP Growth Rate
National Income
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80)
Third Five Year Plan (1981-85)
Fourth Five Year Plan (1986-90)
Agricultural Production
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80)
Third Five Year Plan (1981-85)
Fourth Five Year Plan (1986-90)
Industrial Production
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80)
Third Five Year Plan (1981-85)
Fourth Five Year Plan (1986-90)
Source: General Statistical Office of Vietnam.

Projected

Actual

13-14
4.5-5
8.0

0.4
6.4
4.3

8-10
6-7
6.2

1.9
4.9
1.4

16-18
4.5
9.0

0.6
9.5
5.6

100
38.8
37.6
5.7
17.9
100
41.1
39.5
5.3
14.1

100
38.3
38.4
5.5
17.8
100
39.2
40.6
5.4
14.8

101610
35.2
89500
31.0
97410
33.8
10.0

100
37.2
41.2
7.3
14.3
100
38.5
42.3
5.6
13.7

110920
35.7
109190
35.2
90280
29.1
7.6
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Whereas the agricultural sector had shown a decline in its growth rate in the two
years after reunification, the industrial sector in Vietnam experienced a high growth rate of
10.8 per cent and 8.2 per cent (in real terms) in 1977 and 1978 respectively (Table 3.3).
This was attributable to the large aid provided in terms of capital stock from Western
countries and China. From 1979, however, the real value of industrial output declined
sharply from 78.3 billion dong in 1978 to 74.6 billion in 1979 and 66.9 billion in 1980,
resulting in negative growth rates of –4.7 and –10.3 per cent respectively (Table 3.3).
Table 3-3: Agricultural and Industrial Production 1976-1985

(1)
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Agricultural Production
Output
Growth rate
Food crops
(2)
(3)
(4)
65364
13.5
61722
-5.6
12.6
60597
-1.8
12.3
65847
8.7
14.0
70804
7.5
14.4
73899
4.4
15.0
82254
11.3
16.8
85001
3.3
17.0
89472
5.3
17.8
91045
1.8
18.2

Industrial Production
Output
Growth rate
(5)
(6)
65344
72399
10.8
78300
8.2
74594
-4.7
66925
-10.3
67594
1.0
73463
8.7
83033
13.0
93952
13.2
105340
12.1

Note: (2) and (5) are calculated in million dong at 1982 prices; (3) and (6) are percentages; (4) is million
tonnes.
Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Data: Economics and Finance 1955-1986, Hanoi, 1988.

A worsening in agricultural production in the two years of 1977-1978 and a severe
reduction in industrial production over the period 1978-1980 contributed to a small
negative growth rate of the Gross Social Product (GSP) in 1979 and 1980. The growth rate
of real GSP (at constant 1982 prices) slowed down from 4.4 per cent in 1977 to 4.1 per cent
in 1978 (Table 3.1). The situation became even worse when real GSP fell successively in
the next two years 1979 and 1980, from 224.1 billion dong in 1978 to 220.3 billion in 1979
and further to 218.1 billion in 1980 at constant prices. Besides the consequences of war, a
very important reason for the poor economic performance was shortcomings in
management and leadership. In agriculture, along with bad weather, agricultural production
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was adversely affected by scarce investment and forced collectivisation. In industry, a
combination of ambitious targets, poorly trained cadres, arbitrary management and
shortages of incentives was blamed for the lack of improvement in productive capacity. The
policy of nationalising industry and commerce in the South had a disastrous impact on
industrial output and overall economic activity. Thus, in spite of the Second FYP’s
emphasis on industrialisation, industrial output over the plan period hardly grew at all.
The disastrous effects of attempting to collectivise agriculture and nationalise
industry and commerce were further compounded by the failure of promised foreign
assistance from Western countries and China to materialise. As early as June 1978
deterioration in the bilateral relations with China resulted in a termination of aid estimated
at US$900 million. With general condemnation and embargoes from the international
community resulting from the retaliations for the invasion of Cambodia, the country lost a
further US$78.5 million in bilateral aid and US$90 million in multilateral aid. General
embargoes also meant a loss of access to international lending sources and a loss of
important international markets. The loss was reflected by a sharp decline in the share of
foreign loans and grants in total budget revenues from 60 per cent for the North, during the
period 1971-75 on an annual average basis, to 32 per cent in 1978, while total budget
revenue increased by only 8.6 per cent from 9.0 billion dong in 1977 to 9.8 billion in 1978
(Table 3.4). The dependence on foreign aid was further reflected by the share of imports of
production input in total imports declining from 83.2 per cent in 1976 to 76.1 per cent in
1978 (Table 3.5). Fuel and raw materials were major components of imported production
input, but their share in total imports declined sharply from 53.6 per cent in 1976 to 28.2
per cent in 1980. This meant a considerable cut in imported supplies which were much
needed for the country’s reconstruction after the war.
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Table 3-4: Summary of State Budget Operations, 1976-1985 (billion dong)
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total revenue
9.178
9.043
9.824 11.033 11.882 22.787 56.638
Domestic revenue
5.069
5.927
6.681
6.537
6.760 17.165 40.327
Tax revenue
0.676
0.686
0.733
0.771
1.278
2.837
7.300
Agriculture
0.234
0.230
0.283
0.292
0.443
0.605
2.489
External trade
0.010
0.002
0.008
0.001
0.007
0.197
0.339
Other non-agricultural taxes
0.432
0.454
0.442
0.478
0.828
2.035
4.472
Tax on industry and trade
0.432
0.454
0.442
0.478
0.828
2.035
4.472
Tax on housing and land
Income tax
Non-tax revenue
4.393
5.241
5.948
5.766
5.482 14.328 33.027
State enterprises
4.038
4.847
5.411
5.231
4.953
3.716 30.047
Other
0.355
0.394
0.537
0.535
0.529 10.612
2.980
Grands and aids
4.109
3.116
3.143
4.496
5.122
5.622 16.311
Total expenditure
9.413
9.179 10.099 11.545 12.003 26.915 61.233
Current expenditure
5.733
5.969
6.359
7.788
8.636 22.126 47.253
Capital expenditure
3.680
3.210
3.740
3.757
3.367
4.789 13.980
Interest
Overall balance
-0.235 -0.136 -0.275 -0.512 -0.121 -4.128 -4.595
Financing
0.235
0.136
0.275
0.512
0.121
4.128
4.595
Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Data: Economics and Finance 1955-1986, Hanoi, 1988.

1983
75.044
58.815
13.436
3.172
1.096
9.168
9.168
45.379
41.828
3.551
16.229
77.999
58.895
19.104
-2.955
2.955

1984
111.398
96.140
19.140
4.338
2.353
12.449
12.449
77.000
68.116
8.884
15.258
115.448
88.704
26.744
-4.050
4.050

1985
25.341
18.977
3.058
0.679
0.439
1.940
1.940
15.919
14.688
1.231
6.364
34.610
23.910
10.700
-9.269
9.269
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Table 3-5: External Trade: 1976-1985 (Rouble-US$ million)*
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
-801.4
-895.5
-976.4
-1205.6
-975.6
-981
-945.6
-910.2
-1095.4
-1158.9
Trade balance
Total exports (fob)
222.7
322.5
326.8
320.5
338.6
401.2
526.6
616.5
649.6
698.5
Structure of exports (%)
100
100
100
Industrial goods
16.0
10.9
9.0
Handicrafts
38.7
47.4
33.7
Agriculture, Forestry and Marine
45.3
41.7
57.3
Total imports (cif)
1024.1
1218.4
1303.2
1526.1
1314.2
1382.2
1472.2
1526.7
1745.0
1857.4
Production inputs
852.5
932.4
991.2
111.6
998.8
1143.0
1267.3
1392.1
1532.1
1856.6
Consumer goods
171.6
286
312
414.5
315.4
239.2
204.9
134.6
212.9
270.8
Structure of imports (%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Production inputs
83.2
76.5
76.1
72.8
76.0
82.7
86.1
91.2
87.8
85.4
Production packages
14.4
27.4
18.7
Machine and transport equipment
9.2
14.3
8.4
Spare parts and tools
6.0
6.0
5.9
Fuel and raw materials
53.6
28.2
48.4
Consumer goods
16.8
23.5
23.9
27.2
24.0
17.3
13.9
8.8
12.2
14.6
Terms of trade index (1987=1000)
137.8
131.0
139.8
138.3
151.1
148.3
118.4
115.9
114.2
105.9
Export price index (fob) (1987=100)
73.3
77.8
93.6
107.4
128.9
127.5
98.9
95.5
94.3
85.4
Import price index (cif) (1987=100)
53.2
59.4
67.0
77.7
85.3
86.0
83.6
82.4
82.6
80.6
Note: * Vietnamese official surveys measured foreign trade in “dollars-roubles”. To quote the official source: “For the socialist countries (area I), calculations
are in roubles; for the capitalist and developing countries (area II), calculations are in US dollars. At present we do not yet have the means for converting
the data into a single united currency” (SO 1987, p. 357).
Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Data: Economics and Finance 1955-1986, Hanoi, 1988.
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By the end of the 1970s the Vietnamese economy was on the brink of disaster, with
real per capita income falling from an already intolerably low level. In response to the
serious economic crisis caused by the failure of economic strategies adopted since
reunification, the Sixth Plenum of the Fourth Party Congress (1979) presented a number of
measures to repair the economy. The goal of complete socialist transformation of the
economy was retained, but a more gradual approach to it was adopted. In addition to
slowing the rate of socialist transformation, two market-oriented reforms were adopted.
The first was the initiation of a “contract” system in agriculture, which set quotas for
household units rather than for entire cooperatives and allowed households to retain and
trade any output in excess of their quota. In effect, the cooperatives were reduced to a
subsidiary role of allocating land, supplying inputs, and providing technical assistance. The
response to this reform was a remarkable acceleration in agricultural output, which
expanded by 4.9 per cent on an annual average basis over the plan period (Table 3.2). On
average, rice output rose to 17 million tonnes a year, versus 13.35 million tonnes in the
1976-80 period.
The second major reform was directed at industry, giving state enterprises more
autonomy in their production. The decree legalised other productive activities outside state
obligations for the purpose of which enterprises were established in a so-called “three-plan
system” 10. At the same time various measures to increase incentives such as a payment
system based on piecework rate, bonuses and monetary awards were applied. These
measures contributed to the recovery in state industrial output over the Plan period, with
industrial growth rising from an average of 0.6 per cent in the Second FYP to about 9.5 per
cent in the Third FYP (Table 3.2). From falling in the two previous successive years, the
value of industrial output continued to grow strongly in the last four years of the Plan. The
growth rate increased sharply from 1 per cent in 1981 to 8.7 per cent in 1982, and
10

Under Plan One, the enterprises were provided with the inputs at subsidised prices and in turn were
required to supply set quantities of goods to the state. Under Plan Two, the enterprises could produce
beyond the amount specified in Plan One and use revenues to purchase additional inputs. Plan Three gave
enterprises the right to engage in sideline activities more or less on a free market basis, which became
known as the “fence-breaking” movement.
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continued to increase in the two subsequent years of 1983 and 1984 to 13 per cent and 13.2
per cent respectively before slowing down to 12.1 per cent in 1985 (Table 3.1).
One spontaneous development in the aftermath of the Sixth Plenum was the creation
of local export-import companies, the most important of them in Ho Chi Minh City. Hard
currency earnings grew rapidly outside the direct control of the central authorities. One of
the more positive points of the period is the development of exports, which showed an
average growth of 15.6 per cent over the period 1980-81 compared with 1.6 per cent
between 1977 and 1980. After 1981, growth slowed. Furthermore, erosion of the central
state monopoly of foreign trade also had positive effects on state industry and agricultural
cooperatives.
In spite of the positive responses to economic liberalisation in industry, agriculture
and trade, there was the emergence of severe macroeconomic imbalance in the early 1980s,
reflected in high and rising inflation. Inflation undermined the reform movement not only
because it was a symptom of the failure of the reforms, but it also reduced the real wages of
civil servants. The source of rising inflation in the early 1980s was the budget deficit of
SOEs which, under the central planning system, were automatically financed by central
bank credits. It is important to note that while financial deficits were inherent in the
command economy system, the gradual market-oriented reforms only served to exacerbate
the financial problems of SOEs (Riedel and Comer, 1997). The diversion of resources into
sideline activities, while encouraging firms to respond to market signals they would
otherwise have ignored, increased the operating deficits of SOEs under Plan One and
allowed them to borrow more from the central bank than they would have otherwise. Thus,
by 1985 the economy of Vietnam again found itself facing an economic crisis, reflected by
rising inflation, food shortages and a rapid increase in the money supply. This prompted the
government to accept even more radical measures to reform the economy.
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3.2.2

Doi Moi - The renovation policy response to the crisis
In response to the immediate crisis, at the Sixth National Congress in December 1986

the decision to transform Vietnam into a market economy, albeit one with a “socialist
orientation”, was taken. The slogan adopted for the economic reform program was “Doi
Moi” (renovation) with the goal of transforming the economy gradually into a “socialist
market economy” through step-by-step reforms. The objectives of the reforms were: (a) to
develop the private sector; (b) to increase and stabilise agricultural output; (c) to shift the
focus of investment from heavy to light industry; (d) to reduce the role of the SOEs; (e) to
focus upon export-led growth, based upon the experience of Vietnam’s dynamic regional
neighbours; and (f) to attract foreign direct investment, seen as essential for economic
development.
The agricultural sector was initially a major focus when economic reforms began,
because this sector had been heavily repressed under central planning and its liberalisation
could have immediate payoffs. In agriculture the reform went beyond the contract system
to confirm the household as the basic production unit, and to further limit the role of
cooperatives. Farmers were no longer required to sell contracted amounts of output to the
state, but instead could sell off their product in the market after paying taxes and
commissions. In addition, in 1988, households were given land tenure for at least 15 years,
and land was made transferable between farmers under certain circumstances. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the dominant sector of the Vietnamese economy was effectively
privatised. As a result there was an immediate jump in farm output, and only a year later
Vietnam started to export its rice and became the world’s third largest exporter after a long
period in famine conditions.
Reforms also began in other areas of the economy, and had some initial successes. In
the state industrial sector the system of state subsidies for enterprises was abolished, and
capital ceased to be provided free to enterprises from the state. Enterprises were put on a
self-financing basis and had to provide for their own capital needs through loans or savings.
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These new regulations were also to give enterprises greater production autonomy. Since
1989 any remaining obligations for state-owned enterprises to deliver goods at low prices
to the state were removed, and, with prices thereby usually set by negotiation between
buyer and seller, the embryonic Vietnamese market economy emerged.
In the financial sector the monobank system was dismantled and the Vietnamese
State Bank was established as the central bank. Under the reforms, a two-tier banking
system was established, and the State Bank began gradually to devolve its banking
functions to specialized banks and shift its role more to that of a modern central bank. The
functions of the State Bank focus mainly on money issuance, management of money
circulation, and control of the capital market.
Another early and important step in the Doi Moi program was the elimination of the
state monopoly of foreign trade in 1988, allowing the establishment of Foreign Trade
Organisations (FTOs) and permitting some firms to engage directly in international trade
outside the FTOs. To improve the country’s trade performance the dong was devalued in
early 1988, narrowing the spread between the official and parallel market rates. In 1989 a
new tariff schedule was introduced, while quotas on imports and exports were lowered. The
monopoly held by the central state trading corporations was eliminated, when provincial
and local authorities were allowed to establish competing foreign trade companies. Priority
was to be given to the development of goods for export as one of the key programs in the
structural adjustment of the economy, reflecting a new open-door economic policy. The
objective of the policy was to induce capital and technology from foreign countries with a
view to intensifying the use of domestic resources, mainly the labour force, and step-bystep integration of the Vietnamese economy with the world economy starting with other
economies in the region.
In addition to freeing up international trade, another early step in the reform program
was the liberalisation of foreign direct investment. At the end of 1987 the government
promulgated the Law on Foreign Investment, which was considered to be one of the most
liberal in South East Asia at that time. All sectors of the economy, in principle, were open
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to foreign investors, although special incentives were attached to investments that promoted
exports and generated hard currency earnings. Since the new foreign investment regulations
came into effect, many investors from other countries have invested in all areas from
industry, services to agriculture. However, the amounts were not substantial.
Compared with the periods before the Doi Moi policy was applied the economic
achievement in this period was considerable. However, the economy was still suffering
from severe macroeconomic imbalance arising from public sector deficits and retention of
the planning apparatus and the dual (official vs. market) pricing system in industry. Prices
again increased sharply causing hyperinflation at an annual rate of about 400 per cent in
1989. In early 1989, facing a macroeconomic crisis like the one encountered in 1986 as
well as prospective declines in financial assistance from the USSR, the government decided
to adopt a bold combination of structural reforms and orthodox stabilisation, with the latter
including raising interest rates, restraining the growth of credit, and devaluing the exchange
rate. These measures, together with the legalisation of gold trading, induced a strong
portfolio adjustment by households in favour of dong assets and away from dollars and
gold, which at the time were circulating widely in Vietnam (Dollar, 1993). The effect of
these measures was to bring inflation to a virtual halt in mid-1989. Structural reform
included the liberalisation of prices and the elimination of the system of state procurement.
While the pace of reform in Vietnam from 1986-89 was gradual, the stabilisation
program adopted in 1989 was certainly as ambitious as anything described as “shock
therapy” in other countries (Riedel and Comer, 1997). There can be no question that (1)
privatising the dominant sector of the economy (agriculture); (2) decontrolling prices; (3)
opening up the economy, all in matter of a few years, constituted a radical reform program.
The outcome was, nevertheless, very different from that in Eastern Europe, where “Big
Bang” describes the “big collapse” in output that followed major reforms. The analysis of
the macroeconomic performance and reform policies since Vietnam transformed to a
market economy will be conducted in the next sections.
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3.3 The Effect of Reform Policies on Macroeconomic Performance since
1986
This section attempts to analyse the effects of the reform policies, applied since the
decision to change course and transform Vietnam into a market-oriented economy was
taken in 1986, on its macroeconomic performance. These reform policies can be classified
into two kinds: macroeconomic stabilisation policies and structural adjustment policies.
The macroeconomic stabilisation policies include: (a) fiscal policy; (b) monetary and credit
policy; and (c) exchange rate adjustment. Structural adjustment policies contain: (a)
agricultural and industrial policy reforms; (b) state-owned enterprise reforms; (c) trade
policy reforms; (d) public sector reforms; (e) tariff reforms; and (f) factor market reforms –
land reform, labour policy, financial sector reforms, etc. The effects of these policies on the
macroeconomic performance in Vietnam can be usefully broken down into three periods:
the first period from 1986 to 1989; the second period from 1990 to 1997; and the third
period from 1998 until the present.
3.3.1

Period 1986 – 1989: Economic renovation
Following the Doi Moi policy Vietnam experienced a major increase in the growth of

real GDP that was contributed primarily from agriculture and services. From Table 3.6 it
can be seen that GDP growth increased dramatically from 3.4 per cent in 1986 to 8.0 per
cent in 1989. For agriculture and services, similarly, substantial increases in growth rates
were recorded, except for the year 1987 where a negative figure for agriculture resulted
from bad weather. Radical changes in pricing and the management of agriculture in 198789, which greatly increased the freedom of producers and thereby stimulated impressive
increases in agricultural production and particularly of rice, were the main factors that
contributed to this growth. However, this period witnessed a decline in industrial
production, largely due to the loss of aid and markets in COMECON countries which used
to be the main suppliers of cheap required raw materials and spare parts to SOEs, and the
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closure of many unprofitable enterprises when they were made subject to market
determined-pricing principles. Surprisingly, consumer price inflation abated considerably
in 1989 to 34.7 per cent from 487 per cent in 1986, arising from measures to bring
monetary growth under control and to devalue the Vietnamese dong, as well as from the
increased availability of products. A key part of the fight against inflation was a drastic
increase in interest rates. During the year 1989 both borrowers and savers were confronted
with a positive real interest rate, which was linked to the previous month’s inflation plus a
few per cent. This signified that the real rate of interest became almost ten per cent per
month during the first half of 1989, when inflation decreased dramatically. Other price
reforms complemented the interest adjustments. The government unified and devalued the
exchange rate and legalised gold trading. As a consequence of these reforms, households
shifted some portion of their liquid assets out of gold and dollars back into dongdenominated assets. Vietnamese households switched from saving in gold and dollars to
saving in bank accounts, and a vast amount of liquidity was thereby absorbed. The velocity
of money was greatly reduced and, as a result, inflation was under control.
Low recorded levels of domestic savings were a characteristic of the Vietnamese
economy through the 1980s (Dollar, 1993), leading to a reliance on foreign savings to
cover demand for consumption and accumulation. During this period the domestic savings
ratio ranged between 2 per cent and minus 3 per cent. The proportion of total national
income devoted to accumulation was also unstable. Accumulation peaked in 1988 owing to
the Doi Moi program but decreased sharply in 1989. Spending cuts in the face of
accelerating inflation badly affected state investment. State investment dropped by 64.5 per
cent in 1987 and recovery was very slow. Investment data was only officially available for
the state sector. The productive sector accounted for 85.6 per cent of state investment. Of
the productive sector, the share of industry reached the level of 45 per cent. According to
statistics, the structure of accumulation and investment did not change by much despite the
move to a market economy.
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Table 3-6: Real GDP and Sectoral Growth Rates
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

3.4

4.0

5.2

8.0

5.1

6.0

8.6

8.1

8.8

9.5

9.3

8.1

5.8

4.7

6.8

6.8

7.04

Agriculture

1.5

-3.5

5.9

6.9

1.6

2.2

7.1

3.8

3.9

4.8

4.4

4.3

3.5

5.2

4.6

2.8

4.1

Industry

4.6

11.4

3.9

-4.0

2.9

9.0

14.0

13.1

14.0

13.6

14.5

12.6

8.6

7.4

10.1

10.3

9.4

Services

-

5.6

8.9

17.7

10.8

8.3

7.0

9.2

10.2

9.8

8.8

7.1

4.3

2.4

5.3

6.1

6.5

Inflation Rate
487
317
311
34.7
67.5
67.6
17.5
Source: World Bank 1993 and UNDP Reports (various issues).

5.2

14.4

12.7

4.5

3.6

9.2

2.0

-1.0

0.8

4.0

Real GDP

2002

Table 3-7: Fiscal Position (% of GDP)
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

13.2

12.2

11.3

11.9

14.7

13.5

19.0

22.5

24.7

23.9

22.9

20.8

20.2

19.6

20.5

21.3

19.94

Tax revenue
Transfers
from
state
enterprises1
Others non-tax revenues
Grants

-

-

-

-

4.0
8.6

3.7
8.1

5.0
10.8

8.3
11.2

9.9
12.1

10.5
9.8

10.3
9.5

8.8
8.7

8.7
8.0

9.0
8.0

7.8
10.2

8.2
10.6

-

-

-

-

-

2.0
0.0

1.4
0.4

2.5
0.8

2.2
0.7

2.1
0.7

2.9
0.7

2.5
0.6

2.6
0.8

2.9
0.6

2.1
0.6

2.0
0.5

2.0
0.4

-

Current expenditures (exc.
Interest)
Social expenditures

13.4

12.8

14.1

12.3

14.7

11.4

14.0

18.8

18.3

17.8

16.4

15.7

14.5

13.2

15.1

15.4

-

-

-

-

-

4.2

2.6

-

6.5

8.0

6.5

6.2

6.9

6.2

5.8

6.7

7.4

-

Capital expenditure (exc. Onlending)

5.6

3.9

4.4

6.4

5.1

2.8

5.8

7.0

6.9

5.4

5.7

6.2

5.7

7.4

6.7

8.0

-

-

-

-

-

0.7
0.0

0.8
0.0

0.9
0.0

1.3
0.0

0.6
0.0

1.3
0.0

1.0
0.0

0.6
0.0

0.6
0.3

0.6
0.1

0.8
0.8

0.9
0.4

-

-

-

-

-

20.5

15.0

20.7

27.1

25.8

24.5

23.1

22.6

20.7

21.2

23.4

24.7

22.47

-5.8

-4.4

-7.1

-6.8

-5.8

-1.5

-1.7

-4.6

-1.1

-0.6

-0.2

-1.7

-0.5

-1.6

-2.8

-3.4

-2.53

Total revenue and grants

Interest (paid)
Contingency
Total expenditures
Overall Balance (cash basis)

Note: 1 Transfers include all taxes, operating surplus, depreciation allowances, and capital user fees.
Source: Ministry of Finance and General Statistical Office, and World Bank staff estimates.
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In the mid-1980s total exports were around US$700-800 million a year, of which
around US$350 million went to convertible currency areas. These figures almost certainly
underestimated the effective openness of the Vietnamese economy at this time. A high
proportion of means of exchange and liquid savings was kept in gold and dollars, and
economic agents were surprisingly well aware of relative border prices for tradable goods
and services (Fforde and Stefan, 1996). Furthermore, a large amount of unreported
merchandise was illegally imported and exported in cross border trade with its neighbours
(China, Laos and Cambodia).
Despite the fact that Vietnam could benefit from foreign trade as it has a
comparative advantage in terms of cheap and rather highly-educated labour, the barriers
imposed by the state ensured that the external sector remained weakly developed. A high
proportion of imports, albeit hard to quantify, was financed by the economic assistance
program. Reported exports per head grew from 4.5 current U.S dollars-roubles 11 in 1976 to
6.3 in 1980 and to 11.7 in 1985. It stayed approximately unchanged until the rapid
increases of 1989-1990. See Figure 3.1 for the reported trade deficits with the convertible
and nonconvertible areas.
Figure 3-1: Trade Deficits (Roubles and US$ million)

Rouble and US$ million

500
0
-500

US$
Rouble

-1000
-1500
-2000
1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Note: Rouble data is evaluated at the rate of 1 Rouble equals 1 US$.
Source: SO 1991c, 1992, 1994a. (Fforde, 1996).
11

Vietnamese official surveys measured foreign trade in “dollars-roubles”. To quote the official source:
“For the socialist countries (area I), calculations are in roubles; for the capitalist and developing countries
(area II), calculations are in US dollars. At present we do not yet have the means for converting the data
into a single united currency” (SO 1987, p. 357).
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Before 1985 more than 80 per cent of the budget deficits of the Vietnamese
government were financed by loans and grants from COMECON countries. The remainder
was covered by loans from the State Bank and from material bond issues. However, the
reform of “prices, wages, and currency” in 1985, which led to an annual inflation rate of
nearly 500 per cent, was a major cause of high financial deficits, which reached the level
of 45 per cent of total expenditure in 1985 but the coverage of foreign aid in deficits was
only 40 percent. About 60 per cent of deficits were covered by borrowings from the State
Bank, leading to the issue of bank notes.
During the period 1986-1989 the structure of government revenue did not change
and was composed mainly of taxes, transfers from state enterprises, and others. But the
structure of expenditure changed considerably. Of expenditure, subsidies for basic
consumer goods, exports, and loans of state enterprises expanded their share in total
expenditure from a level of 15 per cent in 1986 to 29 per cent in 1987 and 1988. The share
of wages and salaries in total expenditures increased sharply from 5 per cent in 1987 to 9
per cent in 1988.
Since late 1988 the government took many concrete measures to reform the fiscal
and monetary fields. The rate and base of various taxes were revised in response to the
level of inflation. The state started trying to mobilise more domestic resources into the
budget in 1989. A number of taxation laws were passed in July 1990 and later
implemented. In real terms, transfers from state enterprises declined by one-third between
1987 and 1990, while taxes collected from the non-state sector increased slightly. In 1989
all budgetary subsidies, with the exception of small working capital contributed to newly
established state enterprises, were abolished.
In conclusion, although there were many physical and institutional difficulties the
initial results of economic reforms during 1986-1989 were very encouraging: three digit
inflation was curbed; food production increased remarkably leading Vietnam to become the
world’s third largest rice exporter; export earnings were 2.4 times higher than those for the
period 1980-1985; and the GDP growth rate grew steadily. Such success encouraged the
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government to take a positive and decisive step in accelerating the process of transition to a
market economy with a combination of structural reforms and stabilisation measures.
3.3.2

Period 1990 – 1997: Accelerated structural reform and stabilisation
Entering the 1990s the flow of foreign savings into Vietnam dropped dramatically,

and this inevitably had an effect on growth. The rate of GDP growth declined slightly to 5.1
per cent in 1990 but increased again after 1991. Much of the increase in output came from
two sub-sectors: oil and rice. Agriculture was a leading sector as rice production responded
to price liberalisation and strengthened property rights for farming households. By 1991 the
industrial sector was the most rapidly growing sector with the expansion of the oil sector,
light manufacturing and agro-processing. The period 1992-1997 was a very good one for
Vietnam with the real GDP growth rate averaging 9 per cent per year (see Table 3.6). The
main impetus to growth came from private consumption and FDI inflows, which on
average contributed over 13 percentage points annually to the real growth rate of GDP.
Sectors that made the largest contribution to growth during 1992-1997 were manufacturing
(accounting for 27 per cent of total growth in value added), wholesale and retail trade (15
per cent), and agriculture (13 per cent). Within manufacturing, import-substituting
industries – metallurgy, machinery, chemical, and materials industries – contributed on
average 40 per cent of total growth in manufacturing value added. The main sources of
growth in industry during this period were foreign-owned enterprises: their share in
industrial production increased to nearly one-third, and they accounted for 42.4 per cent of
the increase in industrial output in 1997 (IMF Report, 1999). However, much of the
increase in output of foreign-owned enterprises was concentrated in capital-intensive
import-substituting industries.
This period witnessed some important reform measures implemented in the SOE
sector (see Appendix 3.1.A for a road map of SOE reforms) including: more autonomy to
SOEs in production and employment decisions (the contract responsibility system);
subjecting of all enterprises to more uniform rules of taxation; allow more enterprises to
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establish trade links or to use trade companies of their own choice rather than a prescribed
trade channel; and expose all enterprises to more foreign competition through liberalising
the trade regime. The State Enterprise Law was passed in 1995 to provide a coherent
blueprint for strengthening the sector by limiting the state’s financial responsibility for
commercial enterprises, establishing rules to control the creation of new enterprises,
improving the monitoring and supervision of enterprises, and allowing greater managerial
autonomy. This period also witnessed a reduction in the number of SOEs from around
12,000 in 1990 to around 6000 in 1997. Most of this reduction took place by 1994. During
1995-96 nearly half of the remaining state enterprises were grouped under 18 big holding
companies known as General Corporations, with the goals that these corporations could
reap economies of scale, limit both monopoly powers and disorderly competition, and
conserve government administration. However, contrary to intention, the grouping of
enterprises has introduced a degree of monopoly power and rent-seeking activity. Their
creation has reduced efficiency by lowering the flexibility and the autonomy of production
decisions of individual firms, and reducing the rewards for healthy firms to operate
profitably (IMF Report, 1999).
Compared with other transition economies in Europe at the beginning of their
transition process, Vietnam has provided an excellent example of successfully reducing
rampant inflation. Its inflation rate has declined noticeably and continuously since 1989
with the exception of 1994-1995. As the government has continued with its policy of not
borrowing from the State Bank, to keep the money supply under tighter control in the
subsequent years, the inflation rate declined from 12.7 per cent in 1995 to 4.5 per cent and
3.6 per cent in 1996 and 1997, respectively (Table 3.6).
The savings and investment pattern have changed considerably since 1990. The
traditional source of public investment, Soviet aid, was reduced and then disappeared from
1991. Since then Vietnam has done an impressive job of replacing foreign savings with
domestic savings. Total investment increased steadily, reaching 27 per cent of GDP in
1996-1997 (see Figure 3-2). Vietnam achieved this rate due to higher household investment
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being put into household small companies in 1993-1994 and to the foreign investment
boom of 1995-1997.
The composition of investment, however, changed during this period. The state
budget, including ODA, funded a steady portion of total investment through the 1990s,
amounting to an annual average of 6 per cent of GDP. State enterprises accounted for an
increasing share of investment from 1990, averaging 7 per cent of GDP for the whole
period. However, the deteriorating performance of the SOEs also has important
implications for government revenue and the non-performing loans of the state banks.
Foreign investment inflows reached their peak between 1995-1997 when an average of
around US$2 billion a year was disbursed. At the same time private investment has
expanded, with an average 7.1 per cent share of GDP for the whole period. This basic shift
is a healthy development for Vietnam. Nevertheless, both public and private investment
figures are low compared to other countries in the region.
Figure 3-2: Total Investment and Savings 1993-1998

Percent of GDP

30
25
20
Total Investment

15

Total Savings

10
5
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Source: World Bank, 1998.

Entering the 1990s, Vietnam’s savings situation was far better than a few years
before. While foreign aid declined the country’s bold reform had an immediate payoff in
terms of improved national savings, which climbed to 17 per cent of GDP by 1993-1996
and peaked at 20 per cent a year later. Although Vietnam’s domestic saving rate is already
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above the average of low-income countries, it is still well below regional levels. To meet its
expanding investment requirements for further development the government must have
policies aimed at liberalising the investment environment for the private sector,
strengthening the banks to attract financial savings, and also making itself more attractive
to foreign investors (World Bank Report, 2000).
Important fiscal reforms were implemented over this period. In the first five years
from 1991 to 1995 Vietnam set up a centralized State Treasury system and implemented
the first phase of tax reform. Although the year 1991 was a difficult one, due to the loss of
CMEA aid and markets, the overall budget deficit fell to 1.5 per cent of GDP, the bulk of
which was financed by foreign borrowing. Compared to 1989 there were reductions of
wages, salaries and subsidies to SOEs, bringing the budget into a slight surplus.
Government capital expenditure was halved, while Central Bank financing was virtually
eliminated. In 1993, the principle of only non-bank financing of the budget deficit was
adopted and the fiscal deficit was brought down to a sustainable level in 1994-1995.
During the period 1991-1995 the methods of tax collection, and the base upon which
taxes were assessed, had improved. Income tax receipts were still tiny but revenue from
agricultural and turnover tax had improved substantially, as had import and export duties.
Real revenue and spending had both grown rapidly. Over this period revenue rose in real
terms on average by 20 per cent a year, and total spending by 22.6 per cent (Table 3.7).
The trade and exchange system was further liberalised (see Appendix 3.1.B and 3.1.C
for details) arising from an increase in the number and scope of private sector involvement
in direct import and export activities, and trade barriers were reduced. Private trading
enterprises had tripled in number from 3,894 in 1994 to 13,639 in 1997. During the 1992 –
1997 period, the maximum tariff rate was reduced 80 per cent and the number of bands
reduced from 50 to 35. The share of imports subject to non-tariff barriers fell from fourfifths to two-fifths. Over the years, most export quotas have been lifted and export taxes
have been reduced to generally low levels. In addition, export activities by the private
sector – mainly labour intensive manufactures in line with the country’s comparative
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advantage - have been increasingly encouraged, thus breaking the trade monopoly of a
small number of state-owned enterprises. These reforms have led to a rapid export and
import growth. As can be seen in Table 3.8, between 1990-1997 the dollar value of imports
and exports roughly quadrupled (to US$10,460 million and US$9,145 million,
respectively), raising the share of trade (including both imports and exports) in GDP from
50 per cent to 86 per cent - a high share by international standards.
Since 1995 there has been a significant shift in the composition of Vietnam’s exports
(see Table 3.9) as textiles and garments overtook sea products and rice to become the
country’s second largest export earner after oil, and shoes also moved into the top ten
earners in 1996. Textile and garment exports increased nearly ten times from 1992 to 1997
to US$1,349 million, largely on the basis of increased sales to Western Europe which
absorbed about half of the total. In 1997 growth in earnings of crude oil, seafood, garments
and footwear led the strong pick-up in total export earnings. Both the Asian and European
markets contributed to this spurt in export earnings, although the Asian crisis happened in
the second half of 1997. Crude oil export growth came from larger purchases by China and
Australia, while seafood was due mainly to stronger demand in Japan and other countries in
Asia. Increases in garment exports went evenly to Europe and Asia, while Europe
accounted for most of the growth in footwear exports. In fact, Europe increasingly became
an important market for Vietnam’s exports.
As Vietnam did not receive any significant financing from overseas during the 19901992 period, its imports had been constrained by the level of exports. With the principle
that export growth must be sufficient to ensure that there was no compression of the level
of imports during the adjustment period, the growth rate of imports in Vietnam during this
period was not much different from that of exports. Thus Vietnam’s current account deficit
was kept at a low level (about 2 per cent of GDP during 1990-1992), especially if
compared to other developing countries with a similar level of income. The current account
deficit peaked at 13.1 per cent of GDP in 1995, but decreased steadily in subsequent years.
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Table 3-8: Foreign Trade
(US$ million)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Total exports (fob)

2,404

2,087

2,581

2,985

4,054

5,449

7,256

Total imports (cif)

2,752

2,338

2,541

3,924

5,826

8,353

10,483

Current account balance
(as % of GDP)

-4.2

-1.9

-1.3

-9.9

-10.9

-12.5

-13.1

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

9,145

9,365

11,540

14,449

15,027

16,530

10,461

10,341

10,460

14,072

14,401

19,300

-6.2

-3.9

4.5

2.1

2.2

-1.5

Source: Data provided by the Vietnamese authorities and World Bank staff estimates.

Table 3-9: Leading Exports
(US$ million)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Rice

272

225

300

363

429

549

855

870

1,024

1,025

667

625

726

Petroleum

390

581

756

844

866

1,024

1,346

1,413

1,232

2,092

3,503

3,175

3,226

Coal

38

48

47

70

75

81

115

111

102

96

94

108

149

Rubber

16

50

54

74

113

181

163

191

127

147

166

161

170

Coffee

25

74

86

110

328

495

337

491

594

585

501

385

317

Seafood

220

285

302

427

551

620

651

781

858

971

1,479

1,800

2,024

Cashew nuts

13

26

41

44

59

130

130

133

117

110

167

144

212

Textiles & Garments

20

156

221

336

550

800

1,150

1,349

1,450

1,747

1,892

1,975

2,710

na

na

na

530

965

1,032

1,392

1,465

1,560

1,828

Footwear

na
na
na
Source: Ministry of Trade and Bank staff estimates.
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In the financial area, continuing the initial steps of restructuring the banking system
begun in mid 1988, the government’s objectives for further reform were to develop a safe,
sound, and competitive banking system that would help protect macroeconomic stability,
instil financial discipline and intermediate effectively i.e. mobilise more savings and
allocate them to more efficient uses. To do so the government approved two banking laws
in 1997 and set up the Bank Restructuring Committee (BRC) aimed at: restructuring Joint –
stock banks and State-owned commercial banks; improving the regulatory, supervisory and
legal framework; levelling the playing field for all banks; and developing human capacity
and resources in the banking sector.
In the period 1990-1997 Vietnam experienced a substantial rise in FDI. Following the
1990 revision that clarified several provisions in the original version of the 1987 FDI law,
the amount of foreign investment approved for 1991 doubled over that of the previous year.
The increasing trend continued until 1997 as further reforms were introduced. Foreign
investment inflows reached their peak between 1995 and 1997, when an average of around
US$2.5 billion a year was disbursed. Much of the capital flowed from East Asia such as
from Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and from other ASEAN firms.
Nevertheless, with its advantages of a central location in a dynamic region of the world,
strong human resource potential and low-wage labour, it is clear that Vietnam’s potential to
attract FDI had not been fully exploited during this period. This was due to technicaleconomic factors, as well as institutional deficiencies (Gates, 2000). Firstly, the
underdeveloped physical infrastructure resulted in a great increase in costs of using this
infrastructure as well as of improving this infrastructure for foreign investments. Secondly,
a major institutional deficiency was Vietnam’s property rights system, which made it
difficult for foreign investors to obtain and retain user rights to land. Further, its rather
opaque legal and bureaucratic procedures on project approval and implementation were
deficient. Another problem is with serious corruption spread over all administrative levels.
Before 1996 foreign investors were most active in oil and gas exploration and in the
tourism industry. Nearly 30 per cent of the approved investments were in the oil and gas
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exploration sector, mainly due to the government’s encouragement of capital-intensive
import substituting industries. The most active projects in this sector were in the south, off
the coastal town of Vung Tau. About two-thirds of FDI has been located in the south
despite the government’s encouragement and promotion of investment in all parts of the
country. The reason foreign investors prefer to have their projects in the south, among other
things, is that infrastructure is better than in the north and business practice, as known in
the west, is also better understood. Management skills appropriate to a market economy,
despite a shortage in both north and south, are nevertheless more available in the south.
The majority of foreign investment projects are joint ventures, mostly with SOEs or
state agencies, which often contribute their capital in the form of land use. A revision of the
FDI law in December 1992 also allowed private companies to enter joint ventures with
foreign investors. Although the FDI law allows for 100 per cent foreign-owned projects
relatively few of the approved projects were of this type before 1994, in part because
foreign investors preferred to have local counterparts in their projects to benefit from their
familiarity with the country and because it was difficult for foreign investors to obtain
rights to use land unless they engaged in a joint venture. However, there has been a slight
trend away from joint ventures with state enterprises and an increase in wholly foreignowned investments, as a new decree on foreign investment has been approved in 1996
under which foreign-invested businesses would be allowed to grant mortgages over land
use rights and assets attached to Vietnamese banks. Since November 1999 this decree has
been applied to foreign banks as well.
Important fiscal reforms were implemented during the period 1990-1997 (see
Appendix 3.1.D) with the setting up of a centralised treasury system and implementing the
first phase of tax reform. The Treasury gradually extended its network to all provinces and
all districts, providing a strong basis for effective budget execution. Vietnam’s tax base was
diversified during this period. Four new taxes – turnover, profit, import-export and special
consumption – were introduced, and, for the first time, the non-state sector and state sector
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were largely subject to the same tax rates. After 1994, there were no explicit subsidies from
the budget for SOEs (World Bank Report, 2000).
In conclusion, Vietnam’s improvements in macroeconomic performance were
remarkable for this period: inflation was substantially reduced, the budget deficits declined
and external competitiveness increased. Moreover, it successfully doubled its savings rate
and tripled investment. Productivity had also been raised through higher capital investment
and utilisation of idle capacity, in addition to reforms in the economy’s incentive structure
in both industry and agriculture. Consequently, economic growth soared over the period
1990-1997: Vietnam’s GDP growth averaged 8 per cent per annum. However, the Asian
economic and financial crisis happened at the end of this period and changed the course of
the Vietnamese economy. Vietnam entered the next period with many internal and external
difficulties that required the government to take strong steps in further reforming the
economy towards a market economy.
3.3.3

Period 1998 – present: Reform slowdown
The economic and financial crisis that happened in some Asian countries from mid-

1997 contributed to a slowing down of economic reforms in Vietnam. To avoid an adverse
impact of the crisis on the economy Vietnam has followed a cautious economic stance,
giving priority to ensuring macroeconomic stability rather than taking risks in order to
achieve higher growth. The government has continued to reform, though not at a pace that
could compensate for the deteriorating economic situation. Consequently, economic growth
was adversely affected. Growth of real GDP during the two-year period 1998-1999 was
around half the rate of the period 1992-1997 (Table 3.6). While agricultural growth was
down to 3.5 per cent due mainly to drought in 1998, 1999 experienced a recovery of
agricultural performance through higher growth in rice, fishery and livestock. Rice output
rose to 32 million tonnes from 29 million and 27 million tonnes in 1998 and 1997,
respectively. As a result, rice exports were to top 4.2 million tonnes in 1999, which
accounted for 9 per cent of total exports. Livestock, which has been growing quite rapidly
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for sometime maintained its strength, while fisheries showed renewed vigour in part led by
strong export demand. Low industrial growth was due to negative growth in construction
and slower growth in both manufacturing and utilities, which were attributable to the large
decline in foreign investment. Slower growth in trade, real estate, tourism and the financial
sector dominated the decline in service sector growth during these two years.
To resist the downward trend of economic growth arising from the Asian financial
crisis, new and important legislative measures to facilitate the entry of private enterprises
and to liberalise trading rights were taken. In mid-1998 the revised Law on Promotion of
Domestic Investment provided new incentives for the domestic private sector. This was
followed by the approval and implementation of the Enterprise Law in 1999 and 2000.
Together with the elimination of more than 100 different business licenses that restricted
the entry in different sectors, ongoing implementation of this Law is improving the policy
environment for domestic private enterprises significantly. As a result, the number of
household-enterprises has increased dramatically, and they are playing an increasingly
important role in manufacturing. As of 1999 there were around 600,000 micro household
enterprises in manufacturing, a quarter of all micro-enterprises, contributing 28 per cent of
manufacturing value-added, and 5,600 private enterprises in manufacturing accounting for
10 per cent of manufacturing GDP (World Bank Report, 2001). As a result, the economy
has been recovering with real GDP increasing substantially to 6.8 per cent in 2000 from 4.7
per cent in 1999, primarily due to both demand and supply side developments. On the
demand side, private consumption and investment, including FDI, were buoyed by an
accommodative fiscal policy and improved business sentiment. Despite a weak external
environment and lower commodity prices, exports still grew on average at 4 per cent over
the period 2000-2001. Supply side factors contributing to the growth of real GDP included
an increase in oil and coffee output, despite other agricultural production being below the
record harvests of the last decade. Industrial production also grew at a faster pace than
1999, with growth largely attributable to the domestic market. The service sector was still
relatively strong, with retail sales growth staying at 9 per cent, reflecting low import prices,
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a sharp rise in government wages, and the expansion of small and medium-sized
enterprises.
The Asian financial crisis led to an increase in consumer price inflation of 9.2 per
cent in 1998. But average annual inflation decreased to 2 per cent in 1999 and even to a
negative number in 2000, which reflected significant declines in the food price index
mainly due to a bumper rice harvest.
Most of the significant fiscal reforms took place after 1997. The new Budget Law
was approved in 1997 and the VAT implemented in 1999. The Budget Law provides a
legal framework for budget formulation, approval, and execution and monitoring, defining
clearly revenue and expenditure assignments to different tiers of government. However,
revenue as a share of GDP fell substantially, by about 5 per cent, over the last three years of
the 20th century, a decline of nearly a quarter of what it was in 1996. Nearly two-thirds of
that decline happened in 1998 and 1999, two years of substantially lower growth. Weaker
SOE performance and lower import-tax receipts explain most of the stagnation in revenue.
Harder times faced by private firms in 1998 and 1999 – whether domestic private corporate
sector or foreign-invested sector – also contributed. The decline in import tax revenue is
explained by both a shift in the composition of imports away from consumer goods and of
course a falling GDP share of imports in these two years.
The government has responded to this situation by cutting planned current
expenditures across-the-board. Expenditures were reduced by 4.1 per cent of GDP over the
period 1996-1999, but the GDP share of social sector (education and health) spending was
maintained. Spending on economic services and general administration was cut and those
cuts fell disproportionately on non-wage expenditures. Expenditures on social transfers fell
most, but most of this was because spending was shifted from the budget to the Social
Insurance Fund. With regard to sector composition, industry and construction, irrigation
and transport sectors have not seen many changes during this period, while agriculture and
forestry experienced a substantial increase in 1999.
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The fiscal stance eased in the first two years of the new century thanks to the windfall
in oil revenue. The overall budget deficit estimated at 2.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent of GDP
in the years 2000 and 2001 respectively, was higher than budgeted, and was financed by
domestic non-bank sources. However, non-oil revenue performance was weak, reflecting,
in part, ad hoc reductions in VAT and income tax rates, and also a weak financial
performance of SOEs and generous tax incentives (IMF Reports, 2000 and 2001).
The most significant measure was the freeing-up of trading rights for firms registered
in Vietnam. These firms were allowed, for the first time, to export and import goods
directly without license. This prompted rapid growth in the number of exporting and
importing enterprises, especially private trading firms. The domestic private sectors’ share
in the value of non-oil exports rose from 12 per cent in 1997 to 22 per cent in mid-2000,
and in import value from 4 per cent to 16 per cent. However, the regional economic crisis
resulted in a slowdown of export growth in 1998, the dollar value of exports increased only
2.2 per cent compared to that of the previous year (see Table 3.8). Facing a decline in
exports to Asia – they fell by 20 per cent in 1998 - Vietnamese exporters were striving to
diversify to non-Asian markets such as Europe and the US. Exports to Europe and the US
grew by more than 19 per cent and 25 per cent per year, respectively, in 1998 and 1999.
Petroleum, footwear, textiles and garments were the main products for these markets. This
geographic diversification helped to maintain some growth in export earnings. There was a
dramatic pick-up in export earnings in 2000 and 2001. The dollar value of exports rose by
25 per cent, led by oil, but non-oil exports also grew by a robust 16 per cent, the same as in
1999. Also, for the first time, nearly half of total exports were conducted by domestic
private firms and by foreign invested enterprises, and the share of the domestic private
sector in exports jumped from 4 per cent in 1997 to around 15 per cent in 2000.
With regards to the structural adjustment reform policies, since 1998 the country has
entered a period in which further reform measures were delayed. With the view that trade
controls are an effective means of limiting the impact of external development on the
domestic economy, the government tightened trade policies and imposed more restrictions
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on foreign trading rights (represented in the boxes under the baseline in Appendix 3.1.B).
There was an increase in the categories of goods in the list of licensed goods in order to
protect the balance of trade. In addition, the introduction of a new tariff schedule, despite a
lower maximum standard tariff (from 60 per cent to 50 per cent) and number of rates (from
14 to 10), has continued very high levels of effective protection. In the industrial area, the
SOE reform program has tapered off. The process of equitisation has proceeded at a slow
pace, reflecting the weakened pressure for reforms, especially with a slowdown of inflows
of foreign direct investment; concerns of workers and management about their jobs;
concerns of local governments over losing revenue sources; and the lack of a well
articulated framework for equitisation and valuation.
During the regional crisis most currencies in the East Asian countries depreciated,
however the exchange rate between the dong and other foreign currencies, especially the
US$, remained stable. However, with the purpose of increasing domestic exports the
government decided to depreciate the dong after the second quarter of 1998 (Table 3.9).
Major steps have been taken to liberalise the foreign exchange market, including a gradual
phasing out of the foreign exchange surrender requirement that was relaxed from 50 per
cent to 30 per cent in 2002.
Foreign investment inflows reached their peak between 1995 and 1997 when an
average of around US$2 billion a year was disbursed (see Table 3.10). Inflows fell sharply
following the Asian financial crisis with a large reduction from East Asia and Japan.
Foreign investment inflows fell by around 60 per cent in 1998 and further in 1999.
Recession, as well as adverse investor sentiment, contributed to the continuing decline in
foreign investment disbursements. However, while East Asia still experienced a sharp
reduction in foreign investment inflows, the inflow of foreign direct investment remained
stable in the period 1999-2001, reflecting Vietnam’s intermediate position in the region and
its achievement in implementing the reform program and especially amendments to the
Foreign Investment Law helping to improve the climate for FDI.
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Table 3-10: Foreign Investment Commitments and Disbursements
(US$ million)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Commitments

1582

1417

2321

3661

4167

6566

8633

4397

3899

1677

2200

2510

1350

Disbursements

na

206

380

1112

1936

2672

2607

3250

2200

2110

1966

2300

2200

30.2

73.9

56.4

125.8

89.4

91.6

163.0

% Disb./Comm.
na
14.5
16.4
30.4
46.5
40.7
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment and World Bank staff estimates.

Table 3-11: Forms of Foreign Investment Inflows (percent)
Share in % Implemented Capital
Majority joint - ventures
Wholly foreign owned
Business co-operation contract
Source: MPI, Government of Vietnam.

1994
51.0
16.0
33.0

1995
52.0
18.0
30.0

1996
59.0
27.0
14.0

1997
65.0
33.0
2.0

1998
51.0
17.0
32.0

Total 91-98
56.2
23.7
20.0

Table 3-12: Exchange Rate
(D:US$; annual average)
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

8,819

11,200

10,650

10,954

11,029

11,050

11,689

13,613

13,932

14,170

14,785

15,242

Source: State Bank of Vietnam – UNDP data.
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In recent years, although the share of FDI flowing into light industry has increased,
most investment is still capital-intensive, which has entered oil-related production, heavy
industry or real estate. This structure of foreign investment partly reflects Vietnam’s high
barriers to heavy industrial imports, which not only protect capital-intensive SOEs but also
attracts foreign investors into import-substituting and capital-intensive activities often in
the form of joint ventures with SOEs. It has been estimated that more than 70 per cent of
foreign investment occurs in sectors with effective rates of protection above 50 per cent.
Table 3.11 shows that by the end of 1998 less than 13 per cent of the total stock of FDI was
in the labour-intensive light industrial sector, where about 80 per cent of production was
exported and where the growth of jobs can be found. Strikingly, even within the non-oil
industrial sector, more than half of the investments were in heavy industry. This shows that
the amount of export-oriented and labour-intensive foreign investment attracted by
Vietnam’s high human capital and low labour costs are still modest (Belser, 2000). It is
thus unsurprising that foreign investment, although accounting for 31.8 per cent of
industrial production in 1998 and accounting for almost half of industrial growth over the
period 1995-1998, still employs only 11.5 per cent of all industry workers.
In conclusion, economic growth began to slow sharply in 1998 as the Asian crisis
started affecting the Vietnamese economy and exposed underlying structural weaknesses,
especially in the SOE and banking sectors. However, the economic outlook for Vietnam
improved gradually over the period 2000-2002. This improvement was due to a series of
policies and regulations that put the economy on an enhanced growth path, even as the
external environment remained weak. This favourable outlook suggests that the effects of
the East Asian crisis may be over. However, there will be a lot of possible problems ahead
such as global downturns resulting from terrorism or epidemic diseases (SARS, for
example), which should be taken into consideration by the Vietnamese government when
building the economic development strategy.
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3.4 Current Problems Facing The Vietnamese Economy
At the current stage of the economic development process Vietnam is facing
significant pressures from neighbouring countries’ reform policies that are focused upon
raising their competitiveness by currency devaluation and product improvement. As well as
from increasing internal challenges due to chronic SOE losses, the resultant heavy fiscal
and quasi-fiscal burden, the unfavourable environment for private sector development,
systemic risks in the banking sector, low level of domestic savings and investment, and
inefficient resource allocation resulting from the import-substitution strategy. Failure to
address any of these issues may lead to a slow down of Vietnam’s economic growth and
even expose the country to serious crisis. This section will briefly discuss these issues
focusing mainly on SOE reforms, private sector development constraints, banking sector
reforms, trade liberalisation, and fiscal reform policies.
3.4.1

Slow progress of state-owned enterprise reforms
Since 1998, the government has carried out an assessment of all SOEs and developed

a detailed SOE reform program. As of 1999, SOEs accounted for 30 per cent of GDP and
nearly half of bank credit. But SOE financial conditions have been deteriorating due to
inefficiency, overstaffing, and outdated technology. Official estimates show 60 per cent of
SOEs were loss makers or marginally profitable as of the end of 1997. Although SOEs
show only small book losses, in 1997-1999, the government had to provide about 2.2 per
cent of GDP annually in supplementary capital, subsidies, tax exemptions, debt write-offs,
and preferential credits. The outstanding bank debt of SOEs at end-2001 was officially
estimated at 90 trillion dong, equivalent to almost US$6 billion. This represents roughly 40
per cent of total domestic credit. Many of the loans given to SOEs by state-owned
commercial banks might never be recovered, thus contributing to a weakening of these
banks.
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State-owned enterprise reforms during the 1990s progressed extremely slowly. After
mergers and a rationalisation of the enterprise sector in the late 1980s and 1990s, the
reform program tapered off. The process of equitisation was launched in mid-1992, but by
the end of 1997 only 17 enterprises had been equitised. However, under the revised
guidelines for equitisation, about 130 enterprises were equitised between end 1997 and
March 1999. In view of the poor financial conditions and inefficiencies of many SOEs the
government adopted a five-year SOE reform plan in March 2001, with annual targets
specified for 2001-2003. The objectives of the plan are to reduce losses and improve
competitiveness. Around 1,800 out the more than 5,500 SOEs will be subject to enteprisespecific reform measures, mostly through equitisation (1,400), divestiture (140), or
liquidation/closure (220). An additional 200 enterprises will face merger/consolidation.
These enterprises are mainly small and medium-sized SOEs in terms of state capital and
their debt, but they account for one-third of total SOE employment.
There are some potential explanations for the slow progress of SOE reforms. Firstly,
there is still a lack of an appropriate legal framework to convert SOEs into companies
operating under the Enterprise Law enacted in 1995. While important regulations
concerning the valuation and sale of state equity, which were not touched upon in the last
Decrees, were issued between April and July 2002, there has been insufficient time for
them to really have an impact on the rate of equitisation. Further, stakeholders in SOEs
identified for transformation are still waiting for the new permanently amended legislation
before moving ahead with important decisions, thus contributing to the slow down in the
process. Secondly, a resistance by insiders, including workers and managers in SOEs is
another potential explanation for the slow pace of transformation. For workers, their
concerns have focused on the compensation policy for redundant workers after the
transformation process of SOEs. For managers or directors, in particular, the resistance has
originated from their anxiety of losing their power over the equitised enterprises. Thirdly,
the monitoring and enforcement of the transformation process remains weak. Binding
constraints do not fit well in a wholly consensual process. There is a gap between having a
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mandatory equitisation program and creating a framework where SOEs can transform if
they wish to. Lastly, excessive debts are another obvious reason why ownership
transformation may be slowing down. Many SOEs are currently burdened by huge debts
and payment arrears, thus very few buyers are interested in acquiring their shares. A new
mechanism is now being considered whereby the government would trade these debts at a
discount price. However, there is a risk that this proposed mechanism could be used to
write off the debts of enterprises that are not bound to be transformed, thus raising the
prospect that new debts will be contracted only to be subsequently written off (World Bank
Report, 2002).
In relation to the speed of SOE reform in other transition countries in Eastern Europe
and China, the pace of enterprise reform in Vietnam has been very slow. Most Eastern
European countries have made extensive use of privatisation to improve the performance of
enterprises, and a recent study points to the importance of ownership changes,
complemented by reforms to promote private sector development, as the key to improving
the efficiency of the enterprise sector (Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999). In China,
which like Vietnam is making the transition to a market economy while maintaining its
political system, the pace of SOE is somewhat faster than Vietnam. China has made major
progress in the corporatisation of the largest enterprises, about half of which have multiple
shareholders and most of these are listed on stock exchanges. Major progress has also been
made in divesting the smaller enterprises. Most recently, the constitution has been amended
to give the private sector equal status to the state sector. A more detailed comparison of
SOE reforms in China and Vietnam is given in Appendix 3.2.
3.4.2

Private sector constraints
Although a significant shift in attitudes toward the private sector occurred recently

with the enactment of the Enterprise Law in 2000, the private sector in Vietnam remains
more constrained than in other countries in the region, including China. The recent policy
and legislative changes have been attributed to a dramatic increase in the number of new
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registered firms. In the period 2000-2002 almost 50,000 new enterprises were registered,
the vast majority of which are fully privately owned but are relatively small in scale.
However, the private sector continues to face various unnecessary restrictions on entry
arising from the remaining business license requirements, whose modification and
rationalisation are still needed. Access to, and transitions in, land-use-rights remain difficult
despite recent changes in land law and security regulations. Access to capital and credit is
also more difficult for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in part because banks are in
dire financial straits and in part because lending to SOEs is viewed more favourably than
lending to the private sector. Currently, as the report from the World Bank (World Bank
Report, 2000) points out, there are four main constraints facing the private sector that
should be addressed by changing policies in order to unleash the productivity of this sector.
The first constraint is social and administrative attitudes. Negative social and administrative
attitudes towards private enterprises colour behaviour towards those engaged in private
activities. They influence individual’s decisions to enter the private sector and, once
entered, constrain their ability to unleash their full potential. Growing one’s business and
increasing its visibility through success is seen as a risky proposition by many
entrepreneurs in Vietnam, because private business has tended to be viewed negatively.
Second, vague and frequently changing regulations and excessive bureaucracy
increase the risk and cost of doing business and tax the resources of private entrepreneurs
that would otherwise be available for investment or for management of the business, and
create an inhospitable business environment. Evidence points out that the bureaucratic
stranglehold, exercised through discretion, is a major drag on private sector dynamism.
Third, private business faces some difficulties in gaining access to available financial
resources. Although Vietnam’s banking reforms aim to address the shortages and problems
of availability of credit and capital for the economy, the impact of these reforms on the
domestic private sector still remains limited because the institutional arrangements for
private transactions in land-use rights as collateral and as equity for joint ventures have not
been established.
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Finally, there are some problems of corporate governance that impede the private
sector to grow in a transparent, accountable, and effective manner. First, a key
characteristic of the private SMEs is that their organisations are quite opaque. Not only is
the ownership-structure of most of these SMEs not known but also the way decisions are
made is unclear. This is not much of a problem when firms are small, but, as they become
bigger and owner-managers’ span of control is less adequate, absence of appropriate
decision-making processes will constrain their growth. Second, most SMEs do not maintain
sufficient accounts or make any public disclosure of their accounts. Various types of
restrictions, and insufficient social acceptance of business success, lead SMEs to misreport
financial and other flows, when reporting is required.
3.4.3

Highly restrictive trade system
Since the introduction of Doi Moi, trade liberalisation has been impressive.

Restrictions on the establishment of Foreign Trading Corporation were relaxed in 1988,
allowing for a rapid increase in the number of enterprises allowed to engage in trade. New
trade policy instruments, including quantitative restrictions and tariffs, were introduced and
then gradually reduced. The foreign exchange regime was also liberalised. The process has
continued at a steady pace in the first years of the 21st century. All the quotas and targets
that, together with domestic production targets, were the basis of the central-planning
system, have been progressively eliminated 12.
Quantitative restrictions on exports of most sectors have been eliminated as well. The
tariff schedule was rationalised in 1992 and simplified in 1999, following Vietnam’s
accession to the ASEAN Free Trade Area. Currently, there are three sets of rates. Mostfavoured nation (MFN) tariff rates are applicable to imports from countries with which
Vietnam enjoys the MFN status. Items in this category represent about 75 percent of total
12

By early 2003, all quantitative restrictions on imports will be abolished with the exception of sugar (to be
kept until 2005) and petroleum products. Quantitative restrictions on imports of cement, motorbikes and
vehicles for up to eight passengers were scheduled to be abolished by end 2002.
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imports. Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates are applicable to imports from
ASEAN countries. General tariff rates, 50 per cent higher than MFN rates, apply to all
other countries. In practice, trade with those other countries is negligible (World Bank
Report, 2002).
While there has been impressive progress in trade liberalisation, Vietnam’s trade
system remains highly restrictive and needs to be further liberalised. The current trade
regime still maintains a policy bias in favour of domestic-market oriented industries,
particularly those dominated by SOEs. From a legal standpoint, all registered firms,
regardless of ownership, can engage in foreign trade. But barriers exist which discourage
trading by non-state enterprises 13. The tariff structure also consists of a policy bias in
favour of domestic industries. Most low tariff rates are on items predominantly used by
SOEs as inputs.
This policy bias could impose large indirect costs on social welfare, particularly
because of its impact on investment decisions. Scarce resources have been distributed
mainly to the manufacturing sector and especially to the capital-intensive industries. As a
result, although the manufacturing sector has been modernised substantially in the 1990s,
this sector remains inefficient because of a high effective protection rate 14, which is a
standard indicator of inefficiency, and the small scale of production. The capital-intensive
nature of this sector has also restricted job growth as well as exports.
Commitments under the AFTA, which imply that most quantitative restrictions have
to be abolished, will affect many industrial sectors and SOEs in particular. Items in the
temporary exclusion list are to be transferred to an inclusion list by 2003, and tariffs to be
reduced to a maximum of five per cent by 2006. In addition, the sensitive list is expected to
be phased out by 2010. The key effects of preferential liberalisation under AFTA can be

13

For example, stringent regulatory requirements demanded by line ministries prevent private firms
participating in rice exports and fertilizer imports. Also, monopolies in production may translate into
monopolies in trading, as in the case of coal.
14
The effective protection rate is as high as 599 per cent for domestic-oriented production of motor
vehicles and motorbikes, 366 per cent for sugar, 241 per cent for tea, 181 per cent for wearing apparel,
and 163 per cent for plastic products (Athukorala, 2002).
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understood in terms of a relatively simple set of partial equilibrium diagrams, of the type
used by Fukasa and Martin (1998). The reduction in the trading partners’ tariffs on exports
from Vietnam leads to an increase in demand for exports from Vietnam, as a result the
price received for these exports also increases. The resulting increase in the price of exports
to the trading partners creates welfare benefits to Vietnam. When access to the markets of
the AFTA members increases, there are likely to be increases in Vietnam’s import demands
for several reasons. First, the rise in domestic prices resulting from the increases in prices
for exports to the trading partners is likely to switch demand towards imported goods.
Second, there will be changes in the volumes of imports resulting from changes in real
incomes. Although the reduction in the tariff on imports from the AFTA partners cause a
decrease in tariff revenues, the gains to consumers are greater since they are able to
increase the quantity of AFTA goods that they purchase.
Import liberalisation also brings about an increase in exports by changing the real
exchange rate. Lowering the domestic price of at least some imports will cause consumers
to substitute these goods for non-traded goods. The reduction in demand for the non-traded
goods lower their prices relative to the prices of traded goods – a relative price change
frequently termed a real exchange rate depreciation (Salter, 1959). This reduction in the
profitability of non-traded goods production makes production for export relatively more
attractive and increases the supply of exports.
The main feature of the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement (BTA) is that the US
agrees to accord normal trade relations status, MFN, to Vietnam, albeit subject to annual
renewal. Thus, Vietnam will move from column 2 to column 1 tariff rates, allowing
Vietnamese goods to enter the US at the same low tariff rates that apply to almost all other
countries. In practice, this is expected to reduce the tariff on Vietnamese goods entering the
US from around 40 per cent to 3 per cent. Over a period of three years Vietnam will reduce
the tariff it charges on imports from the US by about a third, and will eliminate its
quantitative restrictions on many agricultural and industrial products over three to seven
years. In principle, the key impacts of the BTA on the Vietnamese economy are the same as
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those of the preferential liberalisation under AFTA. Beyond tariff reductions the real
significance of the BTA is that it maps out a strategy for Vietnam’s economic development.
It introduces more competition into the economy, and pushes reform and growth overall,
especially in the state sector (Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002). The most immediate effect of
the BTA is expected to be a rapid increase in Vietnam’s exports to the US, especially of
garments and footwear. Vietnam’s exports to the US are already growing fast, jumping
from US$319 million in 1996 to US$1,065 million by 2001, although they are low
compared with those of the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. However this figure is
expected to rise rapidly in the coming years. Commitments under the Vietnam-US bilateral
trade agreement also imply that important service sectors, including banking and insurance,
have to be opened up to competition. These commitments will also have an impact on the
domestic tax system and require tax administration reform to increase the tax base in order
to offset the decrease in tariff rates.
Not being, as yet, a member of WTO puts Vietnam at a disadvantage compared with
its neighbour, China. China’s accession to the WTO, while creating additional incentives
for Vietnam to become a member, intensifies the competition with China’s exports in third
markets as Vietnam shares a similar comparative advantage in labour intensive products as
well as competition for FDI. For example, Vietnam’s textile and garment industry will be
directly affected by the abolition of quotas on Chinese textiles and apparel exports to the
US and the EU starting in 2005. As China improves its business environment, foreign
direct investment may be diverted away from other countries including Vietnam.
It is argued that WTO membership can bring three main benefits. First, it forces
countries to introduce and maintain a relatively liberal economic structure. Second, it gives
them permanent and unconditional MFN status with all other members. Finally, it provides
access to a dispute settlement mechanism (Michalopoulos, 1998). It is obvious that in order
to join the WTO, Vietnam will probably have to make similar reforms to those undertaken
by China in its successful quest for membership. Apart from introducing substantial legal
and institutional changes, China has committed itself to lowering its import tariffs from 21
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per cent (on a trade-weighted average basis) to 8 per cent. Vietnam’s trade-weighted
average tariff rate in the mid-1990s was quite similar, 19 per cent, although this does not
take the substantial degree of smuggling into account. Ianchovichina and Martin (2001),
using a computable general equilibrium model, find that, as a result of WTO membership,
China’s share of world trade is likely to rise from 3.7 per cent in 1995 to 6.8 per cent, and
wages of unskilled workers will rise sharply. To the extent that Vietnam shares a similar
economic structure, and tariff and trade regime with China, Vietnam is also likely to see
relative changes in its trade if and when it becomes a member of the WTO (Nhu Binh and
Haughton, 2002).
3.4.4

Banking system problems
After a period of rapid expansion in the mid-1990s, Vietnam’s banking sector has

come under mounting pressure from the slowdown in growth and the deteriorating financial
condition of the state enterprise sector since the late 1990s. In response, the authorities have
taken a number of measures to facilitate the necessary restructuring, and have started
developing a comprehensive strategy for banking reform. However, as in other transition
economies, the problems affecting Vietnam’s banking system originate in incomplete
reforms of the financial sector and the SOEs. The state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)
still account for 80 percent of loans and deposits and their lending remains subject to
official intervention. Accounting practices make credit evaluation problematic; the banking
supervisory framework is weak; and supervisors have difficulties in enforcing the existing
prudential rules. This has especially affected the performance of the joint-stock banks,
which have accumulated large non-performing loans and short foreign currency positions
due to imprudent lending and weak regulatory standards, and many are undercapitalised
and suffer from serious governance problems. Banks, in turn, have been hampered in their
efforts to improve accountability and transparency by the lack of appropriate accounting
standards for businesses and also of professional skills. As a result, banks find it difficult to
evaluate the feasibility of projects they are asked to finance, and the value of collateral their
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customers have to offer. This state of affairs has left the banking system weak and
vulnerable, and the regional economic crisis has further strained its fragile condition.
Many problems of the banking system can be further traced to the poor performance
of state enterprises, which are the main customers of the banks, especially the SOCBs. In
particular, financial discipline remains weak, and, although the SOEs no longer receive
direct budgetary subsidies and real interest rates have been kept at positives levels, state
enterprises receive extensive fiscal, trade, and credit privileges. A thorough reform of the
SOE sector should therefore be a key complement of a longer-term strategy for
rehabilitation of the financial system.
Weaknesses in banking supervision and prudential regulations have also contributed
to the problems. As the examination function is one of the tools used in the supervisory
process, it allows the supervisor to review the operations of an institution to ensure that it is
acting consistently with the rules and regulations for the industry. But in Vietnam the
inspectors’ main duty is only to check whether the laws on monetary and banking
operations have been observed by the financial institution. Evaluation of asset quality and
other risks in the banks’ operations are not yet among the routine tasks.
3.4.5

Weak fiscal management
Since the peak in 1994, budgetary revenue has declined by 7 percentage points to 18

per cent of GDP in 1999. This is closely linked to the deterioration in the financial
performance of the state enterprise sector. With a tight budget constraint – most budgetary
revenues are spent on wages and benefits of government employees, and purchase of goods
and services for existing operations – the government’s fiscal resources are inadequate for
the provision of such basic public services as infrastructure, health care, education, and
social safety net. In addition, the government’s inability to provide sufficient financing
from the budget for key projects results in excessive pressures on the banking sector for
extending policy loans both by policy banks and commercial banks – a fact that is
contradictory to the goal of commercialising the banking system. Looking ahead, Vietnam
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also faces several long-term fiscal problems, including the large contingent liabilities for
recapitalising banks and accrued public enterprise pensions.
In Vietnam, the public investment program emerges as a compilation of national,
regional, provincial and sectoral strategies and plans. Its preparation follows a complex
process of consensus building designed to guide decision-making by all sectors in the
economy. The resulting document is a list of projects that may or may not be implemented
over the plan period. This process has several drawbacks. Firstly, there is limited emphasis
on economic efficiency in project appraisal, which allows investment in areas where the
public sector has no particular advantage over the private sector. Secondly, the poverty and
equity implications of investment projects receive little consideration. Thirdly, the
separation of the development of sectoral strategies from the resource allocation process
makes it difficult to ensure priority programs are adequately funded. Lastly, there are no
effective spending needs of new and existing projects budgeting processes to ensure that
recurrent spending needs of new and existing projects are adequately catered for (World
Bank Report, 2002).

3.5 Conclusions
It is remarkable that Vietnam has shown strong growth throughout its stabilisation
and structural adjustment programs. Doi Moi policy in 1986, and reforms in subsequent
years, brought an initial surge in output, especially in agriculture and services, and GDP
increased 8.0 per cent in 1989. However, at that time, Vietnam was still receiving
substantial assistance from the Soviet Union. Foreign savings flowing into Vietnam
dropped precipitously between 1989 and 1991 and this inevitably had an effect on growth,
which declined to 5.1 per cent in 1990 and 6.0 per cent in 1991. Vietnam achieved an
impressive record of GDP growth in the mid-1990s, averaging 9 per cent per year during
1992-97. The output growth was closely associated with the surge in foreign direct
investment inflows and exports. However, growth began to slow sharply in 1998 as the
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Asian crisis started affecting the Vietnamese economy and exposed the underlying
structural weaknesses, especially in the SOE and banking sectors.
After a slowdown period during the East Asian crisis, Vietnam is again growing quite
strongly with GDP growth of 6.8 per cent and 7.04 per cent in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
This improvement is partly due to a series of policy measures that put the economy on an
enhanced medium-term path. Confidence in the private sector was boosted by the adoption
of a detailed reform program in 2001. Foreign investors have reacted positively to the
reform announcements and commitments made by Vietnam. Despite an unfavourable
external environment, in terms of demand and prices, exports can be expected to pick up as
a result of trade liberalisation efforts, including the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement.
Strong economic growth is also associated with an external debt at a very manageable
level. However, Vietnam’s structural adjustment program of transition to a market
economy has a long way to go because it has yet to: create a basis for a sustained growth
process based on a market economy; diversify the economy; stimulate investment and
domestic savings; and improve efficiency and competitiveness of the state sectors, which
can lead to a strong macroeconomic development and substantial reduction in poverty.
There have been a number of measures for the restructuring and reform of SOEs in the
transition period, but the process appears to be slowing down. Reluctance to reform is
understandable when over-staffing is pervasive and transformation could lead to massive
job losses. Excessive debt burdens may also dissuade potential buyers. But the slowdown
in the transformation process also seems to reflect the opposition of many SOE directors,
who could lose their powers from ownership transformation. The slowdown and
incomplete reform of SOEs can, in part, be attributed to the problems of Vietnam’s banking
system, as the state-owned commercial banks still account for 80 per cent of loans and
deposits and their lending remains subject to official intervention.
A sizeable portion of the structural adjustment has come from development in the
private sector, which will be of critical importance in Vietnam especially for job creation
and competitive pressure creation required to improve the performance of SOEs. A vibrant
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private sector will also provide an important source of investment and could help the
economy attain long-term growth. It is also worth noting that achieving an inclusive
economic development is largely attributable to following a prudent fiscal strategy, with
relatively small budget deficits and low debt, both domestic and foreign. However, there
remain some important challenges ahead relating to further progress in economic structural
adjustment reforms. They are slow progress of SOE reforms, the private sector
development constraints, a highly restrictive trade system, banking system problems, and
weak fiscal management.
Although there are many reforms that can be examined, this study will consider four
types of policy reforms in the context of a simulation analysis, which will be presented in
Chapter 7: state enterprise reform, exchange rate liberalisation, external sector
liberalisation, and public investment expansion. These four areas of reform will give a
sense of the lessons to be drawn from the model developed in Chapter 5. Before
formulating a model which can be used for casting light on the issues of speed and
sequencing of reforms applicable to Vietnam, in the next chapter a critical review of the
existing macroeconomic models developed the transition economies, including Vietnam,
and the models that this study will be based on are reviewed.

CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND MACROECONOMIC
ADJUSTMENT: THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of existing theoretical and empirical models
concerned with identifying the macroeconomic adjustment processes arising from the
transition from a centrally planned to market oriented economy. The theoretical basis and
assumptions of these will be examined with the objective of developing a long run
macroeconomic model for Vietnam, a transition economy, which can be used to analyse the
impact of stabilisation and structural reform policies on the economy as whole.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, characterised by the prevalence of shortages
and inefficient production, all transition countries started the economic transition period
with imbalances between aggregate domestic demand and aggregate domestic supply. In
response to these, and related problems, transition countries embarked on macroeconomic
adjustment with the objective of putting their economies on to a path of sustainable
development with improved prospects of economic growth and income distribution, while,
at the same time, ensuring both external and internal balance. The emphasis of this
macroeconomic adjustment can be characterised by the five-point strategy outlined in
Fischer and Gelb (1991), including price and trade liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation
and financial reform.
With the aforementioned purpose, and the important role of macroeconomic
adjustment in transition economies, Section 4.2 proceeds by presenting a brief survey of the
studies on macroeconomic adjustment in transition economies both theoretically and
empirically. Empirical studies related to macroeconomic adjustment undertaken for
Vietnam since its government implemented the economic reform policies in 1986 will be
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presented in Section 4.3. Finally the major conclusions derived from this analysis are
presented in Section 4.4.

4.2 Theoretical and Empirical Studies on Macroeconomic Adjustment in
Transition Economies
Transition countries undertaking macroeconomic adjustment generally suffer from a
broad range of economic problems. These include: (i) internal and external imbalances as
reflected in aggregate domestic demand and supply disequilibrium, unsustainable current
account deficits, and rising levels of external debt; (ii) high and sometimes accelerating
inflation, often accompanied by a situation of monetary and fiscal disequilibrium, and low
or negative gross domestic product growth; and (iii) reliance on rationing and control (for
credit, imports, prices, and foreign exchange) with consequent reductions in capacity
utilisation. In response, the design of a typical structural adjustment program, which has
evolved over the past decade in response to the changing economic and political scenarios
of these countries, usually comprises the following reforms:
(1)

Liberalisation of prices, trade, and market entry from state controls;

(2)

Macroeconomic stabilisation with the objective of reducing inflation and
containing domestic and external imbalances;

(3)

Restructuring and privatisation including the creation of a viable financial
sector, reforming state-owned enterprises and transferring their ownership into
private hands;

(4)

Legal and institutional reforms that consist of redefining the role of the state,
establishing the rule of law, and introducing appropriate competition policies.

This section proceeds to review existing studies in the transition literature on
macroeconomic and structural adjustments based on these reform policies respectively.
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Liberalisation
Across the transition economies there are a number of reasons that extensive

liberalisation has been vital for improving economic performance. First, it decentralises
production and trade decisions to enterprises and households, and directly addresses the
two fundamental weaknesses of central planning: poor incentives and poor information.
Second, liberalisation exposes firms to customer demand, the profit motive, and
competition, and it lets relative prices adjust in line with true scarcities. Third, liberalised
markets process information better than central planners, and, combined with supporting
institutions, competitive markets unleash powerful processes to force technological and
organisational change. Finally, liberalisation, by depoliticising resource allocation, helps
governments cut subsidies to firms and thus facilitates economic stabilisation (World Bank,
1996).
A number of existing studies have analysed the prospects of macroeconomic
liberalisation in the transition economies, concentrating on the linkage between economic
performance during transition to variations in liberalisation policy (see Sachs, 1996;
Fischer et al., 1996b; de Melo et al., 1996b; and Aslund et al., 1996, among others). Most
of these studies use average reform indices developed by the World Bank and the European
Bank for Rural Development (EBRD). For example, Sachs (1996) regresses output levels
in 1995 against the EBRD’s index of liberalisation, finding that countries with the highest
index of liberalisation recovered from the transition recession most quickly. Similarly, de
Melo et al. (1996b) estimate average growth in gross domestic product as a function of the
cumulative liberalisation index (CLI), per capita income in 1989, and a dummy variable if
the country is from an area subject to regional tensions. They also examine the relationship
of inflation to the CLI, the drop in GDP, repressed inflation, and regional tension. Both
these papers reveal strong relationships between liberalisation and performance as
measured by either inflation or output or both. A related paper by de Melo and Gelb (1996)
adopts a similar framework, however no explicit regressions are run with CLI against
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output or inflation. This paper is noteworthy in that it raises the question of the relative role
of transition policy versus initial conditions in determining performance.
A somewhat different approach, relating performance with liberalisation, is adopted
by Fisher et al. (1996b). These authors pool annual data from 1992 to 1994 for 25 transition
economies and regress the log of inflation or GDP on the CLI, income in 1991, the
government fiscal balance, and a fixed exchange rate dummy variable. In order to capture
the disruptions due to the collapse of the CMEA in 1992, they also add either a dummy
variable equal to one for the year 1992 or the share of CMEA exports to GDP. This latter
measure is somewhat problematic as no data are available for the republics of the former
Soviet Union. For these republics intra-Soviet exports are used instead, but the authors do
not report results using the CMEA export to GDP variable.
Åslund et al. (1996), with a quite comprehensive paper, undertake a similar exercise
relating economic performance to liberalisation. They argue that the explanatory power of
the CLI is not robust under reasonable modifications. The authors discern a substantial
difference in the pattern between the much slower recovery in the countries of the former
Soviet Union relative to the countries of Central Europe. The conclusion from this paper is
that initial conditions, specifically the longer legacy of central planning and greater military
burden for the countries of the former Soviet Union, were important determinants of
performance differences during the transition. Krueger and Ciolko (1998), however, argue
that one commonly used index (the CLI) is, in all likelihood, endogenous to at least one
measure of performance, that is the change in total output up to 1995-1997. Hence, the
estimates regarding the relationship between liberalisation policy and performance are
potentially biased. They also conclude that the rankings of reform progress based on these
absolute scales of liberalisation are potentially misleading, or, at a minimum, incomplete.
Hernández-Catá (1999) examines the influence of economic liberalisation and
monetary growth on inflation during the transition from central planning to a market
oriented economy. He concludes that: price decontrol had a substantial and one-time effect
on the price level but with no lasting effect on inflation; that economic liberalisation
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broadly defined may have helped dampen price increases; and that monetary expansion has
been the fundamental determinant of inflation in the region. The author also finds that the
intensity of liberalisation has been related to geographic proximity to market economies, to
the size of the underground economy, and to the degree of political freedom. Havrylyshyn
and van Rooden (2000) show that economic liberalisation has a more significant impact on
economic performance than measures of the quality of the institutional environment,
although the latter’s importance is increasing over time. Fischer and Sahay (2000) show
that average growth over the first decade of transition is best explained by the EBRD’s
liberalisation and small-scale privatisation indices, whereas the other EBRD transition
indicators do not add significant explanatory value.
There are some important parallels between the Asian and European transition
economies in terms of the relationship between liberalisation and growth. Economic growth
has largely resulted from the lifting of restrictions on new entry and a surge of previously
repressed services and export industries in CEE countries, and agriculture in Asia. Freeing
prices and trade, reducing subsidies and containing credit can also revitalise growth in
previously dormant sectors, by increasing the competitive and financial pressure on firms
to restructure. Kalra and Sløk (1999), who conduct a study on the progress made in four
Asian transition economies (China, Laos, Vietnam and Mongolia), argue that while initial
conditions played an important role in determining the strategy and speed of the transition,
growth performance benefited from continued macroeconomic stability and liberalisation
in a key sector: especially the agricultural sector. However, the authors have noted that
growth has been fastest in only those sectors where liberalisation is most advanced, and the
risks to future growth are largest in sectors where most remains to be done. The Asian
experience also highlights the importance of liberalisation of price and foreign exchange
markets to ensure a market-based resource allocation. These efforts were crucial to
reducing economic distortions, and liberalised prices were critical to generating the supply
response in the key agricultural sector. In this context, dual price and exchange rate systems
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in China, Laos, and Vietnam, while leading to much inefficiency and rent seeking, had the
important advantage of providing market signals at the margin.
Many studies in the literature on transition find that trade liberalisation is playing a
vital role and has made a significant impact on economic growth in the transition
economies. In general, those transition economies that have pursued trade reform most
rigorously have recovered fastest from the initial output decline (Brenton et al., 1997). A
number of authors have also highlighted a significant positive correlation between growth
in exports to non-former Soviet Union (FSU) countries and growth of GDP (see
Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1996, for example). Furthermore, trade liberalisation is associated
with a broader range of microeconomic reforms, such as price liberalisation and enterprise
reform, and also macroeconomic stabilisation. Countries which exhibit little reorientation
of exports tend to have been slowest in liberalising trade and in implementing other reforms
(Kaminski et al., 1996), and have typically been unable to provide a stable macroeconomic
environment.
Many studies analyse the prospects of trade liberalisation in the East Asian transition
economies, and concentrate on the linkage between economic performance during
transition to variations in trade policy reforms including trading rights, tariff and non-tariff
barriers, import and export licensing measures and exchange rate system, such as World
Bank (1994, 1997, 1999), Naughton (1994), Martin (1993, 1996, 2001), Fukase and Martin.
(1999, 2000), amongst others. The general conclusion from these studies is that the
performance of the East Asian transition economies during the 1990s has clearly been
remarkable relative to that of the transition economies of the CEE and FSU. Reforms of
trade policy, as argued by many, need to focus on opening up the trade system to
competing traders, on developing indirect policy instruments such as tariffs, and on
removing exchange rate distortions. Although each of the East Asian transition economies
have had a successful trade performance, the trade regimes in all of these countries have a
considerable distance to go, not only in terms of reducing barriers, but also in terms of
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developing systems that will facilitate trade flows and create a more predictable and
sustainable investment climate (Martin, 2001).
4.2.2

Macroeconomic Stabilisation
Stabilisation policy is considered as a priority and an essential complement to

liberalisation in transition. The empirical analysis in the papers of de Melo et al., (1999),
Ickes et.al. (1994) and Balcerowicz and Gelb (1994), support the idea that there are strong
interactions between liberalisation and stabilisation. They also support the conclusions of
Easterly and Fischer (1994) and Bruno (1994), who find evidence in other countries that
neither the effective functioning of markets nor renewed investment is possible with severe
macroeconomic price instability; thus, stabilisation becomes a priority for the resumption
of growth. However, de Melo and Cevdet (1999) argue that stabilisation is rendered more
difficult by severe output contractions during the early stages of liberalisation; such
contractions reduce potential tax revenues and raise claims on fiscal resources to cushion
the effects. Stabilisation is also rendered difficult by the absence of external financing and
by the large depreciation of the exchange rate that accompanies the early stage of
liberalisation.
With respect to stabilisation policies in the early phase of transition, in the majority
of the transition countries the most important controversies refer to: (i) how to solve a
situation of monetary and fiscal disequilibrium. In some nations this discussion has also
involved how to eliminate a situation of monetary overhang; (ii) whether the antiinflationary program should be based on an exchange rate or monetary anchor; and (iii) the
extent to which the labour market should be reformed and de-indexed. With respect to each
of these areas, some lessons stemming from the developing country experience with
stabilisation and anti-inflationary policies has been discussed by some scholars such as
Edwards (1992), Bofinger (1994), and Begg (1997), among others.
Although the Latin American experiences offer some important lessons for the
transition economies in Europe, Edwards (1992) argues that their policies should not be
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mechanically applied because of differences in initial conditions and the political
environment between these countries. Based on an analysis of the price level adjustment
measures used to eliminate the monetary overhang in Chile in October 1973, which proved
to be costly, he also argues that monetary policy should have been immediately followed
by a liberalisation of most prices and devaluation. Fiscal adjustment is no doubt a crucial
requirement for achieving stability for the countries in the transition process. An important
component of this adjustment is the creation of a tax system that is not vulnerable to
inflation itself. The adoption of an exchange-rate-based stabilisation program, where the
nominal exchange rate is either pegged or its rate of change is predetermined at a rate
below ongoing inflation, carries a serious danger of provoking a major overvaluation. To
avoid this problem an exchange rate rule should be supplemented with an incomes policy
as in the Mexican case.
Similarly, the argument of Bofinger (1994) is that in a transition economy monetary
policy is much less powerful than in a market environment, while incomes policies have to
play a decisive role in stabilisation policy. Though the classical approach used in his study
would allow monetary policy to determine the inflation rate, this is impaired by the lack of
hard budget constraints and other financial market imperfections in transitional economies.
The experience of some advanced transitional economies suggests that an attempt to stop
hyperinflation by monetary policy alone would not be successful. Without the support of
effective incomes policies, the short-term effects of monetary restraint on the real economy
would be so drastic that this policy would have to be abandoned after a relatively short
period of time. He also argues that as long as microeconomic distortions persist, it would
also not be advisable to use rule-based schemes for monetary policy. This argument is
shared with Begg (1996, 1997) who notes “monetary (or fiscal) policy may then fail, not
because of any fault in its macro design, but because it was not appropriately accompanied
by suitable microeconomic policy” (Begg, 1997, p.34). He suggests that fiscal tightening
and more exchange rate flexibility offer a sounder response to large capital inflows
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experienced by the transition economies. Poor incentives and corporate governance in
banks would have negatively affected their improvements.
Many analysts have emphasised the need for tight and active fiscal policies to support
stabilisation and enterprise restructuring; they have also underlined the importance of
quickly reforming the tax system (see Fischer and Gelb 1991; Bruno 1994; Kopits 1991;
Tanzi 1991, 1993; Balcerowicz and Gelb 1994; and Sachs 1994). The “transitional
recession” and lags associated with the development of a new tax system were seen to
result in a fall in revenues in the short run, and social expenditures were noticed to increase
as they were transferred from enterprises to the budget.
Some observers argue, or imply, that there is a “fiscal constraint’ to rapid reform
(Chadha and Coricelli 1994, and Aghion and Blanchard 1994). These studies note that
there are fiscal costs associated with closing or restructuring state enterprises that need to
be offset by revenues generated from new private business. Otherwise, the budget balance
deteriorates as reforms are implemented; revenues from state enterprises decline while
unemployment benefits increase. These studies further note that tax rates on the private
sector need to be low in order not to discourage growth; so, meeting a target budget deficit
may require measures to sustain state enterprises, the traditional tax base. However, de
Melo et al., (1999) argue that there is no convincing evidence that a slower pace of reform
has strengthened the fiscal position of intermediate reformers. Fiscal revenues and
expenditure have tended to remain high, relative to GDP, in advanced reformers, and fiscal
deficits have been noticeably smaller than in the slower reformers. The lack of adjustment
by state enterprises in the face of structural shifts in demand may result in negative value
added for many of these enterprises, and therefore no taxable profits. The failure of slow
reformers to maintain fiscal balance is highlighted by the fact that their consolidated fiscal
and quasi-fiscal deficits are even worse than those of intermediate reformers.
There was much scholarly interest regarding the choice of the exchange rate regime
as an instrument in bringing down inflation and as a growth-promoting policy. The
discussion of many authors such as Sachs (1996), Roldos (1995), Flood and Mussa (1994),
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Rebelo and Vegh (1995), among others, has focused on the role of exchange rate policies in
transition economies and, more specifically, on the role of these policies in stimulating the
growth of domestic demand and exports. A consensus has been reached that transition
economies with stable exchange rates have contained inflation more rapidly and at low cost
to growth, and have arrested and reversed output declines much more quickly than did
those countries that pursued a flexible exchange rate policy. One reason for this is that the
automatic exchange of foreign for local currency by central banks at a fixed rate lets
enterprises and households rebuild their real money balances more easily. Nevertheless,
stable exchange rate policies have turned out to be detrimental to the growth of output on a
sustained basis. Both of these points have been made by Sachs (1996), who explains the
impediments to economic growth generated by pegged exchange rates as stemming from
various market rigidities in the transition economies that preclude a flexible domestic
response to changes in relative prices. There is general agreement that exchange-rate-based
stabilisations have been relatively less successful in high-inflation countries where initial
booms have been followed by severe recessions (Ades et al., 1993). The impact has been
the opposite in low-inflation countries that started with recessions but were able to recover
later. In either case, exchange-rate-based stabilisations have been associated with
recessions and thus with increased calls for protection. Both Edwards (1992) and Krueger
(1997) also cast doubt on the effectiveness of fixed nominal anchors, arguing that
inflationary expectations may be strong in countries with a history of rapid and unstable
inflation even in the presence of nominal anchors.
There has been substantial debate surrounding the choice of nominal anchors in
stabilisation programs (Sachs 1994, Sahay and Vegh 1995, and Citrin et al. 1995). The
main choice has been between a money anchor and an exchange rate anchor, both often
used in combination with restrictions on public sector wages; and the debate has been
primarily over whether greater reliance should have been placed on the exchange rate
anchor. The uncertainty of change in money demand, the adequacy of foreign exchange
reserves, and the role of the chosen anchor in signalling and establishing credibility are
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seen as choice factors. However, what is critical for the success of stabilisation programs is
their credibility, and, in the context of transition, credibility does not come without
extensive liberalisation (de Melo et al., 1999).
4.2.3

Privatisation and Restructuring of SOEs
Most papers in the literature place emphasis on the impact of privatisation on

macroeconomic performance, and the relationship between the state and private sectors in
transition economies. For the developing countries, privatisation was only an attempt to
ease the financial burden on the state budget of the public enterprise sector. But in the case
of the transition economies the objectives are manifold, and they range from economic to
purely political and ideological ones. One of the main objectives of privatisation is to
contribute to the creation of a market economy (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Hare, 1994).
Improved efficiency of the SOEs and the whole economy is considered another main goal
of privatisation. In many theoretical analyses privatisation is equivalent to producing
increased efficiency. For example, Dewatripont and Roland (1992) elaborate upon a model
of industrial restructuring, where there is a shift towards higher productivity accompanied
by massive layoffs. Similarly, for Aghion (1993) transition involves the emergence of the
private sector where the productivity of labour is presumably believed to be higher than in
the old state sector. Although evidence from the developed and developing countries
reported in Balassa (1993) supports the view that the private sector is more efficient, and
increased efficiency is often attributed to regulatory reform and greater competition rather
than ownership transfer, in the case of the transition economies it seems that changes in
efficiency may be related to the way in which ownership transfer is organised as well as to
who gets the privatised assets.
According to Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995) the impact of privatisation on
performance can be measured in many ways, closely related to the objective of
privatisation. If the objective is to foster development of a market economy, the success of
privatisation is measured by its contribution to the deregulation of the state sector and the
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economy in general. For many countries this broader context is more important than narrow
efficiency considerations. Those who are preoccupied with efficiency will seek the effects
of privatisation at the enterprise level as measured by financial profitability. An alternative
approach is to assess the successes of privatisation in terms of the effect on macroeconomic
performance, as indicated by an increase in government revenue from the sale of stateowned assets and to a lower expenditure required to finance loss-making operations. The
social impact of privatisation is also regarded as important, and the most commonly used
measures are in terms of employment and wages.
Many papers in the literature have focused attention on developing theoretical models
emphasising the relationship and interaction between the state and private sectors during
the transition. A very simple two-sector model is found in Aghion (1993). Adapted from
Blanchard et al. (1991), this model is used to show adjustments in the size of the
government sector and the privatised sector when transition policies cause some SOEs to
go bankrupt. Aghion uses his results to argue that, during the early period of transition, the
state should maintain a substantial fraction of existing large SOEs. This government
support should continue until the private sector has accumulated knowledge and capital
needed to absorb those SOEs that can be successful in the new environment. Husain’s
(1994) general equilibrium model is used to analyse the impact of the size of the stateowned sector on the profitability of private firms. He argues that a decrease in the number
of SOEs, due to closures or liquidation, may reduce total industrial output in the short-run
but encourage the entry of private firms into the industry in the long-run, and lead to an
increase in total output. Policies that result in a depreciation of the exchange rate also have
a positive impact on output both in the short and long-run.
Gibson and Dutt (1993) also consider a situation where the government is trying to
control the size of the private sector, but they use a dynamic macroeconomic model. The
conclusions from the model are that, first, the successful restoration of the private sector in
transition economies hinges on the responsiveness of entrepreneurs to the opportunities for
privatisation, and, second, if the government privatises a sufficiently profitable share of
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productive capacity a stable mixed economy is possible. Otherwise, all capital will be
owned by either the government or private capitalists.
Using a two-sector general equilibrium model similar to Aghion (1993), Lane and
Dinopoulos (1991), however, look at a wide range of reform issues including privatisation,
dismantling monopolies, trade reform, and tax reform. They find that the government’s
ability to put market-oriented reforms into place may be restricted by the government’s
ability to increase revenue or continuously finance deficits. The authors conclude that tax
changes should take precedence in any reform sequence.
Grafe and Wyplosz (1997) develop a model for analysing the role of the real
exchange rate and the link between productivity, capital accumulation, real wages, and
relative prices in the transition process in which the state sector is gradually replaced by the
new private sector. A number of policy implications can be drawn from the model. First, an
exchange rate appreciation policy causes labour to be attracted out of the inefficient state
sector. Undervaluation of the domestic currency blocks transition by preventing labour
from migrating to the modern sectors, while overvaluation may wipe out profitability in the
new manufacturing sector. Second, outside finance sources such as foreign direct
investment, assistance from the IMF or World Bank, play a crucial role in the early days of
reform. However, these grants may act as a disincentive to the elimination of soft budget
constraints in the state sector.
4.2.4

Legal and Institutional Reforms
Although there are a number of studies on the importance of institutions and

synthetic indicators of the business-friendly environment such as political or business risk,
degree of corruption, effectiveness of governance, economic freedom, effectiveness of the
legal system and protection of property rights, and political freedom, econometric studies
taking account of institutional development as a growth determinant are very few.
Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000), in their pioneering empirical work, analyse the
importance of developing market-enhancing institutions for restoring economic growth in
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transition economies covering the period 1991-98. Their finding is that the development of
an institutional framework has indeed exerted a significant and positive impact on growth,
but that progress in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation and implementing broad-based
economic reforms remain the key determinants of growth in transition economies.
Although it cannot be denied that favourable policy reforms have been able to spur
economic growth, even in the weak institutional setting during the initial period of
transition, a growing body of evidence on market economies suggests that, for the longer
term, if transition economies are to join the ranks of the advanced market economies, they
will need not just good economic policies but strong and accountable institutions to support
and implement them. First, they are good laws and effective means for their enforcement.
These establish and apply the rules of the game, lower transactions costs, increase
commercial certainty, create incentives for efficiency, and control crime and corruption so
that businesses can focus on productive activities. Second, are strong financial institutions
to encourage saving and channel it to its most productive uses. Financial institutions also
play an important role in corporate governance, complementing that of enterprise owners,
by imposing financial discipline and overseeing the activities of borrowers. A third
essential institution is the government role in supporting and complementing the
development of market economies. An excellent summary of the requirements of legal and
institutional reforms is found in the 1996 World Bank Report, which consists of creating a
legal framework for private sector development including property rights, contracts,
company and foreign investment law, bankruptcy and competition laws; judicial
institutions; and increasing the level of trust in the state including constraining state power,
controlling corruption and stopping organised crime.
So far, the literature on transition economies has focused mainly on the prospects of
macroeconomic adjustment in transition economies. Some have placed their attention on
the linkage between economic performance during transition to variations in transition
policies, while others have placed emphasis on the role of the privatisation process and
relationship between state and private sectors. However, there is, as yet, no paper that
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proposes a model enabling the identification of the way in which exogenous shocks
transmit their effects to the domestic transition economies. Nevertheless, analysing the
macroeconomic consequence of, and adjustment to, such shocks is very important for the
transition economies. This thesis, therefore, aims to develop a dynamic long-run
macroeconomic model, which will be outlined in Chapter 5, for Vietnam, a small open
transition economy, to identify the ways in which both external and internal shocks affect
the domestic economy, as well as its structure. Before examining the models that can
provide the theoretical foundations to formulate such a model, which is conducted in
Chapter 5, in the next section a critical review of the existing macroeconomic models
currently developed for Vietnam is conducted. This review is undertaken mainly to identify
the existing gaps, so as to build a macroeconomic model that can be used to analyse the
extent to which some current reform policies impact on Vietnam’s economic development
as a whole.

4.3 Empirical Studies on Vietnam
In Chapter 3 the overall picture of the Vietnamese economy was explored, which
suggested that, although the reform policies that have been applied since 1986 have
succeeded in reviving the economy, other policies will be required to ensure that economic
development is not restricted including that of trade liberalisation, SOE privatisation or
restructuring. The question to be examined here is whether these adjustment problems have
been modelled appropriately in the Vietnamese context. In fact, macroeconomic model
building in Vietnam is a very new experimentation, since the country has only been
involved for a short time in a transition process to a market economy. A small number of
quantitative investigations have appeared from 1998 describing both the short and long run
fluctuations in the Vietnamese economy. This section provides a survey of the development
of macroeconomic models in Vietnam.
The purpose of the present review is to shed light on the nature of all types of
macroeconomic models for Vietnam since its inception. The review focuses on two
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aspects: (i) surveying the macroeconomic modelling literature including macroeconometric
models, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, and multisectoral models; (ii) to
suggest the limitations of existing macroeconomic modelling, and propose directions in
which the modelling efforts need modifications in view of the changing macroeconomic
environment.
Compared with other transition economies, particularly China, Vietnam has received
much less attention by scholars of both macroeconomic and econometric models. So far the
studies being pervasive on the Vietnamese economy in these areas consist of two types,
macroeconometric models, and CGE or multisectoral models. This classification is
important as it is based on certain major common features shared by a group of
macroeconomic models. The two kinds of models described here reflect different
motivations towards macroeconomic modelling. Macroeconometric models, in general, are
aggregative in character and they generally incorporate a Keynesian type static model with
disequilibrium dynamics introduced through lagged adjustment, while CGE models take
explicit account of income distribution and its impact on demand and thus price behaviour
through a Walrasian general equilibrium framework.
4.3.1

Macroeconometric models for Vietnam
At this time there is only one macroeconometric model, developed by the Central

Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in collaboration with the German Institute for
Economic Research (DIW). This model was first developed in 1999 and then updated and
re-estimated in 2000, and can be viewed as a step towards the use of a structural
macroeconometric model for forecasting and economic policy analysis in Vietnam. There
are some main features of the model: (i) the model was based mainly on data for 1990-1998
provided by the National Accounting Framework for Vietnam (NAFVN), therefore the
database could be easily updated and its consistency can be guaranteed; (ii) to exploit as
much available information as possible, the model estimated GDP by sector of production
(at constant prices) and by final expenditure (at current prices), and the development of the
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price level was determined endogenously; (iii) the model paid more attention to the public
budget and disposable income of private households; and (iv) the model allowed for the
impact of external shocks to the Vietnamese economy by determining some principle
exogenous variables such as the Dong/US$-exchange rate, the GDP growth rates of the
country’s most important trading partners, US prices and international prices for
agricultural products, foreign direct investment, money supply (M2), oil production and oil
price, and public investment expenditure.
a.

Production function

The model takes into account both sector of production and aggregate expenditure
(see Appendix 4.1). The included sectors are agricultural production, industry,
construction, transport, trade, and services. The production in each of these sectors is
explained in a different way. Production in agriculture is mainly real private consumption
determined, with another factor being exports of agricultural products. Real private
consumption again depends on private households’ disposable income and on the
development of prices. The output of industry is determined by real GDP and the capital
stock financed by foreign direct investment (FDI). The industrial production function is
dynamic because it involves a lagged variable. Production in the construction sector
depends on public investment and GDP, while transport and communication is explained
by real private consumption. The assumption that industrial production is mainly FDIdetermined has to be modified, as it also depends on domestic private investment.
b.

Investment function

Total investment is modelled as the sum of gross capital formation and changes in
inventories. The capital formation component is subdivided according to government and
private capital formation. The government component is set exogenously since it is
dependent on government policy. The fixed capital formation component depends on FDI
flows and on developments in GDP. The other component of investment is inventory
accumulation, which is formulated as a function of GDP. Thus, given the chosen
formulation, stocks increase as GDP grows.
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Obviously, in this model, the links between public sector and private sector
investment are not identified to trace complementary and crowding in effects of public
investment. The model also seems to ignore constraints on investment growth due to
certain gaps: inadequate domestic saving, scarcity of imported capital goods, scarcity of
foreign exchange reserves, and an inability of the government to increase public
investment. These specifications of the investment function consider the public sector as a
stimulant to overall economic growth as well as private investment. The impact of public
investment on the domestic capital market has escaped the attention of either the internal or
external macroeconomic modellers for the case of Vietnam. There is now, therefore, a need
to relate the investment function to other related variables of the financial sector.
c.

Price function

In this model, the consumer price index (CPI) depends on the GDP deflator and
import prices. The GDP deflator is explained by the gap between nominal and real GDP
and real money balances. The real money balance is (by definition) money supply M2
divided by prices (real M2). M2 is an exogenous variable and it is defined as the sum of net
foreign assets and net domestic assets. Export prices are made to depend on import prices,
the internal price development (measured by the GDP deflator) and the prices of oil and
agricultural products multiplied by the Dong/US$-exchange rate (see equations 23 and 24
in Appendix 4.1). The mechanism of price adjustment is as follows: the prices of oil,
agricultural and imported products affect the cost of living, which in turn affect the wage
rate in the industrial sector. The wage rate change, in turn, gives rise to changes in
industrial prices. Then the industrial prices in turn affect non-agricultural prices.
d.

Fiscal sector

The specification of the functioning of the fiscal system, particularly the role of
government, is very important in any model for a transition economy. The model
developed by CIEM treats government expenditure as endogenous, depending on public
consumption, public gross capital formation, transfers from the budget, interest payments,
and property transfers. Most of these variables are exogenous to the model, with only
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public consumption being endogenously explained by overall public revenue. The public
deficit is calculated by subtracting the expenditure items from the revenue items. In this
model, there is an explicit recognition of the government’s role in improving economic
growth through increased public investment. However, developing a model to examine
structural adjustment policies requires a detailed fiscal structure. Separation of the public
capital and current accounts is obviously needed. While examining government
expenditure it is necessary to see how much of it is for public investment (infrastructure)
and how much on current expenditure (public consumption). Further, there is a need to see
what effects variations in public investment spending have on private investment. This will
be given focus in Chapter 5 as a novelty of this study for the case of Vietnam.
e.

Monetary sector

Since this macroeconometric model is primarily concerned with the real sector no
elaborate monetary module is developed, and it is assumed that monetary disturbances
would be reflected by changes in the exchange rate which has a direct effect on prices.
There are two reasons for this simplifying assumption. First, the monetary approach to
exchange rate determination suggests that the exchange rate represents the relative price
between different currencies and is therefore determined by the demand and supply for
these currencies. Therefore, the exchange rate of a country not only reflects the money
supply but also the demand for money determined by income, interest rates, expectations
and other factors that may influence portfolio choices. Second, it is not always necessary to
have an explicit monetary model in order to examine the effects of different monetary
policies, since these can frequently be introduced as the balancing entries of the real model.
Thus, for example, an expansionary monetary policy could be modelled through increases
in government expenditure (Wengel, 1993).
In spite of these reasons for the exclusion of a monetary component to the model, its
absence limits the flexibility of the model to deal with issues related to savings and the
foreign capital account. Since capital flows have gained an increased importance in
transition economies in general, and Vietnam in particular, this appears to be a significant
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shortcoming. The incorporation of rational expectations in the context of a model that
explicitly incorporates the monetary sector, would constitute a desirable improvement of
the model developed for Vietnam. This will be attempted by the present study in Chapter 5.
f.

External sector

In this model, total imports are constrained not only by domestic demand for
consumption and production but also by income obtained from exports. Exports are divided
into oil exports, agricultural exports and other exports. Oil exports are the product of the
volume of exports, oil price (US$) and the exchange rate. The export of agricultural
production is considered as exogenous, since no satisfactory economic explanation for it
could be found (CIEM, 2000). The other export items are explained by their export prices,
the real effective exchange rate and the foreign trade weighted GDP growth of foreign trade
partners. Broadly speaking, the foreign trade sector has a weak link in this model. With the
objective of integrating the Vietnamese economy into the world market, it is essential to
model this sector by incorporating export and import functions in greater detail and
enabling an analysis of the effects of tariff reductions on the trade balance and current
account deficits and what should be the appropriate level of devaluation. This dimension
will be incorporated in the model presented in Chapter 5.
As can be seen from Table 4.1, in which the main features of the empirical models
undertaken for Vietnam are summarised, the model developed by CIEM (2000) is static but
it emphasises both the short and long runs in forecasting economic developments for
Vietnam. Two scenarios arising from both external and policy shocks were simulated by
CIEM in order to forecast some macroeconomic variables, namely the growth rate of real
GDP, the inflation rate, the trade and budget balances. The changes of these variables,
which were affected by exogenous shocks, are presented in Table 4.2. In these scenarios
the external shocks consist of a change in import prices, demand for Vietnam’s exports,
export prices including oil and rice, and foreign direct investment, whereas policy shocks
include an exchange rate devaluation, increasing domestic credit, and increasing public
investment. In the first scenario, it was assumed that the country also faced an unfavourable
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external condition due to the Asian financial crisis. The major outcomes from this scenario
were that the growth rate of GDP in 1999 was forecast to be 4.3 per cent increasing to 4.6
per cent in 2000. At the same time, the inflation rate, which declined to 3.7 per cent in
1999, increased again to 5.6 per cent in 2000. During these two years the budget deficit to
GDP ratio was forecast to be about 2.5 per cent, while the trade deficit to GDP ratio
declined considerably in 1999 and vanished in 2000.
A second scenario was established on the assumption that the external conditions in
1999 and 2000 would be more favourable for Vietnam than the first scenario. That is, the
real effective exchange rate appreciated by only 2 per cent (instead of 5 per cent as in
scenario 1), import prices decreased by 1 per cent in 1999 and increased by 3 per cent in
2000 (instead of by 1 and 2 per cent in scenario 1, respectively), and the Dong devalued
against the US dollar by 7 per cent each year (instead of 5 per cent in scenario 1). The
results of these simulations show that the Vietnamese economy is relatively sensitive to
external conditions. If Vietnam managed to stabilise the real effective exchange rate, longterm growth would be considerably higher, being 6.2 per cent in 2000 compared with only
4.6 per cent in scenario 1. At the same time, price increases and the trade surplus would be
larger (6.0 and 2.0 per cent respectively in 2000). The results obtained from scenario 2 are
close to what actually happened (see Tables 3.6 and 3.8) with the exception of the inflation
rate, which decreased to –0.1 per cent in 2000.
Due to a lack of sufficient or detailed data the macroeconometric model developed by
CIEM is not truly dynamic. By using the simple OLS method for the estimation of the
behavioural equations the model, it is assumed that the underlying time series data are
stationary. However, over the long run, regression of a time series variable on another time
series variable may lead to the possibility of obtaining spurious or dubious results. This
problem arises if both time series involved exhibit strong trends (sustained upward or
downward movement). Thus, in order to avoid the pitfalls of traditional econometric
modelling, a time series model of the Vector Autoregression Variables (VAR) type can be
used to adequately meet policy makers’ needs. There are three reasons why the use of the
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VAR type time series model of Sim (1980) has become a popular tool in empirical model
building, and as an alternative to large-scale macroeconometric models. First, the method is
simple; one does not have to worry about determining which variables are endogenous and
which ones exogenous. All variables in VAR are endogenous. Second, estimation is
simple; that is, the usual OLS method can be applied to each equation separately. Finally,
the forecasts obtained by this method are in many cases better than those obtained from the
more complex simultaneous-equation models. Thus VAR models are allowed to reveal the
dynamic structure, and to capture empirical regularities in the data, and thereby provide
insight into channels through which the different policy variables can act on target
variables (Mallick, 1999).
The Granger representation of an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA) process as a cointegrated error-correction model (Engel and Granger, 1987)
provides a kind of synthesis between structural models and atheoretic time series models.
Most economic time series have an ARIMA representation. One must represent the data
generating process as a reduced form VAR model for cointegrating equations, and error
corrections for endogenous economic variables. These cointegrated equations present the
long run relationships between variables. Cointegration and error correction models can
serve both as confirmatory as well as exploratory multivariate time series models in
economics. There has been some discussion in recent years on the forecasting performance
and on the reliability of policy simulations when one uses different types of models such as
unrestricted VAR models, restricted VAR models (including Bayesian VAR models), and
models with an error correction mechanism (ECM) (Runkle, 1987).
The cointegration and error-correction models depend on two main foundations – a
unit root test methodology and a linear relation between cointegrating economic series.
There are a number of methods used for testing the cointegration between variables such as
the Engle-Granger (EG) or augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) tests, or the cointegrating
regression Durbin-Watson (CRWD) test provided by Sargan and Bhargava (1983). The
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employment of an error-correction model can be derived from the long run cointegration
relationship. This methodology will be attempted in Chapter 6 of this study.
4.3.2

Computable general equilibrium and multi-sectoral models for Vietnam
In Vietnam, macroeconomic modelling has also been analysed within the framework

of a CGE model. This model combines the features of the input-output framework and
static econometric models to provide an analytical framework for economic analysis.
Rather than being based on time series, as in the case of macroeconomic or econometric
models, CGE models are built on the basis of a social accounting matrix. In CGE models,
model builders do not necessarily estimate all the parameters, but they can “calibrate” them
on the basis of their own beliefs and experience and using parameters derived from other
studies.
The focus of almost all CGE models developed for Vietnam recently has been on the
effects of external liberalisation. Among the CGE models, Ianchovichina et al. (2000), and
Fukase and Martin (1999) adapted and applied the now-standard GTAP (global trade
analysis project)

15

CGE models to Vietnam. They used it to trace the effects of lower

United States tariffs under the bilateral trade agreement (BTA) between Vietnam and the
US, and the effects of AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) liberalisation, to which Vietnam is
currently committed, on the economy of Vietnam, respectively. These models are relatively
standard static multi-sector multi-region applied general equilibrium models (see Table 4.1,
p. 136 for the models’ main features), which incorporate the necessary links between factor
demands, production structures, trade and protection. The models assume that firms use
constant returns to scale technology in a perfectly competitive product market.
Consumption in the household sector is determined by the constant difference of elasticity
functional form. The equilibrium levels of production and consumption are determined by
global demand and supply of the product and zero economic profit for firms. A key

15

The original model was developed by Hertel (1997).
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assumption of the models is that Vietnamese consumers distinguish between imported and
domestic goods, and between imports by country of origin, under the so-called Armington
assumption (Fukase and Martin, 1999).
These models present the key features of the analysis and results by a relatively
simple set of partial equilibrium diagrams. Two effects of preferential liberalisation under
the BTA and AFTA are evaluated: (i) the effects of changes in the rates of protection
imposed by Vietnam’s trading partners (the US and ASEAN countries); and (ii) the
implications of changes in protection that Vietnam levies on its imports.
Figure 4-1: Impacts of a Reduction in a Tariff on
Vietnam’s Exports to its Trading Partners

p1
p0

reduction in the tariff of the trading
partners on exports from Vietnam

ES1

price

Other things being equal, the

shifts the demand curve for exports
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from Vietnam to the right, as is
b

shown in Figure 4.1. The result is
D0

D1

an increase in both the volume of
exports from Vietnam to the

q0 q1

trading partners, and an increase in
export volumes

the price received for these exports
from p 0 to p1 . The resulting increase in the price of exports to the trading partners creates
welfare benefits to Vietnam, measured in Figure 4.1 by the area p1 abp 0 .
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Figure 4-2: Impact of Vietnam’s Liberalisation on
Partner Imports
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equilibrium, Vietnam imposes a
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tariff t on the trading partners
D
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import volumes

( p d = p w + t ). Preferential tariff
rate T is introduced through a

reduction in the tariff on imports from the partners. This reduces tariff revenues on initial
imports from trading partners by p d abpt . However, the gains to consumers are greater
since they are able to increase the quantity of imported goods that they purchase. Following
the decline in the domestic price, consumers move down the demand curve D from initial
quantity q 0 to q1 . Consumer surplus increases by the area p d abpt + abc . In addition, with
the increase in the imports from trading partners, the loss of revenues is partially
compensated by the area bced . Therefore, the net gain to Vietnam in this market is
approximated by the area aced . This is the welfare benefit from trade creation.
Based on this framework the attention of Fukase and Martin’s (1999) quantitative
model was given to analysing how the changes in relative prices resulting from tariff
reductions affect key variables such as trade patterns, terms of trade, factor returns, and
welfare levels 16. Another focus of this model was upon how each policy affected Vietnam’s
industrial structure. Two shocks are simulated, including: (i) a reduction of tariffs under the
AFTA plan both by Vietnam against ASEAN-5 17 and by the ASEAN-5 countries against
Vietnam, and (ii) unilateral liberalisation applied between Vietnam and the APEC 18

16

Table 4.2 (p.136) synthesises the main results of the simulation. Appendix 4.2 presents the simulation
results in detail.
17
The members of ASEAN-5 are Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, and
Indonesia.
18
The members of APEC are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong (China),
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of
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countries under the APEC framework. Unlike AFTA, APEC trade liberalisation is based on
a unilateral and non-discriminatory basis. These two shocks were divided into five
scenarios for the model simulations (see Appendix 4.2 for the experimental design and
results).
The simulation results from this model showed that with AFTA liberalisation the
outputs of agriculture, forestry, and processed agriculture increase, whereas they decrease
when Vietnam extends the concession to the rest of the world. There is substantial
expansion of the apparel industry, particularly when Vietnam liberalises against the rest of
the world either unilaterally or in APEC. This is partly because low cost intermediates,
resulting from import liberalisation, lowers the cost of production, and partly because
Vietnam has a comparative advantage in the labour-intensive sectors against non-ASEAN
countries whereas its competitive position for these commodities is less clear within
ASEAN. In contrast, the output of some import competing sectors, such as transport
equipment, and beverages and tobacco, are likely to contract due to increasing competition
(see Table A4.2.1 in Appendix 4.2).
AFTA liberalisation can raise wages for both skilled and unskilled labour as well as
the return to capital. The magnitude of these increases more than double when Vietnam
extends its liberalisation to the rest of the world. Returns to land increase under AFTA
liberalisation, whereas its return decreases with non-discriminatory liberalisation. With
further liberalisation with the rest of the world, a portion of labour seems to shift from the
agricultural sector to the industrial sectors. The conclusion from this simulation is that a
wider scope of Vietnam’s liberalisation is likely to induce Vietnam’s industrialisation (see
Table A4.2.2 in Appendix 4.2).
The terms of trade was used to evaluate the effects of price changes on welfare in
this model. In general, trade liberalisation leads to a deterioration in Vietnam’s terms of

the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and the United States. Peru, Russia and Vietnam joined in
November 1998.
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trade primarily through decreased prices received for exports, but a further part results from
the increased price of imports (see Table A4.2.3 in Appendix 4.2).
In the context of some important economy-wide variables, as the scope of
liberalisation widens from partial AFTA to non-discriminatory, both imports and exports
increase. The magnitude of increase in trade value is the highest with the nondiscriminatory liberalisation, which implies a 12.8 per cent increase in imports and a 15.2
per cent increase in exports (see Table A4.2.4 in Appendix 4.2). Tariff reductions also
cause losses of tariff revenues, ranging from 18.0 per cent in scenario 2 to 82.4 per cent in
scenario 4 (see Table A4.2.4 in Appendix 4.2). The change in tariff revenue under
discriminatory liberalisation has three components: (i) a loss of revenue resulting from the
fall in rates on the goods liberalised; (ii) a gain from increases in the volumes of liberalised
imports; and (iii) a loss of revenue from reductions in the volumes of import flows not
being liberalised. The third loss is frequently critical to the welfare impacts of
discriminatory liberalisation.
However, the results drawn from the simulations also indicated that when Vietnam
extends its AFTA commitments to all of its trading partners on a most favoured nation
(MFN) basis, its welfare increases substantially because of the greater extent of
liberalisation and the more efficient allocation of resources among Vietnam’s industries.
The model of Ianchovichina et al. (2000) was designed to conduct simulations of the
effects of reducing US tariffs against imports from Vietnam from their 1996 general rate
levels to their MFN levels, and of reducing import protection from Vietnam. Based on trade
and tariff data for 1997, the authors found that Vietnam’s exports to the US would nearly
double, from US$416 million to US$794 million, after a change to MFN status. The
increase in exports to the US of beverages and tobacco, textiles, basic manufacturing, and
electronics and machinery are significant, while exports of agricultural and forestry
products decrease. This is because the general tariff rates on major agricultural exports,
such as coffee and shrimps, are already zero. These industries do not benefit from the move
to MFN status, and the labour-intensive manufacturing sectors that do benefit are able to
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attract labour away from the lightly protected sectors. Due to the BTA, Vietnam’s imports
from the world increase by 2.8 per cent. About 40 per cent of this increase in imports is
attributed to the textile sector, reflecting the increase in demand for textiles as inputs into
the clothing sector (see Table A4.3.1 in Appendix 4.3).
With MFN status, Vietnam’s exports increase by 1.2 per cent. As goods are
redirected from the domestic market to the export market, the domestic consumer price
index rises by 2 per cent (see Table A4.3.3 in Appendix 4.3). However, higher foreign
exchange earnings from increased exports enable Vietnam to import more, and this in turn
leads to an increase in tariff revenues of US$27 million. Total welfare, as measured by
Equivalent Variation 19, increases by US$164 million, or a 0.5 per cent increase in real
expenditure per capita, and at a minimum Vietnam’s real income would rise by 0.9 per
cent. By granting MFN status to Vietnam the US also gains from improved resource
allocation, although some of the gains are offset by a deterioration in its terms of trade. The
gains for the United States were estimated to be around US$48 million per year.
The experiments conducted in these models are comparative-static in nature (see
Table 4.1, p.136), and the models contain no money or financial assets in the system. These
models did not consider the effects of external liberalisation on growth rates, nor the
‘natural’ growth of trade which would occur without further liberalisation. The models
focus mainly on the effects of a tariff reduction in the short run but do not fully deal with
the long-run effects of trade liberalisation, and particularly on exchange rate policy (see
Table 4.2, p.136).
In a more recent study, using the same approach as that of Fukase and Martin (1998,
1999), Tyers (2001) developed a multi-commodity comparative static macroeconomic
model to analyse, for the short term, the effects of a negative terms of trade shock on the
agricultural and fishery sectors, and the effects of a number of possible reform policies to
see how best to redress the negative consequences of external shocks. The model is also

19

The amount of additional money needed to give the level of utility which an individual could have
reached if the price of a commodity fell, or a new commodity became available.
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used to assess the long run direct and indirect effects of taxes, tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on the economy and the agricultural and fishery sectors (see Table 4.1 and 4.2,
p. 136).
This model uses a comparative static approach, similar to that of Mundell-Fleming
(1961). In this comparative static model it is assumed that the price level is endogenous but
continuous inflation is ruled out, and there is only one domestic interest rate. A length of
run is considered over which investment does not alter the current physical capital stock.
The model incorporates both a microeconomic global general equilibrium model that has
its genesis in GTAP, and the key structural features of the Vietnamese economy. These
structural features include: sticky nominal wages, flexible prices, imperfect capital
mobility, and a fixed nominal exchange rate.
In this model the production function is of a standard neoclassical variety depending
on the use of effective labour and physical capital, in which only labour is endogenous.
However, the most important investigation that is required for the case of transition
economies such as Vietnam, is how does the physical capital in each sector, government,
private and foreign, contribute to aggregate supply. This will be executed in Chapter 5.
In Tyers’ (2001) model, investment demand is modelled as a function depending
positively on the quantity of effective labour employed and negatively on the market
interest rate. A separate specification for the government and private sector is not
identified, nor the link between them. Thus the relationship between the investment
function and other related variables of the financial sector have been ignored. The price
function is not explicitly modelled either in this model.
Knowing that the specification of the functioning of the fiscal system, especially the
role of government, is very important in any model for a transition economy, one key
modification of the model by Tyers (2001) is that it makes government financially
independent and so enables more explicit treatment of fiscal policy. The monetary sector is
modelled within the overall framework of the money-multiplier theory of money stock
determination. More specifically, the multiplier values of the stock of broad money and
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aggregate deposits depend on two asset ratios: the currency to deposit ratio of the public,
and the reserve to deposit ratio of the banks. The demand for money is influenced
positively by aggregate income and negatively by the domestic interest rate. In the spirit of
comparative statics, although price levels do change in response to shocks, agents
represented in the model do not expect any continuous inflation and so there is no
distinction between the real and nominal interest rates. Exports are determined by the real
exchange rate, while imports are determined by both disposable income and the real
exchange rate. The current account deficit and its impact on macroeconomic variables are
not explicitly modelled in this model.
The external shocks that were used for the model simulation consisted of (i) a global
slowdown represented by a 5 per cent fall in the elasticity of consumption to income in the
US; (ii) a trade liberalisation policy represented mainly by the reduction of import tariffs
and export and production taxes; and (iii) reform policies in the short run focusing on both
bilateral and multilateral liberalisation between Vietnam and the US, EU and ASEAN. The
results obtained from the model simulation showed that, in the short run, the negative terms
of trade effect induced by the global slowdown caused a real depreciation, deflation and
aggregate output (GDP) reduction. Reduced employment and output lowered the return on
installed capital in Vietnam, and this reduced overall investment. There is a more adverse
effect from the real depreciation on the service sector than on the others, where the coffee
and fisheries sectors have contracted the most in response to the falls in their export prices.
Rice production does not contract, despite the fall in its export price. This is because
reduced overall income bolsters the expenditure share of staple foods, and because a small
amount of land is reallocated out of coffee into other agricultural activities including rice.
In the long run, if all structural features assumed in the short run are relaxed, a trade
liberalisation policy may lead to a substantial overall economic expansion, in particular in
the light labour intensive manufacturing sector where Vietnam has a comparative
advantage. This is fuelled, in part, by a considerable rise in the rate of return on installed
capital, which attracts large foreign investment. In the agriculture sector the main
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beneficiary from trade liberalisation is specialty crops such as fruit, vegetables and nuts
which become more important for exports, whilst the fisheries sector and coffee producers
are hurt. The rice sector also declines, though this is in part a consequence of its
dependence on the previously protected processed food industry.
To redress problems associated with the more hostile external economic
environment, some policy reforms are suggested from the model simulation. They are: (i) a
unilateral 20 per cent liberalisation of all import tariffs and export taxes; (ii) the US BTA: a
20 per cent liberalisation of trade distortions against US goods in Vietnam and against
Vietnamese goods in the US; (iii) the extension of the US BTA to Europe: a 20 percent
liberalisation of trade distortions against US and European goods in Vietnam and against
Vietnamese goods in both the US and the EU; and (iv) the ASEAN free trade agreement:
20 per cent bilateral liberalisation on the mix of items detailed by Fukase and Martin
(1999). The effects of policy reforms in the short run come mainly from a unilateral 20 per
cent liberalisation of all import tariffs and export taxes. This leads to a domestic output
expansion with restored employment. Because the liberalisation raises the rates of return on
installed capital in each sector, when the capital controls have been removed and more
investment allowed, this change would see GDP expand by an extra 2 per cent and
employment by an extra 4 per cent. The agriculture sector, however, continues to contract
overall even with the added reform. The bilateral trade reforms are also valuable, though
they have more limited scope and so are not as advantageous as the unilateral reform.
When the bilateral agreement with the US is extended to the EU the pattern of net gains is
similar to unilateral reform. In fact, if more foreign investment is allowed in combination
with the bilateral reform, the gains yielded by the US-EU agreement begin to look better
than unilateral across-the-board reform because of reductions in US and EU distortions
against Vietnam’s exports.
Among the macroeconomic models, Sand-Zantman et. al. (2000) use a multisector
macroeconomic model of a small developing economy in transition, to highlight linkages
between agriculture and the rest of the economy and the consequences of external opening
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up. By presenting a simple two-sector model for Vietnam they develop a system of supplydemand equilibrium equations for an agriculture sector (sector 1), in which production is
assumed to be rigid, and a non-agricultural sector (sector 2), consisting mainly of industry
and services, which is assumed to be demand-led with imperfect competition. According to
this dual theoretical pattern, the labour market is segmented with an unlimited supply in the
rural area. In the latter case the labour force is employed in the agricultural sector and in the
rural non-agricultural sector. Urban workers are employed in the non-agricultural sector but
may face unemployment. The wage gap between urban and rural areas induces migration.
The model is then calibrated on the basis of Vietnamese data for the period 1989-1997. An
ex-post forecast and base line forecast are computed for the period 1993-1997 and 19972010 respectively, in order to check the consistency of the model with observed and
targeted indicators planned by the Vietnamese authorities.
In this model, agricultural production (sector 1), at constant prices, is determined by
constant capital productivity and a rate of capital accumulation that is also exogenous. In
the demand-led sector 2 (industry and services), the production capacity depends on
endogenous capital productivity, which is a function of domestic and foreign investment.
The investment behaviour embodies a flexible accelerator, and capital accumulation
decreases with rising idle capacity. FDI is also introduced as part of total investment, but
only in sector 2.
Price functions are specified separately for sector 1 and sector 2. The model
determines the agricultural price in two steps: (i) a market clearing process determines an
equilibrium “shadow” price, assuming the export price to be equal to the domestic
production price and to the domestic demand price; and (ii) effective domestic demand and
exports are a function of a lagged price. At this price, the gap between effective external
and internal demands and supply entails adjustment of agricultural inventories. The price of
sector 2 output is set according to a mark up over total unit cost, including input and labour
costs, with a negative influence from idle capacity.
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Exports of agricultural goods increase with domestic output and price
competitiveness. These exports are strongly price elastic, and, according to the small
country hypothesis, foreign demand is assumed to be unlimited. The model excludes
agricultural imports. Export and import functions of non-agricultural goods both depend on
price competitiveness and idle capacity. Exports increase with foreign demand and imports
with domestic demand. Foreign prices and the nominal exchange rate are exogenous.
In this model, the labour market is modelled and segmented into two sectors. Labour
demand from the non-agricultural sector 2 depends on both the level of product demand
and endogenous labour productivity. For agriculture, labour supply is assumed to be
unlimited. The sum of individual incomes amounts to agricultural value-added. Changes in
rural and urban labour supply are determined by the respective natural rates of
demographic growth, corrected by the exogenous urban and rural activity rates of
population, and by endogenous migration. Urban unemployment results from the difference
between urban labour demand and supply. Migration depends on the expected urban/rural
wage differential (with the expected urban wage equalising the actual urban wage
multiplied by the probability of getting a job). Migration decreases the rural labour supply
and increases the urban one. Fiscal and monetary sectors are not explicitly modelled in this
model.
Two sets of simulations are presented. The first set of analytical simulations aims to
assess the consequences of elementary demand and supply shocks. They include: (i) a 20
per cent exchange rate devaluation; (ii) a 10 per cent rise of the urban wage; (iii) a 10 per
cent foreign demand increase in sector 2; (iv) foreign investment increases by 3 per cent of
GDP in sector 2; and (v) a 10 per cent domestic investment increase in sector 2. A second
set combine the elementary shocks in order to explore the impact of the dramatic recent
changes faced by Vietnam. These changes include (i) the combination of increasing
domestic saving and investment, and a strictly monitored trade opening up, in order to
speed up capital accumulation and modernisation; (ii) a more liberal strategy that induces
an increase in foreign direct investment; and (iii) the impact of the Asian financial crisis on
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the Vietnamese economy resulting in a decrease in foreign demand for Vietnamese exports,
a decrease in foreign direct investment and imported inputs, and a devaluation of the
Vietnamese Dong. The main features of the model and its results are synthesised in Tables
4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
In terms of elementary demand shocks, a 20 per cent exchange rate devaluation
improves competitiveness in sector 2, which in turns leads to an export rise. As a result, the
current account improves in the first year following the devaluation. A devaluation
stimulates real GDP and investment growth, but inflation, which occurs strongly in both
sectors (15.3 per cent and 9.2 per cent during the first year for sectors 1 and 2 respectively),
gradually dampens this recovery.
A 10 per cent rise of the urban wage increases non-agricultural prices, but allows for
purchasing power gains due to the lag in price adjustment. The initial boom in household
consumption is offset by a fall in exports and a rise in imports due to the reduction of
competitiveness. Thus, the value-added in sector 2 declines, while the accelerator effect
and the slowing down of investment amplify the recession.
A 10 per cent increase of foreign demand in sector 2 leads to an improvement of
exports and in internal demand. The increase of prices and wages slows down this trend
and deteriorates competitiveness. Due to the rigidity of the supply sector the price increases
in the agricultural sector, and, as a result, reduces agricultural exports. However, the trade
balance is strongly improved.
In the context of supply shocks, from the simulations of two scenarios, the results
show that an increase in both foreign and domestic investment promotes growth due to
productivity gains and higher competitiveness. In consequence, non-agricultural exports are
boosted. Demand is also stimulated through rising investment, which is partly imported. On
the whole, GDP increases with a slowdown of inflation. The trade balance deteriorates
slightly. However, foreign investment, which enables technology transfers, has a larger
impact on economic growth potential than domestic investment.
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A second set combines the elementary shocks in order to explore the impact of the
dramatic changes recently faced by Vietnam. The first shock is based on the combination
of increasing domestic saving and investment, and a strictly monitored trade opening up, in
order to speed up capital accumulation and modernisation. The results show that the
combination of a significant saving effort and a high rate of accumulation and productivity
gains, generates foreign trade and investment-led growth without worsening the current
account. Successful disinflation policies during the transition period in a country like
Vietnam seem to be linked to the capacity of promoting supply. In this scenario the role
played by agricultural modernisation is also highlighted. The second shock presents a more
liberal growth strategy whereby modernisation is backed by foreign investment, as
experienced by the “Asian Tigers” and China. Due to the increase of investment and to
productivity gains, a regime of balanced growth can be achieved with an improvement in
competitiveness and a restrained current account deficit. Consumption is also sustained due
to the increase in income. Lastly, some real aspects of the impact of the Asian crisis on the
Vietnamese economy have been simulated. The decrease of foreign demand and the decline
of FDI have a negative impact in terms of a sharp decline of GDP and of investment, in
spite of the balancing effect of the devaluation of the dong. The decrease of urban
migration limits the magnitude of the increase in unemployment. The increasing inflation is
mainly due to the effects of the devaluation.
An often mentioned criticism of CGE models is that they are static in nature in spite
of multiple attempts to incorporate dynamic elements. The result has been that in applied
studies, CGE models fail to show anything but very modest welfare gains or losses.
However, it must be admitted that these models have shown that the distributive impact of
different policy measures may sometimes be significant (Wengel, 1993). CGE models also
present empirical problems: the emphasis on sectoral disaggregation leads to a large
informational requirement in order to estimate the large number of parameters involved in
detailed CGEs. Limited data availability in the transition countries such as Vietnam
obviously precludes the econometric estimation of these parameters and the modellers have
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to assume a set of parameter values for the developed models and describe an equilibrium,
and then keep altering these parameter values until the model can track adequately the
observed values of the variables.
Since CGEs are built on the basis of social accounting matrices, rather than being
based on time series, and the data to construct them is only required for one year, this also
leads to another weakness of these models: there is no way to evaluate their performance.
As Ray (1984) indicated: “the main problem with this methodology, as is well known to
people in the field, is that there is no obvious way of testing whether the model is a good
approximation to the truth” (Ray, 1984, p. 18). This contrasts with the many possibilities
for the evaluation of the specification, estimation and simulation properties of
macroeconometric models.
In conclusion, as can be seen from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, although three of the five
models do analyse the effects of external and policy shocks upon the economy for the long
run, none of these models emphasises the long run nature of the adjustment process and the
link between the short and long runs. All these models deal with trade liberalisation,
focusing mainly on an exchange rate devaluation and tariff reduction. The discussion in
these models has been fragmented in that it has taken a sectoral rather than a
comprehensive look at the reform package. All these deficiencies will be corrected by the
present study, as discussed in the following chapters.
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Table 4-1: The Main Features of the Economic Models Undertaken for Vietnam
Models
Static

Type of models
Dynamic Short-run

External shocks1
Demand
Supply
shocks
shocks
Y
Y

Long-run

Central Institute for Economic
Y
N
Y
Y
Management (CIEM) (2000)
Fukase and Martin (1999)
Y
N
Y
N
N
Ianchovichina et al. (2000)
Y
N
Y
N
N
Tyers (2001)
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Sand-Zantman et al (2000)
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Note:
- “Y” means yes and “N” means no.
- 1 The policy implications arising from these shocks are simulated using these models.

Exchange
rate
Y

N
N
Y
Y

Policy shocks1
Tariff
Privatisation
reduction
of SOEs
N
N

N
N
N
Y

Y
Y
Y
N

Monetary or
fiscal policies
N

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

Table 4-2: The Main Simulation Results of the Economic Models Undertaken for Vietnam
Simulation shocks

Central Institute for Economic
Management (2000)
GDP
growth

Inflation

Trade
balance

Fukase and Martin (1999)
Industrial
growth

Agricultural
growth

Inflation

Ianchovichina et al. (2000)
Trade
balance

Industrial
growth

Agricultural
growth

Inflation

Tyers (2001)
Trade
balance

GDP
growth

Inflation

Sand-Zantman et al (2000)
Trade
balance

GDP
growth

Inflation

Trade
balance

+

+

+

4.
Increased
demand for exports

+

+

+

5.
Increased
investment

+

-

-

+

-

+

1. Exchange rate
devaluation
2. Tariff reduction

-

+

+

-

-

3. Adverse terms of
trade

6.
Combined
a
simulation shocks

-

+

+

+

Note:
-

-

+

“+” means increase for GDP growth and inflation or a surplus for the trade balance.
“-”means decrease for GDP growth and inflation or a deficit for the trade balance.
Blank spaces mean the models did not use these kinds of shocks or did not focus on these variables.
a
Combined simulation shocks include some shocks identified in the table or others not identified here.

+

-

-

-

+

Chapter 4 – Economic transition and macroeconomic adjustment: theories and empirical evidence.
____________________________________________________________________________________

137

4.4 Conclusion
Overall, the focus of this chapter has been placed upon reviewing the basic models in
the literature, which can be used to develop a macroeconomic model for Vietnam as a
transition economy. Although there is an increasing literature devoted to analysing the
problems emerging in the transition economies, the studies reviewed have focused mainly
on the prospects of macroeconomic adjustment in transition economies. Some have placed
their attention on the linkage between economic performance during transition to variations
in transition policies, others have placed the emphasis on the role of the privatisation
process and the relationship between the state and private sectors. However, there is not as
yet in the literature a model that enables the identification of the way in which exogenous
shocks transmit their effects to the domestic transition economies.
In this sense, such recent studies for the case of Vietnam cannot be found. As can be
seen from the reviewed studies, the development of macroeconomic modelling in Vietnam
is still in its initial stage. There is only one simple macroeconometric model and several
CGE models that have been developed for Vietnam as a transition economy in the last
decade. Almost all these models are static, and their focus has been placed upon trade
liberalisation and mainly on tariff reductions when Vietnam becomes a member of AFTA
and APEC, when Vietnam signed the bilateral trade agreement with the US, and when
Vietnam joins the WTO in years to come. The fact is that neither type of model emphasises
the long-run nature of the adjustment process and the link between the short and long runs,
possibly due to the lack of data. Perhaps, more importantly, modelling the macroeconomic
development of a transition economy such as Vietnam’s is simply incomplete in these
papers. So far none of the existing studies analysing the speed of the reform policies
include the exchange rate, tariffs, restructuring or privatisation of SOEs, and monetary and
fiscal policies. The objective of the present study is to fill this gap by developing a
theoretical model that can be used to explore further the macroeconomic implications
arising for a transition economy operating with either a fixed or flexible exchange rate
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system. In particular, to identify which of these two extreme systems best offers insulatory
properties, in the sense of reducing the volatility of adjustment of key macroeconomic
variables arising primarily from the implementation of reform policies at different speeds.
Developing an appropriate model from the existing literature is necessary. Three basic
theoretical models contributed by Mundell-Fleming (1963), Dornbusch (1976) and Branson
(1977, 1984), although they have not been developed specifically to look at a transition
economy, can provide the basic building blocks for developing a dynamic macroeconomic
model for Vietnam as a transition economy. The next chapter will present these three basic
theoretical models. Based on these models, and other models contributed by Harvie and
Lee (1996) and Harvie and Kearney (1996), a dynamic long run macroeconomic model for
Vietnam, with some appropriate amendments and modifications, will also be presented in
the next chapter.

Chapter 8 – Summary and Conclusions
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CHAPTER 5
MODELLING MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN
VIETNAM’S TRANSITION ECONOMY
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with modelling the macroeconomic adjustment of Vietnam
as a transition economy. The model will explicitly identify the ways in which this
adjustment affects the domestic economy, as well as Vietnam’s economic structure. The
macroeconomic adjustment emphasised focuses upon that arising from economic
liberalisation and the restructuring processes, specifically involving the abolition of state
production and trading monopolies, the creation of a favourable environment for the
development of the private sector, creating an import tariff structure, liberalising the
domestic currency, and expanding foreign investment. All these have occurred since the
initiation of economic reforms in 1986. The model gives emphasis to the long-term nature
of the dynamic adjustment process, recognising the effects that such adjustments have had
upon the long-term development of the Vietnamese economy. The economic developments
emphasised are those of domestic output production, private capital stock, foreign asset
stocks, exports and imports, the trade and current account balances, the real exchange rate,
private sector real wealth, and the domestic inflation rate. The macroeconomic adjustment
model adopted for Vietnam has its foundation in the models contributed by MundellFleming (1963) (MF), Dornbusch (1976) (DB), and the Portfolio balance models (Branson,
1977 and 1984) (PBM), and also in the Harvie and Lee (HL) (1996) and Harvie and
Kearney (HK) (1996) models which were developed to incorporate the supply side of the
economy and capital stock accumulation within the context of a fixed exchange rate.
The model developed is based on the special characteristics of the Vietnamese
economy, and a number of important assumptions. The main characteristics of the economy
of Vietnam are as follows: a high share of state-owned enterprise production in domestic
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output; a small share and underdeveloped private sector; a high degree of government
control over credit policy and allocation; a high degree of government control over
international capital mobility in the context of a less developed financial market; the
existence of a fixed exchange rate regime; the importance of government spending for the
development of infrastructure; and the existence of both domestic and international trade
barriers. The model developed will focus on the macroeconomic adjustment of the
economy of Vietnam by explicitly incorporating the aforementioned characteristics.
The key characteristics and uses of the model are as follows. First, the model
separates domestic aggregate supply into two sources; state and non-state production. The
re-structuring of the Vietnamese economy, in the context of privatisation of SOEs and
private sector development, is a key policy issue, which has important implications for the
development of the Vietnamese economy in the future. Second, it can be used to analyse
the effects of a nominal exchange rate devaluation and tariff reduction on the economy, as
committed to by the Vietnamese government when it joined AFTA, signed the bilateral
trade agreement with the US, and as a likely prerequisite for it becoming a member of
WTO in the next few years. Third, it emphasises the role of government expenditure, which
is divided into two categories; government consumption, and government investment. In
reality, due to a relatively high percentage of the labour force working in the government
sector in Vietnam, government consumption has been largely spent on paying salaries.
While this has contributed to an increase in domestic aggregate demand, it may lead to a
decrease in government expenditure on public infrastructure. Finally, the model is also
capable of incorporating different degrees of control over capital flows, along with the
adoption of either a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime. All these key policy issues will
be analysed in much greater detail in Chapter 7, in the light of the discussions conducted in
Chapters 5 and 6.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In relation to developing a macroeconomic model
for a transition economy, specifically Vietnam, Section 5.2 will present three basic
theoretical models, MF, DB, PBM respectively, upon which the model developed for
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Vietnam is primarily based. Section 5.3 will present the macroeconomic model developed
in this study, representing an extension of existing models by incorporating new
developments that will cast light on the issues of speed and sequencing of reforms
applicable to Vietnam. Some alternative versions of the base model will be represented in
Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 presents the major conclusions.

5.2 The Basic Theoretical Frameworks
In this section the theoretical frameworks of the Mundell-Fleming (MF), Dornbusch
(DB) and Portfolio balance models (PBM) are analysed and their limitations, including that
in the context of this study, highlighted.
5.2.1

The basic models
5.2.1.1 The Mundell-Fleming model
The MF model is a model of a small open economy with unemployed resources, a

perfectly elastic aggregate supply curve, static exchange rate expectations and perfect or
imperfect capital mobility. The model shows that the relative effectiveness of monetary and
fiscal policies depends on both the nature of exchange rate arrangements and the degree of
international capital mobility.
Figure 5-1: MF Model under a Flexible and Fixed
Exchange Rate with Perfect Capital Mobility
r
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thereby raising aggregate demand which is then matched by an equal rise in aggregate
supply. The LM curve slopes up (A5.1.13) because, as income rises the demand for
money increases; therefore, for a given real money supply, the rate of interest must rise to
reduce the demand for money in order to maintain money market equilibrium. Under the
assumption of perfect capital mobility the slope of the BP curve, which represents
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, is zero or a horizontal straight line at a
domestic interest rate that is the same as the international interest rate (A5.1.15).
The MF model can be used to generate some very powerful policy advice. To
examine these policy implications, first consider monetary and fiscal policy with perfect
capital mobility under a flexible exchange rate. In terms of Figure 5.1, from the initial
equilibrium at E , the LM 0 schedule will shift to the right to LM 1 if the authorities apply
an expansionary monetary policy conducted by an open market purchase of bonds by the
central bank. At the initial levels of income and world interest rate ( y 0 , r * ) the
expansionary monetary policy must imply a potential balance of payments deficit and a
depreciation of the exchange rate. With the domestic interest rate effectively fixed at the
world level and prices assumed constant the only way money market equilibrium can be
restored is via an increase in income, from y 0 to y1 . The latter will occur because the
expansionary monetary policy leads to an incipient decline in the domestic interest rate
from r * to r0 , which in turn leads to a capital outflow and exchange rate depreciation. The
rising price of foreign exchange will, on the assumption that the augmented MarshallLerner condition is satisfied 20, result in an improved trade balance and have an

20

The condition states that a depreciation will improve the trade balance only if the sum of the exchange
rate elasticities of export and import demand is larger than unity. In deriving this condition, make the
simplifying assumptions: (1) domestic prices P are unaffected by the exchange rate e , where e is
measured in units of the domestic currency per unit of foreign currency; (2) domestic output is held
constant; (3) export and import volumes are determined by the real exchanger rate ( P * e / P where P * is
the foreign price level) and with imports also influenced by domestic output Y . Then the trade balance
( BOT ) in domestic currency may be written as:
(1)
BOT = PX − ( P * e) IM where X = X ( P * e / P ) and IM = IM ( P * e / P, Y )
Assumptions (1) and (2) imply ∂P / ∂e = ∂Y / ∂e = 0 . Differentiating (1), then obtains:
∂BOT / ∂e = ( P∂X / ∂e) − ( P * e∂IM / ∂e) − P * IM

(2)
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expansionary effect on income as demand is switched from foreign goods to home goods;
income will continue rising, and the IS 0 schedule moves to the right to IS1 where money
market equilibrium is reached at point F. Hence, in the case of perfect capital mobility and
a flexible exchange rate, no fall in the interest rate is possible, so that the full burden of
external adjustment falls on the exchange rate. The outcome is a greater increase in income
resulting from an expansion of the domestic export sector via a domestic currency
depreciation.
By contrast, an expansionary fiscal policy will give rise to an appreciation of the
exchange rate that will completely crowd out the increase in government expenditure. In
the case of a fixed money stock and constant price level the LM curve of Figure 5.1 is
unmoved but fiscal expansion shifts the IS curve to the right, from IS 0 to IS1 , via a direct
injection into the flow expenditure. This leads to a potential rise in the rate of interest above
the world rate and hence a larger foreign inflow of capital which will appreciate the
exchange rate. The appreciation of the exchange rate implies that domestic exports become
more expensive abroad, while foreign imports become cheaper in the home country,
thereby reducing the net exports of the home country, shifting the IS1 curve back to the
left, to IS 0 . As a result in a flexible exchange rate regime and perfect capital mobility,
fiscal policy is ineffective in influencing real output.
Consider next expansionary monetary and fiscal policies with a fixed exchange rate
and perfect capital mobility. The impact effect of the increase in the total money stock has
to be the downward shift in the LM curve in Figure 5.1. Starting from balance of

PX e ∂X P * e 2 ∂IM eP * IM
−
−
(
)
e X ∂e
PX ∂e
PX
If assuming initial payments equilibrium PX = eP * IM , then
PX
(3)
∂BOT / ∂e =
( η X + η IM − 1) > 0
e
For a depreciation to lead to an improvement in the trade balance it is required that ∂BOT / ∂e > 0 and
therefore:
(4)
η X + η IM − 1 > 0
∂BOT / ∂e =

Equation (4) is the Marshall-Lerner condition where η X and η IM are the exchange rate elasticities of
exports and imports respectively.
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payments equilibrium at point E the shift of the LM curve leads to a fall in the interest
rate from r * to r , and this must worsen the capital account balance. At the same time the
increase in income with an unchanged exchange rate causes a deterioration in the current
account, as can be seen at the point G in Figure 5.1. In the case of perfect capital mobility
the fixity of the exchange rate implies that the authorities must be loosing reserves. As they
intervene to support the currency the money supply will fall with the assumption of no
sterilisation policy being applied, and the LM schedule will shift back to intersect IS at
the initial equilibrium point, E . The impact effect of monetary policy on real output under
a fixed exchange rate regime is also represented mathematically in Appendix 5.1. In this
case where capital is perfectly mobile ( k i → ∞ ) a monetary expansion does not alter real
output (see A5.1.35) or the interest rate (see A5.1.37). The only change is in the
composition of the money stock. An increased quantity of domestic currency reserves leads
to a lower quantity of foreign currency reserves by the same amount (A5.1.39).
With a fixed exchange rate, an increase in government spending will shift IS 0 to IS1
in Figure 5.1 and would be effective in raising income. For example, an increase in
government spending by raising income would increase the demand for money and the rate
of interest. The latter would attract a potentially infinite inflow of capital, shifting LM
rightwards and increasing income by the full multiplier (see A5.1.41).
Consider now monetary policy with imperfect capital mobility and a flexible
exchange rate. Expansionary monetary policy shifts the LM curve rightwards. The
incipient excess liquidity puts downward pressure on the interest rate (A5.1.19), generating
incipient excess demand for foreign currency and thus causes the domestic currency to
depreciate (A5.1.21). This shifts both the goods market equilibrium schedule and the
balance of payments equilibrium schedule. The new long run equilibrium is at a higher
level of output (A5.1.17). However, under imperfect capital mobility, monetary policy is
less effective in altering the level of output than in the perfect capital mobility case. The
reason for the dampened effect of monetary policy is that the depreciation of the domestic
currency required to eliminate the balance of payments disequilibria under imperfect
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capital mobility is smaller than in the case of perfect capital mobility, and therefore
increasing output by a smaller proportion.
A fiscal expansion leads, as in the perfect capital mobility case, to a rise in income
(A5.1.23) by shifting the IS curve rightwards. This puts upward pressure on the domestic
interest rate (A5.1.25) because of an increased demand for money when incomes rises,
which in turn causes net capital inflows since the domestic interest rate rises above the
world rate. The net effect on the exchange rate is not clear (A5.1.27). It depends on the
degree of international capital mobility. If capital mobility is comparatively high, the BP
curve is flatter than the LM curve, and expansionary fiscal policy will generate higher
income, an appreciation of the exchange rate, and a current account deficit that is offset by
the effect of a higher interest rate on net capital inflow. However, if capital mobility is
comparatively low the BP curve is steeper than the LM curve, and capital inflows are less
responsive to changes in the interest rate. An improvement in the capital account caused by
an increased capital inflow does not outweigh the deterioration in the current account. In
this case the balance of payments moves into deficit, which induces a depreciation of the
exchange rate.
The conclusion of the MF model is that the relative effectiveness of monetary and
fiscal policy is very much dependent on the choice of the exchange rate regime and the
degree of capital mobility. With perfect capital mobility monetary policy has no effect on
output under a fixed exchange rate, but has a powerful effect under a flexible exchange
rate. In contrast, fiscal policy has a powerful effect on output under fixed rates and no
effect under flexible rates. These results are reversed when there is imperfect capital
mobility. However, relaxing various restrictive underlying assumptions of the MF model,
such as allowing a variable price level to deflate money balances and non-static exchange
rate expectations, may yield different results from those discussed above, and this will be
considered in the next model - the Dornbusch model.
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5.2.1.2

The Dornbusch model

With the purpose of developing a theory to explain observed large fluctuations in the
exchange rate and of establishing that such exchange rate movements are consistent with
rational expectations formation, the DB model (1976) extends and amends the MF model to
draw on the fact of differential adjustment speeds in goods and asset markets. In fact, the
dynamic aspects of exchange rate determination in the DB model arise from the assumption
that exchange rates and asset markets adjust instantaneously relative to gradual adjustment
in non-financial markets. Within this framework the model assumes that prices are sticky in
the short run but variable in the long run (purchasing power parity holds in the long run but
not in the short run) resulting in disequilibrium in the goods market, whereas the interest
rate and exchange rate are perfectly flexible responding to any shock instantaneously and
hence financial markets are in continual equilibrium. In the short run, a monetary
expansion will, if real output is fixed, lower the interest rate and cause the exchange rate to
overshoot its long run depreciation and to account therefore for fluctuations in the
exchange rate and the terms of trade. During the adjustment process, rising prices may be
accompanied by an appreciating exchange rate so that the trend behaviour of exchange
rates stands potentially in strong contrast with the cyclical behaviour of exchange rates and
prices. In this context the exchange rate is identified as a critical channel for the
transmission of monetary policy to aggregate demand for domestic output. The model is
explained in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5-2: Dornbusch Model: Monetary
Shocks under Perfect Capital Mobility
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p1

p

is presented by the asset market schedule,
AM , which is negatively sloped. Thus,

for asset market equilibrium, the rise in p above p implies that real money balances have
fallen, requiring an increase in the rate of interest to maintain money market equilibrium,
which in turn requires an expectation of an exchange rate depreciation so that e must
appreciate relative to e . This will worsen the trade balance but be offset by a large capital
inflow.
A crucial feature of the adjustment process is that the asset market clears
instantaneously while the goods market adjusts only slowly. In Figure 5.2 point E , where
both goods and asset markets are in equilibrium and the exchange rate is at its purchasing
power parity value, implying that the trade account is also balanced, is one of long run
equilibrium. An increase in money supply will lead to a rise in the long run nominal
exchange rate, e , and domestic price level, p in proportion to the increase in money
supply. The AM curve shifts to the right and the new long run equilibrium is at point F ,
where purchasing power parity is re-established. But the assumed short run sluggishness of
prices precludes the new equilibrium from being obtained instantly. If the price level
cannot initially adjust, and since y is exogenously given, the only way the money market
can clear is by a fall in the interest rate. With perfect capital mobility the initial rise in the
money supply will, for a given price level, lead to a lower interest rate, a capital outflow
and an exchange rate depreciation. The exchange rate will depreciate by more than the long
run depreciation so that the uncovered interest parity condition is maintained: the exchange
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rate overshoots its equilibrium value. This is shown by the movement from E to G and e0
to e1 .
However point G , at which purchasing power parity is violated, can only be a point
of short run equilibrium, the new long run equilibrium is at point F . At point G the lower
interest rate and exchange rate depreciation will create an excess demand for goods.
However, in contrast to the MF model, this excess demand does not lead to an output
expansion 21, rather it gives rise to inflationary pressures. The excess demand at G pulls up
domestic prices, that is the move from G to F along AM 1 , and this reduces real money
balances and increases the domestic interest rate over time. The rising interest rate in turn
will lead to an incipient capital inflow which appreciates the exchange rate, thus ensuring
expected yields are continually equalised.
In the DB model an increase in government expenditure does not lead to exchange
rate overshooting. However, by incorporating the explicit specification of a linkage from
the real exchange rate to the level of domestic output, the Devereux and Purvis model22
demonstrates that real fiscal shocks may also generate volatile exchange rate movements.
This is shown mathematically and graphically in Appendix 5.2.
However, what happens to the short run response and dynamics of the system if the
assumption of perfect capital mobility is relaxed? With imperfect capital mobility the
exchange rate is not determined solely in asset markets, as the trade account and the capital
account both have a role to play. Recall that the balance of payments BP comprises the
current account CA and the capital account CP . Suppose that the current account depends
linearly on the real exchange rate, e − p and the capital account depends linearly on the
expected excess yield of domestic assets, i − i * −θ (e − e) , then:

BP = ξ (e − p ) + κ [i − i * −θ (e − e)]

21
22

In the version of the Dornbusch model reviewed here output is held constant.
This model emphasized here refers to Pentecost (1993), “Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Chapter 5.
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By integrating this generalised condition for a balance of payments equilibrium into
the DB model, represented in Appendix 5.2, the model with imperfect capital mobility is
obtained. The equilibrium condition for the asset market or AM schedule is as follows:
m − φy + λi *
λθ + λξ / κ
λθe
e
p=
+
−
1 − λξ / κ
1 − λξ / κ
1 − λξ / κ
The slope of the new AM curve depends on the sign of the expression − (1 − λξ / κ ) .
It can be negative or positive. The schedule AM is positively sloped as shown in Figure
5.3 if ξ / κ is very large, that is if the current account responds strongly to movements of
the real exchange rate or if capital mobility is very small.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that a given money supply expansion in the long run shifts the
economy from G to G ' , no matter whether the AM curve is positively or negatively
sloped.
Figure 5-3: Dornbusch Model: Monetary
Shocks under Imperfect Capital Mobility
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Assume that the current account is in equilibrium at point G . The increased nominal
money supply will lead to a capital account deficit if the exchange rate remained at e ,
since domestic assets pay a lower interest rate and are expected to devalue. Thus, the
balance of payments would be in deficit. If the exchange rate were to rise to e1 the capital
account would remain in equilibrium, but the country would run a current account surplus.
Thus, any exchange rate between e and e1 generates a current account surplus and a
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capital account deficit. At some exchange rate higher than e and smaller than e1 the
current account surplus and the capital account deficit balance.
In summary, the main features of the DB model are that, in the short run it
emphasises the stickiness of prices in the goods and non-asset markets, and it displays the
long run characteristics of the monetary model, where prices and the exchange rate adjust
equi-proportionally to a change in the money supply and purchasing power parity is
maintained. The combination of sticky prices or sluggish output response and perfect
capital mobility causes the exchange rate to temporarily overshoot its long run equilibrium.
This, however, may not hold in the case of imperfect capital mobility. The DB model has
been criticised for its assumption of the perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign
assets, and a failure to incorporate the stock flow interactions arising from current account
imbalances.
5.2.1.3 The Portfolio Balance Model
The portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination pioneered by Branson
(1976, 1977, 1984) and Kouri (1976) stem from the work on portfolio theory and the
demand for money by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958). The central feature of the
portfolio balance approach to exchange determination is that domestic and foreign nonmoney assets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, as a result uncovered interest rate
parity does not hold in this class of model. Thus, international investors will hold a
diversified portfolio of non-money assets, the proportion of each asset in the portfolio
depending on its particular risk-return characteristics. In addition, stock-flow interaction is
also introduced into the PBM by making the demand for domestic money and assets
depend upon the level of non-bank private wealth. Private sector wealth is accumulated and
decumulated through current account surpluses and deficits, which in turn affects the
exchange rate and the level of private sector wealth, which in turn feed back into private
expenditures and the demand for money. The dynamic model is examined under both static
exchange rate expectation and perfect foresight expectations respectively.
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a.

Dynamic Model under Static Exchange Rate Expectations 23

Total domestic nominal wealth, W , is made up of domestic residents’ holding of
domestic money, M , domestic residents’ holdings of domestic bonds, B , and domestic
residents’ holdings of foreign currency assets, F * . Domestic residents are assumed not to
hold foreign currency, M * . Therefore domestic non-bank private sector wealth, measured
in domestic currency is defined as: W = M + B + eF * , where e is the exchange rate
defined in terms of the domestic price of foreign currency. The principal characteristics and
the asset market equilibrium conditions for each of these three assets are given as equations
in Appendix 5.3. Short run exchange rate determination is diagrammatical presented in
Figure A5.3.1. The three asset market equilibrium equations can be achieved by
intersection of the MM , BB and FF lines (see Figure A.5.3.1), which presents the shortrun equilibrium levels of the exchange rate and the domestic interest rate. In fact, because
of the wealth constraint, only two of the three market equilibrium equations are
independent. Thus if a given change restores equilibrium in two markets, the third market
must also be in equilibrium.
The short run impact of monetary policy can be represented in Figure 5.4. The result
of the impact depends upon how the central bank has increased the money supply. In
Figure 5.4A, suppose that the central bank expands the money supply by an open market
purchase of domestic bonds in exchange for domestic money. At point A, the initial
equilibrium, there will now be an excess supply of money and an excess demand for both
foreign and domestic bonds. A large proportion of the new money goes to swell the
demand for bonds, driving the interest rate down. It can be shown that the net effect is to
cause both money and bond market lines to shift to the left. The MM line moves further
than the BB line because the direct effect in the money market is greater than the impact
on the bond market. Foreign assets become more attractive when the interest rate decreases,

23

The model emphasized here refers to Pentecost (1993), “Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Chapter 7, and
Copeland (1994), “Exchange Rates and International Finance”, Chapter 8.
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this in turn increases the demand for foreign assets and requires a depreciation of the
exchange rate.
Alternatively, the central bank can expand the money supply by buying foreigndenominated securities from domestic residents. Obviously, the impact on the MM
schedule would be the same as in the previous case. On the other hand, the decrease in the
value of the stock of foreign currency assets creates an excess demand which can only be
offset by a depreciation of the exchange rate. Hence, the equilibrium moves up the BB
schedule, with a fall in the interest rate and rise in the exchange rate as shown in Figure
5.4B.
Figure 5-4: Monetary Policy in the Short-run:
Open Market Purchase of Domestic and Foreign Bonds
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Consider now the effect of the fiscal expansion policy as illustrated in Figure 5.5. In
the case of the increase in the domestic bond supply the interest rate will rise, but the
exchange rate may rise or fall depending upon the substitutability of domestic and foreign
bonds. Since the higher supply of bonds will lower domestic bond prices and increase the
yield at each level of e , the BB schedule shifts out to the right to BB' . The higher level of
wealth will lead to the purchase of foreign currency by domestic residents, which in turn
will depreciate the domestic currency and leading to a rise in the exchange rate. Hence the
FF line will shift up rightward in both cases of Figure 5.5. The extent of the shift in the
FF line is important for the final effect on the exchange rate. First, if domestic and foreign

Chapter 5 – Modelling macroeconomic adjustment in Vietnam’s transition economy

153

______________________________________________________________________

assets are close substitutes, then the rise in the interest rate will cause a substitution into
domestic bonds which will dominate the wealth effect, leading to greater purchases of
foreign bonds. In this case the shift in the FF line will be relatively small, as in Figure
5.5(A), and the net effect for the exchange rate will be a fall in the exchange rate
(depreciation). Second, if domestic and foreign bonds are not very close substitutes then the
wealth effect will dominate, making the demand for foreign bonds stronger and hence
giving rise to a larger shift of the FF line to the right, as in Figure 5.5(B). In this case the
exchange rate will decrease (it will appreciate).
Figure 5-5: Fiscal Expansion Policy in the Short-run:
An Increase in Bond Supply
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Dynamic Exchange Rate Expectations 24

In the PBM model exchange rate dynamics require the specification of a wealth
accumulation equation and a hypothesis about exchange rate expectations. Wealth
accumulation is assumed to occur only through the purchase of foreign currency assets,
since domestic asset stocks are assumed fixed and the government budget in balanced. The
characteristics of the long run steady-state equilibrium are presented in Appendix 5.3.
Consider now the case of an increase in the domestic money supply by way of an
open market purchase of domestic bonds. Figure 5.6 shows that the long run equilibrium
24

The model emphasized here refers to Pentecost (1993), “Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Chapter 7.
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implications for the exchange rate differ according to the slope of the F&* = 0 line. An
unanticipated increase in the domestic money stock, due to an open market purchase, will
shift the e&= 0 hyperbola up to the right. In Figure 5.6(A), where the F&* locus has a
negative slope, the exchange rate initially depreciates from e1 to e2 and then appreciates
down the saddle path to the new long run equilibrium at e3 . The net effect on the exchange
rate is therefore an appreciation, as the initial steep depreciation gives rise to a trade surplus
as domestic residents accumulate foreign assets. There are two points to be noted from this
result. First, unlike the MF model, in the long run the exchange rate may appreciate in
response to a domestic monetary expansion. Second, under perfect foresight expectations
an unanticipated increase in the domestic money stock will lead to an immediate
depreciation of the home currency, but this depreciation will not be as great as under static
expectations. In this case perfect foresight expectations assist the adjustment of the foreign
exchange market, because in the face of the initial depreciation rational agents will realise
that this will improve the trade balance and generate a future appreciation of the domestic
currency.
Figure 5.6(B) shows an equivalent monetary expansion with the F&* = 0 line having a
positive slope, reflecting the point that higher domestic wealth requires a depreciation of
the exchange rate to maintain current account balance as domestic residents use their higher
wealth to buy foreign goods. The rise in the money supply causes an immediate
depreciation of the exchange rate from e1 to e2 , after which it partially appreciates back to
e3 , as the trade balance improves from the initial depreciation. In this case the long run

equilibrium exchange rate is higher, at e3 , than in the initial equilibrium. Thus an
expansionary monetary policy has depreciated the exchange rate and this is consistent with
the MF model.
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Figure 5-6: An Open Market Purchase in the PBM with Perfect Foresight
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Consider a shock to the current account, through a shift of the exogenous import
parameter, IM . From an initial balanced-trade position a fall in IM will give rise to a
trade balance surplus, hence requiring an appreciation of the exchange rate at all levels of
F * to maintain equilibrium. Thus the negative sloped F&1 * = 0 locus shifts down to the left

to F&2 * = 0 , as shown in Figure 5.7. From the initial equilibrium at point A the exchange
rate jumps immediately down to B on the saddle path, which represents an appreciation of
the exchange rate. The exchange rate then continues to appreciate along the stable arm until
the new long run equilibrium is reached at point C . There is no short run overshooting of
the exchange rate in this case under
Figure 5-7: Trade Balance Shock in the PBM
with Perfect Foresight
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Table 5-1: Summarized Effects from a Monetary Expansion in the MF, DB, and PBM Models
Effects from a money expansion

Real income
Price level
Nominal interest rate
Real interest rate
Nominal exchange rate
+ (depreciation)
- (appreciation)
Real exchange rate
+ (depreciation)
- (appreciation)
Balance of payments
Current account
Capital account
Note:
+
-

0
?

The MF model
Fixed exchange rate
Flexible exchange rate
Perfect
Imperfect
Perfect
Imperfect
capital
capital
capital
capital
mobility
mobility
mobility
mobility
0
+
+
+
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
+

0

0
?
?

0

+

+

The DB model
Flexible exchange rate
Short run
Long run
(on impact) Adjustment
Ultimate
process
outcome
0
0
0
fixed
+
+
+
0 ( i = i*)
+
0
+
+

+

0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
increases of the variables
decreases of the variables
no change in the variables
change in the variables not known, since not explicitly included

On
impact
?
fixed
+

The PBM model
Flexible exchange rate
Short
Long run
run
Adjustment
Ultimate
process
outcome
?
?
?
fixed
+
+
?
?
?
?
+
- or +

-

0
( e ↑= p ↑ )

+

+

-

- or +

?
?
?

?
?
?

0
0
0

?
+
-

?
+

0
0
0
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Table 5-2: Summarized Effects from a Fiscal Expansion in the MF, DB, and PBM Models
Effects from a fiscal expansion
The MF model
Fixed exchange rate
Perfect
Imperfect
capital
capital
mobility
mobility
Real income
Price level
Nominal interest rate
Real interest rate
Nominal exchange rate
+ (depreciation)
- (appreciation)
Real exchange rate
+ (depreciation)
- (appreciation)
Balance of payments
Current account
Capital account

Note:

The DB model

Flexible exchange rate
Perfect
Imperfect
capital
capital
mobility
mobility

Short run (on impact)

On
impact

Flexible exchange rate
Long run
Short run
Adjustment Ultimate
process
outcome
?
fixed
+
+
- or +

+
fixed
0
0
0

+
fixed
+
+
0

0
fixed
0
0
-

+
fixed
+
+
-

+
+
+
-

Not
overshoot
+
+
+
+
+

0

0

-

-

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

- or +

0
?
?

+
+

0
?
?

+

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

+
0

?

Overshoot

The PBM model

Flexible exchange rate
Long run
Adjustment process
Ultimate outcome
Overshoot
Not
Overshoot
Not
overshoot
overshoot
+
+
+
+
+
+
0
0
0
0
+
+
+

increases of the variables
decreases of the variables
no change in the variables
change in the variables not known, since not explicitly included

?
fixed
+
+
+
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5.2.2

A critical look at the basic theoretical models
A critical look at these basic theoretical models can be specified under the following

headings: fixed and sticky price, imperfect and perfect capital mobility, static and dynamic
expectations, demand and supply side determination, current account equilibrium and
wealth effects.
5.2.2.1 Fixed and Sticky Price
In the MF model, the price level is simply an exogenously fixed index which can
have no role to play in the domestic macroeconomy. With this distinctive feature in the
model there is neither a price response to a monetary shock nor feedback from a
depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate via import prices to domestic prices.
Hence the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition does not hold, even in the long run. In
the DB model the price level is fixed only in the short run due to the inherent rigidities that
are so typical of markets for labour and goods, but it rises during the adjustment process
arising from the excess demand in the goods market. Goods prices, which are sticky,
response to market disequilibria by a factor π (see A5.2.1), but not fast enough to
eliminate those disequilibria instantly. The goods market adjusts slowly and remains in
disequilibrium throughout the adjustment process, whilst the exchange rate and interest rate
are assumed to instantaneously adjust following a disturbance ensuring that the asset
markets is permanently in equilibrium. For the PBM model, as the model is a partial
equilibrium model, the price adjustment process has not been mentioned.
In both the DB and PBM models a monetary disturbance can lead to exchange rate
overshooting, meaning that PPP does not hold in the short run. However, each has its own
explanations for the overshooting phenomenon. Sticky prices in the short run cause
exchange rate overshooting in the DB model, whilst the PBM model gives a reason that
changes of wealth via balance of trade disequilibrium need time. In addition, the important

Chapter 5 – Modelling macroeconomic adjustment in Vietnam’s transition economy

159

______________________________________________________________________

difference between these two models is that while the PPP condition does hold in the short
run in the DB model, in the PBM model this does not hold in both the short and long run. A
monetary expansion with a flexible domestic price response in the long run will tend to be
associated with an exchange rate appreciation, and hence the non-PPP model represents a
more radical departure from the PPP-based DB model.
5.2.2.2 Imperfect and Perfect Capital Mobility
Capital can only be considered perfectly mobile if it can be moved into the preferred
form of investment any time without delay and in the desired amount. The extent to which
capital is mobile determines how quickly the long run equilibrium value is approached. If
capital is perfectly mobile the market clears instantaneously, and short run and long run
responses are identical. When mobility is less than perfect, however, the market needs time
to adjust to its new long run equilibrium. In the MF model, one of its advantages is that
both cases of perfect and imperfect capital mobility assumptions can be analysed. The
assumption of perfect capital mobility implies that, if expectations are assumed to be static
(that is, the expected change in the exchange rate is equal to zero) and arbitrage is assumed
to ensure that bond yields are continually equalised, the domestic rate of interest must
continually equal the foreign rate ( i = i * ). In this case the capital account and the balance
of payments can be in equilibrium and hence the balance of payments (BP) curve is
horizontal. From these assumptions the conclusion of the MF model is that the choice of
the exchange rate regime and the degree of capital mobility determines the relative
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. However, in the DB model only the perfect
capital mobility case is analysed.
In contrast with the MF and DB models the PBM model assumes that domestic and
foreign non-money assets are imperfect substitutes. This assumption implies that the
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition does not hold in the PBM model because
investors will hold a diversified portfolio including non-money assets, and the proportion
of each asset in the portfolio depends on its risk-return characteristics. Imperfect substitutes
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in the PBM model means that not only must we consider the equilibrium of the money and
domestic bond markets but also to pay attention to changes in relative demands and
supplies in the foreign bond market, which will disturb portfolio equilibrium and influence
exchange rate behaviour.
5.2.2.3 Static and Dynamic Expectations
In the MF model there is no role for exchange rate expectations. Capital movements
are solely a function of the interest rate differential between the domestic economy and the
rest of the world, taken to measure the differential yield on the respective assets. However,
another component in the prospective asset yields is the expected capital gain/loss through
expected exchange rate variations. Whilst expectations play a crucial role in many theories
of the exchange rate, the neglect of this in the MF model is a fundamental criticism of this
approach.
The difference between the MF and DB models is that in the DB model capital
movements are not solely dependent on the interest rate differential but exchange rate
expectations also play an important role in determining capital flows. The interest rate
differential domestic and world markets will reflect the expected rate of depreciation or
appreciation of the domestic currency. If the domestic currency is expected to depreciate
then financial markets demand a higher rate of return on domestic currency denominated
asset holdings, in other words the domestic interest rate is higher than foreign interest rate,
and vice verse.
In the DB model exchange rate expectations are assumed to be regressive, and hence
the expected change in the exchange rate depends upon the difference between the current
exchange rate ( e ) and the equilibrium exchange rate ( e ). If ( e ) exceeds the equilibrium
value then there is an expectation that ( e ) will appreciate (fall) back to the equilibrium
level. Similarly, if the current value is below the equilibrium value then it is expected that
the rate will depreciate ( e will rise) back to the equilibrium. The relaxation of the static
expectations assumption has implications for policy shocks and allows policymakers to
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analyse the impact of policy shocks in different time periods, short run, medium run and
long run. Exchange rate expectations are assumed to be perfect foresight expectations,
which means that the expected change in the exchange rate next period based on
information available in this period is exactly the change which occurs. That is E (e&) = e&,
so that the UIP condition is i = i * +e&. The assumption of rational expectations allows the
model to make the distinction between policies which are anticipated and those which are
unanticipated, and this in turn has important implications for the effectiveness of monetary
and fiscal policies.
In the PBM model the domestic interest rate can diverge from the world interest rate
not only because of exchange rate expectations as in the DB model, but also because of risk
premium ( i − i* = E (e&) + rp ).
5.2.2.4 Demand and Supply Side Determination
The three models reviewed above emphasise only the demand side of the economy
and neglect the supply side. The MF model assumes the aggregate supply curve is flat,
which implies that the burden of adjustment to aggregate demand fluctuations falls on the
level of real output rather than on the price level. The DB model also puts emphasis on the
demand side of the economy in which output supply is fixed at the full employment level,
and hence fluctuations in goods demand only results in price movement and not in output
movement. However, although the supply side is not directly incorporated in the PBM
model, the model can be extended to allow for changing capital stock accumulation in both
the public and private sector, which in turn will affect the production function and therefore
aggregate supply. This will be attempted in designing a macroeconomic model of Vietnam
in the next section.
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5.2.2.5 Current Account and Wealth Effects
The consistency of a non-zero current account with long run equilibrium has been
regarded as a point of weakness in the MF and DB models. If the current account is not in
equilibrium it will affect the stock of foreign assets and therefore financial wealth, which in
turn will have implications for expenditure on goods and the asset demand function and
thus the equilibrium in these two models can only be temporary. However, this
shortcoming is remedied in the PBM model by incorporating the current account into the
analysis. The PBM model requires for overall equilibrium that the current account has to be
in balance, and to ensure that the current account is restored to balance in the long run it is
necessary for the real exchange rate to have appreciated (in the case of monetary
expansion) in the long run equilibrium. This is because the current account surplus, which
is generated by an initial monetary expansion, results in an accumulation of foreign assets
on the service component of the current account, thus tending to push the current account
further into surplus. For the current account balance to achieve long run equilibrium
requires an appreciation in the real exchange rate so that there is a worsening of net exports
in the trade account to offset an increase in net investment income in the service account.
The eventual real exchange rate appreciation is determined by the cumulative size of the
current account generated between equilibrium positions and hence accumulation of
foreign asset stocks.
In the MF and DB models, although the current account plays a leading role in the
adjustment mechanism, no account is taken of the wealth effects, either on portfolio
allocation or on real expenditure. The inclusion of wealth effects in asset and goods
markets has been considered to be an important feature in exchange rate theory. A current
account surplus, and increasing domestic wealth, will increase the demand for money and
other domestic assets and, in addition, may directly affect domestic expenditure through
wealth effects on consumption. Through these mechanisms the current account will
influence the exchange rate and, possibly domestic real income, which in turn will feed
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back onto the current account, until the model is in full equilibrium once the current
account is brought back into balance.
Although these three models have a number of shortcomings, and their focus has
been placed on mainly monetary and fiscal policies, they can provide the basic building
blocks of a dynamic macroeconomic model for transition economies, particularly for the
Vietnamese economy. However, there is a need to have some amendments so that the
model developed can be used for analysing macroeconomic and reform policies that are
specific to Vietnam such as that of trade liberalisation, state-owned enterprise privatisation
or restructuring, and expansionary public investment. The development of such a model is
the basic purpose of the present study.

5.3 A Macroeconomic Model for Vietnam
Based on the models previously presented, and combined with the contributions of
Harvie and Lee (1996) (HL) and Harvie and Kearney (1996) (HK) this section will develop
a macroeconomic model which can allow an analysis of the macroeconomic adjustment
processes arising from structural reform policies, and exogenous shocks emanating from
trade and financial liberalisation, for a small transition economy such as Vietnam’s. Before
presenting the model the key assumptions underlying the theoretical model will be
discussed first.
5.3.1

The major assumptions of the model
Similar to the DB, HL and HK models the model developed for Vietnam assumes a

deterministic framework in which economic agents posses rational expectations, and this is
equivalent to the case of perfect foresight. Importantly, financial markets are assumed to be
in continual equilibrium because of the ability of financial variables to adjust
instantaneously, while non-financial markets can remain in disequilibrium throughout the
adjustment process because of the presumed stickiness of price and quantity adjustment.
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However, there are some points that make the HL and HK models, and also the
model developed in the present study, different from DB’s but similar to PBM’s. First,
while the DB model focuses upon the short run, and does not explicitly consider the role of
the current account during the adjustment process, these models, like the PBM model,
emphasise the long run nature of the adjustment process, in which the need for long run
equilibrium in the current account is explicitly incorporated as well as the wealth effects
from the flow of foreign asset stock holdings which arise from current account
developments. Second, while in the basic theoretical models focus is placed solely upon the
demand side, the model developed in this study, similar to the HL and HK models, will
focus upon both aggregate demand and supply. In the case of the supply side output is not
restricted to remaining at some natural level of output, appropriate in the context of a short
run framework, but rather output supply can vary through the process of capital stock
accumulation. Finally, other extensions include Tobin’s q theory of investment, emphasis
on the important role of wealth effects during the adjustment process, the incorporation of
additional financial assets and the introduction of both sticky price and quantity adjustment
of non-financial variables.
The model developed for Vietnam will also contain other major assumptions
underlying the HL and HK models, which can be summarised as follows: the reform
policies 25 will have an impact upon the economy indirectly through their effect on the real
exchange rate and also directly through capital stock accumulation and the trade balance,
which include a change in domestic output and foreign assets generated from the reform
policies; the domestic economy produces goods which can be consumed domestically and
are an imperfect substitute for the imported goods; and, finally, the economy operates
under a fixed nominal exchange rate with extensive government control over the capital
market. This last assumption is ultimately abandoned and replaced by a flexible exchange

25

The reform policies emphasised here are: (a) nominal exchange rate devaluation, (b) tariff reduction,
and (c) privatisation of the SOE capital stock.
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rate and perfect capital mobility, with the objective of conducting a comparison of the
effects of the reform policies upon the domestic economy under two exchange rate regimes.
Moreover, with the aim of looking at the issues of the speed and sequencing of
reforms applied in transition economies, and especially for the case of Vietnam, the
development of an appropriate macroeconomic model requires extensive refinement and
extensions to the existing HL and HK models. These are as follows.
(1)

The model developed is for Vietnam, a small transition economy, incorporates

a significant presence of SOEs, which often provide the dominant mode of organisation in
large scale and heavy manufacturing (steel, power, cement) as well as in the financial and
distribution sectors. In 1995 in Vietnam, for instance, SOEs were estimated to account for
around 30 per cent of non-agricultural employment, and 43 per cent of non-agricultural
value added (Ghosh and Whalley, 2000). Thus, the model will explicitly distinguish the
contributions of both SOEs and the private sector to domestic aggregate supply. This is
conducted to examine the impact of the privatisation policy. It is assumed that the private
sector is more efficient than the public sector and that the privatisation of SOE capital stock
means that the capital of SOEs is simply given to the private sector, and as a result the
private capital stock and private wealth will increase. Privatisation is assumed to be
introduced either gradually or immediately. This assumption would lead to different
adjustment paths for the economy. Particular focus is given to the case of privatisation
since the Vietnamese economy is changing towards a market-oriented one in which the
private sector is expected to make a larger contribution to total output.
(2)

The model developed initially assumes that the nominal exchange rate is

fixed, and that there is significant government control over international capital mobility.
Unlike other transition economies in Europe, Vietnam’s financial markets are still
rudimentary and in the process of being liberalised. Imperfect capital mobility implies that
the return on domestic financial assets is not equated continuously with that on foreign
assets. This is a second amendment of the basic theoretical model upon which the model
developed and presented here is based.
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These assumptions will be gradually relaxed during the macroeconomic adjustment
process. Government control over international capital mobility will be increasingly
reduced, and abandoned when full liberalisation is adopted by the Vietnamese government.
At the same time a change in the nominal exchange rate regime from fixed to flexible is
also examined. These assumptions are of contemporary relevance for Vietnam, since its
integration with the global market economy through, first, being a member of AFTA in
1996, and, second, signing a bilateral trade agreement with the US in 2001, and then, third,
possible membership of the WTO in 2005. These assumptions allow the recognition of
appropriate polices in regard to changing the nominal exchange rate regime and capital
controls, and their implications for the adjustment process arising from trade and financial
liberalisation for Vietnam. In the context of the model a comparison of the impact of the
reform policies applied under two exchange rate regimes will be conducted in Chapter 7, in
order to identify an appropriate exchange rate policy for the case of Vietnam.
(3)

It is assumed that government spending consists of consumption and

investment spending. Government investment spending on infrastructure development
contributes to the level of aggregate demand for output as well as affecting output supply,
while government consumption spending only affects the level of aggregate demand for
output arising from increased salaries in the state sector. The distribution of government
expenditure between consumption and investment is primarily politically determined, and
in the context of the model is assumed to be exogenous. Alternative spending options,
combined with the reform policies, allow the identification of an appropriate policy that
would enhance the level of aggregate demand and supply.
A main objective of this study is to identify the implications of alternative policies,
such as privatisation and the restructuring of SOEs, trade and financial liberalisation, and
an expansion of government infrastructure expenditure for the economic development of
the economy. Although there are many other reforms that can be examined, these three
should give a sense of the important lessons to be drawn from the model developed here for
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the case of Vietnam. These policy implications form the basis of the simulation scenarios to
be discussed further in Chapter 7.
The equations of the model are now presented, as with the HL and HK models, they
are categorised under five headings; goods market, assets market, foreign sector,
price/wage nexus, and definitions. All equations in the model, except for the domestic
nominal interest rate and the world interest rate, are presented in log-linear form 26. The
symbols are defined in the box following the equations.

26

The original Dornbusch (1976), HL and HK (1996) models have all adopted this log linear approach.
As the equations are in log form the estimated parameters are equivalent to elasticities. This is very useful
in identifying the percentage changes in endogenous variables arising from percentage changes in
exogenuous variables, especially for the simulation analysis we can plot the percentage deviation of an
endogenous variable from its baseline value throughout the adjustment process.
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The Base Model
Goods Market
y d = α 1c p + α 2 i + α 3 c g + α 4 i g + α 5 (tx − tm)
c p = c1 y s + c 2 w p

(2)
(3)

i = βi + (1 − β )i
i p = k&p = τ 1 k&p ' − τ 2 k&e
k&p ' = ηq
p

(1)

e

(4)
(5)

i e = k&e = ϕ (k e* − k e )
i g = k&g = θ (k g * − k g )

(6)

c =c

(8)

g

(7)

g

Assets Market
m = p + w1 y d − ϖ 2 r + ϖ 3 w p

(9)

w = m1 ( f + e − p) + m 2 (m − p) + m 3 (k + q)
m& = dce + ψ (r − r w + f&)
p

p

(10)

e= r−r
q&= δ 3−1 {q − δ 1 R + δ 2 (r − π )}

(11a)
(11b)
(12)

R = e1 y s − e 2 k p − e 3k e + e 4 k g

(13)

Foreign Sector
tx = σ 1 y w + σ 2 (e − p) − σ 3T

(14)

w

tm = t 1 y − t 2 (e − p ) − t 3T
f&+ e&− p& = r1 (tx − tm) + r 2 (r w f + e − p )
d

(15)
(16)

Price/wage Nexus
p = αw + (1 − α )e
π& = φ1 ( y d − y s ) + φ 2π
y s = λ1 k p + λ2 k e + λ3 k g − λ4 ( w − p)

(17)
(18)
(19)

Definitions
t = tx − tm
m& = π
c=e−w
l=m−w

(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)

A dot (.) above a variable signifies its rate of change.
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List of Symbols
d

y
cp
i
ig
tx
tm
ip
ie
ke
kp
k p'
kg
m
p
r
wp
w
f
q
R
ys
f&

c
l

π
t

Endogenous variables
Aggregate demand for output
Private consumption
Total investment
Government investment spending
Total exports
Total imports
Domestic private investment
SOE investment
SOE capital stock
Private capital stock after the
privatisation policy is applied
Private capital stock
Public capital stock
Nominal money supply
Domestic price level
Domestic nominal interest rate
Private real wealth
Domestic nominal wage
Foreign asset stock
Tobin's q ratio
Real profits
Aggregate supply of output

c

g

e
yw
rw
dce
T

Exogenous variables
Government consumption
spending
Nominal exchange rate
World real income
World interest rate
Domestic credit expansion
Trade protection
(tariff imposed on
exports and imports)

Current account balance
Real exchange rate
Real money balances
Inflation expectation
Trade balance

Equilibrium in the model depends on equilibrium in the goods market, assets market,
and foreign sector. Equilibrium in the goods market will be discussed first.
The goods market equilibrium consists of eight equations. The first two equations are
the same as those in the HL and HK models. Aggregate demand for output ( y d ) is given by
Equation (1). In this study, aggregate output demand comprises private consumption, total
investment, government consumption, government capital investment and the trade balance
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consisting of exports less imports. Equation (2) indicates that private consumption
expenditure depends positively on the level of real income 27, ( y s ), and real private sector
wealth, ( w p ). Equation (3), total investment, consists of two components: private sector
investment ( i p ) and state-owned enterprise investment ( i e ).
Equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) explicitly explain capital investment in the model.
Private sector investment is also explicitly modelled as in Equations (4) and (5). Equation
(4), consists of net private investment and SOE capital stock given to the private sector
arising from the privatisation process. Equation (5) gives the net private investment
equation, which captures the partial adjustment hypothesis where the capital stock adjusts
gradually to its new optimal level. Equation (5a) captures this partial adjustment
hypothesis:
k&p ' = η (k * −k )

(5a)

where k * represents the desired capital stock and k the actual capital stock. Assuming
costs of adjustment, the gap is closed only by η for each period. The desired capital stock
depends upon its market value as given by (5b)
k* = k + q

(5b)

Substituting (5b) into (5a) Equation (5) can be obtained. Hence net private investment
adjusts positively to Tobin’s q.
State-owned enterprise investment arises from a gradual adjustment of the actual
SOE capital stock ( k e ) to its policy-determined level ( k e* ), as in Equation (6). It is
assumed that the decrease in the SOE capital stock, caused by the privatisation policy, is
policy determined. These major differences from the basic models emphasise the important
policies of government in regard to restructuring SOEs and stimulating the development of
the private sector. Identifying this issue for the Vietnamese economy is one of the main
objectives of this study28. Government capital spending arises from a gradual adjustment of

27

Real income is measured as domestic aggregate supply rather than domestic aggregate demand because
aggregate supply specifies domestic production of goods and services, and therefore domestic income
generated. This is a major variable influencing consumption expenditure.
28
More details will be presented in Chapter 7 when a simulation of the model is conducted.
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the actual public capital stock ( k g ) to its policy determined level ( k g * ), as in Equation (7),
while government consumption spending is an exogenous policy determined variable
(Equation (8)). Identifying the contribution of government investment to the development
of the domestic infrastructure system for the Vietnamese economy is another key objective
of this study. These two equations are the same as those in the HK model.
Assets market equilibrium, given by equations (9)-(13), is fundamentally based on
the base models presented in the last subsection. There are four financial assets here, these
being domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and equities. The latter represents
claims to the ownership of the capital stock in the private sector. Domestic financial assets
are assumed to be perfect substitutes, with arbitrage between them resulting instantaneously
in the same expected rate of return. However, due to the assumption of imperfect
international capital mobility, the return on domestic financial assets is not continuously
equated with that on foreign assets (bonds). Only gradually will the return on these
financial assets be equated. This assumption, based on the HL model, makes the model
developed more suitable to the characteristics of the Vietnamese economy as previously
presented.
Equation (9) represents the demand for real money balances, which depends
positively on the level of aggregate demand ( y d ) and domestic private real wealth ( w p ),
and negatively on the domestic nominal interest rate ( r ). Real domestic private sector
wealth, which is given by Equation (10), as in the HL and HK models, depends positively
on the real domestic currency value of domestically held foreign assets ( f ), on holdings of
real money balances ( m − p ), and on the real value of the domestic capital stock ( k p + q ).
Equation (11a) identifies the balance of payments condition with a fixed exchange
rate and imperfect capital mobility. With the nominal exchange rate fixed the money stock
becomes an endogenously determined variable in the model. The assumption of imperfect
capital mobility produces a discrepancy between the return on domestic financial assets and
foreign financial assets, which can persist for a prolonged period of time. With a fixed
exchange rate expected returns on domestic and foreign financial assets are not equalised,
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and divergences in the returns on these will lead to changes in capital inflows or outflows.
Such flows will affect domestic reserves and have an impact upon the domestic money
supply growth, resulting in changes in inflation.
In the case of a fixed exchange rate the money supply is endogenously determined. It
depends on increases in the domestic component of the money supply, described here as
the exogenous domestic credit expansion ( dce ), and the change in foreign exchange
reserves by the central bank, which are endogenously determined by balance of payments
surpluses or deficits arising from a fixed nominal exchange rate and developments in the
current account and capital flows, as shown in Equation (11a).
m& = dce + ψ (r − r * + f&)

Capital flows depend on the difference between the domestic nominal interest rate and the
world interest rate, while the current account position is indicated by the
accumulation/decumulation of foreign exchange reserves. With a fixed exchange rate there
will be a balance of payments surplus or deficit resulting in an accumulation/decumulation
of foreign exchange reserves, and a consequential increase/decrease in the growth of the
domestic money supply.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate can adjust, so that
either capital inflows or outflows will have no effect upon foreign exchange reserves. As a
result the growth of the money stock is exogenous, and the nominal exchange rate becomes
endogenous. Hence Equation (11b) is relevant with the assumption of a flexible exchange
rate combined with perfect international capital mobility.
Equation (12) represents equilibrium in domestic non-money asset markets. The
return on all non-money financial assets is assumed to be maintained continuously through
arbitrage in the case of a flexible exchange rate, while in the case of a fixed exchange rate
only the return on domestic financial assets is assumed to be equated continuously. The
expected real return on holding equities is given by:
q&/ q + R / q
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The expected return on equities depends upon the expected capital gain/loss from holding
equity capital ( q&/ q ) plus the real profit stream derived from the capital service R (profit)
relative to q .
Continual, and instantaneous, arbitrage between domestic bonds, foreign bonds and
equity capital implies:
q&/ q + R / q = r − π = r * +e&− π

Ignoring ( r * +e&− π ), since this must be equivalent to ( r − π ), and taking a log linear
approximation, it can be solved for q :
q = δ 1 R − δ 2 (r − π ) + δ 3 q&
or re-arranging and solving for q&, Equation (12) is obtained.
Equation (13) defines the real return on capital services, which depends positively on
the level of real income, and negatively on the stocks of SOE and private capital ( k e , k p )
due to diminishing returns, and positively on public capital ( k g ). The latter holds because
it is assumed that public capital may crowd in other capital and the productivity of other
capital rises as the government provides more public capital stock. Hence the public and
private capital stocks are assumed to be complementary.
Foreign sector equilibrium consists of three equations, as presented in Equation (14)(16). Total exports are given by Equation (14). It depends positively on world real income,
the real exchange rate, and negatively on exogenous world trade protection. Equation (15)
represents total imports, which depend positively on real domestic income and negatively
on the real exchange rate and exogenous domestic trade protection.
Equation (16) defines the current account of the balance of payments, which is
equivalent to the change in domestic holdings of foreign assets. This equation indicates that
the accumulation of foreign bonds (or asset stocks) depends on the trade balance
( t = tx − tm ) 29, and real foreign interest income ( r * f + e − p ). In the long run steady state

29

If the trade balance and current account balance are negative, with the log-linear forms they cannot be
calculated. To change from a negative to a positive number the weighted calculation for these variables
will be applied.
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the current account balance must be zero, otherwise further wealth effects will arise which
in turn requires further macroeconomic adjustment.
The wage-price nexus and aggregate supply are given by equations (17)-(19). The
domestic price, Equation (17), is a weighted average of domestic nominal wages and the
world price of the imported goods. Nominal wages, Equation (18), adjust in line with a
simple inflationary expectation ( π ) augmented Phillips curve. Aggregate supply, as
represented by Equation (19), is derived from a production function which includes labour
(which is assumed homogeneous between the private and government sectors and earns the
same wage in both sectors), the SOE and private as well as public capital stocks.
Finally, equations (20)-(23) are defined as follows. Trade balance is measured by the
difference between exports and imports in equation (20). Inflationary expectations, as given
in Equation (21), are assumed to adjust instantaneously with the domestic monetary growth
rate. Equations (22) and (23) define two variables which are used extensively throughout
this model, the real exchange rate ( c ) and real money balances ( l ) respectively.
5.3.2

Alternative approaches of the economic reform policies
The model developed above will be used to analyse the implications of two

alternative paths of economic reform polices. In the first, the country moves gradually by
selectively introducing reforms and spacing them over time. In the second the country
pursues a “Big Bang” approach, by which the government immediately and simultaneously
introduces the reforms. The focus is on the speed of introducing a limited number of policy
and reform variables: (i) privatisation; (ii) nominal exchange rate devaluation; (iii) tariff
reduction; and (iv) fiscal expansion. All these reform policies will also be conducted in the
context of a flexible exchange rate version of the model.
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5.3.2.1 Privatisation of SOE capital stock
This policy deals with an analysis of the effects of SOE privatisation and
restructuring policies on the Vietnamese economy. In this case there is no amendment to
the base model, except for varying the parameter values in respect to the share of the SOE
and private capital stock in domestic capital investment as described in Equation (4). A
simple form of privatisation of the SOE capital stock will be implemented. That is, when
the government privatises SOEs, it simply gives the capital of the state enterprises to the
private sector. This change, as discussed in more detail later, will have a positive impact on
economic development.
If τ 2 = 0 in Equation (4), this implies that private investment, which equals the
change in the stock of private capital ( k&p ), depends totally on Tobin’s q ratio, while if

τ 2 > 0 this means that there exists an allocation of capital stock from SOEs to the private
sector. Privatisation requires varying the policy-determined parameter ( k e* ) as described in
Equation (6). This parameter will be smaller than zero as the privatisation policy is applied.
These alternative possibilities will be discussed in Chapter 7.
5.3.2.2 Trade liberalisation policies
These policies deal with varying the nominal exchange rate and the degree of tariffs
on exports and imports. The effects of trade liberalisation on the Vietnamese economy will
be examined under these alternative policies. There is no modification to the base case
except for varying the nominal exchange rate ( e ) in Equations (10), (14), (15), (16) and
(17), and the change in tariffs ( T ) on exports and imports as indicated in Equations (14)
and (15). These variables are treated as exogenously determined. The parameter of the
nominal exchange rate ( e ) in these equations can range from less to more. If it is more than
zero this implies that the nominal exchange rate devaluation policy is applied, while if this
parameter is less than zero this implies that the nominal exchange rate appreciation policy
is adopted.
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For the tariff reduction policy, the parameter values σ 3 (Equation (15)) and τ 3
(Equation (16)) can range from zero to one. A rise in each parameter value means an
increase in trade barriers or protection (both domestic and international). If σ 3 = 0 , this
implies that there is no world trade barrier. Consequently, this should lead to an
improvement in Vietnam’s exports to the rest of the world, while if σ 3 = 1 this means that
the world trade barrier is fully imposed and presents a complete obstacle to Vietnamese’s
exports. A similar explanation holds for the parameter τ 3 : if τ 3 = 0 this means that there is
no domestic trade barrier resulting in an increase in imports from the rest of the world to
Vietnam, but if τ 3 = 1 , this implies that the domestic trade barrier is fully imposed on
Vietnam’s imports. These alternative options will be further discussed in Chapter 7.
5.3.2.3 Alternative public infrastructure spending policies
Another important alternative policy deals with an analysis of the impact of
government capital expenditure on infrastructure development. In this case there is no
amendment to the base case except for varying the policy determined variable ( k g * )
(Equation (7). The policy determined variable ( k g * ) can range from less to more. If the
parameter of ( k g * ) ( θ ) is greater than zero, this means that the government adopts
expansionary public capital spending on infrastructure, while if this parameter is less than
zero this implies that the government adopts a contractionary fiscal policy.

5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has outlined three basic theoretical models contributed by MundellFleming (1963), Dornbusch (1976) and Branson (1977, 1984), which, although they have
not been developed specifically to look at a transition economy, can provide the basic
building block for developing a dynamic macroeconomic model for Vietnam as a transition
economy. Based on these three models, and also the contributions of Harvie and Lee (1996)
and Harvie and Kearney (1996), a dynamic macroeconomic model (see p. 228)
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emphasising the long run for the case of Vietnam is developed. This model will be used to
analyse the macroeconomic adjustment process arising from a variety of shocks emanating
from the period of transforming to a market economy for Vietnam.
In this study it is assumed that the domestic economy produced output that is
consumed domestically and is an imperfect substitute for the imported good equivalent.
The price of these goods is domestically determined. The deterministic framework of the
model combined with economic agents possessing rational expectations, is equivalent to
the case of perfect foresight. Financial markets are assumed to be in continual equilibrium,
while non-financial markets are subject to sticky price and quantity adjustment. The model
developed focuses on the long run nature of the dynamic adjustment process, because the
macroeconomic adjustment process arising from the reform measures focused upon will
exert a long run effect on the Vietnamese economy. This arises from allowing for physical
capital stock accumulation and developments in the current account balance. It is assumed
in the model that private and government capital spending contributes to an expansion of
the physical capital stock in the real sector, improving the productivity capacity of domestic
output, whilst SOE capital spending steadily declines resulting from privatisation and
restructuring.
The model developed is used to analyse the implications of two alternative paths of
economic reform for an economy with a large public sector that is being transformed to
become more market oriented such as Vietnam. The reform policies emphasised, in
particular, relate to that of SOE privatisation and restructuring, trade liberalisation, and
public infrastructure capital spending. These three policies will be discussed and presented
in Chapter 7. The next chapter will conduct an estimation of the model’s parameters based
on Vietnamese data.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter the analytics of the base model for macroeconomic policy analysis
was developed. The objective of this chapter is to estimate this model for Vietnam using
econometric techniques, and to use the estimated coefficients for the conduct of a
simulation analysis of various policy measures and their impact on the macroeconomic
adjustment of the Vietnamese economy. Time series data, taken from many sources for
Vietnam (see below), are used to estimate the model that we believe reasonably well
captures the dynamic interaction between the product, financial and labour markets. The
behavioural equations are first estimated using a simple method – Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regression. The analysis of these results, based on diagnostic test statistics including
t - values, the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, F - values and the coefficient of
determination (R2) of the regression, allows identifying whether the regressions conducted
and the results obtained are acceptable.
Since the traditional OLS approach to modelling ignores the temporal properties of
the data, the re-examination of the model requires techniques that account for time series
data that is inherently non-stationary. Determining whether the variables are stationary or
non-stationary is done by testing the null hypothesis that each variable included in the
model contains a unit root. The unit root tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
approach help to determine the integration orders of the time series used. If all variables are
integrated of order one I (1) , the conduct of cointegration tests will be the next step for the
possible determination of both long-run and short-run relationships among the variables
involved. The theory of cointegration (Granger, 1981, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1987)
deals with causation between economic variables, focusing particularly on long-term
relationships. The combination of long-run information and a short-run adjustment
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mechanism is presented in the error correction model (ECM) proposed by Granger (1988).
All these econometric modelling approaches will be applied to estimate the model
developed for Vietnam.
However, all these estimation methods have been justified on asymptotic grounds,
which might be applied comfortably when the sample sizes are very large. In the case of
Vietnam, where the sample size is limited by 16 observations, it is obvious that the
aforementioned approaches may not give reliable results. Thus, in order to assess the
accuracy of the obtained results from conventional approaches, this chapter also applies the
bootstrap method, initiated first by Efron (1979), that is used for the correction of a small
finite sample size.
The arrangement of this chapter is laid out as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data
sources and the econometric methods used to estimate the model. Section 6.3 presents the
results of the OLS estimation. Tests for unit roots are then described and conducted in
Section 6.4. In this section, a cointegration analysis is also used to examine the long-run
relationship among the variables of interest. Then an error correction model will be
undertaken, since it can characterise the nature of the short run dynamic adjustment
towards the long run equilibrium. Section 6.5 gives a brief review of the bootstrap idea,
pinpoints the technique issue to be addressed by the bootstrap relating to the OLS, and unit
root tests, and applies these ideas to the equations of the developed model. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 6.6.

6.2 Data Sources and Econometric Methods
The model developed utilises a number of macroeconomic variables that have been
obtained from a number of sources. Statistics on GDP, private and state consumption, total
investment, capital stock, total exports and imports were collected from the General
Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam, and the annual reports of the World Bank and United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), various issues. Financial figures, monetary
aggregates and the general price level were obtained from various reports produced by the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF). International figures including world real income were
proxied by real GDP, in billions of US dollars, for the ten major trading partners with
Vietnam, and the world price level and world nominal interest rate were taken from
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Each variable is defined and its source noted in
Appendix 6.1. All the variables are in real terms and expressed in logarithms except for the
domestic and international nominal interest rates, which are expressed as percentages. The
model is estimated using yearly data from 1986 to 2001. This period saw the introduction
of significant adjustment policies to change the Vietnamese economy from being centrally
planned to a market oriented one. Although the data set is not large, containing only 16
observations corresponding to the duration of Vietnam’s transition, it represents the best
choice from available sources. As with many other transition economies, some data are
simply not available. In several other cases some data may be available but are not
appropriate to the definitions of the relevant simulation variables, thus proxies are needed.
The model developed in Chapter 5 contains 20 equations and 3 definition
equations 30, which include a total of 42 parameters. For a number of the variables in the
model no data exist. Hence either a proxy variable can be substituted, if it exists, or the
parameter value must be imposed, based upon other studies and casual empiricism. All the
parameters of the equations, which are elasticities since the model is expressed in logarithm
form, are listed in Table 6.1. For the equations (1), (2), (9), (10), (14), (15), (16), and (19)
the coefficients are estimated using Vietnamese data. The parameters of the remaining
equations are imposed from existing sources 31.

30

The definition equations define the inflation expectation, the real exchange rate and real money
balances, respectively.
31
These parameters are imposed based on the HL and HK models (see Chapter 5) and some existing
studies on Vietnam. They will be identified in Chapter 7.
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Table 6-1: Model Parameters
Equation
Parameters

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

α1 *, α 2 *, α 3 *,

c1 * , c 2 *

β

τ ,τ

(6)

(7)

(9)

(10)

ϕ

θ

ϖ *, ϖ *,

µ *, µ *,

ω *
3

µ*

(14)

(15)

(16)

ρ *, ρ *

1

(5)

η
2

α 4 *, α *
5

Equation
Parameters

Equation
Parameters

Equation
Parameters

(12)

δ,δ ,δ
1

2

(17)

α

1

(13)
3

2

1

(11a)

3

ε ,ε ,ε ,

σ *, σ *,

τ1 * , τ 2 * ,

ε

σ

τ

1

3

2

4

1

2

3

(18)

φ,φ
1

ψ

2

1

2

3

(19)
2

λ *, λ *, λ *, λ *
1

2

3

4

Note:

-

Due to the limitation of the collected data, only parameters denoted with an * will be estimated in
this chapter.
See Chapter 5, p. 169 for more information on the meaning of each of these parameters.

The equations in the model are divided into three categories, “identity”,
“adjustment”, and “behavioural” equations 32.
Log-linear equations (3), (12), (13) and (17) 33 are classified as an “identity” or
“proportional” equations, comprising 9 parameters, which use values from existing studies.
Equation (8) identifies government consumption ( c g ) as an exogenously determined
variable. Equations (20), (21) and (22) are defined as those in the HL and HK models.
Equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (11a,b), (12), and (18) are the “adjustment” equations.
Equations (4) and (5) identify the adjustment of the private capital stocks, ( k&p ), when the
32

“Identity” equations must hold by definition of the variables involved.
“Adjustment” equations must hold the variables that can be adjusted following the policy changes.
“Behavioural” equations consider the motives and structure of the variables involved (Oxford Economic
Dictionary, 2000).
33
Page 168 Chapter 5.
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privatisation policy is applied. Equations (6) and (7) present adjustment of the state-owned
enterprise, ( k&e ), and public capital stocks, ( k&g ), respectively, which capture the partial
adjustment process. This partial adjustment arises from the political process of adjusting
the actual state enterprise capital stock, ( k e ), and public capital stock, ( k g ), to their policy
determined levels ( k e* ) and ( k g * ) respectively. Equation (11a) identifies money stock
adjustment, ( m&), with the adjustment coefficient ψ . Equation (12) identifies the
adjustment of Tobin’s q ratio ( q&). Finally, Equation (18) identifies wage adjustment ( w&).
All parameters in the eight adjustment equations will be imposed from the HL and HK
models or assumptions based upon Vietnamese data.
The remaining eight structural equations (1), (2), (9), (10), (14), (15), (16), and (19)
are behavioural equations, which all together comprise 25 parameters, where 23 parameter
values will be estimated and 2 parameter values are assumed (see Table 6.1). A simple
OLS estimation method will be utilised first for these behavioural equations. Then an
analysis of the estimated results is required in order to determine the appropriate
specification for estimation purposes. The details of the estimation and analyses will be
presented in the following sections.

6.3 Regression Model Estimation and Evaluation Interpretation
The behavioural equations are estimated by drawing on time series data covering the
period 1986-2001. A simple estimation method – OLS – is first applied. Each individual
equation is evaluated using statistics such as t -values, Durbin-Watson (DW) test, R 2
(coefficient of determination), and F -values. Contained in Table 6.2 are the estimates of
the eight behavioural equations of the model. The numbers in parentheses below each
coefficient are the t -values. Intuitively, Figure 6.1, which plots the actual and fitted values
for all the behavioural equations, can help to check the estimated regression results and
determine whether the equations are acceptable.
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Table 6-2: OLS Estimation Results of the Level of Logarithm Variables
Equation
(1)

y d = 0.262 + 0.89 * c p + 0.197 * i − 0.185 * c g + 0.106 * i g + 0.019 * (tx − tm)
(1.11)

(10.89)

R2 = 0.999
Equation
(2)

(1.42)

(13.68)

F (2,13) = 6406.1 [.000]

m − p = 5.727 − 1.159 * y − 0.224 * r + 1.21 * w p
(7.74)

(-5.30)

(-3.44)

DW = 1.397

(6.39)

F (3,12) = 80.2 [.000]

w = 0.057 + 0.115 * ( f + e − p ) + 0.792 * (m − p ) + 0.619 * (k p + q )
p

(0.26)

(3.51)

(11.19)

DW = 1.426

(11.73)

F (3,12) = 1857.5 [.000]

tx = −20.147 + 2.013 * y + 0.143 * (e − p )
w

(-14.77)

(19.54)

(1.79)

DW = 1.077

F (2,13) = 233.3 [.000]

tm = 5.772 + 0.443 * y − 0.72 * (e − p )
d

(11.1)

(7.9)

(-4.02)

DW = 1.183

F (2,13) = 30.3 [.000]

( f&+ e&− p&) = − 0.993 + 0.509 * (tx − tm) − 0.131 * (r w f + e − p )
(-0.30)
R2 = 0.163

Equation
(19)

(-1.0)

d

R2 = 0.831
Equation
(16)

F (5,10) = 7820.2 [.000]

DW = 0.566

R2 = 0.973
Equation
(15)

(1.82)

c = 0.265 + 1.014 * y − 0.065 * w p

R2 = 0.997
Equation
(14)

(2.14)

s

R2 = 0.953
Equation
(10)

(-1.30)

DW = 1.598

p

R2 = 0.999
Equation
(9)

(2.11)

(1.28)

DW =2.099

(-0.95)
F (2,12) = 1.7 [.22]

y = 2.645 + 0.462 * k + 0.461 * k e − 0.126 * k g + 0.69 * ( w − p )
s

p

(3.31)
R2 = 0.997

(4.58)

(2.14)

(-0.60)

(1.45)

DW = 1.588
F (4,11) = 1030.2 [.000]
Note:
- Due to R2 small, Equation (16) is re-calculated by using a dummy variable representing the change in year
1992 (number 0 for year 1992 and number 1 for the remainings). The result is as follows:
( f&+ e&− p&) = −3.83 + 0.66 * (tx − tm) − 0.07 * (r w f + e − p ) + 5.23 * D
(-2.38) (4.27)
(-0.74)
(7.33)
DW = 1.76
F(3,11) = 23.95 [.000]
R2 = 0.87
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Figure 6-1: Behavioural Equations: Actual and Fitted Variables
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Equation (1) of Table 6.2 shows the results for aggregate output demand, ( y d ),
which depends on private ( c p ) and government ( c g ) consumption, total productive capital
investment, ( i ), public capital investment, ( i g ), and the trade balance, ( tx − tm ).
Explanatory variables are statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent level and have the
theoretically expected sign except for government consumption, which has a theoretically
unexpected sign, possibly due to multicollinearity. Private consumption exerts a remarkable
influence on aggregate demand with its elasticity recording 0.89 per cent. The trade balance
has a small impact on aggregate output demand, although its t -statistic is quite high (1.8),
probably indicating the unreliability of the data collected 34. The R2 (0.99) and DW statistic
(1.6) are good. In Figure 6.1 (Equation 1) it can be seen that the actual values fluctuate very
closely to the fitted ones.
Equation (2) provides estimates of the determination of private consumption
expenditure, ( c p ). Aggregate output supply, ( y d ), which is statistically significant at the
99 per cent confidence level, exerts a remarkable influence on private consumption, with its
elasticity recording 1.014. A 1 per cent increase in domestic aggregate output supply
increases private consumption by more than 1 per cent. Private wealth, ( w p ), which is
given by the sum of foreign asset stocks, broad money and private capital stocks, has a
theoretically unexpected negative sign. This can be explained by the fact that aggregate
output supply in a given period is not enough for private consumption, thus private wealth
is the source to supplement this shortage. Although yielding a high R2 = 0.999 the
regression result for the private consumption equation seems to have a negative
autocorrelation, as the DW is very small (0.57). The low DW statistic confirms the
existence of autocorrelation resulting from model misspecification. However, a look at the
actual and fitted values plotted in Figure 6.1 for Equation (2) suggests that it may not be so.
From the figure it is noted that the actual and fitted values are very close together indicating
that the equation is a true regression. Due to the low DW statistic the re-estimation of this

34

A percentage of illegal trade and smuggling across the borders with China, Laos and Cambodia is
reported at about 15-20 per cent of the official statistics of the trade balance.
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equation using iterative procedures proposed by Cochrane and Orcutt 35 (see Appendix 6.2
for more details) is conducted. Although the regression result (after being converted to the
original equation) has the same values of the coefficients and the private wealth variable
still has a wrong sign, the DW statistic is much higher (2.0) compared to its value in the
ordinary least squares approach (see Table 6.3 further below).
Equation (9) shows the results of the demand for real money balances, which is
defined as the nominal money stock deflated by the consumer price index ( m − p ). The
domestic interest rate, ( r ), and private wealth, ( w p ), variables are statistically significant at
the 5 per cent level, and have the theoretically expected signs with their coefficients
reporting 0.22 and 1.2 respectively. Domestic aggregate demand, ( y d ), has a significant (at
the 5 per cent level) and unexpected negative coefficient. The R2 is good but the DW
statistic is smaller than 2, reporting 1.4. A closer examination of Figure 6.1 (Equation 9)
shows that the year-on-year changes in the demand for real money balances do not in fact
match particularly well with the changes in the independent variables, including domestic
aggregate demand and domestic nominal interest rates. The iterative Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure is used to re-estimate this equation. From Table 6.3 it can be seen that the values
of the estimated parameters are higher than those of the OLS estimation, while their signs
are unchanged.
With respect to real private wealth, ( w p ), (Equation 10), all explanatory variables
including the demand for real money balances, ( m − p ), and the real value of the domestic
capital stock, ( k p + q ), owned entirely by agents in the domestic private sector, which
consists of a physical quantity and its market valuation 36, and domestic holdings of foreign
bonds, expressed in domestic currency terms and deflated by the domestic prive level,
( f + e − p ), have a strong positive impact on real private wealth with their coefficients
being significant at the 5 per cent level and their values being 0.79, 0.62 and 0.12
respectively. The result from this regression is good as it yields a high R2, but there is

35
36

Damodar N. Gujarati (1995) “Basic Econometrics” (p. 431).
The data for such a market valuation, required to calculate Tobin’q, is not available in Vietnam.
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probably negative autocorrelation when considering the value of the DW statistic (1.4).
However, a closer examination of Figure 6.1 for Equation (10) shows that the year-to-year
changes in all explanatory variables in fact match particularly well with the changes in real
private sector wealth.
Total exports, ( tx ), are reported in Equation (14) and they respond to increases in
foreign real income, ( y w ), proxied by the sum of the GDP of Vietnam’s ten main trading
partners, and the real exchange rate, ( e − p ). The coefficient for foreign real income is
highly significant (19.5) suggesting that Vietnam’s exports largely depend on the real
incomes of its trading partners. This can explain why Vietnam has witnessed a sharp falling
off in exports as its key East Asian trading and investment partners entered a recession
during the period 1997-2000. With a coefficient of 0.14 the significance of the real
exchange rate is also apparent, indicating that Vietnam’s exports have also been affected by
the foreign exchange rate policy. Although the result yields a high R2 (0.97), a low DW
statistic (1.08) is usually considered as proof of autocorrelation between the explanatory
variables. Figure 6.1 (Equation 14) may confirm this result as the actual values swing far
from the fitted ones. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are not different when
the Cochrane-Orcutt method is applied to re-estimate this equation. However, its statistics
are much improved.
Equation (15) provides estimates for aggregate imports, ( tm ), which depend on
domestic aggregate demand, ( y d ), and the real exchange rate, ( e − p ). Both these variables
are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and, with their theoretically expected
signs, have a strong impact on aggregate imports. With the value of the coefficient of
determination being 0.83 and the DW statistic recording 1.2, this result probably shows
autocorrelation. This is also supported by Figure 6.1 (Equation 15), although both actual
and fitted values “trend” upwards, where the year-on-year changes in aggregate demand
and the real exchange rate do not match particularly well with the changes in total imports.
In this case using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure may improve the estimated results. The
coefficient of domestic aggregate demand is much higher than the previous result, whilst
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the real exchange rate has a theoretically unexpected sign. All the explanatory variables are
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level (see Table 6.3).
Equation (16) indicates the accumulation/decumulation of foreign bonds, as reflected
in the current account balance, ( f&+ e&− p&), which depends on the trade balance, ( tx − tm ),
and real foreign interest earnings, ( r * f + e − p ). The first explanatory variable has the
theoretically expected sign and is statically significant even at the 10 per cent level, whilst
real foreign interest earnings has an unexpectedly negative coefficient and is insignificant
at the 10 per cent level. The R2 is only 16 per cent 37, indicating that only 16 percent of the
total variation in the current account balance can be explained by variations in the trade
balance and real foreign interest earnings. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.1,
indicating no autocorrelation. This is also confirmed by Figure 6.1 (Equation 16) where the
movement of the actual values is far from the fitted ones. The spike in the actual current
account balance in the year 1993 is due to the large trade deficit.
For aggregate output supply, ( y s ), Equation (19), the capital stock of state-owned
enterprises, ( k e ), and the private sector, ( k p ), has a strong positive impact on state output
supply with both coefficients recording the same value of 0.46. This is not puzzling, as the
increased capital stock from investment tends to raise the productive capacity of both state
and private sectors. Public capital expenditure, ( k g ), which is often regarded as productive
expenditure, and the real wage rate, ( w − p ), have the wrong sign in the estimated results.
For this equation there is no suspicions about the spuriousness of the results as far as the
diagnostic statistics and figure of the actual and fitted values are concerned.
Overall, the quantitative estimates are satisfactory in spite of some parameters of the
model having the theoretically unexpected signs or that several explanatory variables are
statistically insignificant at the 10 per cent level. Given the relatively high value of the R2,
except Equation 16 (due to the outlier), it can be said that the endogenous variables have
predicted reasonably well. However, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistics may be of

37

R2 increases to 0.87 when this equation is re-calculated by adding a dummy variable (see Note of Table
6.2).
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concern regarding serial correlation in the residuals of these equations. The iterative
Cochrane-Orcutt procedures are used to re-estimate these equations. The intuitive approach
by plotting the actual and fitted values of the regressions also confirms the estimated
results.
Table 6-3: Iterative Cochrane-Orcutt estimation results
Equation
(1)

y d = −0.38 + 0.98 * c p + 0.1 * i − 0.1 * c g + 0.04 * i g + 0.003 * (tx − tm)
(-1.03)

(12.28)

R2 = 0.999
Equation
(2)

(3.02)

(23.1)

m − p = 9.27 − 1.52 * y d − 0.46 * r + 1.33 * w p
(4.65)

(-5.83)

(7.5)

DW = 1.88

w = −0.7 + 0.33 * ( f + e − p ) + 0.45 * (m − p) + 0.6 * (k p + q)
(-0.72) (2.62)

(1.9)

(3.23)

DW = 2.07

tx = −15.2 + 1.97 * y w + 0.23 * (e − p )
(-4.63) (7.94)

(0.92)

DW = 1.93

tm = 0.52 + 0.65 * y d + 0.14 * (e − p )
(0.13)

(2.15)

(0.53)

DW = 2.13

( f&+ e&− p&) = − 0.94 + 0.73 * (tx − tm) − 0.3 * (r w f + e − p ) + 4.72 * D
(-0.37)
R2 = 0.91

Equation
(19)

(-3.6)

p

R2 = 0.93
Equation
(16)

(-1.66)

DW = 2.08

R2 = 0.95
Equation
(15)

(0.32)

DW = 2.18

R2 = 0.995
Equation
(14)

(1.0)

c = 0.65 + 0.97 * y s − 0.1 * w p

R2 = 0.95
Equation
(10)

(-0.4)

p

R2 = 0.999
Equation
(9)

(0.98)

(4.0)

(-1.40)

(5.64)

DW =1.55

y = 3.5 + 0.3 * k p + 0.54 * k e − 0.1 * k g + 0.32 * ( w − p )
s

(3.32) (2.0)
R2 = 0.99

(3.0)

(-0.3)

(0.6)

DW = 1.3

The estimation of the model using the regression approach presented above was
based on the economic time series which are clearly non-stationary (see Figure 6.1), in the

Chapter 6 – Empirical estimation of the model

190

______________________________________________________________________

sense that the mean and variance depend on time, and they tend to depart ever further from
any given value as time goes on. It is argued that the regression of one non-stationary
variable on another is very likely to yield regression results that are spurious. Thus the
alternative modelling testing approaches dealing with non-stationary time series data,
which will be investigated with the purpose of estimating the parameters of the model, will
be presented in the next sections.

6.4 Long-term and short-term relationships between macroeconomic
variables
The first concept of causality was proposed by Granger (1969) to investigate possible
causation between economic variables. The concept is based on the cross-spectrum
decomposition and deals specifically with short-run fluctuations (Harvie and Tran Van
Hoa, 1993). Empirical applications of this Granger causality test have been extensive in the
literature and involve many important areas of economics, such as money and income
(Sims, 1972), and wage and price inflation (Fels and Tran Van Hoa, 1981). The theory of
cointegration (Granger, 1981, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1987) also deals with causation
between economic variables, but is focused particularly on long-term relationships. The
basic idea of the theory is that causal or correlated economic series may wander in the
short-run, but they will not drift apart in the long run or in equilibrium. Thus, in the short
run, the equilibrium error may not be zero, but in the long run systematic differences
between the causal or cointegrated variables should disappear.
The empirical tests of the above methods assume that the variables in the models
must be stationary for causality and non-stationary for cointegration. In addition, in applied
economic work, it is well known that the reliability of the results of both the causality and
cointegration methods depends not only on the correct information set used but also
crucially on the usually unknown lag structure of these variables. There are several
appropriate tests of cointegration including cointegration regression analysis (Sargan and
Bhargava, 1983), which will be used in this section, Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-
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Fuller regression procedures, and restricted and unrestricted vector autoregression methods
(Engle and Granger, 1987). More recent developments of the cointegration theory include
the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen (see for example Johansen, 1991) within the
unified framework of vector autoregressive and error correction models, in which
cointegrating vectors are simply obtained as eigenvectors. It can be verified that the
eigenvector approach yields identical results to the OLS approach, in the case where the
eigenvector is derived from the maximum characteristic root and when the data set is very
large.
This section will first test for unit roots in the time series variables of interest (6.4.1)
and then for cointegration between the series (6.4.2).
6.4.1

Unit roots test
Since both causality and cointegration test procedures are based on regression

analysis, it is necessary for estimation to ensure that the series satisfy the required
stationarity conditions. In this study, the test of unit roots 38 for a variable, say Y , consists
simply of estimating the unrestricted regression equation (also known as the reduced form
error correction model)
p

∆Yt = µ + αt + ρYt −1 + ∑ θ∆Yt − j + ε t

(6.1)

j =1

and the restricted regression equation with unit root (with α = 0 and ρ = 0 )
p

∆Yt = µ + ∑ θ∆Yt − j + ε t

(6.2)

j =1

In (6.1) and (6.2), t is a time trend, ∆Yt − j an error correction term to capture higher
order lag corrections, µ , α , ρ , θ are the parameters to be estimated, and ε the error
terms with white noise properties.

38

See Appendix 6.3 for more detail about the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots.
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For the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test the presence of drift or trend
necessitates that if the null hypothesis of a unit root ( H 0 : ρ = 0 ) is not rejected (using
Fuller’s (1976) τˆτ distribution of the t -statistic of ρ̂ ), then it is necessary to proceed to
test the joint hypothesis that ρ = 0 and α = 0 (using the F -statistic Φ 3 given in Dickey
and Fuller, 1981). If the trend is significant under the null of a unit root, then normality of
the t -statistic of ρ̂ follows, and the standardised normal tables should be used (Dolado, et.
al., 1990). If the trend is not significant, the null hypothesis is then tested with the
constraint that α = 0 (using τˆµ from Fuller, 1976). Again, failure to reject means testing
the joint hypothesis that ρ = 0 and µ = 0 (this time using the F -statistic Φ 1 given in
Dickey and Fuller, 1981). If the constant under the null hypothesis is significant, then the
test for the unit root should be repeated using the standardised normal; otherwise, Fuller’s

τˆ should be used. The results of unit root tests, which are conducted in this section, are
based on both the t -statistic of ρ̂ ( τ τ distribution) and F -statistic ( Φ 3 ).
An informal examination of the data for nineteen variables may be useful to give a
preliminary idea of the time series properties of the variables. Figure 6.2 plots the
logarithms of levels of all the variables and confirms that non-stationarity is apparent in all
the series.
The starting point is to test for integration properties of the individual series using
ADF tests mentioned before, with and without trend. These tests allow testing formally the
null hypothesis that a series is I (1) against the alternative that it is I (0) . In order to
determine the order of integration, the tests must be applied to the levels of the variables
and then to the first or second differences of the variables. If the computed absolute value
of the t -statistic ( τˆτ ) for the case of without trend or that of the F -statistic ( Φ 3 ) for the
case of with trend exceeds the tabulated absolute values by Fuller (1976) or Dickey and
Fuller (1981) respectively, then the hypothesis that the given time series is stationary
cannot be rejected.
The results of unit root tests using the annual time-series data from 1986-2001 for all
the variables are given in Table 6.4. For fifteen variables, namely private real consumption
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( c p ), government consumption ( c g ), private wealth ( w p ), real money balances ( m − p ),
domestic price level ( p ), domestic nominal interest rate ( r ), foreign asset stock
( f + e − p ), total exports ( tx ), total imports ( tm ), real foreign interest earnings
( r * f + e − p ), world real income ( y * ), and current account balance ( f ), nominal
exchange rate ( e ), private capital stock ( k p ), and domestic real wage ( w − p ), the null
hypothesis of a unit root based on the estimated τˆτ value cannot be rejected. So the results
are compatible with the hypothesis that non-stationarity characterises these variables. For
the remaining variables, aggregate supply of output ( y s ), real exchange rate ( e − p ), SOE
investment capital stock ( k e ), and government investment expenditure ( k g ), their
estimated τˆτ values are well above the critical values tabulated by Fuller (1976) at 10 per
cent and supports the hypothesis that stationarity characterises these variables. However,
the results from using the ADF tests suggest that five variables, private wealth ( w p ),
foreign asset stock ( f + e − p ), real exchange rate ( e − p ), SOE investment capital stock
( k e ), and government investment expenditure ( k g ), are stationary with trend (Equation
6.1) based on F - statistic ( Φ 3 ) tabulated by Dickey and Fuller (1981).
The application of the ADF test then is conducted to the first and second differences
of the variables in order to determine the order of integration. However, the conclusion (the
results are not shown here) of the order of the variables, I (1) or I (2) are inconclusive
because the critical values for unit root tests tabulated by Fuller (1976) or Dickey and
Fuller (1981) have a sample size of at least 50, whilst the sample size of data used here has
only 16 observations 39. The critical values for smaller sample sizes are not presently
available 40.
From Figures 6.3 and 6.4, which plot the first and second differences of the
logarithms of the variables, respectively, it might be concluded that the variables under
consideration are well characterised as non-stationary in the levels and first difference, but

39

The sample size is only 12 when second-differenced variables are tested.
When only a small sample size is available there is a concern with the a priori power and size of the tests
of the unit root. This problem will be examined in Section 6.6.

40
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stationary in the second difference, which mean that the variables are integrated of order
I (2) . For the cases that have limited time series data observations and experience a

structural break, however, the results from the formal test, as well as graphic examination
of the data mentioned above, may be inconclusive. The next step is to test whether the time
series in question are cointegrated.
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Figure 6-2: Plot of (log) Levels of the Variables
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1991

1996

2001

1.9
1986

1986

11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4

LE

7

5

3
1996

1991

8

6

1991

7.5
1986

8

LYW

11.5

1986

1991

1991

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
1986

8

12.0

11
10
9
8
7
6
5

1986

4.0

LP

7.5

12.5

1986

2001

8.5

-1.5

10.5

1996

8.0

-1.0

13.0

1991

9.0

-0.5

-2.0
1986

9
8
6

5.5

1991

LGC

10

1986

LM

11

LPC

1991

1986

1991

LKE

1991
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Table 6-4: Tests for Unit Roots of Variables: Vietnam 1986 to 2001
Variables
1

ADF tests for a unit root
lag length p 1
F-test ( Φ 3 )

t-ratio ( τ -test)

ys )
p
Private real consumption ( c )
g
Government consumption ( c )
p
Private real wealth ( w )
Real money supply ( m − p )
Domestic price level ( p )
Aggregate output supply (

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Domestic nominal interest rate ( r )
Foreign asset stock ( f + e − p )
Real exchange rate ( e − p )
Total exports ( tx )
Total imports ( tm )
Real foreign interest earnings ( r * f

13

World real income (

14

Current account balance ( f )
Nominal exchange rate ( e )

15
16

+e− p)

y*)

e

SOE capital stock ( k )

17

Private sector capital stock ( k )

18

Government investment expenditure ( k )
Domestic real wage ( w − p )

p

g

19

-3.31*

4.43

4

-1.77

1.35

3

-2.33

2.18

4

-0.34

5.87*

2

-0.27
-2.06
-0.58
-0.75

2.69
2.34
3.26
5.67*

1
3
1
3

-3.85*
-0.27
-0.64
-1.04

8.55*
4.26
3.64
4.38

3
3
1
3

0.53

1.17

1

-1.40

3.09

2

-0.95
3.89*

2.18
12.40*

4
4

-1.72

1.64

2

-4.58*

11.57*

3

-0.20

3.29

4

Note:
w

-

All variables in the Table are in logs except r and r .
Critical values are given in Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981). At the 10% level they are -2.57 [for
τˆτ ] and –5.34 [for Φ 3 ] for n = 50.

-

1

-

The choice of the length of the distributed lag of (first-differenced) variables under consideration was decided
upon by experimenting with the lag-length p that minimised the value of the Akaike (1974) information
criterion to determine the optimal specification of equations (6.1) and (6.2).
* Since the computed absolute values of these variables are greater than the 10% critical values, the null
hypothesis can be rejected, so these variables do not exhibit the unit roots.
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Figure 6-3: Plot of First Differences of the (log) Variables
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Figure 6-4: Plot of Second Differences of the (log) Variables
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6.4.2

Cointegration between macroeconomic variables
The results from the tests for unit roots previously indicate that most variables

concerned are non-stationary. Regression involving non-stationary data may include the
possibility of obtaining spurious results. To see this problem, look back to the OLS
estimation results reported in Table 6.2. The regression results of estimated equations look
good in terms of high R 2 and statistically significant t statistics. The only worry is that the
DW statistics are low probably due to some multicollinearity. However, if variables are
found to be cointegrated then there is a long run relationship between two (or more) nonstationary variables. In this case, although those variables themselves are non-stationary, a
linear combination of them might be stationary. If that is the case the regression on the
levels of the variables would be meaningful (not spurious) (Gujarati, 2003).
For example, if two variables yt and xt are non-stationary or random walk stochastic
processes (each is

I (1) ), then the linear combination of these two variables

u t = y t − β 1 − β 2 xt might be stationary, or I (0) . In this case these two variables are said to
be cointegrated or they are on the same wavelength. Intuitively, when u t is stationary or
I (0) , the “trend” in yt and xt cancel out (Griffiths, Hill and Judge, 1993).

The formal definition of cointegration of two variables first developed by Engle and
Granger (1987) is as follows.
Definition:

Time series xt and y t are said to be cointegrated of order d , b
where d ≥ b ≥ 0 , written as: xt , y t ∼ CI (d , b) , if:
1. both series are integrated of order d ,
2. there exists a linear combination of these variables, say

α 1 xt + α 2 y t , which is integrated of order d − b .
The vector [ α 1 , α 2 ] is called a cointegrating vector.
There are a number of methods for testing cointegration. Two simple methods are (i)
the DF or ADF test on u t estimated from the cointegrating regression called Engle-Granger
(EG) or Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test; and (ii) the cointegrating regression Durbin
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Watson (CRWD) test provided by Sargan and Bhargava (1983). For the EG or AEG test,
all we have to do is estimate a regression (like Table 6.2), obtain the residuals, and then use
the DF or ADF test for their stationarity41. If yt and xt are not cointegrated, any linear
combination of them will be non-stationary and, therefore, the residuals u t will be nonstationary too. The Engle-Granger 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical values of the t value in the
residual regression are, respectively, -2.5899, -1.934, -1.6177. If in absolute terms the
estimated t value exceeds these critical values, the conclusion would be that the estimated
u t is stationary, and, therefore, yt and xt , despite being individually non-stationary are
cointegrated.
An alternative, and quicker, method of finding out whether yt and xt are
cointegrated is the CRWD test. With the CRWD the DW statistic value obtained from the
cointegrating regression is used. But now the null hypothesis is that DW = 0 rather than the
standard DW = 2. The 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical values to test the hypothesis that the
true DW = 0 are 0.511, 0.386, and 0.322, respectively. Thus, if the computed DW value is
smaller than, say, 0.511, the hypothesis of cointegration at the 1 per cent level is rejected,
which means that yt and xt are not cointegrated.
Based on both the EG and CRDW tests, cointegration among the variables of the
eight behavioural equations estimated by using OLS in the previous section will be tested.
The results from the DF unit root test indicated that 15 out of the 19 variables are nonstationary in levels, but they are inconclusive in the context of formal or informal tests. It
can be assumed here that these variables are integrated in the same order of I (1) . These
variables are said to be cointegrated if the estimated t values of the residual regressions
exceed the critical values tabulated by Engle and Granger (1987) for the EG cointegration
test, or if the computed DW values exceed the critical levels for the CRWD test. Table 6.5
presents parameter estimates of the OLS using these two tests.

41

Since the estimated

u t is based on the estimated cointegrating parameter β 2 , the DF and ADF critical

significance values are not quite appropriate. Engle and Granger have calculated these values.
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Regressions of the eight behavioural equations (1), (2), (9), (10), (14), (15), (16) and
(19) using the OLS method are first applied 42, and then the residuals estimated from these
regressions are subjected to the DF unit root test. Since, in absolute terms, the estimated t
values for the residuals of equations (2), (9), (10), (15), (16) and (19) exceed the critical
value at the 1 per cent significant level and those of equations (1) and (14) exceed the
critical value at the 5 per cent significant level, the conclusion would be that the estimated
u t are stationary. This means they do not have a unit root. As seen also from Table 6.5 the
calculated DW values are greater than the critical values for testing DW=0 in the case of 3variable and 2-variable models, which are 0.363 and 0.327 respectively at the 5 per cent
significance level. To sum up, based on both the EG and CRDW tests, the conclusion is
that the variables under study form valid cointegrating relationships. Although they
individually exhibit random walks, there seems to be a stable long-run relationship between
these variables. They will not wander away from each other, as is evident from Figure 6.2.

42

These results are taken from the previous section.
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Table 6-5: Cointegration Tests between Variables: 1986-2001

Aggregate demand
Private consumption
Real money demand
Domestic
wealth

private

Const.

cp

i

cg

ig

t

0.26
(1.1)
0.27
(1.4)
5.7
(7.7)
0.06
(0.26)

0.9
(10.9)

0.2
(2.1)

-0.19
(-1.3)

0.11
(2.14)

0.02
(1.8)

Const.

yd

Total exports

-15.5
(-13.7)

Total imports

5.8
(10.85)
-2.4
(-0.65)

Current
account
balance
Aggregate supply

2.6
(3.3)

ys

wp

yd

1.01
(13.7)

-0.07
(-1.0)
1.2
(6.4)

-1.16
(-5.3)

f −e+ p m− p

r

0.22
(3.4)
0.12
(3.5)

yw
2.02
(19.5)

0.44
(7.7)

e− p

tx − tm

rw f + e − p

kp

kp +q

ke

t -values of ρ

-

DW

2.258*

1.6*

2.794**

0.57*

2.712**

1.4*
1.43*

0.8
(11.2)

0.62
(11.7)

3.124**

kg

w− p

t -values of ρ

1

DW

0.14
(1.8)

2.023*

1.08*

-0.71
(-3.85)

4.842**

1.17*

3.656**

2.5*

3.029**

1.59*

0.64
(1.8)

-0.13
(-0.64)
0.46
(4.58)

0.46
(2.14)

-0.12
(-0.60)

0.69
(1.45)

Note:
-

1

All variables except domestic and international nominal interest rates.
1
t - values of ρ in equation ∆uˆ t = ρu t −1
The critical value of residuals tabulated by Engle and Granger is 2.5899 at 1 per cent and 1.9439 at 5 per cent significant level.
The critical value for testing DW=0 in the case of 3-variable models is 0.367 at the 5 per cent significant level. In the case of 2-variable models, it is
0.386.
** means the estimated t -values or DW are significant at the 1 per cent level; * means the estimated t -values or DW are significant at the 5 per
cent level.
t -values are in brackets.
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6.4.3

The error correction model (ECM)
The results from the cointegration tests indicate that the variables in the eight

behavioural equations are cointegrated, which implies that there is a long-term equilibrium
relationship between them. Of course, in the short run, there may be disequilibrium.
Therefore, one can treat the error term u t 43 as the “equilibrium error”. This error term can
be used to link the short-run behaviour of the dependent variables to their long-run values.
The error correction mechanism (ECM) first used by Sargan, and later popularised by
Engle and Granger, corrects for disequilibrium (Gujarati, 1995). This is known as the
Granger representation theorem, which in this case says that xt and yt are considered to
be generated by ECMs of the form:
∆xt = ρ1u t −1 + lagged (∆xt , ∆y t ) + e 1t

(6.3)

∆y t = ρ 2 u t −1 + lagged (∆xt , ∆y t ) + e 2t

(6.4)

where at least one of ρ1 and ρ 2 is non-zero and ε 1t and ε 2t are white-noise errors. Notice
that ρ1 and ρ 2 are the speed of adjustment parameters. The larger ρ1 is, the greater the
response of xt to the previous period’s deviation from long term equilibrium. On the other
hand, a very small value of ρ1 and ρ 2 implies that xt does not respond to last period’s
equilibrium error. In the case that both ρ1 and ρ 2 are zero there is no error correction, and
Equation (6.3) and (6.4) comprise nothing more than Vector Autoregressions in first
difference.
Table 6.6 presents the OLS estimations of the error-correction model (ECM) for the
behavioural equations based on cointegrating VAR (1) 44 and VAR (2).

43
44

u t = y t − β 1 − β 2 xt

If the order of the VAR (optimal lag length) for each equation is equal to one, the lagged changes of
each independent variable in this equation cannot be calculated. Hence the only coefficient that appears in
the ECM model is the coefficient of the error-correction term.

Chapter 6 – Empirical estimation of the model

204

______________________________________________________________________

Table 6-6: ECM Results Estimated by OLS Based on Cointegrating
VAR (1) and VAR(2)
Equation (1) y d = α 1c p + α 2 i + α 3 c g + α 4 i g + α 5 (tx − tm)
VAR (1)

Variable

Coefficient

t -ratio

ecm1(−1)

2.56

5.07**

ecm1(−1)

Equation (2) c p = c1 y s + c 2 w p
VAR (1)

-1.26

-11.85**

s

-2.39

-2.50*

h

-0.12

-0.80

-3.32

-7.88**
0.94
53.32
0.83
5.41
0.01

dy 1

VAR (2)

dw 1
ecm1(−1)
Adjust R2
F-statistic, (4,9)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

Equation (9) m = p + w1 y d − ϖ 2 r + ϖ 3 w p
VAR (1)

ecm1(−1)

-0.002

-0.30

VAR (2)

dy d 1

0.70

2.01*

dr1
dw p 1
ecm1(−1)

0.13

0.67

-0.73

-1.61*

-0.03

-0.64
0.04
1.12
3.38
7.00
0.39

Adjust R2
F-statistic, (4,8)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

Equation (10) w p = m1 ( f + e − p) + m 2 (m − p) + m 3 (k p + q)
VAR (1)

ecm1(−1)

-0.16

VAR (2)

d ( f + e − p )1
d (m − p )1

-0.30

-3.02*

-1.03

-3.61**

d (k p + q )1
ecm1(−1)

-1.39

-3.04*

-1.14

-3.87**
0.89
21.57
0.37
6.59
0.10

Adjust R2
F-statistic, (5,8)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

-11.49**
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Equation (14) tx = σ 1 y w + σ 2 (e − p) − σ 3T
ecm1(−1)

VAR (1)
VAR (2)

w

dy 1
d (e − p )1
ecm1(−1)
Adjust R2
F-statistic, (4,9)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

-0.32

-1.37*

-1.14

-0.77

0.26

1.58*

0.10

1.48*
0.01
1.04
0.01
0.96
0.70

Equation (15) tm = t 1 y d − t 2 (e − p) − t 3T
VAR (1)

ecm1(−1)

0.01

0.24

VAR (2)

dy d 1
d (e − p )1
ecm1(−1)
Adjust R2
F-statistic, (4,9)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

0.07

0.33

-0.06

-0.46

-0.07

-0.68
0.05
0.83
0.77
7.65
0.06

Equation (16) f&+ e&− p&= r1 (tx − tm) + r 2 (r w f + e − p)
VAR (1)

ecm1(−1)

-1.38

-5.02**

VAR (2)

d (tx − tm)1

-1.46

-1.92*

-1.71

-2.62*

-0.37

-0.48
0.65
6.95
0.03
7.03
0.85

0.46

6.10**

d (r w f + e − p )1
ecm1(−1)
Adjust R2
F-statistic, (4,8)
Serial correlation, LM(1)
Functional form
Heteroscedasticity

Equation (19) y s = λ1k p + λ 2 k e + λ3 k g − λ 4 ( w − p)
VAR (1)

ecm1(−1)

Note:
-

-

The dependent variable in each equation is first-differenced, for example, dependent variable in
Equation (1) is: dy d = y d − y d (−1) .
For VAR (2) the independent variables in each equation are the first-differenced variables
lagged one period, for example, in Equation (2) dy s 1 = y s (−1) − y s (−2) .
VAR (2) cannot be calculated for Equation (1) and (19) because of a short length of
observations.
* means the estimated t -values are significant at the 5 per cent level; ** means the estimated t values are significant at the 1 per cent level.
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As can be seen from Table 6.6, the ECM equation for aggregate demand, ( y d )
(Equation 1), based on cointegrating VAR(1), 2.56, is statistically significant at 1 per cent
but has the wrong sign. However, in the case where the order 2 is chosen for the underlying
VAR, the model cannot be calculated due to the lack of sample data. The ECM equation for
private consumption, ( c p ) (Equation 2), based on cointegrating VAR(1), -1.26, has the
correct sign and is statistically significant at 1 per cent. For VAR(2) all estimated short run
elasticities can be obtained as presented in Table 6.6. The econometric model is well
specified, satisfying a range of diagnostic tests for model adequacy. These include the
Lagrange Multiplier test for first order serial correlation and Ramsey’s tests for functional
form and heteroskedasticity.
For the ECM of the demand for real money balances, ( m − p ), Equation (9), in the
case that the chosen order of VAR was one, the coefficient of the error-correction term is
statistically insignificant with a very small value (0.002) and has the correct sign. For
VAR(2), the estimated equation passes all the diagnostic tests. The LM test for serial
correlation, Ramsey’s test, and heteroskedasticity. The coefficient of the error-correction
term is statistically not significant, while it has the correct sign. For domestic private sector
wealth, ( w p ) (Equation 10), the error-correction coefficient for VAR(1), estimated at –
0.16, is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and has the correct sign. For VAR(2),
the error-correction term is larger (-1.14) and is also statistically significant at the 1 per cent
level. The equation passes all diagnostic tests.
For total export demand, ( tx ), the error-correction terms have the correct signs for
both VAR(1) and VAR(2). The particularly low speed of adjustment, as seen from the
error-correction term (0.1), may be reliable due to the fact that Vietnam is a price taker in
export goods. In the ECM equation for total import demand, ( tm ) (Equation 15), in the
case where the chosen order of VAR was one, has a coefficient of the error-correction term,
0.01, that has the wrong sign. For the VAR(2), the error-correction term is -0.07 but is not
statistically significant at all levels. The equation passes all diagnostic tests.
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Equation (16) represents the current account balance, ( f&+ e&− p&). The errorcorrection coefficient for VAR(1), estimated at –1.38, is statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level but has the correct sign, while it is not statistically significant for the case when
the chosen order of VAR was two. The equation passes all diagnostic tests. For the
aggregate supply of output, ( y s ) (Equation 19), the error-correction coefficient for VAR(1)
estimated at 0.46, is highly statistically significant but has the wrong sign. However, in the
case where the order 2 is chosen for the underlying VAR, the model cannot be calculated
due to the lack of sample data.

6.5 Applications of the Bootstrap Method
The estimation methods that were used in the previous sections are largely
asymptotic. It is argued that inference based on asymptotic distribution has two major
drawbacks: (i) the estimators, though consistent (and often super consistent) have
substantial small sample biases; and (ii) the tests of significance based on the asymptotic
distribution have substantial size distortions (Li and Maddala, 1997). The purpose of this
section is to investigate the usefulness of the bootstrap methods, which was initiated by
Efron (1979), in providing some corrections to small sample biases in the estimated
parameters generated previously.
The bootstrap method is a re-sampling method. Several re-sampling methods were in
use earlier but they were disparate. Efron (1979) made the re-sampling method a widely
applicable technique. The purpose of the bootstrap method is to reduce bias and provide
more reliable standard errors. The bootstrap randomly picks a fixed number of observations
from the original sample with replacements. By repeating this random re-sampling
procedure, the bootstrap can approximate the unknown true distribution of the estimator
with the empirical ‘bootstrap’ distribution. The bootstrap re-sampling method was
originally designed for independent and identically distributed (I.I.D) errors. There are
several bootstrap methods in the literature: simple bootstrap, double bootstrap, weighted
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bootstrap, wild bootstrap, recursive bootstrap, sequential bootstrap, and so on. Many
empirical applications in econometrics do not say which bootstrap is being used although
one can infer that the simple bootstrap is being used (Jeong and Maddala, 1993). There
appears to be a lot of confusion in the applied econometric literature about what the
bootstrap is good for. In general, there are two main uses of the bootstrap that have both
sound theoretical justification and support from Monte Carlo or experiment work. First, in
models where asymptotic theory is intractable, the bootstrap can provide a tractable way to
achieve confidence intervals, etc. Typically, these results are equivalent to those obtained
through asymptotic theory. Second, in the models where asymptotic theory is tractable but
not very accurate in samples of sizes used in applications, the bootstrap often provides a
way of improving on the approximations of asymptotic theory. This section proceeds by
applying the simple bootstrap 45 to the ordinary least square, and unit root tests introduced
in the previous sections in order to check the accuracy of the results obtained.
6.5.1

Bootstrap in OLS regressions and empirical results
Consider a regression model y = βX + u where y is an n × 1 vector of the

dependent variable, X is an n × k matrix of k regressors, and u is an n × 1 vector of I.I.D
errors with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . The true distribution of u is not known. The
sampling distribution, or the mean and variance of an estimator β̂ (the OLS estimator) are
of interest.
When the regressors are non-random, the fixed structure of the data should be
preserved and the bootstrap estimation is done by re-sampling the estimated errors. The
procedure is:
(1) Compute the predicted residuals uˆ = y − β̂X
45

46

.

The bootstrap method used here is one with I.I.D errors. For the bootstrap methods with non-I.I.D errors
see Jeong and Maddala (1993).
46
If X does not include the constant vector so the residual û are not centred, the bootstrap usually fails.
Freedman (1981) recommends the use of the centred residuals, uˆ − ∑ uˆ i / n , to correct this problem.
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(2) Resample û : obtain u * by drawing n times at random with replacement from
û .

(3) Construct a “fake data” y * by the formula y* = βˆX + u * .
(4) Re-estimate β * using X and y * .
(5) Repeat (2) – (4) m times.
(6) Compute the bootstrap point estimator, βˆ B = ∑ β *j / m .
(7) Compute the bootstrap variance of β̂ , Vˆ = ∑ ( β *j − βˆ B )( β *j − βˆ B )' /(m − 1) .
The bootstrap OLS is defined as βˆ B = E[( X ' X ) −1 X ' y*] and Efron (1979) has shown
that E ( βˆ B ) = βˆ , var( βˆ B ) = σ 2 ( X ' X ) −1 ; that is the bootstrap estimator is identical to the
usual OLS estimator. Refitting the model to the resampled ‘fake data’, the Monte Carlo
distribution of the observed errors in the parameter estimates can be used to approximate
the distribution of the unobservable errors in the real parameter estimates. This is
particularly useful in situations when it is believed that bias is a problem in small sample
size.
Given the aforementioned problem of small sample size (there are only 16
observations), these steps are taken for determining the variability of parameter estimates in
the eight behavioural equations previously calculated. The actual programming steps are
taken from the SHAZAM illustration ‘Bootstrapping Regression Coefficients’. The results
are shown in Table 6.7 and can be explained as follows.
Column (1) displays OLS estimator ( β̂ ). Column (2), obtained from step 6 as
identified previously, shows for each parameter the sample mean for 1000 estimates.
Column (3) shows the sample standard deviations, which are the bootstrap estimates of
variability in the parameter estimates. The key questions now are how good are the OLS
coefficient estimates and are they biased? To answer these equations one has first to
compare column (1) and (2) in Table 6.7. For instance, the coefficient iˆ for total
productive investment was set to the estimated value 0.197 in the construction of the ‘fake
data’ (pseudo-data). However, the 1000 coefficient iˆ * had a sample average 0.201. The
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discrepancy as shown in column (4) is 0.0035. A standard error for the discrepancy can be
calculated from the standard deviation of the iˆ * (shown in column (3)) divided by the
square root of the number of replications, 0.0935 / 1000 = 0.00296 . The t -value (shown
in column (5)) is 0.0035 / 0.00296 = 1.1973 , which is not significant on 95 degrees of
freedom so the bias is not significant. As can be seen from column (5) of Table 6.7, no
coefficient of the estimated equations is significantly biased. So the answer for the above
questions is that the OLS parameter estimates may be good and reliable. To support this
answer the shapes of the bootstrap distribution (see Figure 6.6) may be of some interest. All
the coefficient estimates are close to normally distributed, as may be anticipated.
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Table 6-7: OLS Estimation and Bootstrap Experiment1 for the Behavioural Equations
OLS estimated coefficients
(1)

Bootstrap
Means of estimated
Standard deviation of
coefficients
coefficients
(2)
(3)

Discrepancy
between (1) and (2)
(4)

t - values of the
discrepancy2
(5)

Equation 1
p

0.88998
0.19727
-0.18461
0.10650
0.01850

0.89073
0.20081
-0.19019
0.10698
0.01821

0.0806
0.0935
0.1381
0.0483
0.0104

0.00075
0.00354
0.00558
0.00048
0.00029

0.29426
1.19727
1.27773
0.31426
0.88179

1.01430

1.01180

0.07659

0.0025

1.03221

-0.06467

-0.06289

0.06657

0.0018

0.84554

-1.1586
-0.2241
1.2098

-1.1566
-0.22498
1.2075

0.22571
0.06569
0.19506

0.0020
0.0009
0.0023

0.28021
0.42363
0.37287

+q)

0.11541
0.79232
0.61942

0.11542
0.79057
0.62072

0.034696
0.068585
0.55103

0.0000
0.0018
0.0013

0.00911
0.80688
0.07461

p)

2.0213
0.14278

2.0220
0.1388

0.10402
0.08011

0.0007
0.0040

0.21281
1.57107

p)

0.44286
-0.71989

0.44504
-0.72753

0.05368
0.17956

0.00218
0.00764

1.28423
1.3455

Private consumption ( c )
Total investment ( i )
g

Government consumption ( c )
g

Government investment ( i )
Trade balance ( tx − tm )
Equation 2
Aggregate output (

ys )

p

Private wealth ( w )
Equation 9
d

Aggregate demand ( y )
Domestic interest rate ( r )
p

Private wealth ( w )
Equation 10
Real foreign assets ( f + e − p )
Real money supply ( m − p )
Private capital stock ( k
Equation 14

p

w

World income ( y )
Real exchange rate ( e −
Equation 15
d

Domestic income ( y )
Real exchange rate ( e −
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Equation 16
Trade balance ( tx − tm )
Real foreign interest income

0.61621

0.61528

0.33951

0.00093

0.08662

(r f + e −
Equation 19

-0.02526

-0.02715

0.12246

0.00189

0.48805

0.46148
0.46102
-0.12552
0.69023

0.46550
0.45522
-0.12202
0.68019

0.10049
0.21118
0.20670
0.46876

0.0040
0.0058
0.0035
0.0100

1.26504
0.86851
0.53546
0.67730

w

p)
p

Private capital stock ( k )
e

SOE capital stock ( k )
g

Government investment ( k )
Real domestic wage ( w − p )
Note:
-

1

There are 1000 bootstrap replications.

-

2

The t - value (column 5) is calculated as follows:

Column (5) =

Column (4)
Column (3) / 1000
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Figure 6-5: The Polygon of the Distribution for the Coefficients

Equation 1

y d = α 1c p + α 2 i + α 3 c g + α 4 i g + α 5 (tx − tm)
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Equation 2

Equation 9

c p = c1 y s + c 2 w p

m = p + w1 y d − ϖ 2 r + ϖ 3 w p
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Equation 10 w p = m1 ( f + e − p ) + m 2 (m − p ) + m 3 (k p + q )

Equation 14 tx = σ 1 y w + σ 2 (e − p ) − σ 3T
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Equation 15 tm = t 1 y d − t 2 (e − p ) − t 3T

Equation 16 f&+ e&− p& = r1 (tx − tm) + r 2 (r w f + e − p )
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Equation 19

y s = λ1 k p + λ 2 k e + λ3 k g − λ 4 ( w − p )
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6.5.2

Bootstrap for unit root tests 47
There are a number of tests for a unit root, with the most popular being the Sargan-

Bhargava (1983) CRDW test, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test, and the tests developed by Phillips and Perron based on the Phillips (1987) Z
test. In Section 6.4.1 the ADF test was used to test for the unit roots of nineteen variables
used in the estimation of the developed model. However, when only a small sample size is
available there is concern with the power and size of the tests of the unit roots. Given this
p

problem the restricted Equation (6.2): ∆Yt = µ + ∑ θ∆Yt − j + ε t (see Section 6.4.1) can be
j =1

estimated for each of the variables under consideration and then bootstrapped 48. On the
basis of Monte Carlo replications, it is possible to compute both the size of the test and the
power of the test.
For the size of the test it means to locate the percentage of times the null ρ = 0 is
rejected, given a random sample drawn from the ε t* based on ρ = 0 , which are then used
to generate new values of Yt * for ρ = 0 . For the power of the test it means to locate the
percentage of times the null ρ = 0 is rejected, given a random sample drawn from the ε t*
based on ρ = 0 , which are then used to generate new values of Yt * for ρ ≠ 0 49.
The results from using ADF tests on the variables in the eight behavioural equations
were given in Table 6.4, and these suggest that fifteen out of the nineteen variables are nonstationary (see Section 6.4.1). Given the problem of small sample size, the following steps
are taken to ascertain the size of the ADF test 50.
(1)

The restricted ADF equation (Equation 6.2) was estimated with ρ = 0 for
each of the variables Yt to obtain ε t* ;

47
48

This approach is applied from Harris (1992)
The restriction imposed is to initially set ρ = 0 . This is necessary to ensure the validity of the bootstrap

if there is a unit root. Note also that the ε t can be tested to ensure that they are I.I.D, although choosing a
larger value of p in equation (6.2) is often sufficient to ensure this occurs.
49
This study focuses on the size of the test only.
50
The actual programming steps were taken from SHAZAM ‘Bootstrapping Regression Coefficients’.
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(2)

1000 random samples (with replacement) of the ε t* were drawn from the
centred normalised residuals ε t* /(1 − kn −1 )1 / 2 (where k denotes the number of
regressors in the model with n observations), to dynamically generate new
values of Yt * with ρ * set to 0;

(3)

The Yt * were used to estimate the unrestricted ADF equation ( ρ * free to
vary), and a bootstrapped distribution of t -value ( t ρ̂* ) and F -value ( Φ * ) were
obtained (based on the 1000 replications);

(4)

The t ρ̂ and Φ 51 from Table 6.4 were located in the bootstrapped distribution
of t -values ( t ρ̂* ) and F -value ( Φ * ) to obtain the significance level for
rejecting the null (see Table 6.8).
Table 6-8: Significance Level1 for Rejecting the Null of a Unit Root
(based on 1000 replications)
P(τˆτ* < τˆτ )

Variables
1

Aggregate supply of output (

2

Private real consumption ( c )

3

Government consumption ( c )

4

0.416

ys )
0.011

p

0.876

p

9
10
11
12
13

World real income (

14

Current account balance ( f )
Nominal exchange rate ( e )

15
16

0.911
0.287
0.945
0.586

+e− p)

y*)

0.894
0.814
0.672

0.415
0.187

0.794

0.731

0.536

0.176

0.043

0.081

e

SOE investment capital stock ( k )
Private investment capital stock ( k )

18

Government investment expenditure ( k )
Domestic real wage ( w − p )

p

g

Notes: - 1 The proportion of the bootstrapped

The study presents

τˆτ -

and

0.856

t -values ( F -values) generated with ρ * = 0 less (greater)

than the t -values ( F -values) in Table 6.4.

51

0.414
0.552
0.119

0.377

17
19

0.416
0.130

g

Private real wealth ( w )
Real money supply ( m − p )
Domestic price level ( p )
Domestic nominal interest rate ( r )
Foreign asset stock ( f + e − p )
Real exchange rate ( e − p )
Total exports ( tx )
Total imports ( tm )
Real foreign interest earnings ( r * f

5
6
7
8

P(Φ *3 > Φ 3 )

Φ 3 -statistics only (see Section 6.4.1)
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The results in Table 6.8 show that, in the case of the drift and trend model, 28.7 per
cent of the domestic price level ( p ), for example, t -values generated with ρ = 0 were less
than the actual t -value of –2.06 (see Table 6.4). In other words, given the bootstrap
distribution, the null would be rejected only if the significance level were as large as 28.7
per cent. In itself, this might be viewed as evidence that the domestic price variable is
possibly non-stationary, especially given the significance level of 55.2 per cent for rejecting
the null that ρ = α = 0 ( Φ 3 ). The explanations for other variables are the same. For some
variables such as private real wealth ( w p ), real money supply ( m − p ), domestic nominal
interest rate ( r ), total exports ( tx ) the rejection of the null is much weaker (for these
variables the null that they are non-stationary can be rejected at around the 90 per cent
significance level). The results are also different among the ADF tests with drift and
without drift. In Table 6.8 three variables, namely real exchange rate ( e − p ), SOE
investment capital stock ( k e ), and government investment expenditure ( k g ), are always
stationary based on both the ADF test and the bootstrap distribution, although this may be
inconclusive as far as the informal examination by graphing (see Figure 6.2) is concerned.
Thus, using the small sample empirical distributions of the ADF statistic, based on the
stochastic structure of the data generated process (d.g.p) underlying the data, a different
result is obtained with regard to whether all the variables being tested are I (1) or I (0)
(Harris, 1992). This comes about because the small sample critical values are greater than
Fuller’s (1976) estimates (which are based on a sample size of 50).
Having assumed that the variables are non-stationary and integrated of order I (1) , a
cointegration vector between the variables possibly exists. Eight behavoural equations were
estimated and tested for stationarity based on both the EG and CRDW tests, with the results
given in Table 6.5 in Section 6.4.2.
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6.6 A synthesis of the estimated results
To provide a range of possible parameter values that can be used in the simulation
analysis conducted in Chapter 7 this chapter has explored at least four estimation
approaches, namely OLS regressions, iterative Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, errorcorrection model, and bootstrap estimation (to adjust for small sample bias). The estimation
results obtained from these approaches are synthesised in Table 6.9.
Overall, the parameter estimates obtained from the OLS regressions of the logarithm
variables are satisfactory in spite of some parameters having theoretically unexpected signs
or are statistically insignificant at the 10 per cent level. This may be due to
multicollinearity. Given the relatively high value of the R2, it can be said that the
endogenous variables have predicted reasonably well. However, the value of the DurbinWatson statistics may be of concern about serial correlation in the residuals of these
equations. To remedy the problem of autocorrelation the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt
procedures were used to re-estimate these equations. Compared with the results obtained
from the OLS regressions the coefficients of the explanatory variables from this approach
are not much different. However, their statistics are much improved, especially the
magnitude of the DW statistics being close to 2.
The estimation methods that were used above are largely asymptotic. It is argued that
for the case of small sample inference based on asymptotic distribution there are some
major drawbacks. In providing some corrections to small sample biases in the estimated
parameters the bootstrap method is investigated with the help of the SHAZAM program.
With relatively small values of the standard deviation of the coefficients (see Table 6.7) the
results obtained from this approach once again confirm the fact that no coefficients of the
estimated equations are significantly biased.
However, the estimation of the model using the OLS regressions as presented was
based on economic time series which are clearly non-stationary in the sense that the mean
and variance depend on time, and they tend to depart ever further from any given value as
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time goes on. It is argued that regression of one non-stationary variable on another is very
likely to yield regression results which are nonsense (named by Yule, 1926) or spurious
(the terminology of Granger and Newbold, 1974). An alternative modelling testing
approach dealing with non-stationary, or integrated, time series data is the concept of
cointegration. Since an informal as well as formal examination of the Vietnamese data
confirms that non-stationary is apparent in all the series, regressions of these series are
meaningful if and only if they involve cointegrated variables. Two simple tests for
cointegration between variables are applied. One is proposed by Engle and Granger, testing
for the existence of a unit root in the residuals of the static regression, and another
suggested by Sargan and Bhargava (1983) is the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson
test (CRDW). Since in absolute terms the estimated t value for the residuals of the
behavioural equations exceeds the critical value at 5 per cent, the conclusion is that the
residuals for these regressions are I (0) ; that is, they are stationary. The results from the
CRDW test also give the same conclusion. Hence, the OLS regressions would not be
spurious, even though the individual variables are non-stationary, and can be called
cointegrating regressions 52. In this case, it can be said that the variables in the behavioural
equations are cointegrated.
In an error correction model (ECM) the dynamics of both short run (changes) and
long run (levels) adjustment processes are modelled simultaneously. This idea of
incorporating the dynamic adjustment to steady-state targets in the form of error correction
terms therefore offers the possibility of revealing information about short run and long run
relationships. In this study ECMs are estimated by the application of the maximum
likelihood cointegration technique of Johansen (1988). The optimal lag length of one for
VAR was chosen for Equations (1) and (19) and of two for the remaining equations. The
results of these tests (not shown here) suggest that there exists one cointegrating
relationship between I (1) variables. Column (5) of Table 6.9 reports the coefficient
estimates of these cointegrating vectors which are normalised on the dependent variables of
52

This is used in the sense given by Gujarati (2003), p. 822.
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the behavioural equations. The finding of estimated cointegrating vectors allows us to
formulate the short run adjustment process in terms of ECM. The coefficients of the error
correction terms are reported in Table 6.6.
As can be seen from Column (5) of Table 6.9 the estimated coefficients obtained
from contegrating vectors have reasonable magnitudes, which are not much different from
those of the OLS regressions (except Equations (9) and (19)), and also have the same signs.
Since the error correction term is assumed to enter its own equation with a negative sign
supporting the error correction interpretation, if it is statistically significant it can tell us
what proportion of the disequilibrium in the dependent variable in one period is corrected
in the next period. The important finding from the ECMs is that the coefficients of the error
correction term of Equations (2), (10), and (16) have the correct signs and are statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting a moderate speed of convergence to
equilibrium 53. The error correction terms of Equations (9) and (14), while they display the
correct signs, are not statistically significant. For the remaining equations the error terms
have the wrong signs. This finding to some extent confirms that the estimated equations are
well specified and the parameter estimates obtained from cointegrating vectors are reliable.
In conclusion, although having been affected by a serious “degrees of freedom”
problem, the OLS regression based on the levels of the logarithm variables seems to give
reliable coefficients in terms of their magnitudes. This conclusion is confirmed when
several other approaches are conducted to check for similar results. Therefore, it can be
useful in providing a range of possible parameter values to be used in the simulation
analysis conducted in Chapter 7.

53

Equilibrium as used in the context of the cointegrating regression and the ECM means a statistically
observed relationship between the variables over the same period.
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Table 6-9: A Synthesis of the Estimated Results
OLS estimation

Iterative CochraneOrcutt estimation
Coefficient
t -ratio
value
(3)
(4)

ECM
estimation1
Coefficient
value
(5)

Bootstrap
estimation
Coefficient value

Coefficient
value
(1)

t -ratio

0.89
0.20
-0.19
0.11
0.02

10.89
2.11
-1.30
2.14
1.82
2
R = 0.99
DW = 1.60

0.98
0.10
-0.05
0.04
0.003

12.28
0.98
-0.40
1.00
0.32
2
R = 0.99
DW = 2.18

0.67
0.54
-0.51
0.30
-0.02

0.89073
0.20081
-0.19019
0.10698
0.01821

1.01
-0.07

13.68
-1.0
R2 = 0.99
DW = 0.57

0.97
-0.06

23.10
-1.66
R2 = 0.99
DW = 2.08

0.79
0.04

1.01180
-0.06289

-1.16
-0.22
1.21

-5.30
-3.44
6.39
R2 = 0.95
DW = 1.40

-1.52
-0.46
1.33

-5.83
-3.60
7.51
R2 = 0.95
DW = 1.88

-5.71
-2.12
2.76

-1.1566
-0.22498
1.2075

(k p +q )

0.12
0.79
0.62

3.51
11.19
11.73
R2 = 0.99
DW = 1.43

0.33
0.45
0.60

2.62
1.90
3.23
R2 = 0.99
DW = 2.07

0.04
1.21
0.20

0.11542
0.79057
0.62072

Equation (14)
yw
(e− p )

2.01
0.14

19.54
1.79
R2 = 0.97
DW = 1.08

1.97
0.23

7.94
0.92
R2 = 0.95
DW = 1.93

1.92
1.50

2.0220
0.1388

Equation (15)
yd
(e− p )

0.44
-0.72

7.90
-4.02
R2 = 0.83
DW = 1.18

0.65
0.14

2.15
0.53
R2 = 0.93
DW = 2.13

1.18
-0.38

0.44504
-0.72753

0.66
-0.07

4.27
-0.74
R2 = 0.87
DW = 1.76

0.73
-0.30

4.00
-1.40
R2 = 0.91
DW =1.55

0.44
-0.39

0.61528
-0.02715

Equation (1)
cp
i

cg
ig
( tx − tm )

Equation (2)
ys

w

p

Equation (9)
yd
r
wp

Equation (10)
( f +e− p )
(m− p )

Equation (16)
( tx − tm )
(rw f +e− p )

(2)

(6)
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Equation (19)
kp

ke
kg
(w− p )

Note:
-

1

0.46
0.46
-0.13
0.69

4.58
2.14
-0.60
1.45
R2 = 0.99
DW = 1.59

0.31
0.54
-0.05
0.32

2.00
3.01
-0.29
0.61
R2 = 0.99
DW = 1.3

0.97
-2.59
3.13
2.36

0.46550
0.45522
-0.12202
0.68019

ECM results estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR (1) for Equations (1) and (19),
and VAR (2) for the remaining equations.
The coefficient values of the ECM model are the cointegrating coefficients.
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6.7 Conclusions
This chapter aimed to empirically estimate the model developed in Chapter 5. A
simple estimation method – OLS – was explored first. Broadly, the estimated results are
good in terms of diagnostic test statistics such as t - values, and the coefficient of
determination (R2). Some coefficients have a priori expected signs whilst others are not
statistically significant and have the wrong signs, probably due to multicollinearity. The
especially low Durbin-Watson statistics in some equations, however, suggest that the
variables in these equations are autocorrelated. The diagnostic statistics were improved
when the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, OLS regressions of the first- and second
differenced variables were applied, although the parameter estimates obtained from these
approaches are not significantly different from those derived from the levels regression.
The OLS regression analysis based on time series data implicitly assumes that the
underlying time series are stationary. However, it is a well-known empirical fact that many
macroeconomic time series are typically non-stationary. It is argued by time-series analysts
that regression of one non-stationary variable on another is inconsistent with most data and
gives rise to spurious inferences. Nevertheless, cointegration analysis allows us to conduct
econometric analysis of non-stationary variables.
Before proceeding to test the sets of variables for cointegration it is sensible to
establish the properties of the individual series. An informal examination by graphing, as
well as the application of the ADF, asserted the non-stationarity characteristics of the
variables of interest. Having assumed that all the variables concerned are integrated in the
same order, I (1) , testing for cointegration was done to determine whether a long run
relationship exists between the variables. The results from the cointegration tests indicate
the existence of long run relationships (or cointegration) for all the equations employed.
The assumption of cointegration relationships between the variables concerned allows us to
formulate the short run adjustment process in terms of an error correction model (ECM).
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Having recognised that inference based on asymptotic distributions of the methods
used has some drawbacks of small sample size biases, the bootstrap method, a computerbased methodology initiated by Efron (1979), was used to check the accuracy of the
asymptotics to make alternative estimates of the standard errors that are more reliable for
the case of OLS regressions and to compute the size of the unit root tests using the ADF
approach. The results from Section 6.6 show that the coefficient estimates obtained from
the OLS regressions were not significantly biased and the non-stationary characteristics of
the variables under consideration were confirmed, although their orders of integration may
be inconclusive due mainly to the limitation of the observation numbers.
A comparison of the estimated results obtained from the various approaches
suggested that, with plausible magnitudes, a set of parameter estimates obtained from the
OLS regression of the level variables can be used for policy analysis by means of a
numerical simulation conducted in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULATION ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the model developed in Chapter 5 is utilised to conduct a number of
numerical simulations. Since the size and complexity of the theoretical framework prevents
the mathematical derivation of analytically unambiguous results, for both the steady state
and dynamic properties of the model, a numerical simulation procedure 54 is used based on
parameters derived from either the econometrically estimated results obtained from Chapter
6 or existing sources. The model must exhibit dynamic properties (see Appendix 7.1)
which are consistent with the underlying behavioural assumptions, thereby ensuring, in the
context of this rational expectations model, a stable saddlepath consistent with the
attainment of long-run equilibrium. With the assumption of a fixed exchange rate the
dynamic equations of the model are assumed to consist of a set of dynamic endogenous
control variables, namely real money balances ( l ), foreign asset stocks ( f ), private capital
stock ( k p ), public capital stock ( k g ), state-owned enterprise capital stock ( k e ), nominal
wages ( w ) and Tobin’s q ratio ( q ). The first six of these, because of assumed stickiness of
price and quantity adjustment in non-financial markets, are predetermined, or non-jump,
variables. Tobin’s q ratio, which is the ratio of the market valuation of the capital stock to
its replacement cost, is the only non predetermined, or jump, variable because it is
determined in financial markets
A simulation analysis, which can be described as a calibrated solution of the model,
is conducted in Section 7.2 in order to derive certain conclusions about the effect of
alternative paths for the Vietnamese economy, corresponding to different assumptions

54

The numerical simulation procedure utilised is known as “Saddlepoint”. It is a numerical algorithm
developed by Austin and Buiter (1982) for solving systems of linear differential equations with constant
coefficients, and is based upon the solution provided by Blanchard and Khan (1980) for the case of
systems of linear difference equations. Its analytical solution is derived and discussed in Buiter (1982).
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regarding policy changes and reforms. Three types of policy reforms in the simulation
analysis will be assumed as exogenous shocks: (1) in carrying out privatisation it is
assumed that 5 per cent of the capital stock of SOEs is given to the private sector; (2) the
nominal exchange rate is assumed to be devalued by 5 per cent; (3) and the tariff rate is
assumed to be reduced by 5 per cent. For each shock, the simulation will be carried out at
different speeds. In the first case a gradual process will occur, while in the second case an
immediate change will take place on impact. A comparison between them will then be
conducted. Two extreme reform packages, involving a multitude of policy instruments
designed to illustrate the more complex cases of gradualism and shock therapy approaches,
will be eventually considered. In both simulations, privatisation, tariff reform, and
devaluation are undertaken, with the only difference being the speed with which these
actions are taken. The analysis will focus upon the adjustment of six key macroeconomic
variables, namely the foreign capital stock, private capital stock, aggregate output supply,
the trade balance, the real exchange rate, and inflation. These key variables are chosen
because they are important factors in the process of economic development of Vietnam,
affecting economic growth and economic stability. Any changes in these variables arising
from policy shocks such as the nominal exchange rate devaluation, privatisation of SOE
capital stocks and tariff reduction, will have an impact on the development of other
variables and the domestic economy as whole.
In addition, the shocks involving the privatisation of the SOE capital stock and tariff
reduction are considered in an alternative model, in which it is assumed that capital
mobility is perfect and the nominal exchange rate is flexible 55. This will then be compared
with the fixed exchange rate and imperfect capital mobility version of the model. The
impact of the changes in government capital expenditure, combined with the reform

55

In this version of the model there are seven dynamic endogenous control variables – real money
balances ( l ), foreign capital stock ( f ), private capital stock ( k p ), state-owned enterprise capital stock
( k e ), public capital stock ( k g ), Tobin’s q ( q ), and real exchange rate ( c ), in which the first five
variables are assumed to be predetermined non-jump variables, while q and c , being determined in
financial markets, are non-predetermined jump variables.
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policies on the Vietnamese economy, will also be explicitly analysed. The policy
implications derived from these simulations will be presented in Section 7.3. The last
section will present concluding remarks for this chapter.

7.2 Simulation Results
In order to identify the steady state properties of the model arising from a shock, as
well as the adjustment process towards the long run steady state, it is necessary to specify
the numerical values of the parameters of the model. The relevant parameter values used
are either chosen from the coefficients obtained from the econometric estimation in Chapter
6 or imposed due to unsuccessful attempts to estimate them or in order to ensure model
stability. Table 7.1 summarizes these.
Using the parameter values contained in Table 7.1 six scenarios arising from
exogenous shocks, and their resulting impact upon six key macroeconomic variables, are
presented in subsections 7.2.1-7.2.6 respectively. The resulting impact of each shock upon
the adjustment of key macroeconomic variables is contained in Figures 7.1-7.6. The
vertical axis for each diagram measures the percentage deviation of that variable from the
baseline, its starting value, while the horizontal axis measures the time period. Each
diagram breaks the adjustment process into four time periods. The impact period is that
arising immediately on the announcement of the policy, or the time at which an exogenous
shock occurs. The short run is described as that occurring over a period of one year, the
medium run that occurring from two to three years and the long run three years onwards 56.

56

The time periods have been arbitrarily identified. The simulation results presented were restricted to
thirty time periods and assumed that each time period equals a half year. In Figures 7.1-7.6, 0-0*
represents the impact period, 0*-2 represents the short run period (one year), 2-6 represents the medium
run (two years) period and 6-onwards represents the long run period. In most cases the steady state is
achieved at the fifteenth year or immediately after that.
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Table 7-1: Parameters Chosen for the Simulation
Equation

(1)

(2)

Parameters

α
α
α
α
α
c
c

OLS estimated
coefficients

Confidence intervals*

Chosen parameters
for the simulation

Sources for imposed
parameters

0.89

0.7

1.1

1.0

Estimated a

0.20

-0.01

0.4

0.1

Estimated

-0.19

-0.5

0.13

0.1

Estimated

0.11

0.004

0.22

0.1

Estimated

0.02

-0.004

0.04

0.1

Estimated

1.01

0.85

1.17

1.0

Estimated

0.07

-0.2

0.1

0.1

Estimated

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

(3)

β

0.6

(4)

τ

0.5
1

τ

2

(5)
(7)
(8)

(9)

(10)

(11a)

-1.16

-1.64

-0.68

1.0

Author’s
calculationb
Author’s
calculation
Author’s
calculation
(A), (B), (C)
(A), (B), (C)
Author’s
calculation
Estimated

0.22

-0.37

-0.1

0.2

Estimated

1.2

0.8

1.62

1.0

Estimated

0.12

0.04

0.19

0.2

Estimated

0.8

0.64

1.0

0.5

Estimated

0.62

0.5

0.74

0.5

Estimated

0.3
0.5

(A), (B), (C)
(A), (B), (C)

0.5

(A), (B), (C)

0.5

(A), (B), (C)

0.2

(A), (B), (C)

0.2

(A), (B), (C)

0.2

(A), (B), (C)

0.2

(A), (B), (C)

0.5

η
θ
ϕ

ϖ
ϖ
ϖ
µ
µ
µ
ψ
δ
δ
δ
ε
ε
ε
ε
σ
σ

0.5
0.5
0.4

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

(12)

2

3

1

(13)

2

3

4

(14)

1.3

0.86

1.76

1.0

Estimated

0.2

-0.18

0.56

0.2

Estimated

1

2
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Equation

Parameters

τ
τ
ρ
ρ
α
φ
φ
λ
λ
λ
λ

OLS estimated
coefficients

Confidence intervals*

Chosen parameters
for simulation

Sources for imposed
parameters

0.38

0.28

0.48

0.4

Estimated

-0.48

-0.73

-0.22

0.3

Estimated

0.64

-0.14

1.4

1.0

Estimated

-0.13

-0.58

0.32

0.2

Estimated

0.5
0.7

(A), (B), (C)
(A), (B), (C)

1.0

(A), (B), (C)

1

(15)

2

(16)
(17)
(18)

1

2

1

2

0.35

0.04

0.66

0.5

Estimated

0.5

-0.2

1.18

0.5

Estimated

-0.05

-0.68

0.57

0.1

Estimated

0.3

-1.1

1.7

0.3

Estimated

1

2

(19)

3

4

Note:
(a)
(b)
*
(A)
(B)

(C)

Estimated coefficients obtained from the OLS regressions identified in Chapter 6.
Author’s calculation is based on Vietnamese data.
Confidence interval (95%) based on the t-distribution.
Harvie C. (1993), “The macroeconomic effects of oil shocks under fixed and flexible
exchange rates – a comparision”, OPEC Review.
Harvie C. and Kearney C. (1996), “Public infrastructure capital and private investment”,
Research Paper, The University of Wollongong.
Harvie C. and Lee B. C. (1996), “Financial deregulation and macroeconomic adjustment:
the case of Australia”, Research Paper, The University of Wollongong.
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7.2.1

Simulation results arising from a nominal exchange rate devaluation
In this subsection the results derivable from simulating the model for the scenario of

a devaluation in the nominal exchange rate is conducted. The presumed change is that of a
5 per cent devaluation in the nominal exchange rate. Two initial simulations are carried out
in which the devaluation is implemented at different speeds. To simulate an instantaneous
devaluation, the nominal exchange rate is devalued by 5 per cent 57 and this takes place
instantaneously. To simulate a gradual devaluation, it is assumed that the nominal exchange
rate is devalued by 3 per cent on impact, 1 per cent more after one year, and another 1 per
cent in the second year. Table 7.2 summarises the long run steady state properties of each
variable under consideration for both cases, in percentage deviation terms, from their initial
base values. The adjustment process involved in this case, for either an up-front
devaluation or a gradual devaluation, is contained in Figures 7.1A-7.1F.
Table 7-2: Simulation Results: Devaluation in the Nominal Exchange Rate
(5 per cent)
% deviation from baseline

Up-front devaluation
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Gradual devaluation
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

f

kp

0
1.8831
0.8751
0

0
-0.7719
-0.4791
0

0
15.441
7.5047
0

0
-6.3304
-4.0777
0

Variables
ys

t

c

p

0.5
-0.4679
-0.2837
0

1.0233
0.0128
0.0346
0

5
-0.8195
-0.4421
0

1.0473
0.0626
-0.002
0

0.3
-3.5971
-2.4189
0

0.614
0.5619
0.2854
0

3
-4.3188
-3.8005
0

0.6284
0.4261
-0.0191
0

A nominal exchange rate devaluation produces important differences in the
adjustment of the major macroeconomic variables to long-run steady state. As can be seen
57

Because the model is linear a 5 per cent change in the exchange rate (or tariff reduction or privatisation)
should be 5 times the effect of a 1 per cent change. Hence it is not the actual magnitude of the change
itself but the direction of change, or impact, on endogenous variables that are of interest, both in steady
state and during the adjustment period. It is not particularly important to assume a certain percentage
change in an exogenous variable, it could be 1 or 5 per cent. The important issue is impact effects
(positive or negative) and the size of these relative to the long run steady state changes.
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from Table 7.2, however, there is no difference in the long-run steady state results for both
immediate and gradual cases. In this case, a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate by 5
per cent is offset by an equi-proportional increase in the nominal domestic wage (not
shown here 58). As a result there is no overall change in the macroeconomic variables in
steady state.
Despite the similarity in the steady state results for both cases, the dynamics of
adjustment are noticeably different. Taking domestic developments first of all, real GDP
( y s ) shows a marginal increase on impact, by 0.5 per cent and 0.3 per cent with an up-front
and gradual process respectively, due to the expenditure-switching effect of the
devaluation. Over the short run developments in aggregate supply are very similar under
either process, with a gradual decline apparent. Two factors that contribute to such a
decline on the supply side are capital stock decumulation and the real exchange rate
appreciation which causes a reduction in the competitiveness of the economy. By the end
of the short run the level of aggregate supply under the gradual case bottoms out at 3.6 per
cent lower than baseline, a point approximately eight times lower than that of the up-front
case. The medium period sees an increase in aggregate supply, while under the up-front
process aggregate supply increases slowly to the steady state. Over the long run a continual
increase occurs and the up-front process achieves the long run steady state earlier.
The private capital stock ( k p ) also shows a similar adjustment process to that of
aggregate supply. As it is assumed to be an endogenous control variable that exhibits
stickiness of adjustment, the private capital stock does not change on impact. The short run
period sees a sharp decline in this variable for the case of a gradual devaluation with a fall
of 6.3 per cent lower than base line, while this number stands at around 0.8 per cent for the
case of an immediate devaluation. The reduction of the private capital stock can be
attributable to an increase in the nominal interest rate (not shown here) arising from
developments in the price level arising from the devaluation, and to a decline in the q ratio.

58

The simulation results of some variables are not shown here because focus is placed primarily only on
the adjustment of key macroeconomic variables, as mentioned in the first chapter.
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After bottoming out by the end of the short run period, the private capital stock starts rising
in the medium run due to a gradual decline in inflation and in the interest rate. Over the
long run a gradual increase occurs for both cases, recovering thereafter to the long run
steady state. With an up-front devaluation the private capital stock achieves the long run
steady state much quicker than for the alternative gradual devaluation case.
External developments are shown by developments in the real foreign asset stock
( f ), the trade balance ( t ) and the real exchange rate ( c ). The foreign asset stock, assumed
to be subject to stickiness of adjustment, does not change on impact and shows a similar
adjustment pattern although with different magnitudes over the short run. By the end of the
short run, the nominal foreign asset stock has reached its peak at 15.5 per cent above
baseline with the gradual case, almost eight times higher compared to that of the immediate
case (1.9 per cent). With the gradual approach the real foreign asset stock deteriorates over
the medium run, but still being 7.5 per cent above baseline by the end of this period and
declining gradually over the long run. Again, with an up-front devaluation the decline is a
gradual one but with the size of adjustment less, and achieving the steady state much
earlier.
The real exchange rate depreciates by exactly the same percentage as the nominal
exchange rate devaluation (5 per cent) on impact in the up-front case, and by 3 per cent for
the gradual case. In the short run the real exchange rate experiences an initial appreciation
for both cases, further appreciating by some 1 per cent over the medium run before
depreciating again to the long run steady state under the up-front devaluation. With the
gradual process the real exchange rate continues to appreciate in the first year of the
medium period, bottoming out at some 6 per cent in the medium run from the baseline, and
depreciates thereafter until the steady state.
An initial improvement in the trade balance ( t ) for both cases is apparent, of 1 per
cent and 0.6 per cent for the up-front and gradual processes respectively, primarily because
of the initial strong impact of the nominal exchange rate devaluation, but the trade balance
worsens in the remainder of the short run period as the devaluation effect is eroded by
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inflation, indicating the real exchange rate appreciation. In the case of a gradual
devaluation the first year of the medium run sees a further deterioration, but a slight
improvement in the trade balance is apparent after the second year of this period. Over the
long run the steady state is achieved quite rapidly with the up-front process, but greater
volatility is apparent with the gradual process.
Finally, the adjustment of inflation ( p ) is very similar in direction under either case.
The inflation rate rises to a level higher than baseline on impact, reflecting the effect of the
nominal exchange rate devaluation on domestic prices. However, the economy does not
experience an inflationary development from the medium run to the long run steady state
irrespective of whether an up-front or gradual devaluation is imposed.
7.2.2

Simulation results arising from a tariff reduction 59
This subsection conducts two simulations on alternative tariff reform paths, involving

a gradual and an up-front tariff reduction. The first simulation supposes that the tariff
reduction is introduced gradually. It is assumed that a reduction from its base level occurs
on impact by 3 percent and then 1 per cent more each year for the next two years. The
second simulation assumes the reduction of the tariff rate by 5 per cent occurs immediately
on impact. Table 7.3 summarises the long run steady state properties of each variable of
interest, in percentage deviation terms from the initial baseline, for both cases. The
adjustment process involved in this scenario is contained in Figures 7.2A-7.2F.

59

Trade barriers in Vietnam are incorporated as non-tariff barriers rather than as high tariff rates. Hence
trade liberalisation should really be studied as a reduction in quantitative restrictions. Such simulations,
however, are beyond the scope of this study.
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Table 7-3: Simulation Results: Tariff Reduction (5 per cent)
% deviation from baseline

Up-front tariff reduction
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Gradual tariff reduction
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

p

f

k

0
1.5546
1.2521
1.6702

0
-0.1412
-0.1823
-0.4134

0
1.4704
1.3299
1.6702

0
-0.1919
-0.2183
-0.4134

Variables
ys

t

c

p

0
-0.2672
-0.2769
-0.4134

0.4772
0.125
0.1724
0.19

0
-1.9661
-1.8581
-2.0668

0.1164
-0.0015
0.0007
0

0
-0.2559
-0.2991
-0.4134

0.2863
0.2045
0.1729
0.19

0
-1.6004
-1.8996
-2.0668

0.0699
0.0302
0.0001
0

Table 7.3 indicates that the major long-term losers from such a tariff reduction
policy, for either case, are the private capital stock and aggregate supply. Both decline by
0.4 per cent from their base levels. The major gainers from this policy are the trade balance
and foreign asset stock, which increase by 0.19 and 1.67 per cent from their baselines
respectively. Other developments suggest an appreciation of the real exchange rate by some
2 per cent, primarily due to a decrease of the nominal wage (not shown here), and no longterm effect upon the rate of inflation.
While these changes are indicative of the overall effects arising from such a policy, it
is of interest to identify the adjustment process towards long run steady state. As can be
seen from Figure 7.2, all the macro variables under consideration achieve their long run
steady states at about the same time irrespective of whether there is a gradual or up-front
process. However, the dynamics of adjustment over the short run and medium run are again
different, although mainly in terms of magnitude and not in terms of the direction of
adjustment. The tariff reduction leads to a decline in aggregate supply over the short run,
with this being marginally pronounced with an up-front path. Deteriorations in production
reflect a decrease in investment reflected in a decumulation of the private capital stock
arising from an immediate decline in the market valuation of capital stock relative to its
replacement value (the Tobin’s q ratio). The long run sees a continual decline in the private
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capital stock to the long run steady state, after levelling off in the medium run, being about
0.4 per cent lower from its baseline.
The foreign asset stock increases sharply in the first period of the short run as a result
of current account surpluses arising from a tariff reduction and the strengthening of the real
exchange rate, with this again being more pronounced under an up-front process. With both
cases the foreign asset stock deteriorates gradually over the remainder of the short run,
levelling off in the medium run period, then increases again to the long run steady state at
about 1.7 per cent higher than its baseline. The factors contributing to the nominal foreign
capital stock improvement is the appreciation of the real exchange rate, and developments
in the trade balance 60.
The adjustment of the trade balance is very similar for either the gradual or up-front
cases. An improvement is apparent on impact, as reflected by the increase in foreign asset
stocks, with a different magnitude depending on the speed of tariff reduction; 0.5 per cent
higher from baseline for the up-front case, and 0.3 per cent for the gradual case. For both
cases, after improving on impact, the remainder of the short run sees a deterioration in the
trade balance. By the end of the short run period, however, the trade balance has improved
relative to baseline in the gradual process case, being marginally more pronounced than
that of the up-front case. This is primarily due to the larger appreciation of the real
exchange rate. In the long run steady state the trade balance is almost 0.2 per cent higher
than baseline.
The real exchange rate appreciates continually throughout the short run for both
cases, and depreciates slightly thereafter by the end of the medium run under the immediate
tariff reduction case. However, the real exchange rate has still appreciated by 2 per cent
from its baseline in the long run steady state for both cases. Finally, there is a tiny increase

f&= 0 and e&− p& = c&= 0 in the long run steady
state, so an increase in the foreign capital stock ( f ) and trade balance ( tx − tm ) must be offset by an
appreciation (decline) of the real exchange rate ( e − p ) in order for this equation to go to zero. An
increase (fall) in ( f ) indicates current account surpluses (deficits).
60

From Equation (16) in Chapter 5, it is assumed that

Chapter 7 – Simulation analysis and policy implications

239

______________________________________________________________________

in inflation on impact for either case. Throughout the remainder of the adjustment process,
inflation declines to steady state.
7.2.3

Simulation results arising from the privatisation of the SOE capital stock
It is assumed that in carrying out privatisation the capital of the publicly owned

SOEs is simply given to the private sector, and that privatisation leads to an increase in the
private capital stock. Two initial simulations are carried out in which privatisation is
introduced at different speeds. In the first, an immediate process of privatisation occurs,
while in the second gradual privatisation takes place over two years. To simulate immediate
privatisation, it is assumed that 5 per cent of the SOE capital stock is given to the private
sector on impact. Gradual privatisation will happen as follows: 3 per cent of SOE capital is
given on impact, 1 per cent more for each of the next two years. The long run steady state
properties of each macroeconomic variable of interest, in percentage deviation terms, from
the initial baseline, are given in Table 7.4. Figure 7.3 contains the adjustment process
involved in this scenario.

Table 7-4: Simulation Results: Privatisation of SOE Capital Stock (5 per cent)
% deviation from baseline

Up-front privatisation
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Gradual privatisation
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

p

f

k

0
-0.3295
-2.7381
-5.2191

0
2.9114
3.678
5.0417

0
-0.0534
-2.5747
-5.2191

0
2.2767
3.6037
5.0417

Variables
ys

t

c

p

0
-1.2606
-0.7651
0.0417

0.0093
0.0642
0.1318
0.0313

0
-2.1263
-1.0415
0.2087

-0.0127
-0.0173
-0.0051
0

0
-1.0284
-0.811
0.0417

0.0056
0.0604
0.1325
0.0313

0
-1.7099
-1.1291
0.2087

-0.0076
-0.0058
-0.0065
0

As can be seen from Table 7.4, in the long run steady state the size of adjustment of
the macro variables is the same for both the immediate and gradual processes. However,
from Figure 7.3 the dynamics of adjustment is again different, although mainly in terms of
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magnitude and not in the direction of adjustment. Again, starting with output adjustments,
the following observations can be made. Initially aggregate supply decreases for either
case, being more pronounced in the case of immediate privatisation, due to an increase in
the real wage level arising from the nominal wage rate increasing by more than the price
level. The medium run sees an increase in domestic production due to a fall in the real
wage and a larger private capital stock arising from the shift of the SOE capital stock to the
private sector. Domestic output is marginally larger in the immediate privatisation process.
Although a more oscillatory adjustment of aggregate supply occurs in the up-front process,
the long run steady state, in which output is a relatively negligible 0.04 per cent higher than
its base level, is achieved at about the same time for both cases.
The adjustment process of the private capital stock is very different from that of
aggregate supply in terms of direction. The 5 per cent of SOE capital stock given to the
private sector has no impact effect on the change of the private capital stock. This is simply
due to the underlying assumptions of the model. The private capital stock improves
continually over the short run period, being some 2.9 per cent and 2.3 per cent higher than
baseline, for the cases of the immediate and gradual process respectively, by the end of it.
A gradual increase thereafter to the steady state over the medium and long run is apparent
with either case. As in the previous tariff reduction shock case, the privatisation policy
shock produces a similar adjustment of the private capital stock to the steady state under
both the immediate and gradual privatisation processes. The steady state of the private
capital stock is achieved at 5 per cent higher than its baseline.
As for external developments, after experiencing an increase in the first period of the
short run, a fall in the foreign asset stock over the short and medium run periods is
apparent, as a result of current account deficits and the strengthening of the real exchange
rate. This is more pronounced with the up-front process. The foreign asset stock
deteriorates continually throughout the long run period under either case, being some 5.2
per cent lower than baseline by the steady state, indicating continual current account
deficits.
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An increase of privatised assets from SOEs contributes to an improvement in the
trade balance in both cases in the first period of the short run, partly due to aggregate
demand (not shown here) being less than aggregate supply and an improvement of the
foreign asset stock. This is more pronounced in the up-front case. However, the remainder
of this period sees a slight deterioration in the trade balance. Over the medium term an
improvement in the trade balance occurs again, which is favourably affected by the
depreciation of the real exchange rate. With both the up-front and gradual processes the
trade balance increases by approximately 0.13 per cent by the end of the medium run. The
deterioration of the trade balance continues until the long run steady state, where the trade
balance is only 0.03 per cent higher than its base level. The real exchange rate depreciates
by 0.2 per cent from baseline for both cases.
Finally, inflationary developments are more turbulent initially in the up-front case. In
this case, there is an initial decline in inflation, although it is fairly negligible in the gradual
case. Inflation initially declines, resulting from aggregate demand decreasing more than
aggregate supply. The second half of the short run period sees a small increase in inflation,
due to the growth rate of aggregate supply being smaller than that of aggregate demand. A
further decline in inflation is apparent in the medium run. After these initial divergences,
the adjustment to the long run steady state is very similar irrespective of the process.
7.2.4

Simulation results arising from “Big Bang” and “Gradual” approaches under
a fixed exchange rate
In this subsection two cases involving a multitude of policy instruments designed to

illustrate the more complex cases of gradualism and shock approaches are considered. In
both simulations, devaluation, tariff reduction and privatisation of the SOE capital stock are
undertaken, the only difference being the speed with which these actions are taken. The
“Big Bang” approach assumed here involves up-front devaluation (5 per cent), up-front
tariff reduction (5 per cent) and the privatised capital stock is immediately given to the
private sector (5 per cent). The gradual approach involves gradual devaluation, tariff
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reduction and privatisation phased in the same manner as in the earlier simulations. Table
7.5 gives the long run steady state properties of each macroeconomic variable under
consideration, in percentage deviation terms, from the initial baseline. The adjustment
process involved in this scenario is contained in Figure 7.4.

Table 7-5 Simulation Results: “Big Bang” Approach vs. “Gradual” Approach
under a fixed exchange rate
% deviation from baseline

“Big Bang” approach
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Gradual approach
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

p

f

k

0
3.1072
-0.6124
-3.549

0
1.9989
3.0175
4.6284

0
16.857
6.2583
-3.549

0
-4.2451
-0.6915
4.6284

Variables
ys

t

c

p

0.5
-1.9954
-1.3254
-0.3716

1.5098
0.2018
0.3386
0.2213

5
-4.9502
-3.341
-1.8581

1.1509
-0.0169
-0.0095
0

0.3
-4.8812
-3.5286
-0.3716

0.9059
0.8267
0.5907
0.2213

3
-7.6287
-6.8286
-1.8581

0.6906
0.4504
-0.0256
0

The implementation of a reform package, irrespective of whether it is a “Big Bang”
or gradual approach, is felt instantaneously in four out of the six variables, namely
aggregate supply, trade balance, real exchange rate and inflation, with their effects being
larger for the “Big Bang” approach. Aggregate supply immediately rises, although as
apparent from Figure 7.4 the magnitude involved is relatively small, resulting from a
decline in the real wage level as the price level rises by more than the nominal wage (not
shown here). The real exchange rate depreciates as a result of the devaluation of the
nominal exchange rate, contributing positively to an improvement in the trade balance and
foreign asset stock. Another factor contributing to the development of the trade balance is
aggregate demand (not shown here) being less than aggregate supply.
The impact effects gradually impinge upon developments in all the markets, as the
adjustment process moves into the short run. The short run period sees an initial sharp fall
in aggregate supply for either approach, this being less pronounced with the “Big Bang”
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approach due to increasing investment as reflected in a higher private capital stock.
Although there is a rise in the capital stock given to the private sector due to the
implementation of the privatisation policy for the gradual approach, the transfer of state
owned capital stock to the private sector is offset by adverse developments on the existing
stock in this sector arising from an increase in the interest rate (not shown here). This leads
to a decumulation in private capital stock. The decumulation contributes to a continual
decline in aggregate supply over the short run, with this being more pronounced than for
the “Big Bang” approach. By the end of the short run the private capital stock is about 2 per
cent higher than its base level with the “Big Bang” approach but 4.3 per cent lower from
the baseline with the gradual case, while domestic production is at a level lower than its
baseline for both cases. External developments in the short run suggest a similar
development in the trade balance under either approach due to a depreciation in the real
exchange rate and a gradual rise in foreign asset stocks as a result of current account
surpluses. The adjustment process of these variables is similar in direction but different in
magnitude. By the end of the short run the trade balance deteriorates, the real exchange rate
appreciates by almost 5 per cent and 7.6 per cent for the immediate and gradual approaches
respectively, the foreign asset stock improves with this being most pronounced under the
gradual approach. The effect of the nominal exchange rate devaluation leads to a spike in
inflation, with it being 1.2 per cent higher than its baseline.
Over the medium run aggregate supply reverses its decline, although it is still under
its base level by the end of this period, resulting from an increasing private capital stock,
which continues rising with the “Big Bang” approach and starts rising after bottoming out
with the gradual approach. This period is characterised by a gradual decline in inflation
which achieves its steady state by the end of it. Little difference is apparent under either
system over the medium and long runs thereafter. In terms of external developments, some
noticeable differences are again apparent. The real exchange rate appreciates continually by
some 10 per cent at the end of the first half of the first year of this period under the gradual
approach, while a slight depreciation in the real exchange rate occurs in the shock therapy
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approach over the period. An appreciation in the real exchange rate, and resulting
deterioration in international competitiveness, contributes to a deterioration in the trade
balance for both cases. With the gradual approach the foreign asset stock, after reaching its
peak at 16.9 per cent higher from its baseline at the end of the short run period, declines
over this period. This deterioration also happens under the “Big Bang” approach.
Over the long run, until the steady state, aggregate supply and the private capital
stock increase continuously for both cases. However, aggregate supply achieves its long
run steady state at about 0.4 per cent lower than its baseline, while for the private capital
stock this figure is 4.6 per cent higher than its baseline. The privatisation of the SOE capital
stock stimulates private investment, and when in place further stimulates aggregate supply.
The structural shift in the economy – from state to private – does not, therefore, appear to
benefit domestic production. Additional demand from investment is also enhanced by
additional demand from private consumption spending, due to the rise in private sector
wealth. External developments are characterised by a continual depreciation of the real
exchange rate and improved trade balance, and a continual deterioration in the foreign asset
stock. The latter being about 3.6 per cent lower than its base level and indicating current
account deficits. A prolonged adjustment to the long run steady state over the long run
period is apparent with the gradual approach, while the steady state is achieved relatively
quickly with the “Big Bang” approach.
7.2.5

Simulation results arising from “Big Bang” and “Gradual” approaches under
a flexible exchange rate
This subsection investigates the effects of a tariff reduction and privatisation of SOE

capital stock at different speeds with the assumption of the Vietnamese economy operating
under a flexible exchange rate regime, which is different from the previous subsection
where a fixed exchange rate applied. The presumed changes in tariffs and privatised SOE
capital stock given to the private sector, and their speeds, are phased in the same manner as
in the earlier simulation. The long run steady state properties of each macroeconomic
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variable of interest, in percentage deviation terms, from the initial baseline, are represented
in Table 7.6. The adjustment process is contained in Figure 7.5.

Table 7-6: Simulation Results: “Big Bang” Approach vs. “Gradual” Approach under
a Flexible Exchange Rate
% deviation from baseline

“Big Bang” approach
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Gradual approach
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

f

kp

0
0.6874
-1.4034
-3.5492

0
2.8996
3.4764
4.6284

0
0.1023
-1.6051
-3.5492

0
2.6405
3.6119
4.6284

Variables
ys

t

c

p

-0.0595
-1.4048
-1.0597
-0.3716

0.362
0.2758
0.2923
0.2213

-0.5949
-3.5478
-2.9796
-1.858

-0.3618
0.0602
-0.0047
0

-0.0357
-0.956
-0.9788
-0.3716

0.2172
0.2402
0.2814
0.2213

-0.357
-2.8045
-2.848
-1.858

-0.2171
0.0065
-0.0008
0

As can be observed from Table 7.6, there is no difference in the long run steady state
results between the “Big Bang” and gradual approaches. More interesting, Table 7.6 also
indicates that the long run steady state adjustment of the macrovariables from their base
levels will be the same for either version of the exchange rate. There is no effect upon the
inflation rate in the long run steady state because there is no monetary accommodation in
the long run equilibrium. The dynamic adjustment process, however, indicates a difference
in terms of magnitude rather than direction of adjustment of the key macroeconomic
variables of interest. It is also noticeable that, with a fixed exchange rate, irrespective of the
approaches involved, the adjustment of the six key macroeconomic variables focused upon
is more oscillatory in the short and medium run periods in comparison with that under a
flexible exchange rate. This is most apparent for the case of an increase in the domestic
price level or inflation due to the effect of the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate.
Under a flexible exchange rate, domestic developments suggest an initial decline in
aggregate supply for both “Big Bang” and gradual approaches on impact, due to an
increase in the real wage level (not shown here), as the nominal wage rises by more than
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the price level. An improvement in the trade balance on impact, with this being more
pronounced with the “Big Bang” approach, is primarily due to the growth rate of aggregate
demand being bigger than that of aggregate supply. In asset markets the nominal exchange
rate appreciates, contributing to a slight decline in the nominal interest rate so as to
maintain the uncovered interest rate parity condition. As a result an appreciation of the real
exchange rate is apparent, by some 0.6 per cent and 0.4 per cent with the “Big Bang” and
gradual approaches respectively. Inflation declines on impact for either case; however, its
initial decline is more pronounced with the “Big Bang” approach.
During the short run period the increase in the privatised SOE capital stock given to
the private sector has a positive effect on private sector investment, with a resulting gradual
accumulation of the private capital stock. Aggregate supply continues declining throughout
the short run period due to the increasing real wage. This decline is most noticeable with
the “Big Bang” approach. In terms of external developments the real exchange rate further
appreciates for both cases, by 3.6 per cent with the “Big Bang” approach and 2.8 per cent
with the gradual approach by the end of the short run period, causing a deterioration in
foreign asset stocks and the trade balance. This deterioration is larger from its baseline for
the shock therapy case. This period is characterised by increasing inflation as aggregate
demand increases by more than aggregate supply.
Over the medium run a further increase in the private capital stock favourably affects
aggregate supply, contributing to a further rise, but it is still lower than the initial baseline
for both cases by the end of this period. Declining inflation is apparent as aggregate supply
starts its recovery. As for external developments the major change relates to a depreciation
of the real exchange rate, although it has still appreciated relative to the baseline, with a
resulting improvement in international competitiveness, which contributes to an
improvement in the trade balance for either case. During this period, however, foreign asset
stocks decline, indicating overall current account deficits.
Over the long run a continual improvement in the private capital stock is apparent,
stimulating aggregate supply. Although these two variables increase to the long run steady
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state, aggregate supply still stands at around 0.4 per cent lower from its initial baseline.
Inflation declines gradually to steady state where it has returned to its base level, due to
aggregate demand catching up with aggregate supply. External developments are
characterised by a continual depreciation of the real exchange rate and improved trade
balance, while real foreign asset stocks achieve their steady state at some 3.5 percentage
points lower than the base level.
7.2.6

A comparison the “Big Bang” and gradual approaches between two versions of
the exchange rate
A comparison between the two exchange rate regimes, fixed and flexible, in which

the reform package is implemented immediately and gradually is represented in Figure 7.6.
From this figure in long run steady state the size of adjustment of the macro variables is the
same for both versions. However the dynamics of adjustment is again different, although
mainly in terms of magnitude and not in the direction of adjustment. Aggregate supply
increases slightly on impact under the fixed exchange rate system, while for the flexible
exchange rate version there is a relatively negligible decline. Over the short run,
developments in domestic production are similar under either system, with a gradual
decline apparent. The medium run sees an increase for both approaches under a flexible
exchange rate while under a fixed exchange rate aggregate supply continues to decline,
bottoming out at 5 per cent lower than its baseline for the gradual case. There is a gradual
increase to the long run steady state for both versions of the exchange rate, and this is
achieved relatively quickly with a flexible exchange rate.
Over the short run period the private capital stock shows a similar adjustment process
for both approaches under a flexible exchange rate and the “Big Bang” approach under a
fixed exchange rate. A gradual increase is apparent until the end of the short run period
under a flexible exchange rate and the “Big Bang” approach under a fixed exchange rate,
this being most pronounced with the “Big Bang” approach under a flexible exchange rate
With the gradual approach under a fixed exchange rate a fall of 4.2 per cent occurs by the
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end of this period. Thereafter, over the medium run, this trend is reversed in the latter case
although the private capital stock is still under its base level by the end of this period. A
prolonged adjustment to the long run steady state over the long run is apparent with a fixed
exchange rate, particularly so in the gradual case, while the steady state is achieved
relatively quickly with a flexible exchange rate.
The foreign asset stock improves substantially in the short run for the gradual
approach under a fixed exchange rate, being some 17 per cent higher than baseline by the
end of it, while an improvement in the foreign asset stock is small under the case of a
flexible exchange rate. Throughout the medium run period a deterioration in this variable is
apparent for both approaches under either version. However, the gradual approach in the
fixed exchange rate case appears to be better in terms of higher foreign asset stocks. This
could be important if foreign exchange reserves in the economy are low. The long run
steady state is reached at about 3.5 per cent lower than the baseline, indicating current
account deficits.
The development in the trade balance is very similar irrespective of the exchange rate
mechanism in operation. It improves on impact, with this being most pronounced with the
“Big Bang” approach under a fixed exchange rate. Over the short and medium runs, it
stabilises with a flexible exchange rate, but deteriorates further with a fixed exchange rate.
Over the long run the steady state is achieved quite rapidly with a flexible exchange rate,
but greater volatility is apparent with a fixed exchange rate, being 0.2 per cent higher than
its baseline.
The real exchange rate depreciates on impact under a fixed exchange rate due to the
effect of the nominal exchange rate devaluation, while it appreciates under a flexible
exchange rate. By the end of the short run the real exchange rate has appreciated in all
cases. This appreciation is most noticeable with the gradual approach under a fixed
exchange rate over the short and, particularly, medium run periods. A gradual depreciation
is apparent over the medium and long runs under both versions of the exchange rate
system. The prolonged and oscillatory nature of adjustment of the real exchange rate, under
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a fixed exchange rate, contributes to the more oscillatory adjustment of the trade balance
and aggregate supply itself.
7.2.7

Simulation results arising from a temporary change in public capital
expenditure 61
During the transition process from a centrally planned economy to a market one the

Vietnamese government has applied a fiscal expansion policy, focusing on increasing
capital expenditure in order to restructure the economy. Concern with the effect of this
development on domestic output, private investment behaviour, and trade performance,
combined with the reform policies undertaken, is very important for policy-makers. Thus
the simulation conducted in this subsection examines the effects of a change in public
capital expenditure, combined with the gradual reform package introduced previously, on
the economy of Vietnam under both exchange rate versions of the model. The pattern of the
temporary shock in public spending is represented along with the change in tariffs, nominal
exchange rate (for the fixed exchange rate case) and privatisation of the SOE capital stock
in Table 7.7. The presumed change in public investment spending is that of a 3 per cent
increase from its baseline on impact, 1 per cent more in the next period, then 3 per cent
increase from its baseline is maintained during the remainder of the adjustment process.
Table 7.8 summarises the long run steady state properties of each variable under
consideration, in percentage deviation terms, from its initial baseline. The dynamic
adjustment process is given in Figure 7.7.

61

This simulation is conducted for the gradual case only.
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Table 7-7: Pattern of Temporary Change in Public Capital Expenditure Combined
with the Reform Package
The pattern of shock: public capital expenditure

0

3

4

3

The pattern of shock: tariff reduction

0

-3

-4

-5

The pattern of shock: devaluation*

0

3

4

5

The pattern of shock: privatisation

0

-3

-4

-5

Transition times for such shocks

0

0*

1

2

* devaluation is applied for the fixed exchange rate version only.

Table 7-8: Simulation Results: Temporary Change in Public Capital Expenditure
Combined with the Reform Package
% deviation from baseline

Under a fixed exchange rate
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact
Under a flexible exchange rate
Instantaneous impact
Short run impact
Medium run impact
Long run impact

f

kp

0
11.5068
-2.2899
-20.2086

0
-2.5399
3.0145
12.8015

0
-5.5607
-11.4897
-20.209

0
4.4604
7.9885
12.8018

Variables
ys

t

c

p

0.3
-3.4463
-0.9963
4.8016

0.8375
0.652
0.3041
-0.3987

3
-5.8034
-3.0361
6.0082

0.7737
0.3639
-0.0409
0

-0.0664
0.5474
1.9267
4.8017

0.0855
0.0621
-0.0895
-0.3987

-0.6634
-0.8673
1.3241
6.0085

-0.1964
-0.0822
-0.0358
0

Table 7.8 indicates that the major long term benefits from such an expansion in fiscal
policy, combined with a reform package, are the same for both versions of the model in
regard to an increase in the private capital stock, which increases by 12.8 per cent from its
base level. This is much higher than the level where only a reform package occurs,
indicating a net crowding in effect. An increase in aggregate supply also occurs (which
increases by 4.8 per cent from its base level), as does the real exchange rate (which
depreciates by approximately 6 per cent from its base line). The major loser from such a
policy expansion is that of foreign asset stocks, which decline some 20 per cent from base
level. Other developments suggest a deterioration in the trade balance by some 0.4 per cent.
There is no long-term effect upon the rate of inflation under both versions of the exchange
rate regime.
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The dynamics of adjustment is again different between the two versions of the model
in terms of magnitude but not in terms of the direction of adjustment. The announcement of
the policy change is felt instantaneously in asset markets where the q ratio, the nominal
interest rate (not shown here) and real exchange rate are the relevant variables. The q ratio
immediately rises in line with a rise in equity prices, thereby increasing the market
valuation of capital stock relative to its replacement value. The devaluation of the nominal
exchange rate in the case of a fixed exchange rate results in a depreciation in the real
exchange rate, while it appreciates marginally with the flexible exchange rate case. The
expectation of a further appreciation of the nominal exchange rate is created, contributing
to a decline in the nominal interest rate so as to maintain the uncovered interest rate parity
condition.
The impact effects gradually impinge upon developments in the product market, as
the adjustment process moves into the short run. The increase in public capital expenditure
contributes to an increase in real profit under a flexible exchange rate. The real profit
increase contributes to an increase in the q ratio and a stimulation of investment and
accumulation of private capital stock. Aggregate supply is increased directly and indirectly
from this spending. The increased public stock of capital enhances output directly, but it
also increases real profit on capital services and therefore private investment and thereby
affecting supply indirectly. However, under the fixed exchange rate case a deterioration in
the private capital stock and in aggregate supply occurs, mainly due to a decrease in the q
ratio and an increase in the real wage. External developments during the short run see an
opposite direction of adjustment under both versions of the exchange rate regimes for the
variables including foreign asset stock, trade balance and real exchange rate. Initially the
real exchange rate depreciates in the fixed exchange rate regime but appreciates in the other
case, although in both cases this is quickly reversed. Developments in the real exchange
rate exert the major influence over the trade balance. The improvement in the trade balance
is most noticeable under a fixed exchange rate, primarily due to the larger depreciation of
the real exchange rate. Developments in the foreign asset stock, reflecting developments in
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the current account, arise from those taking place in the trade balance and real exchange
rate. With a fixed exchange rate the current account improves initially, as reflected by the
increase in foreign asset stocks. With a flexible exchange rate, however, foreign asset
stocks decline, indicating a current account deficit.
Over the medium run, a further increase in the private capital stock stimulates the
development of aggregate supply with a flexible exchange rate, while the case of a fixed
exchange rate sees the upward trend of both these variables after bottoming out at about 3
per cent lower from their baselines. With a fixed exchange rate inflation picks up at 0.8 per
cent in the short run and declines thereafter to the baseline in steady state by the end of the
medium run period. The inflationary effects are negligible under a flexible exchange rate.
In terms of external developments, a continual appreciation of the real exchange rate with
the fixed exchange rate case contributes to a deterioration in the trade balance, while an
improvement in the trade balance under the flexible exchange rate case is attributable to the
depreciation of the real exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate, foreign asset stocks start
to decline after peaking at 11.5 per cent higher than baseline throughout this period. A
continual deterioration in foreign asset stocks is apparent with a flexible exchange rate.
Over the long run to ultimate steady state an increase in public capital spending and
privatised SOE capital stock stimulate private sector investment, while the capital stock,
when in place, further simulates aggregate supply. The steady states of these two variables
are achieved at higher levels from their initial baselines for both cases. External
developments are characterised by a depreciation in the real exchange rate, a deterioration
in the trade balance, which decreases by some 0.4 per cent lower than its baseline for either
case. In addition, foreign asset stocks are still on the downward trend, indicating current
account deficits. A prolonged adjustment to the long run steady state over the long run is
apparent with a fixed exchange rate, while the steady state is achieved relatively quickly
with a flexible exchange rate.
A comparison between this simulation scenario and the previous ones, in which a
reform package at different speeds has been applied alone, suggests that public capital

Chapter 7 – Simulation analysis and policy implications

253

______________________________________________________________________

spending can ‘crowd in’ private investment and lead to an improved performance for a
number of key macroeconomic variables. Asset market variables have a key role to play in
the process of transmitting the effects of such a change in policy to the macroeconomy. As
is clear from the simulation results, public capital spending directly enhances the supply
capacity of the economy as well as aggregate supply. It also indirectly enhances aggregate
supply, on balance, through its improvement of the real private capital stock. Finally,
developments in the external sector are somewhat mixed. In the context of a transition
economy such as Vietnam, which has a major problem on current account, an expansion in
public capital spending could exacerbate difficulties on the current account, as indicated by
declining foreign asset stocks. However, the trade balance can be improved as a result of a
weakening of the real exchange rate during the adjustment process.

7.3 Policy Implications
The results of the simulations illustrate the complexities of the issues involved in
transition economies such as Vietnam in regards to the speed of adjustment or sequencing
of reforms. Much depends on the objectives being sought, the time frame, and the
sustainability of the macroeconomic situation. The major findings and policy implications
derived from the simulation analysis in each case can be summarised as follows:
1.

For the scenario of a nominal exchange rate devaluation under a fixed

exchange rate, the main findings from the simulation results suggest that this has
advantages and disadvantages. The devaluation of the nominal exchange rate leads to a
depreciation in the real exchange rate in the short run, contributing to an improvement of
competitiveness and a better performance externally – trade and current accounts.
However, it has the disadvantage of maintaining a lower value for the q ratio which has an
adverse impact on investment, private capital stock and aggregate supply as well. The
biggest problem appears to be over the medium to long run where the real exchange rate
appreciates, the trade balance eventually deteriorates bringing down the foreign asset
stocks.
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A shock therapy approach to devaluation is preferable to a gradual approach for
minimising the deterioration of the private capital stock, aggregate supply, and
international competitiveness. However, under the gradual devaluation there is more of an
improvement in the external current account and trade balance through the medium and
long run periods.
2.

With the fixed exchange rate assumed, for the scenario of a tariff reduction,

as committed to by the Vietnamese government when it joined AFTA, signed the bilateral
trade agreement with the US, and as a likely prerequisite for it becoming a member of
WTO in the next few years, the simulation results indicate that the private capital stock and
aggregate supply are unfavourably affected by the tariff reduction irrespective of whether
the change is up-front or partial. The tariff reduction leads to a decumulation in the private
capital stock resulting from a higher nominal interest rate and a decrease in Tobin’q ratio,
which is a main factor contributing to the decreasing aggregate supply in the long run
steady state. The implementation of a tariff reduction results in an improvement of current
account outcomes over the adjustment period, primarily due to the strengthening of the real
exchange rate.
These findings suggest that in the long run steady state there will be no difference in
the effect upon the macroeconomic variables irrespective of whether an up-front or gradual
tariff reduction has been applied. However, for the short run period, if maximising the
foreign asset stocks and trade balance and minimising the decline of aggregate supply and
the private capital stock are the primary considerations, an up-front tariff reduction would
have to be pursued. But over the medium run this approach may hurt the economy in
regards to external developments including foreign asset stocks, trade balance and real
exchange rate. As far as the developments of these variables are concerned, the gradual
tariff reduction is a suggested policy to be pursued. Tariffs, and the number of tariff rates,
should continue to be reduced to promote the shift to a more open economy and reduce the
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scope for trade diversion under AFTA 62. Trade reforms need to be supported by a broad
range of complementary policies to maximise their benefits and reduce any adjustment
costs. Domestic liberalisation and policies to develop the domestic and foreign invested
private sector are crucial, as are SOE and banking reforms. Export expansion is also a key
complementary policy to support the trade liberalisation policy, as it can lead to an
improvement of the current account.
3.

The implications of an increase in the capital of public state-owned

enterprises transferred to the private sector (privatisation policy) under the fixed exchange
rate system is a possible increase in private investment and private wealth (financial
market), and result in a large impact on real economic activity. This is due to the
interdependence between financial and product markets. The domestic financial market,
which tends to adjust instantaneously, will transmit the impact of such shocks to the real
sector of the economy through changes in key variables in the financial sector such as the
interest rate, nominal and real exchange rate, q ratio, and wealth effect on investment.
The results indicate that as the SOE capital stock is privatised, a corresponding
increase occurs in the rate of private investment and private wealth as the residents hold the
shares of the privatised companies. The resulting higher private capital stock causes
aggregate supply to rise. The results show that the development in the trade balance, in
particular during the short and medium run periods, reflects a decline in aggregate demand.
The depreciation in the real exchange rate thereafter also contributes to an improvement in
the trade balance, despite a deterioration of foreign asset stocks, as a result of current
account deficits.
The other implication is that, if maximising the private capital stock, foreign capital
stock and trade balance are the primary considerations in the short run period, immediate
privatisation would have to be pursued – although it should be emphasised, and apparent
from Figure 7.3, that the differences of magnitudes involved between the two approaches

62

AFTA calls for regional tariffs of 0-5 per cent across the board by 2006, except for a small exclusion
list, and the liberalisation of non-tariff barriers on such goods.
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are relatively small. It appears that the simulation results presented do not support the
strategy of gradual privatisation as currently pursued by the Vietnamese government.
However, if minimising the deterioration of domestic production and strengthening
international competition are the only considerations, then privatisation introduced
gradually becomes the “best” approach. A policy option to improve the performance and
the efficiency of the enterprise sector, but to mitigate the negative social effects resulting
from the increasing lay-offs arising from the privatisation of SOEs, is to increase steadily
the pace of the privatisation process. Promotion of private sector development is a positive
step that has to be taken in order for the privatisation of SOEs to be fully effective.
4.

In looking at the complete policy package including devaluation, tariff

reduction and privatisation of SOE capital stocks under the regime of a fixed exchange rate,
for the short and medium periods, the “Big Bang” approach is better in terms of a smaller
deterioration in domestic production, a smaller appreciation in the real exchange rate, and a
more pronounced improvement in the private capital stock. However, the development of
the real foreign asset stocks is more pronounced and there is a more oscillatory adjustment
of the trade balance under the gradual approach for these periods.
Based on these simulation results, it is difficult to draw any major sequencing
recommendations. The model and the simulations illustrate how difficult it is to tackle
some real world sequencing considerations such as those discussed in Chapter 2. With
concerns about the speeds and sequencing, the following points can be advanced.
First, a piece-meal approach to reform may not only fail to improve domestic
production and the private capital stock significantly, but may reduce them during several
initial periods. Consider, in the case of the simulations, a gradual approach to devaluation.
It improves marginally the aggregate supply only on impact but leads to a sharp
deterioration in aggregate supply over the short and medium run, resulting from the
decrease in private capital stocks.
Second, careful sequencing can improve domestic production, but improper
sequencing can harm it. A reduction in tariffs alone may lead to a deterioration in domestic
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production and investment, while the privatisation policy alone helps improve these
variables. The speeds at which the reform policies are undertaken also lead to different
results in the adjustment process. For the tariff reduction policy, in the medium run period,
the deteriorations of the domestic capital stock are smaller if the tariff is reduced
immediately. An immediate privatisation alone helps improve the foreign asset stocks and
trade balance more than a gradual one only in the short run period. However, when
combining three policies of tariff reduction, nominal exchange rate devaluation, and
privatisation of the SOE capital stock, a shock approach is better than a gradual approach if
improving domestic production and the private capital stock are the primary considerations
in the medium and long runs.
Third, in sequencing, just like speed, the criterion of improving the current account
position over a number of periods can produce different results. For example, in the
simulations, privatisation alone results in a deterioration in foreign asset stocks, indicating
current account deficits, but improves the private capital stock and the trade balance in the
long run steady state. If domestic production is ignored, and improvements in the external
account are the only consideration, then a tariff reduction alone becomes a preferable
policy. Also, a gradual approach to the reform package may produce an improvement in the
foreign asset stocks in several initial years in the short and medium run periods.
5.

If it is assumed that Vietnam applies a flexible exchange rate in combination

with perfect capital mobility in the transition process to a market economy, the implications
of the reform package including tariff reduction and privatisation can result in a positive
impact on real economic activities. A gradual and immediate approach can lead to an
improvement in the private capital stock, aggregate supply and the trade balance in the long
run steady state. However, it results in an appreciation in the real exchange rate. Under this
exchange rate system, a divergence in the adjustment of the key macroeconomic variables
of interest is apparent only over the short and medium runs. Although experiencing the
same benefits as those from the fixed exchange rate regime in the long run steady state,
with a flexible exchange rate the gradual approach is somewhat better than its alternative as
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a less oscillatory adjustment of aggregate supply and trade balance is apparent during these
periods in time.
A comparison between the two versions of the exchange rate, in which the reform
package is applied, suggests that if a primary objective of policy is to produce a better
outcome in terms of domestic production, private capital stock, and the real exchange rate,
the gradual approach under a flexible exchange rate is the preferred one. In view of the
multitude of factors involved, however, it may remain inconclusive, reflecting the
complexities of the issues involved.
6.

The results derived from the simulations indicate that a policy of fiscal

expansion, combined with a reform package, could lead to an overall “crowding in” effect
of private investment, and an increase in the productive capital stock. This would have a
positive effect upon the long run productive potential of the economy. A policy of fiscal
restraint, on the other hand, which focuses upon reducing public capital spending, could
have potentially adverse effects upon the economy’s infrastructure and impede future
economic performance based on these results.
One implication of the approach taken here is that a policy of fiscal expansion
combined with tariff reduction, privatisation of SOE capital stock and nominal exchange
rate devaluation under a fixed exchange rate can lead to a temporary economic contraction,
in particular during the short and medium runs, reflecting the large capital losses and hence
wealth experienced by residents. With a fixed exchange rate this policy may produce an
improvement in the trade balance and a depreciation in the real exchange rate on impact
and the short run, the medium run sees a deterioration in the trade balance and foreign asset
stocks resulting from a sharp appreciation in the real exchange rate. A depreciation in the
real exchange rate, resulting in improved international competitiveness, is apparent in the
same period with a flexible exchange rate.
The other implication is that such an expansionary fiscal policy, combined with a
reform package, under a fixed exchange rate can improve foreign asset stocks during the
short and medium runs, reflecting a current account surplus, primarily due to the
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depreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the deterioration is apparent for either
case in the long run steady state. Again, the transition to the long run steady state is more
prolonged under a fixed exchange rate.

7.4 Conclusions
This chapter utilised a dynamic rational expectations macroeconomic model,
emphasising the long run, to analyse the adjustment processes arising from a variety of
shocks emanating from the transition process from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy for Vietnam since 1986 when the Doi Moi policy was applied. The impact
of such shocks was assumed to be felt first in financial markets, resulting thereafter in
product and labour market adjustments.
The size and generality of the theoretical framework prevents the mathematical
derivation of analytically unambiguous results, for both the steady state and dynamic
properties of the model. However, this difficulty can be overcome through the use of a
numerical simulation procedure through the assignment of numerical values to the
parameters of the model. The simulation analysis focused upon important aspects of the
sequencing and speed of the reform process in Vietnam: namely the impact of a nominal
exchange rate devaluation, tariff reduction and privatisation of SOE capital stocks at
different speeds, gradual or up-front, on the Vietnamese economy. A multitude of policy
instruments designed to illustrate the more complex cases of gradualism and shock
approaches, in which tariff reduction, devaluation and privatisation were undertaken at
different speeds, was conducted in order to find out the answers to the questions of speed of
adjustment and sequencing of reform for the economic transition process in Vietnam.
Finally, a simulation was conducted with the aim of analysing the impact of a fiscal
expansion policy change, combined with a reform package, under a fixed and flexible
exchange rate regime on the economy of Vietnam.
It was apparent from the results derived that different reform policies can have
different effects upon the Vietnamese economy. The nominal exchange rate devaluation

Chapter 7 – Simulation analysis and policy implications

260

______________________________________________________________________

leads to a jump depreciation of the real exchange rate on impact, and a sudden
improvement of international competitiveness. However, the major loser from such a
policy is a decrease in the private capital stock that contributes to a deterioration in
domestic production. The major conclusion is that if external developments are of lesser
importance and improvements in aggregate supply and private capital stock are the only
considerations, then only privatisation of SOE capital stocks becomes the preferred policy.
The outcomes in the simulations of the reform policies suggest that, under a fixed
exchange rate, the “Big Bang” and gradual approaches for the policies of a tariff reduction
and privatisation of SOE capital stock impart a less oscillatory adjustment of the variables
under consideration over the adjustment periods than those for the devaluation policy. Upfront devaluation is preferable if minimising the decline of aggregate supply and private
capital stock over the simulation periods are the primary considerations. Over the short and
medium run periods, if improvements in the external current account and the trade balance
are the only consideration, a gradual devaluation becomes the best approach. When these
three policies are taken at the same time, however, the “Big Bang” approach is the “best”
approach for the macroeconomic variables under consideration except for foreign asset
stocks, which can have a benefit only from the reform package if done gradually over a
specific period of time.
For a complete reform policy package, if looking at the alternative version, a floating
exchange rate and liberalising capital controls, the gradual approach is somewhat better
than the “Big Bang” approach in regard to the level of the increase of domestic production,
private investment and international competition over the short and medium run periods. If
the comparison is undertaken between the two versions, fixed and flexible exchange rate,
the conclusion is that the reform package introduced gradually in the flexible exchange rate
mechanism can produce a better result in terms of macroeconomic developments. This
conclusion does support the economic strategy followed by the Vietnamese government
currently regarding privatisation and tariff reduction policies, but it will require the
government to change the exchange rate system from a fixed to a flexible one. Capital
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account liberalisation will also be desirable for Vietnam on its way towards a marketoriented economy. However, the experiences of the financial crisis from the Asian
countries during the period 1997-1998 shows that it is necessary to improve the way in
which the domestic financial system allocates capital within the Vietnamese economy.
Instead of encouraging short term flows in financing non-productive investment, which
may generate an excessive aggregate demand and over-consumption in the private sector,
promoting long term flows such as foreign direct investment in financing productive
investment will be required in order to enhance the productive capacity of output supply.
A policy of a temporary increase in public capital spending combined with a reform
package could have potentially favourable effects upon the development of the Vietnamese
economy. These effects are different over the adjustment periods, but not in the long run
steady state, whether these policies are conducted under a fixed or a flexible exchange rate.
An expansionary fiscal policy, combined with a reform package, with a flexible exchange
rate leads to more pronounced developments in domestic production, private investment
and capital stock, and to a depreciation in the real exchange rate in the short and medium
runs compared to that under a fixed exchange rate. The benefits from this policy under a
fixed exchange rate is the improvement of the trade balance and foreign asset stocks,
indicating current account surpluses in the short and medium runs. The conclusions derived
from the simulations is that a flexible exchange rate, combined with perfect capital
mobility, appears to be most appropriate for the economy of Vietnam when some reform
policies are undertaken simultaneously.
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Figure 7-1: Nominal Exchange Rate Devaluation
up-front devaluation

gradual devaluation

up-front devaluation

A. Foreign Asset Stock
16

short-run

medium-run

B. Private Capital Stock

long-run

0

medium-run

short-run
0

12

0*

1

2

3

4

5

long-run
6

7

8

9

10

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25

26

27

28 29

30

-6

0
0

0*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

up-front devaluation

18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25

26

27

28 29

30

-8

up-front devaluation

gradual devaluation

medium-run

short-run

gradual devaluation

D. Trade Balance

C. Aggregate Supply
long-run

1.2

short-run

medium-run

long-run

0.9

0
0

0*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 27

28

29

30

0.6

-2

0.3

-3

0
0

-4

0*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

medium-run

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25

26

27

28 29

30

25 26

27

28 29

30

gradual devaluation

F. Inflation

E. Real Exchange Rate
short-run

12 13

up-front devaluation

gradual devaluation

up-front devaluation

6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6

12 13

-4

4

-1

11

-2

8

1

gradual devaluation

medium-run

short-run

long-run

1.2

long-run

0.9
0.6
0

0*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

0.3
0
-0.3

0

0*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19 20

21

22 23

24

Chapter 7 – Simulation analysis and policy implications

263

______________________________________________________________________

Figure 7-2: Tariff Reduction
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Figure 7-3: Privatisation of SOE Capital Stock
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Figure 7-4: “Big Bang” Approach versus Gradual Approach under a Fixed Exchange Rate
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Figure 7-5: “Big Bang” Approach versus Gradual Approach under a Flexible Exchange Rate
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Figure 7-6: Comparison the “Big Bang” and Gradual Approaches Between Two Versions of the Exchange Rate
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Figure 7-7: Temporary Change in Public Capital Expenditure combined with Reform Package
under a flexible exchange rate
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Thesis summary and conclusions
This thesis has sought to accomplish three objectives. First, to identify the key policy
areas involved in the process of transition from a planned to market economy, including
that of macroeconomic stabilisation, price and market reform, restructuring and
privatisation and the need to redefine the role of the state, and in particular to pay more
attention to the hotly debated issue of their speed and sequencing. Second, to describe the
macroeconomic background and to analyse the macroeconomic reform policies of the
Vietnamese economy being applied since the Doi Moi policy began in 1986. The major
macroeconomic problems currently facing the Vietnamese economy were also discussed.
Third, to develop a long run dynamic macroeconomic model for Vietnam. The model
developed emphasised the effects of the stabilisation and structural adjustment policies
arising during the transition process to a market economy, and their impact upon the
economic development of Vietnam. In particular, the speed of adjustment and sequencing
of reform policies, introduced individually or as part of a package, was given particular
attention.
The findings obtained from this study can provide an important basis for policy
analysis and recommendations for Vietnam.
8.1.1

General review of the study
The collapse of planned socialism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s

was attributed to the structural weakness of central planning in improving the standards of
living of the population. The centrally planned economies, characterised by obsolete and
uncompetitive productive capacities, macroeconomic imbalances, lack of modern
infrastructure and factor markets, and weak institutions, could not last forever and required
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change to another form of economy – a market economy - that could improve their current
situation. To successfully transform to a market economy requires reform in a number of
key areas. While there is general agreement on these basic measures, major disagreement
relates to the speed and sequencing of such reforms. During the first years of the transition
process the “Big Bang” approach was favoured by many economists and policy makers in
Europe. In reality, however, it was primarily limited to the implementation of a rapid
macroeconomic stabilisation program, with the process of restructuring the economy,
including that of privatisation and the development of institutions required in the context of
a market oriented economy, taking a much longer period of time to achieve – a gradual
approach.
There has been considerable variation in the economic performance of the transition
economies since the beginning of economic transition. For the CEE and CIS countries the
initial part of the process was characterised by reduced production as well as a temporary,
in most cases, dramatic increase in inflation. The extent and consistency of macroeconomic
development policies have been pointed out as the main causes for the difference between
each country’s performance, along with other factors such as their initial conditions,
geography, history and culture.
By contrast, the experience of the East Asian transition countries – China and
Vietnam – is considerably different in terms of growth and inflation. Neither suffered the
declines in GDP growth, nor the significant increases in inflation. The stronger
performance of these countries reflected not only more favourable initial conditions but
also far-reaching reforms in a number of areas – agriculture, in particular – undertaken
quite early in the process as well as a more gradual approach to economic transition.
In 1986, at the Sixth National Congress, the Vietnamese government decided to
transform Vietnam from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented one. The slogan
adopted for the economic reform program was Doi Moi (renovation) with the goal of
conducting significant macroeconomic adjustment policies including stabilisation policies
and structural reforms. While stabilisation policies aim at eliminating macroeconomic
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imbalances through demand adjustment, structural adjustment policies aim at raising output
growth through policies that bring about major changes in the microeconomic structure by
promoting competitiveness, efficiency and dynamism among the production units within
the system. A number of stabilisation policies, such as raising interest rates, devaluing and
unifying the exchange rate, and reducing the budget deficit, were implemented. Structural
adjustment policies, such as privatising the agricultural sector, reducing direct control over
state-owned enterprises, eliminating state monopoly of foreign trade, liberalising prices,
and eliminating the system of state procurement, were imposed to maintain and enhance
economic stability as well as to change course and transform Vietnam into a market
economy. However, during the transition period the speed of the implementation of these
policies has been different depending on the internal and external situations.
While the reform policies during the period 1986-1988 were characterised as a
gradual approach, the economic reforms in 1989 carried many characteristics of the “Big
Bang” approach. Nevertheless, in response to the unfavourable external changes since the
Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Vietnamese government has adopted a slowing down of
economic reforms. Consequently, not only has economic growth been affected, but also
there exist a number of obstacles for internal adjustment. First, a slow progress of stateowned enterprise privatisation, or restructuring, and under-development of the private
sector are the crucial problems that Vietnam is now facing, requiring immediate attention
otherwise they will bring further problems which will affect the long run economic
efficiency of the Vietnamese economy. Second, as a member of ASEAN, APEC and
potential member of WTO in the next few years, trade liberalisation, especially exchange
rate and tariff policies, must be seen as important for the future development of the
Vietnamese economy. Third, financial sector policy is another important issue for
Vietnamese macroeconomic policy, since this sector is heavily regulated by the
government. In addition, the speed of these adjustment policies and the sequencing of
reforms, which have been extensively debated amongst economists, remain inconclusive,
and must be examined in the context of Vietnam.
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In response to these key issues in the context of the current situation in Vietnam, this
study attempted to incorporate them into a model developed and presented in Chapter 5.
First, the issue of state-owned enterprise privatisation involves the transfer of capital
ownership from state-owned enterprises to the private sector, on the premise that the
private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Second, devaluation of the exchange
rate or applying a floating exchange rate system was also emphasised. Third, the movement
towards trade liberalisation in terms of import and export tariff reductions needs further
study. The Vietnamese government can only directly control barriers to its imports,
however, as a member of international organisations such as ASEAN, APEC or WTO, it
can also contribute to a reduction in trade barriers imposed by other countries on
Vietnamese exports. Finally, the adoption of expansionary public investment spending to
encourage infrastructure developments was examined. To analyse the implications of two
alternative paths for these reform policies, “Big Bang” or Gradualism, simulations
conducted in Chapter 7 introduced each policy either gradually or immediately, and then
two more cases involving a multitude of policy instruments, designed to illustrate the more
complex cases of gradualism and shock therapy approaches, were also considered.
8.1.2

Developing a macroeconomic model
The main objective of the present study has been the introduction and development of

a dynamic long run macroeconomic model for Vietnam as a transition economy, focusing
on the impact of reform policies on six key macroeconomic variables, namely foreign asset
stocks, private capital stock, aggregate output supply, the trade balance, the real exchange
rate, and inflation. These key variables have been chosen because they are important
factors in the process of economic development of Vietnam, affecting economic growth
and economic stability. Any changes in these variables arising from policy shocks, such as
from a nominal exchange rate devaluation, privatisation of the SOE capital stock and tariff
reduction, will have an impact on the development of other variables and the domestic
economy as whole.
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There is an extensive literature devoted to analysing the problems that emerged in the
transition economies, with most of these having focused mainly on prospective
macroeconomic adjustment in these transition economies. Some placed their attention on
the linkage between economic performance during transition to variations in transition
policies, others have placed their emphasis on the role of the privatisation process and on
the relationship between the state and private sectors. However, no model in the literature
enabled the identification of the way in which exogenous shocks transmit their effects to
the domestic transition economies. In this sense, such recent studies for the case of Vietnam
cannot be found. Moreover, so far none of the existing studies analysing the speed and
sequencing of reform policies include the exchange rate, tariffs, restructuring or
privatisation of SOEs, and monetary and fiscal policies. With the aforementioned objective,
seeking an appropriate model from the existing literature outside that currently developed
for the transition economies is indispensable. In this thesis three basic theoretical models
contributed by Mundel-Fleming (1963), Dornbusch (1976) and Branson (1977, 1984),
although not developed specifically to look at a transition economy, provided the basic
building blocks for developing a dynamic macroeconomic model for Vietnam as a
transition economy.
Apart from these three basic theoretical models the model developed for Vietnam in
this study also had as its foundation the contributions of Harvie and Lee (HL) (1996) and
Harvie and Kearney (HK) (1996), which are general equilibrium models focusing on the
dynamic long run nature of the adjustment process. The main contributions of the HL and
HK models are, primarily, that they incorporate capital stock accumulation in stimulating
economic growth. In these models, the role of equity claims on the domestic physical
capital stock in linking the financial and real sectors is also emphasised.
The model developed contained a number of key assumptions. The domestic
economy produced output that is consumed domestically and is an imperfect substitute for
the imported good equivalent. The price of these goods is domestically determined. The
deterministic framework of the model, combined with economic agents possessing rational
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expectations, is equivalent to the case of perfect foresight. Financial markets are assumed
to be in continual equilibrium, while non-financial markets are subject to sticky price and
quantity adjustment. The model developed focused on the long run nature of the dynamic
adjustment process, because macroeconomic adjustment will exert a long run effect on the
Vietnamese economy. This arises from allowing for physical capital stock accumulation
and developments in the current account balance. It is assumed in the model that private
and government capital spending contributes to an expansion of physical capital stock in
the real sectors, improving the productivity capacity of domestic output, whilst SOE capital
spending steadily declines resulting from the privatisation and restructuring policies that reallocate the physical capital stock to the private sector. Most importantly, aggregate supply
and aggregate demand for domestic output grow proportionally with the development of
the physical capital stock. This arises from the fact that the underutilised labour supply is a
non-constraint upon economic growth. Details of the model were presented in Chapter 5.
The model developed was used to analyse the implications of two alternative paths of
economic reform for a transition economy like Vietnam operating in two alternative
exchange rate and capital control systems, a fixed exchange rate with imperfect capital
mobility and a flexible exchange rate with perfect capital mobility. The reform policies
emphasised, in particular, related to that of SOE privatisation and restructuring, trade
liberalisation, and public infrastructure capital spending.
8.1.3

Estimation of the model
The model was estimated, first, by the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

regression. However, using this simple approach, which often ignores the non-stationary
properties of the time series data, could cause misleading statistical and therefore economic
inferences. It was therefore necessary to ensure that the time series were stationary before
proceeding to econometric estimation.
Two methods were applied to examine the time series properties of the variables.
From an informal examination, by graphing the data, it might be concluded that the
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variables under consideration are non-stationary in the levels and first difference, but they
are stationary in the second difference. This means that the variables are integrated of order
I (2) . The formal augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied to test for the presence

of unit roots. However, the conclusion of the order of the variables, I (1) or I (2) , from this
test are inconclusive because the critical values for unit root tests tabulated by Fuller (1976)
or Dickey and Fuller (1981) have a sample size of at least 50, whilst the sample size of data
used in this study was only 16 observations. The critical values for smaller sample sizes are
not presently available.
With the assumption that the variables of interest are integrated of the same order of
I (1) , two simple methods, Engle-Granger (EG) or Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test

and the cointegrating regression Durbin Watson (CRWD) test provided by Sargan
Bhargava (1983), were applied to detect for the existence of long run relationships between
the variables involved. Where evidence of a long run relationship is found, the error
correction model (Granger, (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987)) was estimated by OLS,
incorporating the short run dynamics of the system with the information from the long run
cointegration relationship. However, these procedures are not applied when it is assumed
that the variables are integrated of order I (2) due to the limitation of small sample size.
This study also applied the bootstrap method, initiated by Efron (1979), for
correcting the problem of small sample size. The bootstrap method in OLS regressions was
conducted first to examine how good the OLS coefficient values previously estimated are
and whether they are biased. This approach was also utilised to confirm the conclusions of
non-stationarity of the variables obtained from the formal unit root tests.
Although having been affected by a serious “degrees of freedom” problem, the OLS
regression based on the levels of the logarithm variables seemed to give reliable
coefficients in terms of their magnitudes. This conclusion was confirmed when several
other approaches were conducted to check for similar results. Therefore, it proved useful in
providing a range of possible parameter values to be used in the simulation analysis
conducted in Chapter 7.
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8.1.4

Simulation analysis and policy implications
The parameters obtained from the estimation of the model, along with imposed

parameter values derived from existing studies where appropriate, were then used to
conduct a simulation analysis to examine what policy options should be used in response to
external shocks. Due to the complexity of the model developed, it was not possible to
derive analytically unambiguous results for the steady state properties of the model. Thus,
an analysis of the steady state and dynamic properties of the model was conducted by
means of a numerical simulation or calibration. The program utilised to derive these results
is called “Saddlepoint”, which is designed for solving linear rational expectations models
with constant coefficients.
The simulation analysis was conducted in order to derive certain conclusions about
the effect of alternative paths for the Vietnamese economy, corresponding to different
assumptions regarding policy changes and reforms. Three types of policy reforms in the
simulation analysis were assumed as exogenous shocks: (1) in carrying out privatisation it
was assumed that 5 per cent of the capital stock of SOEs was given to the private sector; (2)
the nominal exchange rate was assumed to be devalued by 5 per cent; (3) and the tariff rate
was assumed to be reduced by 5 per cent. For each shock, the simulation was carried out at
different speeds. In the first case a gradual process occurred, while in the second case an
immediate change took place on impact. A comparison between them was then conducted.
Two extreme reform packages, involving a multitude of policy instruments designed to
illustrate the more complex cases of gradualism and shock therapy approaches, were
eventually considered. In both simulations, privatisation, tariff reform, and devaluation
were undertaken, with the only difference being the speed with which these actions were
taken. In addition, the shocks involving the privatisation of the SOE capital stock and tariff
reduction were considered in an alternative model, in which it was assumed that capital
mobility is perfect and the nominal exchange rate is flexible. This was then compared with
the fixed exchange rate and imperfect capital mobility version of the model. The impact of
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the changes in government capital expenditure, combined with the reform policies on the
Vietnamese economy, was also explicitly analysed.
The major findings were that a nominal exchange rate devaluation under a fixed
exchange rate, for both “Big Bang” and gradual approaches, can have favourable impacts
upon external developments. The devaluation of the nominal exchange rate leads to a
depreciation in the real exchange rate in the short run, contributing to an improvement of
competitiveness and a better performance externally – trade and current accounts. This
policy produces, as well, favourable impacts in terms of aggregate output on impact.
However, the exchange rate devaluation also stimulates inflation, which gradually dampens
economic growth in the short and medium periods. This result is similar to that obtained
from the model by Sand-Zantman et al. (2000) (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). The exchange
rate devaluation policy has the disadvantage of maintaining a lower value for the q ratio,
which has an adverse impact on investment, private capital stock and aggregate supply as
well. The biggest problem appears to be over the medium to long run where the real
exchange rate appreciates, and the trade balance eventually deteriorates bringing down
foreign asset stocks. It is noticeable that this policy has the largest positive impact during
the first year of the short run period in terms of external improvements and domestic
output. Hence, if the government gives priority to short-term policy outcomes this
simulation result support such a policy. Another important finding is that the government
should apply the “Big Bang” approach for this policy, because this can minimise the
deterioration of the private capital stock, aggregate supply, and international
competitiveness during the adjustment process.
A policy of tariff reduction could also have a potentially adverse impact upon the
development of the Vietnamese economy. The major long-term losers from this policy,
irrespective of whether the change is up-front or partial, are in regard to a decline in both
the private capital stock and aggregate supply. However, like the finding from both the
Fukase and Martin (1999) and Ianchovichina et al. (2000) (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4)
models the major benefits from this policy are the trade balance surplus, increased foreign

Chapter 8 – Summary and Conclusions

278

______________________________________________________________________

asset stocks, and the real exchange rate appreciation. In the long run steady state there
would be no difference in the effect upon the macroeconomic variables irrespective of
whether an up-front or gradual tariff reduction had been applied. However, for the short run
period, an up-front tariff reduction would have to be pursued if maximising the foreign
asset stocks and trade balance and minimising the decline of aggregate supply and the
private capital stock are the primary considerations. But over the medium term this
approach may hurt the economy in regards to external developments including foreign asset
stocks, the trade balance and real exchange rate. As far as the developments of these
variables are concerned, the gradual tariff reduction approach is the suggested policy to be
pursued.
The implications of an increase in the capital of state-owned enterprises transferred to
the private sector (privatisation policy) under the fixed exchange rate system, is a possible
increase in private investment and private wealth (financial market) that results in a large
impact on real economic activity. The resulting higher private capital stock causes
aggregate supply to rise. An increase of privatised assets from SOEs contributes to an
improvement in the trade balance in the short and medium run periods, due to a
depreciation of the exchange rate, and also due to aggregate demand being less than
aggregate supply and an improvement of foreign asset stocks. However, the long run period
sees a slight deterioration in the trade balance, reflecting a rise in aggregate demand. The
other implication is that, if maximising the private capital stock, foreign capital stock and
trade balance are the primary considerations in the short run period, immediate
privatisation would have to be pursued. However, if minimising the deterioration of
domestic production and strengthening international competition are the only
considerations, then privatisation introduced gradually becomes the “best” approach.
Overall, the main findings from the simulation results for the single policy cases
(exchange rate devaluation, tariff reduction, and privatisation) indicate that, for the short
run period, the government should adopt the “Big Bang” approach because this has positive
impacts upon Vietnamese economic development. For the medium and long run periods
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this approach would still be advisable for the exchange rate devaluation because by this
approach the deterioration of the private capital stock, aggregate supply, and international
competitiveness could be minimised. However, there is no different impact upon the
Vietnamese economic development irrespective of whether the application of the tariff
reduction and SOE privatisation is up-front or partial.
In looking at the complete policy package including devaluation, tariff reduction and
privatisation of SOE capital stocks under the regime of a fixed exchange rate, for the short
and medium periods, the “Big Bang” approach is better in terms of a smaller deterioration
in domestic production, a smaller appreciation in the real exchange rate, and a more
pronounced improvement in the private capital stock. However, the development of the real
foreign asset stocks is more pronounced and there is a more oscillatory adjustment of the
trade balance under the gradual approach for these periods.
The implications of the reform package including tariff reduction and privatisation
under the assumption of a flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility system, is a
positive impact on real economic activity. A gradual and immediate approach can lead to
an improvement in the private capital stock, aggregate supply and the trade balance in the
long run steady state. However, it results in an appreciation in the real exchange rate. Under
this exchange rate system, a divergence in the adjustment of the key macroeconomic
variables of interest is apparent only over the short and medium runs. Although
experiencing the same benefits as those from the fixed exchange rate regime in the long run
steady state, with a flexible exchange rate the gradual approach is somewhat better than its
alternative as a less oscillatory adjustment of aggregate supply and the trade balance is
apparent during these periods in time.
A comparison between the two versions of the exchange rate, in which the reform
package is applied, suggests that the gradual approach under a flexible exchange rate is
preferred if a primary objective of policy is to produce a better outcome in terms of
domestic production, private capital stock, and the real exchange rate. In view of the
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multitude of factors involved, however, it may remain inconclusive, reflecting the
complexities of the issues involved.
A policy of an expansion in government capital expenditure combined with a reform
package could lead to an overall “crowding in” effect on private investment, and an
increase in the productive capital stock. This would have a positive effect upon the long run
productive potential of the economy. Under a fixed exchange rate this policy can lead to a
temporary economic contraction, in particular during the short and medium runs, reflecting
the large capital losses and hence wealth experienced by residents. This policy may also
produce an improvement in the trade balance and a depreciation in the real exchange rate
on impact and in the short run, but the medium and long runs see a deterioration in the
trade balance and foreign asset stocks resulting from a sharp appreciation in the real
exchange rate. However, with a flexible exchange rate the expansionary fiscal policy
combined with a reform package can lead to consistent economic development from the
short run to the steady state.
Overall, the conclusions derived from the simulations of the reform package are (i) a
flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility mechanism appears to be most
appropriate for the economy of Vietnam when some reform policies are undertaken
simultaneously, and (ii) the gradual application of these policies is advisable.

8.2 Further studies
Macroeconomic modelling is an evolutionary process that will continue to reflect
new developments in economic theory, new econometric methods, and better
understanding of the structure of transition economies in general and Vietnam in particular.
This study has focused primarily upon developing a dynamic long run macroeconomic
model for Vietnam to analyse the impact of structural adjustment since it applied the Doi
Moi policy in 1986 upon key macroeconomic variables. From this, major policy lessons
arising from the impact of external and reform policy shocks on the Vietnamese economy
can be drawn. Quite clearly, the model presented should be seen as a first exploration of
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complex issues. While it is believed that the results shed some light on the role of the
reform policies during the transition process, further research must explore some of its
limitations. In addition, since the database for examining the impact of macroeconomic
adjustment policies since 1986 is too short a period, and many kinds of data required for
model design are certainly not available for accurate empirical testing, there is a need for
more detailed empirical work in the future.
Specifically there is a need to further explore the following:
1.

With the assumption that in carrying out privatisation the capital of the

publicly owned SOEs is simply given to the private sector, and that privatisation leads to an
increase in the private capital stock, it is weak to draw any strong conclusions about the
impact of the state-owned enterprise privatisation policy. In developing a model to examine
this policy, a further study could develop a model incorporating the production functions
for both state and private sectors. The output of these sectors depends on capital
accumulation, labour productivity and technology. The privatisation policy results in not
only a simple change of the ownership of productive capital but also represents a shift of
workers from state enterprises to the private sector. Wage differences between the two
sectors, which affect the decisions of workers to stay or move away from the state sector,
must also be incorporated in the model. In particular, currently in Vietnam there is the
continuing existence of soft budget constraints in the state sector, such as that arising from
the provision of initial capital investment, tax arrears for loss making companies, and
favourable bank loan interest rates. Hence, in a model for analysing the privatisation policy,
there is a need to develop a model incorporating the production functions and wages for
both sectors, and incorporate the issue of soft budget constraints.
2.

The model developed in this study focused upon the effects of external shocks

and reform policies on a single economy, that of Vietnam. Nevertheless, since Vietnam
currently is a member of AFTA, it would be useful to examine the spillover effects of
shocks and policies from one (or some) member to another, with emphasis placed upon the
channels through which events in one economy (or AFTA members as a whole) are
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transmitted to others. An explicit two-country model could be developed by assuming that
one country is large (AFTA members economy) and the other small (Vietnam). This kind
of model could be used to analyse the effects of policy changes, such as exchange rate,
monetary and financial policies, carried out by the large economy on the small economy,
and the advantages and disadvantages arising from closer policy coordination in these
areas.
3.

Although this study has distinguished the contributions of state and private

sectors to aggregate supply, the different ownership between domestic private and foreign
private is not explicitly incorporated in the model. The foreign investment sector should
also be incorporated in the model design for the case of Vietnam, since this sector, which
currently contributes to a sizeable proportion of aggregate supply, has been strongly
affected by the external shocks and policy changes. The model developed in this study has
also not distinguished the contributions of the production sectors such as industry,
agriculture and services to aggregate output. In order to have an appropriate development
strategy for such sectors the model developed in any future study should incorporate
explicitly these sectors (disaggregating the model by sector).
4.

One must also examine the issues of income tax or value added tax (VAT)

(which has recently been introduced in Vietnam) and foreign borrowing in the context of
government revenues and borrowing. It is in this direction that the fiscal sector needs to be
modified. Government consumption would depend on government revenues arising from
income tax or VAT and foreign borrowing, instead of it being assumed to be an exogenous
variable as in the present study. This would provide the basis for an investigation of the
effectiveness of tax policy reform and debt service obligations from foreign borrowing.
5.

The issue of massive non-performing loans in the banking sector, which is

obviously a crucial factor in obstructing Vietnamese economic development, has resulted
from a slow process of SOE privatisation (see Chapter 3). Therefore the banking sector,
both in their liabilities and assets, should appear explicitly in the model in order to analyse
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the impact of the privatisation policy and other external shocks such as exchange rate
devaluation, international interest rate, and monetary expansion policy upon it.
Overall, the major objective of this study has been to develop a dynamic and long run
macroeconomic model for Vietnam, which has not been done by either internal or external
economists, taking into account the impact of the reform policies as a package and their
speeds of implementation upon the country’s economic development. The model developed
is able to identify the long run steady state properties of key macroeconomic variables, as
well as the adjustment process arising to steady state from external and policy induced
adjustment shocks. This study provides a basis for comparing alternative options in regard
to improving the benefits, and to reduce the adverse effects, of reform policies upon the
Vietnamese economy. In addition, this model also offers an important framework within
which a wide range of possible reform policies can be analysed and evaluated.
Furthermore, the model developed, and the policy implications derived from it, provides
important guidelines for Vietnamese policy makers, as the results suggest that the
Vietnamese economy would benefit from the effects of economic liberalisation and
structural change.
This study not only provides a framework for analysing some key issues confronting
the Vietnamese economy, but is also applicable, upon suitable amendment, to other
transition economies in Europe, including that of the former Soviet Union, which also have
the same objective of successfully transforming to a market-oriented economy.
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APPENDIX 3.1
A. State-Owned Enterprises: The Road to Reform
1988
•

A substantial increase in enterprise autonomy: managers were given the authority to
set most prices, select appropriate mixes of inputs and outputs, layoff excess
workers, and determine their investment programs.

•

Establish a legal framework to support SOE operations: all enterprises were subject
to more uniform rules of taxation; allow more enterprises to establish trade links or
use trade companies of their own choice rather than a prescribed trade channel; and
expose all enterprises to more foreign competition through liberalising the trade
regime.

1989
•

All SOEs were subject to a hard budget constraint: most subsidies to enterprises
were sharply cut with the price liberalisation and the unification of the exchange
rate; reduction of SOE subsidies, restriction on public sector investment,
demobilisation of the military, ceilings on wage rises for civil servants.

1990
•

Liquidation procedures for SOEs were first introduced: the State Enterprise
Liquidation Regulations apply to SOEs which cannot sell their products, cannot
fulfil their business purpose, have continuous losses, cannot repay their debts, or
cannot overcome current financial difficulties. The liquidation procedures were only
applied to small and medium SOEs in non-essential lines of business, and left
outside the scope of the regulations was the liquidation of large SOEs or those
providing important products or those for whom dissolution would have a “bad
influences” on other fields or enterprises. Liquidation under the regulations takes
one of several forms: total or partial merger with other state enterprises; total or
partial sale of assets to other enterprises (public or private); or lease. If an individual
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or institution is willing to buy the enterprise as a going concern, then priority should
be given to reducing the total price.

1991
•

Greater financial autonomy given to SOEs: the rights of SOEs to manage their
assets and the concomitant obligations to maintain and repair them were
established. All proceeds from the sale, transfer, or liquidation of fixed assets can
only be used by the state enterprise for reinvestment in fixed assets.

•

The Regulations on Establishment and Liquidation of State Enterprises were
enacted, and provided rules for the process of state enterprise formation and the
objectives for their operation. Under this provision, the economic functions of the
SOEs are somewhat limited by the state. In addition, social and political functions
are added to the administrative burden of SOEs, representing a positive
disadvantage in competition with private business and companies that are not
similarly burdened.

1992
•

A package of state enterprise reforms was introduced: continuing the reorganisation
of the state-run economy; reforming state enterprise sector management; continuing
the experiment with boards of directors, and then promulgating regulations on
boards of directors; an experiment in state enterprise privatisation, which can take
the form of organising new joint ventures with foreign investors, selling shares of
state enterprises to foreigners, selling shares of state enterprises to domestic
institutions or individuals, or selling shares to workers and cadres; and
strengthening and reorganising joint enterprises and holding companies.

1994
•

A plan for the restructuring of SOEs in selected sectors (electricity, oil and gas) was
introduced.

•

A list of provisions of SOE bonds/shares was issued.
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1995
•

The State Enterprise Law was passed: providing a blueprint for strengthening the
sector by limiting the state’s financial responsibility, establishing rules to control
the creation of new enterprises, improving the monitoring and supervision of
enterprises, and allowing greater managerial autonomy.

•

The National Investment Fund was created to provide preferential credits for
selected sectors (coal, electricity, cement, oil and gas, maritime, coffee, rubber,
garments, tobacco, steel, paper, food, aviation) and disadvantaged regions.

•

Decrees on model statute for SOEs and on SOE reorganisation were enacted.

1996
•

General Corporations were established: nearly half of the state enterprises were
grouped under 18 big holding companies as General Corporations. Another 80
smaller groupings known as Special Corporations were also formed.

•

The SOE Equitisation Committee was established: there were a number of statutes
on the setting up, reorganisation, dissolution of SOEs, on SOE operating conditions,
on transforming SOE into joint-stock company, and on SOE financial management.

1997
•

Regulations for the management boards and control commissions of SOEs were
issued.

1998
•

Equitisation targets were announced for 150 enterprises by the end 1998, 400 by
end 1999, and 1000 by end 2000. A list of SOEs to be equitised was approved.

•

The main policies to guide the restructuring of enterprises and set out the
framework for classification in terms of plans for ownership diversification, were
put into effect.

•

A decree clarifying and simplifying the equitisation process was issued.
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•

The National Enterprise Reform Committee (NERC) was set up with
responsibilities for the SOE sector, as a national level organisation to tackle SOE
reforms.

1999
•

A program of complete divestiture of small enterprises, either by tender, or
complete sale to employees, was announced, but the regulations have not yet been
used.

•

A review of the large general corporations was conducted. It called for maintaining
and strengthening the general corporations and the development of plans to form
conglomerates on a pilot basis.

2000-2001
•

The government adopted a five-year SOE reform plan, with annual targets specified
for 2001-2003, with the objectives of reducing losses and improving
competitiveness. Around 1,800 out of the more than 5,500 SOEs will be subject to
enterprise-specific reform measures, mostly through equitisation (1,400), divestiture
(140), or liquidation/closure (220). An additional 200 enterprises will face
merger/consolidation. These enterprises are mainly small and medium-sized SOEs
in terms of state capital (11 per cent of total) and SOE debt (10 per cent of total),
but they account for 31 per cent of total SOE employment.

2002
•

SOEs were categorised following their importance to the economy: the state shall
hold full ownership in a wide range of areas deemed strategic, or in businesses that
are essential for production development, and for the enhancement of living
conditions in rural, mountainous and remote areas.

•

Some of the industries where enterprises are to be equitised, handed over to
employees, or sold, were specified.

•

One decree issued in 1998 regarding the equitisation of SOE was replaced. It now
gave the right to buy shares to both Vietnamese and foreign organisations and
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individuals. Outsiders are now entitled to buy up to 30 per cent of the charter capital
of a company. A number of financial benefits were also introduced for equitised
enterprises.
•

SOEs were instructed to settle their outstanding debts: those that have large
unrecoverable debts are to be liquidated or declared bankrupt.

Sources: IMF and World Bank Reports, various issues.
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B. A Timeline of Trade Reform in Vietnam
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Foreign
trading floor
introduced at
SBVN
Controls on
Customs
tariff
introduced
Retention,

for the

use of

first time

foreign
exchange
liberalised
.

entry into
permit
international
system
trading

Export
Export
processing
zones
regulation
introduced
Export duty
on rice
reduced from
10 to 1 per
cent

Budgetary
export
subsidies
eliminated
Export tax
system

Import

Imported
inputs used to
produce
exports
exempt from
duty

Special sales

Private
i

Export of
certain
commodities
limited to
relevant
exporters
associations

relaxed

shipment
licensing
relaxed

Trade
agreement
with EU

Duty rebate
system
improved
Vietnam

Import
permits
eliminated
for all but
15
products
GATT
observer

Vietnam
joins
ASEAN
and AFTA
Import
quota
goods
reduced to
seven
Export
Export
taxes raised
on 11
products

Maximum

WTO

tariff

accession

reduced to

process

80 percent

started

activities

Decree 57

relaxed

liberalisin

Management
of consumer
quota goods
shifts to tariffs

g right to
import
and export

Highest tariff
reduced to 60

Imports of

Partial

sugar

surrender

prohibited

requirement

Temporary

N t iff
Decree 254
adds to list
of
conditional
imports
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2000-2001

2002

Quantitative
Quantitative
restrictions on
restrictions on
some items were
some other items
eliminated ahead
were removed
of schedule and
ahead of
replaced with
schedule.
tariffs
Further changes
Changes in tariff
in tariff lines
lines consistent
consistent with
with the
the commitments
commitments
under AFTA
under AFTA

Sources: IMF Reports, various issues.
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C. Exchange Rate Reform

1989

• The nominal exchange rate was devaluated sharply.
• Foreign exchange trading floors in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi were
opened to assist in managing the exchange rate.

• The official exchange rate matched the level of the parallel market rate.
1990-1991

• The official exchange rate was devaluated regularly in line with inflation, so
that the real exchange rate was fairly stable.

1992

• The strengthened credit policies, combined with the improved balance of
payments situation, caused an appreciation in the exchange rate.

• The State Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market to prevent
nominal appreciation.

1997

• The exchange rate depreciated by 5 per cent due to the government widening
the band around the central rate, to give itself more latitude in foreign
exchange management in the face of downward pressure on the Dong.

2001

• Exchange rate management becomes more flexible, and the Dong depreciates
against the US dollar by about 3.5 per cent.

• The foreign exchange surrender requirement was reduced from 50 to 40 per
cent.

Sources: IMF and World Bank Reports, various issues.
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D. Fiscal Policy Reform
1990
•

Budgetary expenditure is reduced significantly by the elimination of
budgetary subsidies to state enterprises and large military demobilisation.

•

New taxes like housing and land tax, personal income tax, and profit tax are
introduced.

•

A comprehensive tax system reform, together with tax administration reform,
was planned in cooperation with the IMF.

1994
•

Land-user rights tax laws were enacted.

1995
•

Turnover tax, special consumption tax laws were amended.

•

Statutes on revenue collection from rental housing were applied.

1996
•

Budget Law was approved and became effective.

•

Decrees on implementing turnover and special consumption taxes were
issued.

1997
•

Two tax laws were approved: (a) the multi-rated profit tax with a single-rate
enterprise income tax and (b) the turnover tax with a three-rated value-added tax.

•

Restructured commercial external debt through a Brady-type debt and debtservice reduction agreement with London Club commercial creditors.

1998
•

Law on a special sales tax was approved.

•

Budget Law was amended to improve assignment and allocation of tax
revenue to the communes, the lowest local level.
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•

Issued Decree to implement External Debt Management Strategy allocating
responsibilities for maintaining debt and for implementing the debt strategy.

•

Approved new Decree to publish state, provincial and commune budgets
every year starting in end-1998.

1999
•

Two tax laws approved in 1997, value-added tax (VAT) and Enterprise
Income Tax Law, became effective.

2002
•

Budget Law was amended and approved with some new provisions.
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APPENDIX 3.2
A Comparison of the Main Aspects of Enterprise Reforms in China and
Vietnam
China
Vietnam
1. Overview of the SOE sector
View of the state sector
China under took market-oriented reforms in order to
stimulate economic growth rather than transform its
economic system, and has taken a pragmatic
approach to SOE reforms. The constitution has been
amended to give an equal role to the private sector.
Size of SOEs
There are about 250,000 SOEs employing 11 per
cent of the workforce. The SOE sector accounts for
one-fourth of GDP, and the share in industrial output
of SOEs has fallen from 55 per cent in 1990 to under
25 per cent in 1998.
Share of large enterprises
Large SOEs play a dominant role. The roughly 5,000
large enterprises among the 85,000 industrial SOEs
with independent accounting systems, account for 70
per cent of SOE assets and two-thirds of gross
output.
Areas reserved for the state
The SOEs play a dominant role in key sectors: (i)
energy and utilities; (ii) military and hardware
industries; (iii) infrastructure and capital-intensive
industries; (iv) essential services, such as grain
distribution and finance. This has left a large number
of “competitive” sectors where the state’s ownership
is not considered necessary.

The market mechanism is seen as an instrument to
stimulate economic growth, rather than as a goal.
The dominance of the state sector is still considered
to be crucial. The constitution stipulates that SOEs
should have a leading role in the economy

There are about 6,000 SOEs. The SOE share of
industrial production has fallen from 78 per cent in
1990 to 55 per cent in 1997.

The SOE sector is highly concentrated. The 200
largest enterprises account for about 60 per cent of
both state capital and bank credit to SOEs, and 40
per cent of total SOE debt.

Officially there is a negative list of areas reserved for
the state under equitisation. However, equitisation
has proceeded so slowly that this list is far from
binding. SOEs in the sector and the local People’s
Committee can veto the entry of any new business.

2. SOE reform strategy
Progress so far
Statements by key political leaders since 1997 have
clarified the macroeconomic and industry level
reform strategy, particularly for the large enterprises,
and have opened the door for further ownership
restructuring of SOEs.

The authorities’ policy goal has remained that an
efficient state sector should continue to lead growth,
and there has been reluctance to reduce the role of
the state in the economy.

Focus of SOE reform
The central government’s SOE reform agenda has
focused on improving management and governance
in large SOEs, under the guiding principle of “seize
the big and release the small”. Small SOEs, which
are the responsibility of local government, have been
explicitly encouraged to leave the state sector.

There has been very little progress in the 1990s. The
authorities envision implementing further SOE
reform, including diversification of SOE ownership,
but they have focused on small and medium-size
enterprises, with the large SOEs mostly untouched.
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China

Vietnam

Macroeconomic adjustment
In an effort to reduce the macroeconomic burden,
China has undertaken economic reforms for SOEs,
including the hardening of budget constraints, exit of
uncompetitive resources, removing social burdens,
and reducing indebtedness.

The current cautious approach to SOE reforms does
not support macroeconomic stability. Comprehensive
reform plans, as well as concrete reform actions,
need to be taken urgently.

Budget constraints for SOEs have been
progressively hardened. However, directed lending
to loss-making SOEs has continued.

The budget subsidies were cut substantially in the
early 1990s, but SOEs have received considerable
bank financing.

SOEs have laid-off redundant workers and idled
production capacity in response to market pressures.
A cumulative total of at least 17 million workers had
been laid off by end-1998.

Enterprise employment rolls were cut substantially in
the early 1990s, but there has been little restructuring
since then.

The government implemented policies to reduce the
indebtedness of SOEs, including establishing funds
for debt write-down. However, the scope for such
write-downs remains constrained by a lack of
financing.

Some limited plans have been developed to address
the heavy debt burden of SOEs, but implementation
has been tied up with bank reform.

In order to divest SOEs of their traditional social
welfare burdens, non-productive social services
units, such as housing, are being transferred to the
government, and pension and unemployment
liabilities are being lightened.

Industrial SOEs provided few social functions
beyond employment and retirement incomes.
Retirement incomes have been take over by the
government, but employment concerns continue to
constrain reforms.

Enterprise management and organisation
About 2,600 SOEs, mostly large, had adopted
modern
corporate
forms
of
governance
(corporatisation) by end-1997, being subject to the
Company Law. Among corporatised SOEs, about
half have adopted multiple-investor status. Other
investors were mainly other state entities, including
management and workers.
For enterprise autonomy, central government
restructuring has eliminated the industrial branch
ministries, further removing government from day to
day management of SOEs. However, government
control over enterprise management has not been
fully removed
Ownership reform
For large SOEs, activity was concentrated in stock
issuance, both domestically and abroad, and the
creation of joint ventures with foreign investors.
About 950 enterprises had been listed on the stock
exchanges. However, the ownership reform process
for large SOEs has been slow.

Equitisation has proceeded very slowly, although
there has been a modest pick-up recently.

The Vietnamese SOEs have largely achieved
autonomy in basic production and marketing
decisions. However, financial autonomy and market
discipline remain weak.

Little has been done for large SOEs beyond the
formation of General Corporations. Currently, only
19 companies, which are all former SOEs
transformed into joint-stock companies, and 18
bonds are listed, with a total market capitalisation of
about 105 million US dollars. Also, sale of enterprise
shares to foreign investors is limited.
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China

Vietnam

Also, 120 key production SOEs have been given the
right to form large holding structures, aimed at
achieving economies of scale and playing an
instrumental role in the restructuring of other
enterprises.

General Corporations have been established for
large, strategic SOEs to exploit economies of scale.
However, they have restricted competition rather
than improved their efficiency.

Small SOEs continue to be quickly moved out of the
state sector. By 1998, the fast reforming coastal and
southern provinces had already shed most of their
small-and medium-sized enterprises.

About 150 medium-sized SOEs have been equitised
since 1992, 130 of them since end 1997, and a total
of 1,800 are planned by end 2005.

The many small SOEs have been sold to
management and workers as shareholding
collectives, or are being auctioned or offered for
public sale.

Enterprises with capital of VND 1 billion ($72,000)
will be sold as a unit by tender, or to employees if
bidding is unsuccessful.

Social aspects
Excess labour in SOEs was estimated to be over onethird of the SOE labour force, about half of which
have already been laid off. For retrenched workers
the government focused on training and
reemployment, while providing a basic living
allowance.

Excess labour in SOEs is estimated to be at least 25
per cent. Severance payment covers half a month of
basic salary per year of service. While there are
programs for retrenched workers, including income
support, training, and subsidised credit, few have
taken them voluntarily.

3. Complementary reforms
Private sector development (level playing field)
While China still advocates a strong role of the state,
it continues broad support for market-determined
price and production decisions, and is taking steps to
improve the business environment for private
enterprises. SOEs have lost their former stronghold
position in many industrial and service sectors, and
competitive pressure from non-state sources is
pervasive.
Competition for joint ventures and imports
Joint-ventures in China have been effective in
creating domestic competition. One key reason is
flexibility in choosing a local partner. Many jointventures are export-oriented, and some have
achieved a relatively high quality level.

Even though China has high import protection, the
borders are porous, and there are many avenues for
exemptions. Tariff receipts are 3 per cent of imports.
Source: IMF Report, 1999.

There has been little progress in levelling the playing
field with regard to the private sector. Throughout
the 1990s SOEs continued to enjoy various
privileges, which have allowed many inefficient state
enterprises to survive.

In Vietnam, joint-ventures must accept the
designated local partner, which is often the same
SOE for all entrants to that sector. Most jointventures have been set up for import substitution
behind protection. Their scale is typically too small
to compete on global markets.
Although there is a great deal of smuggling in
Vietnam, it is less dramatic than China. Moreover,
the effective tariff in Vietnam is 15 per cent.
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APPENDIX 4.1
Structural Macroeconometric Model of Vietnam
GDP by sector of production
(at constant prices)
•
Agriculture
•
Industry
•
Construction
•
Transport
•
Trade
•
Banking/Insurance
•
State, Education, Health
•
Other services

•
Exogenous variables
Money supply (M2)
Public investment
Nominal exchange rate
(VND/US$)
Real effective exchange rate
Export of agricultural products
Foreign direct investment
Price of Oil
Oil production
Commodity price index of
agricultural products
GDP of the major trading partners
Import prices

Deflator

GDP by final expenditures
(at current prices)
•
Consumption
Public
Private
Investment
Public
Private
Exports
Agricultural products
Oil
Other
Imports

Prices (1994=100)
GDP deflator
Consumer prices

Export prices
Real balance

•
Public Budget
(at current prices)
Expenditures
Transfer payments
Interest payments
Public consumption
Property transfers
Public investment
Revenue
Profit tax
Income tax
Oil tax
Trade taxes
Other indirect taxes
Social insurance contribution
Other revenue

•

Disposable income
(at current prices)
Gross wages
Income tax
Transfers
Social insurance
Profits
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The list of equations in the macroeconometric model of Vietnam
1.

AGRIFOR = PCN/PRICE + EXAGRIN/PRICE

2.

INDR = KFIDONGR + GDPN/PGDP + INDR(-1)

3.

CONSTR = GDPR + GCFEXPN/PGDP

4.

TRANSCOR/CRISIS_RES = PCN/PRICE

5.

TRADER/CRISIS_RES = PCN/PRICE + EXN/PEX

6.

LOG(BANKINGR/CRISIS_RES) = LOG(FIDONGR) + LOG(NDC/PRICE) + LOG(GDPR)

7.

LOG(STEDHER) = LOG(STCEXPN/PRICE) + LOG(GDPN/PGDP)

8.

OTHERR/CRISIS_RES = D(GDPR) + OTHERR(-1)

9.

SERVR = TRANSCOR + TRADER + BANKINSR + STEDHER

10. FDPR = AGRIFOR + INDR + CONSTR + SERVR + OTHERR
11. PCN = (DISPINCN – PROFITN) + D(PRICE)
12. FCNPRIV = FIDONG + (GDPR(-1)*PFDP(-1)/100)
13. CHINVN = CHINVN(-1) + GDPN
14. GCFN = FCNPRIV + GCFEXPN + CHINVN
15. LOG(IMN/IMN_RES) = LOG(PCN + GCFN + EXN)
16. EXOILN = OILVOL*POIL$*EROFF/1000
17. LOG(EXOTHN)/PEX/EXOTHN_RES) = LOG(PARTNERGDP_NEW*REER) + (@TREND)
18. EXN = EXOTHN + EXOILN
19. LOG(STCEXPN) = LOG(REVTOTAL) + LOG(STCEXPN(-1))
20. GDPN = PCN + STCEXPN + GCFN + EXN – IMN
21. M2 = NFA + NDC
22. RB = M2/PRICE
23. LOG(PRICE) = LOG(PIM) + LOG(PGDP)
24. LOG(PGDP) = LOG((M2(-1)/PRICE(-1)*(GDPN/GDPR)) + LOG(GDPN(-1)/GDPR(-1))
25. LOG(PEX) = LOG(PIM(-1)) + LOG(PGDP) + DLOG(EROFF*POIL$*AGRIPRICES)
26. LOG(GRWAGNPP/GRWAGNPP_RES) = LOG(PRICE(-1) + LOG(GDPR(-1)/LABOR(-1))
27. LABOR = LABOR(-1) + TREND
28. LOG(SOCSECN) = LOG(GRWAGNPP*LABOR)
29. TRANSFN = PRICE(-1) + TRANSFN(-1)
30. DISPINCN = (GRWAGNPP*LABOR) – INCTAXN – SOCSECN + TRANSFN + PROFITN
31. TAXDIRN = INCTAXN + TAXPROFITN
32. LOG(INCTAXN) = LOG(GRWAGNPP*LABOR) + D96_98
33. TAXPROFITN = GDPN + D98
34. TAXINDN = TAXOILN + TAXTRADEN + TAXINDOTHN
35. TAXOILN/TAXEOILN_RES = EXOILN
36. LOG(TAXTRADEN = LOG(IMN) + D97_98
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37. TAXINDOTHN = (PCN + STCEXPN) + D98
38. TAXN = TAXDIRN + TAXINDN
39. DEPRN = TREND
40. REVTOTAL = TAXN + SOCSECN + DEPRN + OTHREVN
41. EXPTOTAL = STCEXPN + GCFEXPN + TRANSFN_ALL + INTEXPN + GREXPN
42. DEFICITN = REVTOTAL – EXPTOTAL

The list of variables in the model
Variables
GDPN
GDPR
INDR
CONSTR
AGRIFOR
SERVR
TRANSCOR
TRADER
BANKINSR
STEDHER
OTHERR
PCN
STCN
GCFN
GCFEXPN
FCNPRIV
FCN
CHINVN
EXN
EXOILN
EXAGRIN
IMN
PIM
PEX
POIL$
OILVOL
EROFF
ERREAL$
REER
AGRIPRICE$
FIDONG
FIDONGR
KIFIDONGR
PARTNERGDP_NEW
NDA
NFA
M2
PRICE
PGDP
RB
DISPINCN

Name
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product
Industry
Construction
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
Services
Transport and Communication
Trade
Banking and Insurance
State, Education and Health
Other items
Private Consumption
State Consumption
Gross Capital Formation
Public Investment
Private Investment
Fixed capital
Change in Inventories
Export
Oil export
Export of agricultural products
Import
Price Index Imports
Price Index Exports
Price of Oil
Volume of Oil exports
Exchange rate VND/Dollar (official)
Exchange rate (real) to US dollar
Real effective exchange rate
Price of Agricultural raw materials
Foreign Investment in Dong
Foreign Investment in Dong
Cumulated Foreign Investment in Dong
Foreign Demand
Net Domestic Assets
Net Foreign Assets
Broad Money
Price level
GDP – Deflator
Real Money Balance
Disposable Income

Specification
Nominal
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Index
Index
Price
Index
Nominal
Index
Index
Nominal
Real
Real
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Index, 1994=100
GDP/GDPR
M2/PRICE
Nominal
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GRWAGINC
GRWAGNPP
Variables
LABOR
PROFITN
STCEXPN
INTEXPN
GRANTSN
GREXPN
GCFEXPN
SOCSECN
OTHREVN
GREVN
DEPRN
INCTAXN
TRANSFERN
TAXN
TAXDIRN
TAXPROFITN
TAXINDN
TAXTRADEN
TAXINDOTHN
TAXOILN
REVTOTAL
EXPTOTAL
PGDP

Gross Wage Income
Gross Wage Income per capita
Name
Labour Force
Profits
State Consumption
Interests (Expenditure Side)
Current Transfer
Property Transfer (Expenditure Side)
Gross Capital Formation (State)
Social Security Contribution
Other revenues
Property Transfer (Revenue Side)
Depreciation
Income Tax
Transfer from Budget
Taxes
Direct Taxes
Taxes on Profits
Indirect Taxes
Taxes on Trade
Other Indirect Taxes
Taxes on Oil Export
Total Budget Revenues
Total Budget Expenditure
Gross Domestic Product Deflator

Nominal
Nominal
Specification
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
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APPENDIX 4.2
The Fukase and Martin (1999) model

Experimental Design

Scenario 1 (AFTA1): Inclusion List (IL) and Temporary Exclusion List (TEL)
liberalisation under AFTA (2003 for ASEAN-5 and 2006 for Vietnam). Vietnam liberalises
the items in the IL and TEL. ASEAN-5 members reciprocate the concessions.

Scenario 2 (AFTA2): Scenario 1 plus Sensitive List (SL) liberalisation (2010 for ASEAN5 and 2013 for Vietnam). Vietnam liberalises the items in the IL, TEL, SL and ASEAN-5
members reciprocate the concessions.

Scenario 3 (AFTA3): Scenario 2 plus General Exception List (GEL) liberalisation.
Vietnam liberalises, as a counterfactual, the items in the IL, TEL, SL and GEL. The
ASEAN-5 members reciprocate the concessions.

Scenario 4 (UNILATERAL): Scenario 3 plus unilateral tariff reduction on a nondiscriminatory basis. What happens if Vietnam extends its AFTA concessions to the rest of
the world is investigated. It is assumed that the other APEC members maintain the current
protections.

Scenario 5 (APEC): All the APEC members, including Vietnam, reduce their tariff rates
unilaterally to 2.5 per cent on a non-discriminatory basis.
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Results of Experiment
Table A4.2.1: Effects on Output
(in percent)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
AFTA 1
AFTA 2
Agriculture and forestry
-0.1
0.2
Processed agriculture
-1.2
7.8
Beverage and tobacco
-0.1
-1.0
Coal, oil, gas
-0.1
-0.3
Petroleum products
5.0
5.0
Textiles
2.6
0.2
Apparel
10.1
6.9
Light manufacturing
4.2
1.9
Basic manufacturing
-3.6
-4.6
Chemical, rubber, plastics
-0.4
-1.0
Transport equipment
-0.8
-2.6
Electronics and machinery
-3.6
-4.7
Source: Fukase and Martin (1998) – Table 5

Scenario 3
AFTA 3
0.3
8.7
-47.0
1.4
5.8
1.7
7.9
3.3
-3.7
-1.0
-31.5
-2.8

Scenario 4
UNILATERAL
-1.9
2.5
-55.0
0.5
7.1
10.3
75.4
15.6
-12.8
-2.6
-48.1
-7.5

Scenario 5
APEC
-4.0
-22.7
-53.8
1.2
13.8
16.4
83.9
28.0
-10.9
0.1
-54.2
-5.2

Scenario 3
AFTA 3
9.9
8.0
7.7
7.2

Scenario 4
UNILATERAL
2.9
16.1
15.4
14.3

Scenario 5
APEC
-8.3
17.2
17.7
16.0

Scenario 3
AFTA 3
0.0
-0.4
0.05
-0.4

Scenario 4
UNILATERAL
-0.01
-0.7
0.02
-0.7

Scenario 5
APEC
0.01
-2.6
-1.1
-1.5

Table A4.2.2: Real Returns to Factors of Production

(in percent)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
AFTA 1
AFTA 2
Land
1.9
4.0
Unskilled labour
2.3
2.7
Skilled labour
2.0
2.4
Capital
2.0
2.4
Source: Fukase and Martin (1998) – Table 6
Table A4.2.3: The Effects of Terms of Trade

(in percent)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
AFTA 1
AFTA 2
World price effect
0.0
0.0
Export price effect
-0.2
0.4
Import price effect
0.02
0.02
Total TOT effects
-0.2
0.4
Source: Fukase and Martin (1998) – Table 7
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Table A4.2.4: Key Economy-wide Variables for Vietnam

Total import value (%)
From ASEAN
From ROW
Total export value (%)
To ASEAN
To ROW
Tariff revenue (%)
Real expenditure (%)

Scenario 1
AFTA 1
3.1
32.8
-12.3

Scenario 2
AFTA 2
3.4
33.4
-12.1

Scenario 3
AFTA 3
6.3
63.3
-23.1

Scenario 4
UNILATERAL
12.8
22.8
7.5

Scenario 5
APEC
11.7
27.0
3.9

3.9
13.8
2.3

4.7
33.6
0.1

7.2
36.9
2.5

15.2
33.8
12.2

12.7
-2.6
15.2

-18.0

-17.8

-56.0

-82.4

-84.7

0.02

0.4

-0.04

1.4

1.3

51.3

-5.6

191.6

180.3

21.7
29.6

26.6
-32.3

251.0
-59.4

293.3
-113.0

Total Equivalent Variation
2.1
(US$mil.) of which:
Allocative component
19.2
Terms of trade component
-17.1
Source: Fukase and Martin (1998) – Table 8
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APPENDIX 4.3
The Ianchovichina et al. (2000) model

Results of Experiment
Table A4.3.1: Changes in Vietnam’s Exports and Imports
(in percent)
Export changes
To the US
To the world
%
US$mil.
%
US$mil.
Agriculture and forestry
-3
-4
-4
-42
Processed agriculture
16
8
-4
-38
Beverage and tobacco
120
1
14
0.5
Coal, oil, gas
4
3
-1
-9
Textiles
230
0.4
-4
-6
Clothing
1455
345
33
271
Light manufacturing
140
20
-6
-51
Basic manufacturing
314
3
-3
-3
Chemical, rubber, plastics
62
11
13
9
Electronics and machinery
276
1
-5
-4
Total
88
378
0
14
Source: Fukase and Martin (1999) – Table 7-8.

Table A4.3.2: Changes in Output
(in percent)
Vietnam
Agriculture and forestry
-1.0
Processed agriculture
-3.1
Beverage and tobacco
-2.3
Coal, oil, gas
-0.7
Textiles
4.5
Clothing
27.3
Light manufacturing
-5.0
Basic manufacturing
-1.9
Chemical, rubber, plastics
-1.0
Electronics and machinery
-1.6
Source: Fukase and Martin (1999) – Table 9.

USA
0
0
0
0
-0.03
-0.14
0.01
0
0
0

Import changes
From the world
%
US$mil.
5.0
5
3.0
13
2.9
10
-0.2
-1
11.2
86
15.9
6
4.6
11
1.0
9
0.5
7
3.0
61
2.8
230
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Table A4.3.3: Key Economy-wide Variables for Vietnam

Export value (%)
Export price
Export volume
Price index (%)
Real income per capita (%)

Elasticity standard
Vietnam
USA
-0.4
0.005
1.4
-0.002
-1.8
0.006
2.1
-0.002
0.3
0.0

Total Equivalent Variation
138
-3
(US$mil.) of which:
Allocative component
23
19
Terms of trade component
115
-22
Tariff revenues (US$mil.)
-5
-16
Source: Fukase and Martin (1999) – Table 10.

Elasticity minus 50%
Vietnam
USA
1.2
0.013
1.3
-0.005
-0.09
0.015
2.0
-0.003
0.5
0.0

Elasticity plus 50%
Vietnam
USA
5.4
0.04
2.5
-0.005
2.8
0.04
3.9
-0.008
1.4
0.003

164

48

374

157

55
109
27

75
-27
3

162
212
132

225
-68
60

Table A4.3.4: Changes in Vietnam’s Exports to the US – Sectoral Sensitivity Analysis
(in percent)
Elasticity standard
Agriculture and forestry
-3
Processed agriculture
16
Beverage and tobacco
120
Coal, oil, gas
4
Textiles
230
Clothing
1455
Light manufacturing
140
Basic manufacturing
314
Chemical, rubber, plastics
62
Electronics and machinery
276
Source: Fukase and Martin (1999) – Table 11.

Elasticity minus 50%

Elasticity plus 50%

-3
8
48
1
82
296
55
103
27
94

-8
16
292
5
458
5074
227
657
96
553
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APPENDIX 5.1
The Mundell-Fleming Model

1. Goods Market
Y + RQ = C + I + G + X

goods market equilibrium

(A5.1.1)

C = C (Y )

0 < CY < 1

consumption

(A5.1.2)

I = I (i )

I <0
i
QY > 0 ; Q R < 0
X Y* > 0 ; X R > 0

investment

(A5.1.3)

imports

(A5.1.4)

exports

(A5.1.5)

money demand

(A5.1.6)

money market equilibrium

(A5.1.7)

BP = CA + CP = 0
CA = PX − EP * Q

balance of payments
current account

(A5.1.8)
(A5.1.9)

CP = K [i − i * − E (e&)]K = − K = − K
>0
i
i*
E (e&)

capital account

(A5.1.10)

Q = Q (Y , R )
X = X (Y *, R )

2. Money Market
Md
= L (Y , i )
P
s
d
M =M =M

L > 0; L < 0
Y
i

3. Foreign exchange market

Note: The signs or magnitudes of the (partial) derivatives with respect to the
subscript are given next to the behavioural equations. Variables are defined as
follows:
domestic national income
money demand
Y
Md
Q

C
I
G
X
R
E
P
P*

imports
consumption
investment
government spending
exports
real exchange rate ( ≡ EP * / P )
exchange rate
domestic price level
foreign price level

M

s

M
i
BP
CA
CP
i*
E (e&)
Y*

money supply
money
nominal interest rate
balance of payments
current account
capital account
foreign interest rate
expected depreciation
foreign national income
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Mathematical Solution of the MF Model under a Flexible Exchange Rate
The goods market equilibrium, or IS curve, for the domestic economy is rearranged from
equation (A5.1.1) and given by:
Y = D = A(i, Y ) + T (e, Y ) + G

(A5.1.11)

where A stands for domestic absorption or spending ( A = C + I ), T denotes the surplus
on

current

( T = X − Q ),

account

G

is

autonomous

government

spending.

∂A / ∂Y = 0 < Ay < 1 ; ∂A / ∂i = Ai < 0 ; ∂T / ∂e = Te > 0 ; ∂T / ∂Y = Ty < 0 .
di / dY = (1 − Ay − Ty ) / Ai < 0

The slope of the IS curve:

(A5.1.12)

The LM schedule equilibrium in the monetary market is given by equation (A5.1.6).
Setting ∂L / ∂Y = Ly > 0 ; ∂L / ∂i = Li < 0 .
The slope of the LM curve:

di / dY = − Ly / Li > 0

(A5.1.13)

The BP schedule, which is the equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, is given by the
current and capital accounts of the balance of payments:
B = T (e, Y ) + K (i ) = 0

(A5.1.14)

where Ty < 0 ; Te > 0 ; and Ki = ∞ means the assumption of perfect capital mobility.
di / dY = −Ty / Ki = 0

The slope of the BP curve:

(A5.1.15)

The results of totally differentiating equation (A5.1.11), (A5.1.6) and (A5.1.14),
respectively are obtained as follows:

(1 − Ay − Ty ) dy − Aidi − Tede = dG
Lydy + Lidi = dM
Tede + Tydy + Kidi = 0

These three equations can be rearranged in matrix form:

Ly

(1 − Ay − Ty )


Ty

Li
− Ai
Ki

0  dY  1 0 
dM 
− Te di  = 0 1  
dG 






Te  de  0 0

The determinant is given by:
∆ = Te[Ly ( Ki − Ai ) − Li (1 − Ay )] > 0

(A5.1.16)
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A Monetary Expansion Policy (a rise in M)
The money multipliers are derived from the above equations as follows:
dY Te( Ki − Ai )
dY
1
(A5.1.17);
if Ki → ∞ hence
(A5.1.18)
>0
=
=
∆
dM
dM Ly
− Te(1 − Ay )
di
di
(A5.1.19);
if Ki → ∞ hence
= 0 (A5.1.20)
=
<0
∆
dM
dM
Ki (1 − Ay − Ty ) + AiTy
de
(A5.1.21)
>0
=
∆
dM
if Ki → ∞ , in equilibrium i = i * and if i * is fixed, then di = di* = 0 and Ai = 0 ; Li = 0 .
The determinant given by (A5.1.16) reduces to: ∆ = TeLyKi
de (1 − Ay − Ty )
Then
(A5.1.22)
=
>0
dM
TeLy

An Expansionary Fiscal Policy (a rise in G)
dY
− Li
=
>0
dG Ly ( Ki − Ai ) − Li (1 − Ay )
if Ki → ∞ hence

(A5.1.23)
dY
=0
dG

di
Ly
=
>0
dG Ly ( Ki − Ai ) − Li (1 − Ay )
if Ki → ∞ hence
de LiTy − LyKi
=
>< 0
dG
∆

(A5.1.24)
(A5.1.25)

di
=0
dG

(A5.1.26)
(A5.1.27)

if Ki → ∞ hence

de − 1
<0
=
dG Te

(A5.1.28)

Mathematical Solution of the MF Model under a Fixed Exchange Rate
In the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, money supply is an endogenous
variable which consists of two components:
M =C+F

(A5.1.29)

where C is the domestic component of the money supply, F is foreign exchange reserves
which change with the balance of payments and hence dF = dB . Now the model equations
can be represented as follows:
(1 − Ay − Ty )dy − Aidi = Tede + dG

(A5.1.30)
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Lydy + Lidi − dF = dC

(A5.1.31)

Tydy + Kidi − dB = Tede

(A5.1.32)

where the fixed exchange rate means de = 0 . These three equations can be rearranged in
matrix form:

Ly

(1 − Ay − Ty )


Ty

Li

−1

− Ai
Ki

0
−1

 dY  1
 di  = 0
  
 dB  0

0
dC 
1  
dG 
0 

The determinant is given by:
∆ = Ai ( Ly − Ty ) − (1 − Ay − Ty )( Ki − Li ) < 0

(A5.1.33)

A Monetary Expansion Policy (a rise in M)
dY Ai
dY
(A5.1.34);
if Ki → ∞ hence
=
>0
=0
dC ∆
dC
di 1 − Ay − Ty
di
if Ki → ∞ hence
=0
< 0 (A5.1.36);
=
dC
∆
dC
dB dF Ki (1 − Ay − Ty ) + AiTy
=
=
<0
dC dC
∆
dB
if Ki → ∞ ,
then
= −1
dC

(A5.1.35)
(A5.1.37)
(A5.1.38)
(A5.1.39)

An Expansionary Fiscal Policy (a rise in G)
dY − Ki + Li
=
>0
dG
∆

(A5.1.40)
if Ki → ∞ hence

dY
1
=
>0
dG 1 − Ay − Ty

di − Ly + Ty
>0
=
∆
dG

(A5.1.41)
(A5.1.42)

if Ki → ∞ hence
dB LiTy − LyKi
=
>0
dG
∆

if Ki → ∞ hence

di
=0
dG

(A5.1.43)
(A5.1.44)

dB
Ly
=
>0
dG 1 − Ay − Ty

(A5.1.45)
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APPENDIX 5.2
The Dornbusch Model
1. Goods Market
p& = p ( y d − y )
y d = d (e − p ) + gy − σi + g
2. Money Market
m d = p + φy − λi
ms = md = m

Philips curve
aggregate demand

(A5.2.1)
(A5.2.2)

money demand
money market equilibrium

(A5.2.3)
(A5.2.4)

asset market equilibrium
expectations formation

(A5.2.5)
(A5.2.6)

3. International asset market
i = i * + E (e&)
E (e&) = θ (e − e)

Note: Lower-case variables are in natural logarithms, an exception being the interest rate. A
dot indicates the change of the respective variable over time. Greek letters denote positive
parameters. E (.) is the expectations operator. Variables are defined as follows:
domestic inflation rate
domestic interest rate
i
p&
aggregate demand for
foreign interest rate
yd
i*
domestic goods
(exogenous)
aggregate supply of domestic
domestic money
m
y
goods (exogenous)
rate of depreciation
e&
exchange rate
equilibrium exchange rate
e
e
s
domestic price level
domestic money supply
m
p
d
government expenditure
domestic money demand
m
g
Substituting (A5.2.5) into (A5.2.6) and then (A5.2.6) into (A5.2.3), rearranging we
obtain:
p = m − φy + λi * −λθ (e − e)

(A5.2.7)

In long run steady state the actual and equilibrium exchange rate will be equal
( e = e ), hence the long run price level will be written in the form:
p = m − φy + λi *

(A5.2.8)

Inserting (A5.2.8) into (A5.2.7) solving for e we obtain the asset market
equilibrium expressed in terms of deviation from long run equilibrium:
e − e = (−1 / λθ )( p − p )

(A5.2.9)
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with a negative slope: ∂e / ∂p = −1 / λθ .
Goods market equilibrium is found by substituting (A5.2.2) into (A5.2.1) and then
we obtain:

p& = p [δ (e − p ) + (g − 1) y − σi + g ]

(A5.2.10)

Substituting for i from (A5.2.3) into (A5.2.10), setting p& = 0 and rearrange we
obtain the goods market equilibrium:
p=

λ
λδ
σ
λ (1 − g ) + σφ
y+
g
e+
m−
λδ + σ
λδ + σ
λδ + σ
λδ + σ

(A5.2.11)

where 0 < ∂p / ∂e < 1 .
In the long run, when i = i * , p& = 0 , E (e&) = 0 and substitution of (A5.2.2) into
(A5.2.1) we obtain the p& = 0 schedule with unity slope, implying a constant real exchange
rate (the PPP line):
p =e−

(1 − γ ) y

δ

+

γ

−

δ

σi *
δ

(A5.2.12)

By equating (A5.2.11) and (A5.2.12) we obtain the exchange rate at which both the
p& = 0 schedule and the goods market intersect:
e = m − φy +

1−g

δ

y−

g

δ

+ (λ +

σ
)i *
δ

(A5.2.13)

From (A5.2.12) and (A5.2.9), the long run neutrality of money, that is
de / dp = dp / dm = de / dm = 1 , the long run PPP and the quantity theory of money hold.

However, in the short run the market equation (A5.2.9) holds continuously, and
substituting for e from (A5.2.13) and p from (A5.2.8) yields:
e=(

1

λθ

+ 1) y −

1

λθ

p + (λ +

γ −1 φ
σ 1
γ
+
+ )i * −(φ +
)y −
λθ
δ
δ θ
δ

(A5.2.14)

If p and y remain constant in the short run hence:
de / dm = de / dm +

1

λθ

= 1+

1

λθ

>1

(A5.2.15)

In the short run the exchange rate overshoots its long run equilibrium.
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Dornbusch Model with Perfect Foresight Expectations
Perfect foresight expectations imply that the expected change in the exchange rate
next period based on information available in this period is exactly the change which
occurs. That is:
E (e&) = e&

perfect foresight

(A5.2.16)

asset market equilibrium

(A5.2.17)

so that the UIP condition is:
i = i * +e&

From the money market equation (A5.2.14) solving for i :
i=

p−m

λ

+

φ
y
λ

(A5.2.18)

Further solving for i * in the long run price level p in (A5.2.8):
i* =

p−m

λ

+

φ
y
λ

(A5.2.19)

Subtracting (A5.2.16) from (A5.2.15) obtains the change in the exchange rate as a
derivation from its equilibrium value:
i − i* = e&=

p− p

(A5.2.20)

λ

Next substituting (A5.2.3), (A5.2.8) and (A5.2.13) into (A5.2.10) we obtain the
change in the exchange rate as deviations from their equilibrium value:
p& = pδ (e − e ) − p (δ +

σ
)( p − p )
λ

(A5.2.21)

Equation (A5.2.20) and (A5.2.21) form a simultaneous first-order dynamic system
that yields adjustment path for p and e , and can be represented by homogeneous matrix
equation:
 p& − p (δ + σ / λ )
e& = 
1/ λ
  

pδ   p − p 

 p − p
A
=
e − e 
0  e − e 



(A5.2.22)

The eigenvalues of A are obtained from A − θI = 0 where I is the identity matrix, thus
the characteristic equation of (A5.2.22) is given as:
− π (δ + σ / λ ) − σ
1/ λ

πδ
−σ

= 0 ⇒ σ 2 + π (δ + σ / λ ) σ − πδ / λ = 0

which has the following two solutions:
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[

σ1 , σ 2 = − 1 π (δ + σ / λ ) ± 1 π 2 (δ + σ / λ ) 2 + 4πδ / λ
2
2

]

1

2

(A5.2.23)

Thus the two eigenvalues have opposite signs. The unique saddle-point path is
given by the negative root ( s1 ), say. Hence the solution to equation (A5.2.22) is:
p& = s1 ( p − p )

(A5.2.24)

e&= s1 (e − e )

(A5.2.25)

Equation (A5.2.24) may be used to show under what circumstances the simple
regressive expectation scheme used in the simple DB may be rational. The expected change
in the exchange rate in the simple DB was given by equation (A5.2.6): E (e&) = θ (e − e ) .
With perfect foresight E (e&) = e& and therefore it is clear from (A5.2.25) that θ must equal

− s1 for there to be no expectational errors. Hence with perfect foresight the parameter θ
depends on all the model’s structural parameters, as in (A5.2.23).
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APPENDIX 5.3
The Portfolio Balance Model
Static Exchange Rate Expectations
Equations of the model are as follows:
W = M + B + eF *

wealth constraint

(A5.3.1)

M = m(i, i * + E (e&))W

money market equilibrium
m1 < 0 ; m2 < 0
domestic bond market equilibrium
b1 > 0 ; b2 < 0
foreign bonds market equilibrium
f1 < 0 ; f 2 > 0
current account balance
T1 > 0 ; T2 , T3 < 0

(A5.3.2)

B = b(i, i * + E (e&))W
eF * = f (i, i * + E (e&))W

dF * / dt = CAB = T (e / p, W , IM ) + i * F *

(A5.3.3)
(A5.3.4)
(A5.3.5)

The asset market equilibrium conditions for each of these three assets are given as
equations (A5.3.2), (A5.3.3) and (A5.3.4). The principal characteristic of these demand
equations is that the scale variable is the level of wealth and that the demand functions are
all homogeneous in wealth, which allows them to be written in nominal terms. The asset
supplies are exogenous and fixed. Equation (A5.3.2) shows that money demand is inversely
related to the yields on both domestic and foreign securities. Equation (A5.3.3) and
(A5.3.4) indicate that domestic and foreign bond demands depend positively on the own
rate of interest and negatively on the rate of interest on the other asset. The assets are
assumed to be gross substitutes, so that b1 > f1 and f 2 > b2 . The case where the assets
are perfect substitutes is given by, f1 = b2 → ∞ , in which case equation (A5.3.3) collapses
to the uncovered interest rate parity condition and the financial sector of the model given
by (A5.3.2) collapses to the money market equilibrium condition as in the MF model.
The short run exchange rate determination is diagrammatical presented in Figure
A5.3.1. The three asset market equilibrium equations can be depicted in ( e, i ) space, for
given levels of i * + E (e&) and asset stocks, where the MM locus gives money market
equilibrium. It has a positive slope, given by: [de / di ]MM = −(Wm1 / mF *) > 0 .
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A depreciation (rise) of the exchange rate

Figure A5.3.1: The Short-run
Determination of the Exchange Rate

raises the domestic currency value of foreign
bonds, thereby increasing wealth, which results

e

in the increase in the demand for domestic

MM

money. With the supply of domestic money
fixed, the rise in the exchange rate will require
a rise in the home rate of interest to maintain
FF
BB

i

0

money market equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the domestic bond market
is represented by the BB schedule, which is

negatively sloped given by: [de / di ]BB = −(Wb1 / bF *) < 0 .
In this case, a depreciation of the exchange rate increases domestic wealth through a
revaluation of domestic residents’ holdings of foreign assets, which also causes an excess
demand for bonds. However, given the existing number of domestic bonds, the increased
demand for bonds is eliminated by a rise in the price of bonds and a fall in the rate of
interest.
The FF line, representing the equilibrium in the market for foreign bonds, has a
negative slope, given by: [de / di ]FF = Wf1 /(1 − f ) F * < 0 .
As the domestic rate of interest rises, the domestic demand for foreign bonds falls as
domestic residents substitute domestic for foreign bonds in their portfolios. This must be
offset by a fall in the domestic currency price of foreign assets, consequently there is an
appreciation of the domestic currency. However, the FF line is flatter than the BB line on
the assumption that a change in the domestic rate of interest will have a larger effect upon
the domestic bond market than on the foreign bond market.
The intersection of the MM , BB and FF lines shown in Figure A5.3.1 gives the
short-run equilibrium levels of the exchange rate and the domestic interest rate. In fact,
because of the wealth constraint, only two of the three market equilibrium equations are
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independent. Thus if a given change restores equilibrium in two markets, the third market
must also be in equilibrium.
Dynamic Exchange Rate Expectations
Linearising equation (A5.3.5), with i * assumed constant, gives a slope for F&* = 0 of:

de / dF * = −(eT2 + i*) /(T1 + T2 F *) >< 0

(A5.3.6)

Linearising equations (A5.3.2) and (A5.3.4) gives solutions for i and e& with i * constant:

eF * / W   f1
 M / W  = m

  1

f 2  i 
m2  e&

(A5.3.7)

which implies that:

i 
−1  m 2
e& = [ f1 m2 − m1 f 2 ] − m
 
 1

− f 2  eF * / W 
f1   M / W 

(A5.3.8)

so that e& is given by:

e&= φ [(eF * / W ), ( M / W )]

where φ1 > 0 ; φ 2 < 0

(A5.3.9)

Linearising equations (A5.3.5) and (A5.3.9) gives the following second-order dynamic
system:

e&  φ1 ( F * / W )
 F * = (T + T F *)
   1
2

φ1 ( M / W )

+



(eT2 + i*)  F * T2 ( M + B) + T3 IM 

φ 2 (e / W )   e  

(A5.3.10)

Saddlepath equilibrium requires that the determinant of the 2x2 matrix be negative.
This is unambiguously the case if eT1 > i * F * ; that is, if the wealth effect on the trade
balance exceeds the foreign interest rate effect.
In the long run steady-state equilibrium the current account must be in balance
( F&* = 0 ). From Equation (A5.3.6) the F&* = 0 schedule may have either a positive or
negative slope. The denominator of the equation will be positive if the Marshall-Lerner
condition holds, although the numerator can be either positive or negative, depending upon
the relative size of eT2 and i * . If eT2 is large relative to i * , then the F&* = 0 line has a
positive slope. This implies that significant changes in wealth are spent on foreign goods,
which causes the trade balance to deteriorate and the exchange rate to depreciate. If, on the
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other hand, any increase in domestic residents’ wealth is only spent on domestic goods,
then T2 = 0 , and the F&* = 0 line has a negative slope. However, in the case of the F&* = 0
line having a negative slope, stability only occurs when the F&* = 0 curve is flatter than the
e&= 0 curve in the neighbourhood of the intersection. This is represented in the form of a

phase-diagram in Figure A5.3.2.
The slope of the e&= 0 schedule is a rectangular hyperbola since e and F * enter
(A5.3.8) multiplicatively (in both eF * and in W ), and change in e and F * which keep
eF * constant will also keep e& constant. From equation A4.4.9 a rise in e or F * will lead

to a depreciation of the exchange rate.

Figure 5.3.2: Equilibrium in the PBM with perfect foresight
e

e

F&= 0

Saddlepath Solution

Saddlepath Solution

e&= 0
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F&= 0

e&= 0
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APPENDIX 6.1
Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in the Model
No

Variables

1

Endogenous Variables
Aggregate demand for output ( y d )

2
3

Sources

GDP in billion Dong at current prices

Private consumption ( c p )

GSO

Total private investment ( i )

GSO

Private consumption expenditure in billion Dong at
current prices
Total investment capital of society in billion Dong at
current prices
Government consumption expenditure in billion Dong at
current prices
Government capital expenditure in billion Dong at
current prices
Calculated from government capital expenditure

Government consumption ( c g )

5

Government investment ( i g )

6

Public capital stock ( i
Total exports ( tx )
Total imports ( tm )

GSO, IMF, WB

= k&g )

g

GSO, IMF, WB

GSO, IMF, WB

SOE investment ( i e )

GSO
GSO
GSO

10

Private investment ( i p )

GSO

11

Foreign asset stock (

12

SOE capital stock ( i e = k&e )

13

Definition of Variables

GSO

4

7
8
9

Exogenous Variables

IMF, WB

f)
p

Private capital stock ( k )

GSO

Calculated from investment capital from state sector

GSO

Calculated from investment capital from non-state sector
Proxied by GDP at current prices due to the
unavailability of GDP at current factor cost.
Proxied by the ratio between total national income and
total employed labour force
Measured by price index
Private real wealth is not available. Hence to obtain this
data, it is proxied by the total of foreign asset, broad
money and private capital stock

14

Aggregate supply of output ( y )

GSO

15

Domestic nominal wage ( w )

GSO

16
17

Domestic price level ( p )

s

Private real wealth ( w p )

Value of exports in million US dollars
Value of imports in million US dollars
Investment capital from state sector in billion Dong at
current prices
Investment capital from non-state sector in billion Dong
at current prices
Net foreign assets in billion Dong at current price

IMF, WB
GSO
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18
19

Domestic nominal interest rate ( r )
Real profits ( R )

20

Tobin’s q ratio ( q )

21
22

Nominal money supply ( m )
Current account balance (

IMF

IMF, WB
GSO, IMF, WB

f&)

23

Nominal exchange rate ( e )

24

World real income (

25

World price level (

26
27
28

Inflation expectation ( π )

y*)

p*)

World nominal interest rate ( r * )

Trade protection (import and
export tariffs) ( T )

GSO, IMF, WB

IMF (IFS)

IMF (IFS)
IMF (IFS)
IMF, WB
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Measured by short term lending interest rate
The data is not available. Hence the parameter is derived
from existing studies
The data is not available. Hence the parameter is derived
from existing studies
Measured by broad money M2
Current account balance of payments in million $US
Defined as the nominal exchange rate of the Vietnamese
Dong against the US dollar. An increase in the exchange
rate means a nominal depreciation of the Vietnamese
Dong.
Proxied by real GDP in millions of US dollars for ten
major trading partners with Vietnam (Japan, Singapore,
China, Australia, Taiwan, Germany, USA, Indonesia,
Philippines, and UK)
Proxied by USA’s CPI
Proxied by USA’s deposit interest rate
Calculated from the domestic price level (lagged one
period)
The data is not available. Hence the parameter is derived
from existing studies
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APPENDIX 6.2
Iterative Cochrane-Orcutt Procedures

The steps for carrying out the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure are as follows:
Step 1 Estimate equation y t = α + βxt + u t by OLS computes its residuals û t .
Step 2 Estimate the first-order serial correlation coefficient (call it ρ̂ ) from equation

ρˆ = ∑ uˆ uˆ / ∑ uˆ .
2

t

t −1

t

Step 3 Transform the variables as follows: Yt * = Yt − ρˆYt −1 ,

X t* = X t − ρˆX t −1 , and

α = α (1 − ρˆ ) .
*

Step 4 Regress Yt * on X t* and get OLS estimates of the transformed equation:
Yt * = α * + βX t* + ε t .
Step 5 Use the estimates for the coefficients in Step 1 and obtain a new set of estimates of
u t . Then go back and repeat Step 2 with these new values until the following
stopping rule applies.
Step 6 This iterative procedure can be stopped when the estimates of ρ from two
successive iterations differ by no more than some preselected value, such as 0.001.
The final ρ̂ is then used to get the CORC estimates from the transformed equation.
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APPENDIX 6.3
The Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test

For the Dickey-Fuller test, a straightforward procedure is to test for ρ = 1 (the socalled unit root test) in the autoregressive equation y t = ρy t −1 + ε t , in which the dependent
variable is expressed as a deviation from its mean so that there is no constant term in the
model. The error terms ε t are assumed to be white noise and the first observation y t is
assumed to be fixed. This test is based on the estimation of an equivalent regression
equation, namely:
∆y t = δy t −1 + ε t

(A6.3.1)

The DF test consists of testing the negativity of δ in the ordinary least squares
regression of (A6.3.1). Rejection of the null hypothesis ( δ = 0 ) in favour of the alternative
( δ < 0 ) implies that ρ < 1 and that y t is integrated of order zero ( y t ~ I (0) ) 63. In the case
where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected the variable y t might be integrated of order
higher than zero. Consequently, the next step would be to test whether the order of
integration is one. If y t ~ I (1) , then ∆y t ~ I (0) . Hence the test can be repeated using ∆y t
instead of y t . The process is continued until an order of integration for y t is established.
The DF test can also be used for testing the order of integration for a variable
generated as a stochastic process with drift, that is by tests of the equation
∆y t = µ + δy t −1 + ε t

(A6.3.2)

where µ is a constant representing drift. The technique is analogous to that described
before, but the distribution of the t -statistic for δ is different and consequently different
tables of critical values should be used. In practice it is unclear when one should use this
test, and when one should use the DF test without a constant. Experience suggests that tests
with the constant term sometimes give unexpected results that are hard to interpret.
A modification of the DF equation which accounts for both drifts and a linear
deterministic trend is based on the estimation of a regression of the following equation:
•

63

For testing integration the Student- t statistics are in the DF table. However the DF table has been
considerably extended by MacKinnon (1991) through Monte Carlo simulations.
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∆y t = µ + αt + δy t −1 + ε t

(A6.3.3)

In this equation it is possible to test simultaneously for the absence of a stochastic
trend ( δ < 0 ) and the existence of a deterministic trend ( α ≠ 0 ).
A weakness of the original DF test is that it does not take account of possible
autocorrelation in the error process ε t . If ε t is autocorrelated (that is, it is not white noise)
then the ordinary least squares estimates of the equation and its variants are not efficient. A
simple solution is to use lagged left-hand side variables as additional explanatory variables
to approximate the autocorrelation. This test, called the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test, is widely regarded as being the most efficient test from among the simple tests for
integration and is at present the most widely used in practice. The ADF auxiliary equation
which accounts for both drift and a linear deterministic trend is:
k µαx

∆y t = µ + αt + δy t −1 + ∑ φ i ∆y t −i + ε t

(A6.3.4)

i =1

where k max is the maximum lag length chosen a priori for the lagged differenced
variable. The practical rule for establishing the value of k is that it should be relatively
small in order to save degrees of freedom, but large enough to allow for the existence of
autocorrelation in ε t . There are a number of ways to evaluate the appropriate lag length, k .
The standard model specification criteria, such as, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are often used to determine k .
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APPENDIX 7.1
Dynamic stability properties of the model
The model presented in Chapter 5 assumes that economic agents posses rational
expectations. Therefore, this model is characterised by a stable saddlepath property, in
which long-run equilibrium can only be achieved if the economy is on the relevant stable
saddlepath. It has variables which can be characterised as being either predetermined (nonjump) or non-predetermined (jump). The latter variables are required to make discrete
jumps, arising from shocks, in order to instantaneously put the economy on its new stable
saddlepath, which will ultimately take the economy to its long-run steady state.
Two exchange rate versions of the model used in the simulation in Chapter 7 have
been emphasised, each of which, to be stable, must exhibit dynamic properties which are
consistent with their underlying behavioural properties. Each version of the model has
dynamic equations covering a set of endogenous control variables. In the fixed exchange
rate version, only Tobin’s q ratio is capable of jumping on impact following an exogenous
shock, while in the flexible exchange rate version, it is assumed that there are two nonpredetermined variables, that is Tobin’s q and the real exchange rate, since the nominal
exchange rate is now perfectly flexible and capable of adjusting on impact.
Either version of the model can be generalised to the following linear approximation
of deviations about equilibrium values:
Dx = Ax'+ Bz

where ( x ) represents a vector of the endogenous control variables and ( Dx ) is its time
derivative, ( z ) is a vector of the exogenous variables and ( x' ) denotes the deviation of x
around its equilibrium value. ( A ) and ( B ) are parameter matrices.
The dynamic stability of the model depends on the properties of the ‘state’ matrix
( A ). A complete algebraic analysis of the model’s stability, based on the respective
characteristic equations of matrix ( A ), is complex and does not produce analytically
unambiguous results. However, for stability, the determinant of ( A ) should be of a
particular sign for each version of the model. In the fixed exchange rate model, only one
control variable is capable of making discrete jumps, and is associated with a positive and
unstable root, while the remainder are predetermined and associated with negative and
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stable roots. Hence, the determinant of ( A ), which gives the product of the roots for the
fixed exchange rate case, must be positive. If this is not satisfied, then the model will be
unstable, with the dynamics of adjustment being inconsistent with the underlying
assumption of the model.
In the flexible exchange rate model, two of the control variables are assumed capable
of making discrete jumps, Tobin’s q ratio and the real exchange rate, being associated with
positive and unstable roots. In this case the determinant must be negative. If this is again
not satisfied, then the model will be unstable in the sense described previously.
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